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A Metamathematical Model for A/O Opposition in Scientific Inquiry

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Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition

Part of the book series: Studies in Universal Logic ((SUL))

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Abstract

The paper looks at the logic of scientific inquiry through the lens of physical chemistry in order to offer an account of the function of counter-examples to generalizations in scientific inquiry. A metamathematical model of emerging truth (MET) offers an image of truthlikeness in terms of model progressiveness, which supports an analysis of warrant strength that is connected with adaptive logic. The MET is exemplified by the history of the Periodic Table and examples from the history of chemistry are included by way of illustration. The discussion supports a rethinking of the relation of counter-examples to generalizations in terms of relative warrant strength challenging the standard view that calls for the rejection of a generalization in light of available counter-evidence.

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Correspondence to Mark Weinstein .

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Weinstein, M. (2012). A Metamathematical Model for A/O Opposition in Scientific Inquiry. In: Béziau, JY., Jacquette, D. (eds) Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition. Studies in Universal Logic. Springer, Basel. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-0379-3_24

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