Abstract
We study fair allocation of indivisible chores to agents under budget constraints, where each chore has an objective size and disutility. This model captures scenarios where a set of chores need to be divided among agents with limited time, and each chore has a specific time needed for completion. We propose a budget-constrained model for allocating indivisible chores, and systematically explore the differences between goods and chores in this setting. We establish the existence of an EFX allocation. We then show that EF2 allocations are polynomial-time computable in general; for many restricted settings, we strengthen this result to EF1.
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Elkind, E., Igarashi, A., Teh, N. (2024). Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints. In: Schäfer, G., Ventre, C. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 15156. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71033-9_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71033-9_4
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