Introduction

Background

Against the backdrop of populist actors’ efforts to delegitimize ‘mainstream media’ (Bos et al., 2023; Conrad, 2023; Egelhofer et al., 2021; Holtz-Bacha, 2021; Sehl et al., 2022; Lischka, 2021), this chapter addresses the implications of journalists’ experiences of physical and verbal abuse and intimidation for the development of political culture in a liberal democracy. The overall aim of this volume is to discuss post-truth populism as a potentially new political paradigm, characterized to a significant extent by the declining role of facts and truthfulness in politics (Newman, 2019, 2023). This development is intimately linked to the resurgence of populism in liberal democracies. The present chapter contributes to this overarching ambition by drawing attention to a somewhat overlooked aspect of post-truth politics, i.e., the role of populists’ efforts to fundamentally delegitimize—as opposed to merely critique—mainstream media by branding them as ‘fake news’, ‘lying press’, or ‘system media’. Such efforts are viewed here as creating the context in which verbal and physical abuse and intimidation of journalists play out. As such, they are seen as being intended to silence the voice of critical journalism in liberal democracy, thereby imposing a singular version of truth rather than enriching political debate by providing space for otherwise un- or overheard perspectives.

This perspective on the role of populists in silencing critical journalists is essential in informing discussions on post-truth politics. On the one hand, the concept of post-truth politics refers to an ‘epistemic crisis of democracy’ (Dahlgren, 2018; see also Chambers, 2020), suggesting an erosion of commonly accepted standards for ascertaining facts and telling fact from fiction. It is not simply the case that facts (and truth) no longer matter (sufficiently) in political discourse, but rather that the trustworthiness of those who establish and/or convey the facts has become increasingly contentious (see also Harsin, in this volume). More fundamentally, post-truth politics hinges on an epistemic problem in the sense of a fundamental lack of understanding of how facts are established (through the provision of evidence and falsifiable propositions), including the misunderstanding that facts—once established—are permanent and do not change in light of new evidence/observations. And on a related note, truth itself has become increasingly contentious and contested, as different actors claim to know the facts and speak the truth and accuse other actors of lying and/or withholding the truth. Against this backdrop, populist politicians frequently draw on the distinction between elite lies and popular truths (Conrad, 2023; Waisbord, 2018) to claim that they know the truth that the mainstream media are withholding from the people. The point to be made in this chapter is, however, that, far from being meant to enrich efforts to find the truth by offering more and different perspectives, populist efforts to discredit and delegitimize mainstream journalism are intended merely to impose one highly specific version of (allegedly popular) truth by silencing any contending perspectives, including those conveyed by critical journalists.

Aim and Research Questions

In this chapter, this dynamic is explored by discussing the development of the post-truth condition from the vantage point of journalists who, in carrying out their work, have been exposed to various forms of verbal and physical abuse and intimidation. The chapter explicitly addresses the role of populist actors/politicians in this context. Even though such politicians are hardly (if ever) the ones involved in such acts, our interview data clearly underline a connection between the discursive delegitimation of mainstream journalism (Bos et al., 2023; Conrad, 2023; Egelhofer et al., 2021) and acts of verbal and physical abuse and intimidation as they play out both in the online and offline world, for instance in protests or demonstrations. Against this backdrop, this chapter asks the following research questions:

  1. 1.

    What impact do experiences of verbal and physical abuse and intimidation have on the work of journalists and their assessment of the state of journalism in liberal democracy?

  2. 2.

    What is their assessment of the (presumed) link between verbal and physical abuse and intimidation and populist efforts to delegitimize mainstream journalism?

  3. 3.

    What are the consequences for liberal democracy in terms of the development of post-truth political culture—and to what extent does this mark the advent of post-truth populism as a new political paradigm?

Methodological Approach

Against the backdrop of a theoretical discussion on the connection between post-truth politics and populist efforts to delegitimize mainstream journalism, the chapter’s empirical analysis is based entirely on semi-structured interviews with journalists representing important political shows on both private and public TV stations in Germany. The interviews took place between the autumn of 2023 and the spring of 2024 (see section “Journalists’ Experiences of Physical and Verbal Abuse and Intimidation” for further details) and involved journalists who have covered and/or reported on demonstrations against, e.g., German governments’ (at the national or federal level) handling of the Covid pandemic. In the interviews, the respondents were asked about their experiences of physical and verbal abuse and intimidation as well as about their assessment of the impact of such abuse on the role of journalism in liberal democracy, in general, and on their own journalistic work, in particular (see the complete interview guide in Appendix 1).

Organization of the Chapter

Following this introduction, the following section “Post-truth Politics and the Populist Assault on Mainstream Journalism” discusses the current state of the literature on post-truth politics in relation to the chapter’s research questions. Although there is an emerging literature on populist efforts to delegitimize mainstream journalism, the significance of such efforts is not addressed sufficiently in the more specific literature on post-truth politics. Beyond identifying this as a gap, this section also presents the argument that the experiences of journalists do not figure prominently enough in empirical analyses of post-truth politics. The third section presents the findings of the interview study, drawing attention to (a) the interviewed journalists’ experiences of various forms of physical and verbal abuse and intimidation, (b) their assessment of the impact of such abuse on their own journalistic work and on the state and role of journalism in liberal democracy, and (c) their assessment of the role of populism in this context. The fourth section returns to the chapter’s overarching theoretical question, i.e., what the findings on efforts to silence critical journalists contribute to our understanding of the extent to which the populist assault on the institution of journalism constitutes a step towards a new post-truth populist political paradigm.

Post-truth Politics and the Populist Assault on Mainstream Journalism

The last few years have witnessed the emergence of a considerable literature on post-truth politics. Despite an at least partially justified unease about the term’s lack of precision, the concept appears to stick in academic as well as wider public discourse. This lack of precision stems at least in part from the fact that the concept is used to denote a whole range of phenomena that, while certainly interlinked, are and should be kept distinct from one another (e.g., Chambers, 2020).Footnote 1 In terms of positioning this chapter within the literature on post-truth politics, its aim is to contribute to the strand of the post-truth politics literature that is situated within the field of political theory and sees post-truth politics, first and foremost, as a development in political culture (Conrad & Hálfdanarson, 2023; Van Dyk, 2022; García-Guitián, in this volume). This chapter therefore speaks to earlier work that has emphasized the presumably changing status and/or symbolic authority of the truth in political discourse (MacMullen, 2020; McIntyre, 2018; Newman, 2019, 2022). As Simone Chambers has put it, ‘post-truth is about citizens’ attitudes towards the truth’ (Chambers, 2020, p. 149; Strandbrink, in this volume). It is this attitudinal component that creates the conditions in which certain politicians can blatantly disregard the facts (or lie) and get away with it. To some extent, this is connected to a ‘diminishing role of facts and analysis in public life’ (Kavanagh & Rich, 2018), but it is fundamentally also about the authority to define what constitutes facts and how facts are established in the first place. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, the point has been made that politics requires a factual basis and that, indeed, politics becomes impossible to the extent that it lacks a shared factual basis (Hyvönen, 2018; Newman, 2019; Van Dyk, 2022; cf. Ólafsson, in this volume).

However, it has also been pointed out that the discourse of post-truth politics oversimplifies the extent to which facts can claim objectivity (Monsees, 2020, 2023; see also Van Dyk, 2022). This argument is also quite important in developing approaches to dealing with the problem of post-truth politics, not least in regulatory terms: whether to regulate (and possibly prohibit) the dissemination of disinformation depends essentially on the ability to determine objectively whether something is factually correct or not. Whether or not ‘bound up with a call for radical positivism, that is, value-free access to empirical facts’ (Van Dyk, 2022, p. 38), this kind of decision nonetheless comes with the risk of potentially crossing over into censorship or curtailing freedom of speech/expression (cf. Bouza García & Oleart, 2023). In fact, the argument has been made only the most banal facts can be held to be objectively true, e.g., the size of the crowd at Donald Trump’s inauguration ceremony (e.g., Vogelmann, 2018). As a consequence, only the most banal of factually incorrect statements are easily ‘debunked’ and/or corrected. While this criticism is certainly valid, it is enormously important to avoid drawing the conclusion that the relativization of facts—or maybe better, the increasingly blurry lines between fact and opinion (Van Dyk, 2022)—is not a significant challenge to the functioning of a democratic public sphere. What is at stake in the discussion on post-truth politics is ultimately the very idea of deliberation in the democratic public sphere, which necessitates a commonly accepted factual basis.

Apparently, the link between facts and evidence needs to be clarified much better. Even if we adopt the premise that a radical positivism in the sense of value-free access to empirical facts is impossible (Van Dyk, 2022), it should go without saying that facts are not arbitrary statements without any supporting empirical evidence. But just as supporting evidence can change, so can facts—they are not established at one time and claim permanent validity. This point is closely connected to the populist distinction between elite lies and popular truths (Conrad, 2023; Waisbord, 2018). At least at some level, this distinction is based on conspiratorial thinking that facts are imposed by political, cultural, or scientific elites, and that they are not allowed to be contradicted by rival observations or, indeed, alternative facts. But alternative though they may be, the problem with alternative facts is clearly that they are not facts in the first place unless they are empirically substantiated. Post-truth politics, then, is essentially a form or style of politics that breaks with the idea that we need to relate to established facts in political discourse. We can challenge those facts through the provision of new evidence, but we cannot disregard the facts and make up our own. In a nutshell, we can thus make the Arendtian argument that politics requires a shared understanding/acceptance of facts—a public infrastructure, so to speak (Hyvönen, 2018)—and still be reconciled with the notion that facts are necessarily falsifiable and thus cannot claim permanent validity.

This argument is more or less directly linked to populism’s antagonistic relationship towards mainstream media/journalism. Drawing on the binary distinction between elite lies and popular truths, populists make mainstream media out to be part of the corrupt liberal elite that imposes certain facts on the people. Consequently, post-truth politics is very much a struggle about the authority to define the truth against the very elites that have imposed certain truths on the people by only allowing certain facts while disallowing any alternative facts (cf. Waisbord, 2018). The misguided view of facts as imposed by elites onto the people is important, and with it the increasingly blurry line between fact and opinion. Post-truth populist discourse tends to draw on the allegation that only certain perspectives are allowed in public debate, but fundamentally also on the existence of alternative perspectives that need to be given voice and that must not be ignored by the establishment. Populism’s antagonistic relationship towards mainstream media thus even entails an emancipatory claim in that it claims to enhance and broaden democratic discourse by adding alternative perspectives. However, this presumably emancipatory ambition stands in stark contrast to the reality of mainstream journalists’ experiences of verbal and physical abuse and intimidation.

In this regard, there is a certain gap in the literature on post-truth politics that needs to be addressed. While considerable emphasis is placed on the impact that post-truth populists have already had on political culture, the delegitimation and attempted silencing of critical journalism in the creation of the post-truth condition has not been adequately explored. Some emphasis has been placed on questions connected to trust in and demand for quality journalism (Michailidou et al., 2023; Michailidou & Trenz, 2021; Verbalyte et al., 2023). A number of publications have also highlighted the role of populist politicians in fueling resentment against mainstream journalism (Bos et al., 2023; Conrad, 2023; Egelhofer et al., 2021; Wright, 2021). Furthermore, the actual voice of journalists who have experienced physical and verbal abuse and intimidation from populists and their supporters has not found expression in research on post-truth politics. Connected to this, the link between populist efforts to mobilize resentment against mainstream journalism and physical as well as verbal abuse and intimidation against journalists needs to be better understood. The main aim of this chapter is to contribute to filling this gap.

Journalists’ Experiences of Physical and Verbal Abuse and Intimidation

Details of the Interviews

Selection/Recruitment of Respondents

For the interviews, we contacted journalists working for important media outlets on German television, i.e., the political magazines Monitor, Panorama, Kontraste, and Spiegel TV. The first three are produced by different regional broadcasting companies that are part of the association of German public-service broadcasters ARD.Footnote 2 These political magazines are aired every third Tuesday and Thursday night. They were purposively selected because of their prominence in the German TV landscape; they are very well known due to the simple fact that all three have been around already since the 1960s.Footnote 3 Similarly, the hosts of the respective shows (two of which were interviewed for this study) are exceptionally prominent and, as a matter of fact, frequently targeted/singled out as figureheads of what politicians of the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) refer to as ‘lying press’ or ‘system media’. Correspondingly, the political magazines themselves are construed as part and parcel of these system media, which is why it is quite common for far-right politicians to point out the presence of camera crews from these shows in an effort to whip up tensions among the participants at political rallies or other types of events. Furthermore, the two hosts who were interviewed for this study are among those journalists who, along with scientists and political figures, were frequently depicted in prisoners’ uniforms on posters displayed, e.g., at protests in the context of the Covid pandemic, suggesting that they should be imprisoned for their role in misleading or misinforming the German public.

In addition to these three public-service TV shows, the fourth political magazine included here (Spiegel TV) can be accessed via the website of the Spiegel newsmagazine, but its features are also broadcast on various German TV channels, including public-service channels. Moreover, its affiliation with the Spiegel newsmagazine makes it part of the alleged mainstream liar press—and references to the presence of Spiegel TV reporters at populist events have the same effect in terms of whipping up tensions as their public-service counterparts.

The respondents in the interviews perform different roles in their respective organizations. Two are hosts and, indeed, editorial heads of the respective shows; they were selected primarily due to their prominence and the fact that they are frequently singled out as symbols representing/personifying what is construed as the left-liberal liar press. In addition, we interviewed reporters from the different outlets that had covered some of the major demonstrations in various German cities during the Covid pandemic. The respondents were purposively selected on the basis of instances of verbal and/or physical abuse that were visible in their coverage of such events, or because they have previously been singled out at protests as protagonists of the alleged mainstream liar press. The study includes a total of nine interviews, including three with respondents from Spiegel TV and the online version of Der Spiegel, three with respondents from Kontraste, one with the host and editorial leader of Panorama, and one with the host and editorial leader of Monitor. In order to provide more context, the study also includes an additional interview with a representative of the German Journalists’ Union (DJU) that is part of the public services union Ver.di. This interview took place in Berlin in May 2023. The respondents were contacted with a formal contact letter sent out by e-mail that explained the purpose of the interviews.

Execution of the Interviews

The majority of the interviews took place in person in September 2023 in Hamburg (Panorama and Spiegel TV), November 2023 in Cologne (Monitor), and in March 2024 in Berlin (Kontraste). Due to scheduling issues, two more interviews needed to be conducted online, specifically one interview with a Hamburg-based freelance journalist working inter alia for the online edition of Der Spiegel and one interview with a journalist working for Kontraste. These two interviews took place in September 2023 and March 2024, respectively. Apart from these two online interviews, all interviews were conducted in the respective respondents’ offices in Hamburg, Cologne and Berlin. All interviews were conducted in the respondents’ native language German, which is also the native language of the interviewer and of the research assistant who transcribed the interviews. The interviews took between 45 and 75 minutes, were audio-recorded and subsequently transcribed by the research assistant. Additional notes were taken by the interviewer, who is also the author of this chapter. The interview questions can be found in Appendix 1 at the end of the chapter.

Analysis of the Interviews

Following the transcription of the interviews, the author carried out a thematic analysis with the help of the MaxQDA software. Using an inductive approach, the main themes addressed in the interviewees’ responses were identified in successive rounds of coding, starting with an initial paraphrasing of all relevant parts of the material, followed by a gradual condensing of the paraphrases and, finally, a definition of the identified themes. In this process, four broad themes emerged that then guided the interpretation of findings: the respondents addressed (a) the actors that commonly attacked journalists; (b) the forms of abuse that they have experienced themselves; (c) the impact of such attacks on their journalistic work; and (d) their assessment of the development of the situation of journalism/journalists in Germany in light of such experiences. Within these four main themes, a number of subthemes also emerged that are addressed in the presentation of findings below.

Presentation of Findings

Actors

Regarding the question of whether there are any specific groups that journalists, based on their own experience, consider to be particularly prone to engage in verbal and/or physical abuse and/or intimidation, the findings are fairly mixed. According to the interviewed journalists, only one group stands out in particular, i.e., individuals identifiable as part of the far right (Georg Restle/Monitor, Jannis G., and Spiegel TV, R2). One respondent mentioned that ‘the radical right and Neonazis are always a threat’ and that ‘when you recognize them, it’s always clear that you need to be a bit careful’, adding that ‘this was especially the case in the context of the Corona protests, that there were Neonazis openly marching along’ (Jannis G.). Another respondent pointed out that ‘when it comes to more violent or somehow more aggressive reactions, then you definitely have more of that from rightwing radicals, or Neonazis or so’, but added that ‘in principle, aggression can come from anyone’ (Spiegel TV, R2).

However, the overarching impression from the interviews is that it is not necessarily a particular group of people (defined in terms of ideology or worldview), but rather specific types of personalities that journalists would expect physical or verbal abuse from, e.g., individuals who (appear to be) emotional, aggressive, and frustrated (Spiegel TV, R1). One respondent pointed out that ‘if I am at a protest (…), I would be able to say ‘okay, these ones will be aggressive’; but there are also those who you think are just normal people and then they yell the most insane stuff at you’ (Spiegel TV, R2). Several respondents pointed out the—by now well-documented (e.g., Frei et al., 2021; Koos, 2021)—heterogeneity of participants of protests against Covid restrictions/measures in Germany. One respondent spoke of ‘overlaps between Corona protests and the radical right or Neonazi organizations and especially the extreme right’, adding that ‘Neonazis are very hostile to the pressFootnote 4 because to them, everything is somehow leftwing press’ (Jannis G.). Another respondent also pointed out that there was a certain spillover from Corona-related protests to the pro-Russian ‘peace demonstrations’ in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and ultimately also to the protests against the war in Gaza (Kontraste, R2).

Forms of Abuse/Assaults

Regarding the forms of abuse and intimidation that the interviewed journalists have experienced, death threats are strikingly common. In some cases, these have remained fairly abstract (see below), but there have also been cases of more prominent journalists (such as the two interviewed hosts and editorial leaders of the selected TV shows) where the police found death threats to be serious and credible. One host spoke of having received a letter threatening to kill her and her children if she were to go on the air the next day. Another host was among those who received a death threat from the so-called NSU2.0.Footnote 5 But death threats were also directed to lesser known journalists, albeit in a less concrete form. One respondent spoke of a protester who said that ‘when all this is over, heads will roll and also those of the press’ and that ‘this will happen when people realize that you’re a journalist’ (Spiegel TV, R1; emphasis added).

Physical Abuse and Intimidation

In addition to death threats, all interviewed journalists have also experienced different forms of physical abuse and intimidation. One of the interviewed journalists has even experienced an attack so brutal that it was simply a matter of luck that no one was killed or severely injured. While covering a protest against the war in Gaza in Berlin in October 2023, the journalist and his team had a big boulder thrown directly at them from a balcony, injuring one of the two members of their security detail on the leg. In the words of the respondent,

we needed to retreat a little, simply because we needed a break, we needed to regroup and discuss something. So we were standing off to the side a bit, and then someone threw a boulder onto us from a balcony […]. And it hit one of our security people on the leg or the foot. […] If it had been thirty centimeters to the left, it would have hit him in the head. When you’re hit in the head by a boulder like that, there is a good chance that you end up paralyzed or possibly even dead. It wasn’t just a little stone […] and I think we also saw where it was thrown from, it was really people on a balcony. […] Someone really wanted to… they saw that we had a camera. […] We were also not close to the police, we were alone and someone wanted to show us what they think of us.

Many other respondents spoke of other forms of physical and verbal intimidation. This has taken the form of ‘people running towards journalists with the clear intent to destroy the camera or to use other forms of physical violence’ or ‘coming and standing very close to you in a threatening manner’ (Georg Restle). Other respondents spoke of groups of people (‘mobs’) driving them into a corner (Spiegel TV, R1), forming a circle around them so that they could no longer get away (Spiegel TV, R2),Footnote 6 or ‘yelling into your ear so that you cannot hear anything anymore’ (Spiegel TV, R1). One respondent recounted an incident where someone took her hat ‘and then there were—all of a sudden—three people directly behind and all very close, almost all men. And then things got very tight and then the police came’ (Spiegel TV, R1). Along the same lines, one respondent highlighted a threatening experience that he had had when trying to interview a leading figure of the right-wing extremist ‘Free Saxons’ in the state of Saxony. As the respondent recalled:

At one point I was doing sort of an interview with the head of these ‘Free Saxons’, like the leader figure. And […] at first it’s just the two of us, but then maybe five more people join, then at some point ten people come, then 20, then 30, and in the end, […] I would say there are 30-40 people surrounding me. And they are shouting something at you, they’re commenting on every question. Which doesn’t bother me, […] but still. They’re holding their cameras into your face the whole time, they’re filming everything, which they can by all means do, but it is still an attempt, I think, it’s also a kind of intimidation. (Kontraste, R2)

Verbal Abuse and Intimidation

All three female interview respondents reported experiences of sexualized verbal abuse (Anja Reschke/Panorama; Spiegel TV, R1; Spiegel TV, R2). One mentioned that ‘you are insulted as soon as you are recognized’ (Georg Restle/Monitor), while others spoke about the verbal abuse that they have received via e-mail, text messages and even threatening letters (Anja Reschke/Panorama; Spiegel Online). Some spoke of the dehumanizing character of such abuse, which often take the form of personal attacks where journalists are referred to as ‘media whores’ (Georg Restle/Monitor). One respondent spoke of the lack of civility when one tries to argue with people on social media, saying that such efforts result in virtually ‘immediate shitstorms’ and describing Twitter (at the time) as something ‘like a littered picnic area,Footnote 7 there are only terrible people there who (…) don’t address your argument, but immediately insult you personally and gloat’ (Anja Reschke/Panorama). Other respondents spoke of their experiences when covering protests on site, where people threatened to beat them up or claimed that ‘we will get you!’ (Spiegel TV, R2).

Another form of verbal abuse or intimidation is what one respondent has referred to as marking or branding (Markierung in the German original). This involves pointing out the presence of journalists at an event to a presumably already angry crowd and thereby whipping up tensions, saying things like ‘Spiegel TV is here, just in case you want to take it out on someone—this is Spiegel TV’ (Spiegel TV, R2), ‘look, this here is Restle from this terrible show Monitor’ (Georg Restle/Monitor), or ‘you with the pink hat’—‘it’s this idiot over there’ (Spiegel TV, R1). Another respondent pointed out that he had been mentioned by name in speeches or threatened (Spiegel online). One of the respondents recalled a situation where this practice of pointing out their presence resulted more or less immediately in physical abuse, stating that when the speaker was

done with his tirade against our ARD team, an elderly man stood up and attacked the camera directly. And from the sequence it was clear that to me that it was the speech […] that had incited the atmosphere so much among these concrete people that he said: ‘Okay, if such people are here filming, then I have to get physical and put an end to it’. (Silvio Duwe/Kontraste)

One of the respondents also mentioned that after interviewing a person who subscribed to various conspiracy narratives, the same person published the journalist’s (and his colleague’s) presumed home addresses on Telegram, calling on his followers to ‘pay us a visit to tell us the truth’ (Kontraste, R1). Several respondents furthermore mentioned that journalists tend to be filmed/videorecorded permanently when they are reporting from public events (Spiegel TV, R2; Kontraste, R2). Several respondents pointed out that this increasingly occurs also in the form of (live-)streams (Spiegel TV, R2; Kontraste, R2). One respondent shared that when covering a protest against the war in Gaza in October 2023, a person—who the respondent assumed was streaming—identified him as working for German public-service TV, walked up to him with his camera and started filming, stating that (in the words of our respondent), ‘here you have it, it’s these people, these are the people that are responsible for the deaths of human beings because they are lying, look at them, look at these guys here’ and ‘look, these here are these traitors, these are the people that make sure to incite this conflict’. Our respondent also added that this is a particularly uncomfortable feeling because you never know what kind of reach such streamers or their respective channels have (Kontraste, R2).

Sexualized Verbal Abuse

Three of the interview respondents were women, all of whom reported experiences of sexualized verbal abuse (Panorama; Spiegel TV, R1; Spiegel TV, R2). One respondent remarked that ‘it was unusual how many e-mails I received with rape fantasies. What sexual violence wasn’t supposed to be done to me. (…) A lot of sexualized violence, that was really enormous’ (Anja Reschke/Panorama). Another said that ‘you get insulted a lot, also as a woman. I’ve been called a press, a journalist c**t, of course also expressions like this’ (Spiegel TV, R2). The same respondent said that

‘I think I block out a lot. I think that’s also because I have the feeling that, as a woman, one is reduced even more to one’s body and things like this come up as well, of course. This ‘journalist c**t’ has somehow stuck with me, but also because this comes up quite often, also in other variations’.

Obstructions

Finally, different forms of obstructions appear to play a key role in disturbing journalistic work. Notably, it is apparently common practice at demonstrations that organizers designate specific people (which the respondent referred to as ushers, or ‘Ordner’) whose role is to spot cameras and to keep participants from talking to mainstream media. Sometimes, these ushers apparently also follow camera crews directly to make it impossible for the journalists to start a conversation with participants. But it has also happened to one of our respondents that obstructions take the form of protesters tripping journalists up (who are walking backwards while interviewing people who move forward). In addition, it is evidently a very common experience that people push the journalists’ cameras down, place their hands or a piece of paper in front of the camera, or make so much noise that journalists simply cannot do any proper interviews. In fact, according to one respondent, such obstructions are so common that he has stopped paying attention to them (Kontraste, R2). Such obstructions also include instances of people—who aren’t actually the ones being interviewed—disturbing interviews by commenting on the questions asked by the reporter (e.g., ‘what kinds of questions are these—you are intentionally asking the questions that you need to get the image that you want’, Kontraste, R2). One respondent even pointed out that such obstructions also occur, at times, against the expressed will of the person to be interviewed, who say that ‘yes, I know what kind of people these [journalists] are, but I want to make my point nonetheless and see how this will be broadcast’ (Silvio Duwe/Kontraste). The same respondent also spoke of ‘love bombing’ or ‘communication bombing’ as a new form of obstruction to his journalistic work that he experienced for the first time at a Querdenken demonstration against Covid measures. In this situation, people are ‘very communicative’ and ‘want to—in a seemingly friendly way—communicate so much with you that you don’t get to do what you came there to do’ (Silvio Duwe/Kontraste).

Impact on Journalistic Work

Given the chapter’s emphasis on the implications of hostility towards journalists for the development of a post-truth political culture (and with, the silencing of the voice of critical journalists), it is important to discuss the extent and the ways in which journalists are affected in their journalistic work.

Awareness of Security Concerns

The interviewed journalists all acknowledged their awareness of security concerns. Many and, in particular, the more senior ones, also see a development in terms of the quality and quantity of the hostilities that they experience in their carrying out their daily work. The more prominent respondents pointed out that they can no longer participate in public events unless they know precisely that the event in question has a security concept. They also pointed out that this is a fine line because on the one hand, they want to be close to the action, but also not provoke/stir any emotions by showing up with a security detail (Anja Reschke/Panorama; Georg Restle/Monitor). All the interviewed journalists acknowledge that they are affected by the hostility to which they are exposed and that, as a consequence, they need to approach certain situations differently, most importantly by checking the security situation before agreeing to go to certain places or certain events. At the same time, the interviews also revealed that it was very important to the respondents to express clearly and unequivocally their refusal to allow physical or verbal threats to intimidate them. This is an important finding in relation to the question of the link between post-truth politics and efforts to silence the voice of critical journalists (see discussion in section “Discussion: Silencing the Voice of Mainstream Journalism?”).

Regarding their awareness of security concerns, the respondents shared the view that they are fully aware of the risks of their work and that this awareness does leave a mark on them. One respondent described that this ‘is not a nice feeling. Because you feel limited in your freedom of movement […]. At all public events that I go to, no matter where, even at democratic events, this feeling is always present’ (Georg Restle/Monitor). The same respondent also said that

it is absolutely clear that when I express an opinion in commentaries on certain topics […], then I know that a shitstorm is about to go off and then I also know and have it in my head that there’s a lot of crazies out there that could take this to be a call to action to harm me, also personally or physically. (Georg Restle/Monitor)

But the same respondent also made it clear that ‘I wouldn’t say that this affects my day from morning to night’. Another respondent pointed out that ‘this is something that I had not previously experienced in my life to this extent. So one is a bit more fearful, because I don’t know, okay, is there anyone standing there and will stab you?’ But the same respondent added that even death threats did not have ‘an impact on my journalism at that moment. (…) They only had an impact on my behavior in the sense that I lost a bit of my naïveté’ (Anja Reschke/Panorama). But the risks appear to be perceived as manageable. In the words of one respondent: ‘you already know when you arrive, you know exactly what will happen […] and that’s why you don’t go with just any camera crew. […] You know exactly what will happen’ (Spiegel TV, R2). And another one said, along the same lines: ‘you plan in such a way that you prefer to go with a camera crew instead of going alone’ (Spiegel TV, R1).

This refusal to be intimidated is clearly important to the interviewed journalists. They all feel at some level that the awareness of security concerns does something to them and that they need to consider very carefully whether or to what extent they are—and what they need to do in order to be—safe in a given situation or environment. This is summed up by one respondent who said the following:

I don’t want to give these people the satisfaction to be able to say: ‘we succeeded, the press doesn’t come to us anymore, but only the YouTubers and streamers and those alternative media that report according to our views’. But you have this in the back of your mind. How do I approach this? How far can I dare to go in? (Silvio Duwe/Kontraste)

Another respondent remarked that ‘for a long time, I claimed that this has no effect on me because I also don’t want it to have an effect, that I don’t want to let myself be intimidated. But I think that’s not completely honest’. One respondent emphasized that ‘one shouldn’t give these people the feeling that they succeed with their [intimidation], and that’s why I participate in public events whenever I am invited and whenever I want to go and have the time, of course’, adding that ‘I will not be intimidated by that’ (Georg Restle/Monitor). Another respondent (Jannis G.) said that ‘I don’t want to allow myself to be constrained or often I try not to be affected by it and go up really close because that’s how you get the best images’.

Assessment of the Development of the Situation of Journalism in Germany

When asked whether they see any kind of development with regard to the situation of journalists in Germany, the more experienced respondents do point out that the quantity and quality of abuse and intimidations has changed. This is related to various aspects, the most important of which are the perception of (a) an increasing contempt for journalists; (b) an increasing level of aggression/aggressiveness; but also (c) increasing demands for what is often construed as ‘more balanced reporting’.

Regarding contempt for journalists, one respondent speaks of ‘an increasingly hostile atmosphere towards representatives of the media, in particular public-service media, at these demonstrations’ (Georg Restle/Monitor). Another one pointed out that ‘naturally, when you go to demonstrations, then you are the enemy. As a public-service journalist, you are of course the enemy and this is also made very clear to you’ (Kontraste, R1). Along the same lines, a third respondent’s experience is that respect for journalists has deteriorated, arguing that ‘especially at large demonstrations, one gets the impression that people get great enjoyment from taking their anger and frustration out on journalists ‘ and elaborating that ‘you get insulted constantly, people try to discredit you, and when you ask questions, people tell you that you are part of this elite; it is this common blend of anger, hate and conspiracy theories that are fired at you’ (Spiegel TV, R2).

Regarding the aspect of increased aggression, one respondent speaks of the hostility towards journalists having ‘a new quality because there is this incivility (Verrohung in the German original) that spills over from the digital world to the real word’, where ‘people feel that they are part of a large majority or of an imagined will of the people’ (Georg Restle/Monitor). Another respondent used the same term (Verrohung) to suggest that ‘people feel emboldened to express their opinion aggressively’, adding that the atmosphere has changed considerably and that ‘one gets to the point much faster where people react in a verbally aggressive manner’ (Kontraste, R1). Regarding this turn towards increased incivility, a third respondent further mentioned that he considers a series of Neonazi riots in the Saxon city of Chemnitz—as recently as 2018—as a turning point in that it witnessed a massive focus on press and representatives of the media, thereby making it ‘the first time that I thought: can I still responsibly attend such events without a security detail?’ (Georg Restle & Monitor).

Regarding the demand for ‘balanced’ reporting, finally, one respondent claimed that there is an increasing demand that all perspectives are equally given voice and that this is a consequence of a fake news narrative that claims that mainstream journalism is biased and partial. According to this respondent, this demand stems in no small part from within the leadership of public-service broadcasting itself: ‘this has definitely increased because of Corona, this issue of balance. This is incessantly hammered into our brains. We also constantly have to justify ourselves, also in our own houses, also vis-á-vis the hierarchy’ (Anja Reschke/Panorama). According to the same respondent, this claim is also made within her own show’s editorial board, ‘among people who know quite well what journalism is’ and this is an effect of ‘the absolutely clear framing that ‘you are left-green, you’re blind on your left eye’ (Anja Reschke/Panorama). This theme of demands for ‘balanced reporting’ is also addressed by another respondent, who argues that this is intimately connected to the Alternative for Germany (AfD). According to this respondent, the AfD is a party that constantly claims to be discriminated against and whose claims that the media are not reporting truthfully have resulted in a regrettable ‘both-side-ism’: that neutrality and objectivity have been misunderstood as the need to hear ‘both sides’ equally, even if one side represents the scientific consensus and the other side is merely a singular opinion (Kontraste, R1).

The Link to Populism

As a last point in this empirical analysis, we need to explore the link between populism and the hostility towards journalism described so far. After all, the point of this chapter is not to discuss attacks on critical journalists and their implications for democracy as such, but more specifically what role populist actors play in such processes and what that means in terms of the development of political culture in the post-truth condition. On this point, some of the respondents connect the broader delegitimation of mainstream media/journalism to populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD). One respondent pointed out that the AfD’s role in this context is very clear and that the party is by no means trying to disguise its contempt for mainstream media (Kontraste, R2). Another respondent remarked that this contempt is ‘clearly also politically calculated’ and that the party’s efforts to brand mainstream media as ‘government propaganda’ is something they need ‘for the majorities that they want to win on the right margin. Because as public-service media, we are supposed to be ‘state media’ (Georg Restle/Monitor). Another respondent emphasized that the AfD is ‘not like any other party in that it wants a different system, it has a different view of democracy and also on journalism. And I don’t think that this is clear to everyone’ (Anja Reschke/Panorama). The same respondent also argued that the AfD is different from all other parties in the sense that it is the only party that does not subscribe to ‘the fundamental consensus’ that the press plays a fundamental role in democracy ‘even if people get angry when they are criticized’. This fundamental consensus is present in German society at large, but it is diminishing and, indeed, ‘missing in some segments of society’—‘and in my perception, these segments are currently loud and call the shots’ (Anja Reschke/Panorama). However, one respondent also pointed out that the current hostility towards mainstream media can also be found among populists on the left of the political spectrum, even if it is not as open as among right-wing populists (Kontraste, R2).

Discussion: Silencing the Voice of Mainstream Journalism?

In discussing the impact of the populist assault on mainstream media/journalism, it is important to draw attention to two key aspects. One is the impact that this assault has on journalists themselves, i.e., whether it has the—presumably desired—effect of silencing the voice of critical journalism. The other is the impact of the clear and explicit refusal of populist actors to engage in discussion, let alone deliberation with journalists—and, to go even one step further, to even allow their supporters—to engage in discussions with journalists. This reluctance/refusal is connected to the distinction between elites and the people that is constitutive of populism (see below).

Beginning with the aspect of silencing the voice of critical journalism, the findings of the interview study contain both good and bad news. The bad news is fairly obvious: the observation that physical and verbal intimidation is a common experience for journalists is clearly not a good sign for a healthy liberal democracy and its public sphere. Even more concerning is that the forms of intimidation reported by the respondents do not only occur anonymously and/or in online settings, but also happen in face-to-face encounters between journalists and protestors on the street. Even more concerning is the observation that organizers of certain protests apparently feel emboldened to single out specific journalists and point out their presence to already hostile crowds. According to our respondents, such ‘markings’ have become standard practice and are evidently intended to send the message that journalists are unwelcome, that everyone is aware of their presence and that virtually anything can happen to them.

All of the interviewed journalists have furthermore had experiences of insults, threats of physical violence, and even death threats that, in some cases, were concrete enough to be considered serious by law enforcement authorities. In addition, our respondents have also reported how common obstructions of their work are. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the practice of designating certain individuals (referred to by the journalists as ‘ushers’) whose job is to ensure that no participants of a given protest end up speaking to journalists or giving them interviews.

However, there is also good news in the findings from the interview study. Although verbal and physical intimidation and abuse are a common experience for the interviewed journalists, the interviews have also revealed a strong sense of commitment to the journalistic profession. None of the interviewed journalists indicated that they would consider changing professions and underlined that their choice to become a journalist was motivated in large part by their conviction of the importance of journalism in (liberal) democracy. Consequently, the responses from the journalists reflected a strong and unequivocal refusal to allow themselves to be intimidated despite all verbal and physical intimidation and abuse.

It is also good news that one common reaction of the interviewed journalists when facing verbal and physical abuse was a feeling of ‘jetzt erst recht!’, a statement along the lines of ‘now more than ever’, suggesting that if their journalistic work elicits this kind of undemocratic reaction, then evidently even more of this work is needed. Similarly, one respondent also emphasized that ‘we’re going where it hurts’, suggesting that the journalistic profession is never comfortable and will always prompt negative and even outright hostile reactions. In other words, the strong message resulting from the interviews is that the interviewed journalists will not be intimidated, let alone silenced, almost regardless of the physical and verbal abuse and intimidation they are exposed to.

Yet although this refusal to be intimidated is clearly good news, a number of the interviewed journalists did indicate that they would eventually like to move on to positions that involve less street-level work in hostile environments such as, e.g., protests or demonstrations. By the same token, some respondents also pointed out that not all of their current colleagues are equally willing to cover protests/demonstrations and that there are indeed specific camera crews that choose not to get such assignments.

In addition to silencing the voice of journalists, a second point worth discussing here is the impact of the assault on mainstream journalism on the development of a potentially new post-truth populist paradigm. The role of populism and populist actors needs to be highlighted in this discussion. Our interview respondents confirmed their perception of the central role of populist and far-right actors in expressing hostility towards mainstream media. The role of the AfD and its supporters was explicitly mentioned in this context, which is clearly not a surprising finding given the party’s delegitimizing critique of mainstream journalism that is well documented in the literature (see theoretical discussion in section “Post-truth Politics and the Populist Assault on Mainstream Journalism”). Central to the discussion on the role of populism in the development of a post-truth political culture is the explicit refusal of populist actors to engage in deliberation with mainstream media. Through fake news accusations and labels such as ‘lying press’ or ‘system media’, populists attempt to delegitimize mainstream journalists and construe them as part of the deceitful liberal elite. Moreover, they evidently also refuse to speak to such alleged fake news outlets and, as the analysis has shown, even undertake significant efforts to obstruct journalists’ efforts to speak to participants of demonstrations. This observation is important in relation to a point raised by Waisbord (2018), i.e., it is precisely populism’s binary distinction between corrupt elites and the pure people (and, by extension, between elite lies and popular truths) that makes a ‘collective effort to produce agreed-upon facts and reach consensus on the correspondence between assertions and reality’ impossible (Waisbord, 2018, p. 18). This is due to the assertion that whatever the elites say is to be considered a lie by definition; hence populism’s ‘opposition to facts and truth determined by knowledge-producing elites such as scientists and experts’ (ibid., 19).

This point is connected directly to the discussion on the apparently declining role of facts in political discourse—and on what constitutes facts in the first place (see the theoretical discussion in section “Post-truth Politics and the Populist Assault on Mainstream Journalism”). In this chapter, the argument has been made that while not being able to claim objective validity permanently, facts are evidently not simply arbitrary statements devoid of any substantiating empirical evidence—hence the fundamental objection to the idea of alternative facts that grossly blur the boundary between fact and mere opinion. But in order for commonly accepted facts to be possible in the first place, the evidence supporting them has to be discussed collectively—and this is, according to Waisbord, what populists refuse to participate in precisely because of their fundamental rejection of ‘knowledge-producing elites such as scientists and experts’—hence the epistemic crisis of democracy that is characterized not least by the demise of commonly accepted standards for establishing and ascertaining facts.

Both the fake-news narrative (and, with it, the delegitimation of mainstream journalism) and the physical and verbal intimidation of journalists need to be seen against this backdrop: they are two sides of the same coin, i.e., the idea that journalists are part of the corrupt and deceitful liberal elite that therefore should not only not be talked or listened to, but that should moreover be silenced actively. Consequently, the argument made here is that physical and verbal intimidation is indeed an effort to silence the voice of critical journalism, but it also has to be seen as a way of terminating discussion on relevant facts before it can even unfold. With this in mind, it is also clear that populist discourse is not an emancipatory project of giving voice to the allegedly silenced/marginalized/unheard voice of the people, but it is rather a project of imposing a singular version of truth. These aspects also need to be seen in the wider context of the development of the public sphere in post-truth politics (in the digital age). Populism also plays a role in this context, but this will be the topic of another research.

Conclusion

The chapter has shown that instances of verbal and physical intimidation of journalists are a common phenomenon in Germany. All interviewed journalists share the experience of having been insulted, threatened, or singled out by speakers and/or organizers of demonstrations. Some have even received death threats that law enforcement authorities considered to be serious enough to warrant police protection. In the case of female journalists, sexualized verbal abuse and intimidation were also very common. The more prominent of our respondents consequently need to make cautious decisions about the option of being accompanied by a security detail whenever they agree to participate in public events. This constitutes an obvious threat to the role of critical journalism in any liberal democracy, but the statements of the interviewed journalists are also testament to their commitment to the journalistic profession as well as to their refusal to be intimidated by forces whose agenda is clearly and, in some cases, even openly opposed to the values of liberal democracy. There is a clear and, presumably, also a causal link between the kinds of hostility experienced by journalists and the type of agitation against the institution of journalism that is vocalized by representatives of the populist right in the country. This type of agitation goes beyond the boundaries of what may be considered legitimate critique of journalistic work, thus prompting important questions about the link between the hostility experienced by journalists and the potential emergence of post-truth populism as a new political paradigm. In this chapter, the argument has been made that the real risk of such a development resides in what may still lie ahead: beyond the apparently obvious effort to silence the voice of critical journalism, the anti-deliberative attitude displayed by right-wing populists is indicative of the epistemic crisis of democracy; this epistemic crisis is highlighted by the reluctance of populist actors and their supporters to participate even in discussions about shared facts that should form the basis of politics. By propagating alternative facts rather than engaging in a joint effort to probe the evidentiary basis of factual propositions, they further undermine the shared epistemic basis needed for the proper functioning of democracy or, for that matter, the democratic public sphere. On a brighter note, we can conclude by pointing out the spirit of resilience that the interview respondents have demonstrated in view of the populist challenge. At least for now, it seems that the critical voice of journalism is far from being silenced.