Keywords

Introduction

Whereas the Rohingya faced fierce violence in Myanmar, they continue to face multidimensional vulnerabilities in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. Five years after their forced displacement, they still bear mental trauma, the physical scars of violence, shame, stigma, and fear related to sexual violence. The precarious conditions in the camps are forcing this traumatised population to live a ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998). In the camps, men tend to be overall less vulnerable while women and children tend to be more vulnerable. One of my respondents made this sentiment clear when she said, ‘Being female is fearful … it is dangerous to be a woman’ (Interview: 2022MRF4). The dimensions of such vulnerabilities are multifaceted and dependent on intersectional identities, i.e., gender, age, power, education, access to resources (human and financial), and community structure. This chapter discusses such vulnerabilities, as well as the different forms of structural, cultural, and symbolic violence in the refugee camps, and the complexities intertwined in intersectional gender identity.

From Shaming and Ignorance to Domestic Violence

The patriarchal and traditional structure of the Rohingya community, which is also prevalent in the camps in Bangladesh, has led to shame, stigma, and different types of gender-based violence (GBV) against Rohingya women in the camps. Some of my respondents who worked as health workers in the camps told me their experiences dealing with abortions they had performed for the women and girls who became pregnant, due to rape mainly, by the Myanmar military while they were in Rakhine State. One of the respondents explained:

I work for MSF’s gender-based violence project where I have performed abortions on approximately 122 such pregnant women. Most of them were unmarried and very good looking. What would they teach the child they would give birth to, and what would be the paternity of the child if an unmarried girl had a child without paternity? Then, there would be no chance for them to get married later. Tell me, don’t they have a life too? (Interview: 2022MRF4)

However, it was not easy to perform the abortion. My respondent told me,

These girls were raped and consequently became pregnant. Now, if they give birth to the baby, then will any man in the world ever marry them? Of course not! Most of the girls were one month, two months, or three months pregnant. We have built a very good relationship with those girls, saying different things like abortion cannot be done after three months, you have to bring the baby into the world, you are like my sister and friend, we are doing everything because we thought about your well-being. They trust us, and we did abortions by keeping these very secret. However, some girls became pregnant due to rape and did not tell anyone, even their parents. Even when the parents knew about it, they also denied telling us about the pregnancy. Because they thought that their daughter’s future would be ruined, no one would marry their daughter, and people would humiliate them. You know, we must live in this community. (Interview: 2022MRF4)

As their futures were the most important concern for the parents and the girls themselves, I asked my respondents how society treats them now. One of my respondents replied,

We have done it [abortion], so we kept it secret. Secrecy is still prevalent in camps, and it is related to the welfare of victims of sexual violence. We, as volunteers, also feel responsible for keeping it secret. We shouldn’t let the news about the victims spread in the community to make her life more vulnerable. (Interview: 2022MRF5)

The same respondents also claimed that women and men in the camps tend to hide other forms of violence committed, particularly by men against women. I asked her why they hide it. She replied, ‘it is because women often are not allowed by their male members to report it to the Majhi, or CiC [Camp-in-Charge]. I think this is related to our cultural norms regarding women’s behaviour in public, as well as the dependency of women on the male for everything’ (Interview: 2023MRF1). This illustrates how traditional gender norms and social structure exacerbate structural violence among the Rohingya (Galtung, 1996).

Previous research and news reports have discussed the prevalence of different kinds of GBV in the Rohingya refugee camps, including physical torture. One study claimed that the main perpetrator of violence against women is intimate partners; for example, approximately 81 percent of violence against women was committed by their intimate partners (International Rescue Committee, 2020). Although it was difficult to know the extent of such domestic violence in the camps, one of my respondents, who works in an NGO as a social worker and deals with domestic violence, told me, ‘I have 20–25 such cases of domestic violence in my hands. Some days ago, one husband punched on his wife’s face and broke his wife’s tooth … It is not very uncommon in other households in the camps’. Other types of violence against women in the camps, as my respondents told me, include denial and deprived access to resources and services (e.g., control of food and other aid, controlling movement). Another aspect of domestic violence is psychological harm and abuse (e.g., insults, humiliation, and threats). There is also evidence of sexual violence by intimate partners in the form of forced intercourse among married Rohingya women.

I asked my respondents why a male member of the family commits such violence against a female member of the family. The main reasons they offered for domestic violence against females are early marriage, lack of education, the incapacity of women and their families to meet the dowry demands, multiple marriages among the men, and lack of income or jobs for men. Moreover, as the Rohingya social structure is patriarchal and lacks access to resources, there is a high level of inequality between males and females. As is evident from the different stories shared by the respondent, a man in the patriarchal Rohingya society is expected to be the main breadwinner and protect his family from the shock. Being a refugee in the camp who is not entitled to work makes it difficult to sustain a livelihood. Therefore, the man feels powerless and a sense of guilt not being able to feed his family. This stressor also contributes to violence against female member of the family.

One of my respondents did not see it as violence against her; rather, it has been the tradition of the community, and ‘the husband has the right to physically torture his wife if she doesn’t listen to him’ (Interview: 2018MRF6). When asked why she thinks so, she replied, ‘My husband provides me with food and clothes and fulfils my basic needs. Therefore, I should be obedient to him and follow whatever he demands. In addition, if I fail to follow him, he can punish me’. This resonates with what Bourdieu (1979) calls ‘symbolic violence’, in which women do not see or recognise domestic violence as violence in any form. However, this attitude was not prevalent among the women I interviewed, as many of my female respondents were on the way to being empowered. Here, I refer to those refugee women who obtained some education in Myanmar and now work as paid volunteers in different organisations, and who are increasingly becoming aware of gender discrimination and the ways to achieve gender equity.

It became obvious from the respondents that domestic violence against women is widespread in the camps. Alongside domestic violence, different forms of structural violence—for example, child marriage and multiple marriages—have continued in the camps in Bangladesh. The section that follows explains child marriage and multiple marriages in camps.

Multiple Marriages, Child Marriages, and High Fertility

From news reports and information provided by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), there is a prevalence of high birth rates, multiple marriages, and child marriages in the refugee camps. According to GoB, every year, approximately 30,000 children are born in camps.Footnote 1 The GoB estimates that, in 2022, 95 children were born every day in the camps in Cox’s Bazar. I, too, found a large family size among my respondents and asked them why there was such a high population growth rate in the camps. One common answer was that children are Allah’s will. Recently, the Bangladeshi Home Minister commented that Rohingyas have more children to obtain more food aid since the headcount, not one’s age, is considered in the allocation of food aid for refugees (Radio Free Asia, 2022). However, subjective notions about religion or the desire for more food cannot explain the population growth in the camps. Rather, several interlinked structural factors are responsible for this rapid growth. For example, all of my respondents agreed that it was not easy to have or give birth to more children in Rakhine State, as the military and the local administration have enormous control over births, not only with children but also with livestock.

Fewer reproductive restrictions in the camps is one factor. One of my respondents told me, ‘Coming to Bangladesh gave us a lot of freedom and Bangladesh has done a lot of good things for us. There is no control from the government on the birth of children. Therefore, many of our Rohingya people are giving birth to more children than ever before’ (Interview: 2022MRF4). Other factors contributing to the increased birth rate in the camps include multiple marriages, child marriage, and the lack of women’s agency. One of my respondents explained how the lack of women’s agency contributes to a high birth rate. She told me, ‘I have no control over giving birth. We haven’t been taking any birth control measures. Even when I was introduced to birth control measures by one NGO here in the camp, my husband insisted not to use them’. Then, I asked why not, and she replied, ‘I can’t tell you the reason…I feel ashamed’ (Interview: 2018MRF3). Taboos, lack of education, and social stigma related to birth control collectively influence or shape people’s perceptions about birth control among the Rohingya, particularly among women. This is connected with the control of women’s sexual and reproductive choices by men and regulating the use of women’s bodies by men which serves as a pivotal and defining aspect of patriarchy (Whisnant, 2021).

In addition to fewer reproductive restrictions and the lack of women’s agency, child marriages and multiple marriages are contributing factors. In the camps, there are many incidences of multiple marriages. One of my respondents told me how men justify their multiple marriages: ‘Many of our Rohingya people think that our Prophet Mohammad (SWA), married twelve times, so why cannot we get married multiple times, many people think that should one of their wives become sick, they will need to marry another to serve them’ (Interview: 2022MRF8). This can be considered a type of cultural violence because, in this instance, men use religion to justify their multiple marriages (beshi-biya).Footnote 2 Although Rohingya women generally have a negative view of multiple marriages, some women misrecognise it as a form of violence (symbolic violence) (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2004) and try to justify it with necessity (zorurot óiye). For example, when asked if she knows anyone who has multiple marriages, one respondent replied with a big laugh, ‘I have it in my house. My father married twice’. She then added that ‘it was for a valid reason. My mother went to jail, and there was no one to take care of and cook for us… Now my two mothers happily live under the same roof. No fighting between them. We are eight siblings from my mother’s side and two from my stepmother’s side’ (Interview: 2022MRF2). Moreover, the misrecognition of violence by Rohingya women may also be connected to class position, education, and access to resources.

Respondents also noted that it was not easy to attain multiple wives and more kids while in Rakhine State. One of them told me,

We had to take a Zati photo (a photo of all the family members together). In Myanmar, we could not get married multiple times.Footnote 3 We could not get married before turning 18 years old. If someone wanted to get married, they had to go to the military camp to get married. We were forced to get married in a way that we had to confirm in the marriage contract (Nikah) that we would not seek multiple marriages. They made sure that I was above 18 years old, and they forced us to pay the groom a very high bride money so that the groom could not divorce and get married again. (Interview: 2022MRF5)

This is a control mechanism to ensure that the Rohingya population would not increase. As discussed in the previous chapter, mainstream Buddhists and the military in Myanmar consider the Rohingya to be ‘dangerously reproductive’, which in turn would populate the country with Muslims.

One of the respondents gave an interesting insight into multiple marriages. She thinks that ‘getting married is a job. As most of the Rohingya young men do not have any job at the camps or are not involved in any productive work, they think what they can do is get married’ (Interview: 2022MRM12). Other respondents connected multiple marriages with the financial benefits. One interviewee discussed the dowry (zotok) tradition, which is widely practiced in camps, noting, ‘it’s not only cash payment but also gold (what they have brought, mainly from Rakhine) or any other material goods that can be paid as dowry. Therefore, someone who got married in Camp 1 can go to Camp 20 to get married there to live on the dowry for days’ (Interview: 2022MRM9). Another respondent observed that, when a man marries a woman, he becomes the owner of the woman and everything belonging to her. This also affects the number of ration cards they receive and he then has control over these rationed goods. My respondents identified additional factors that are responsible for multiple marriages. One such factor is the lack of livelihood activities for male refugees in the camps. As they are not legally allowed to work, they sit idle. There is also a lack of recreational facilities in the camps, so men spend a lot of time sitting in front of small shops in the camps and gossiping. One respondent considered multiple marriages to be a ‘negative coping mechanism’ to the vulnerabilities faced by male refugees (Interview: 2023INGOF1). Few of my respondents claimed that by nature men are polygamous and thus ‘because of this bad habit wherever he goes and sees a beautiful woman, he gets married with that woman’ (Interview: 2022MRF8).

Child marriage violates human rights and it limits or inhibits the growth of girls to their full potential. Nonetheless, all of my respondents, along with several recent studies, have mentioned a high prevalence of child marriage in camps (Melnikas et al., 2020; Oxfam International, 2018; UNFPA, 2020). Data published by the Myanmar Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for 2015–2016 showed that 16 percent of girls were married before the age of 18 and 1.9 percent were married before the age of 15 nationwide (Myanmar Ministry of Health and Sports and ICF, 2017). Although the prevalence of child marriage was not given for Rakhine State and specifically for the Rohingya, my interviewees told me about the occurrence of child marriage in their community. It was not easy to conduct child marriages in Rakhine State and, those who did had to bribe the local authority and the military. However, the situation in the camp is different. I asked my respondents why there is a prevalence of child marriage in the camps. One told me that the traditional and religious structure of the Rohingya community that is responsible. She said,

In our Rohingya community, when a girl becomes big (Dõr oiye), we cannot delay marrying our girls, as the boys will start looking at them. Many people say bad things about the girls, and sometimes these might be fake. Our community directly or indirectly pushes us to marry our girls early. (Interview: 2022MRF2)

Then, I asked when a girl is considered ‘becoming big’ and eligible for marriage. She replied, ‘with the start of her first menstruation (haiz shuru’on) of a girl, in our community, people start to think about her marriage. However, the eligibility for boys is different, and in most cases, a boy’s eligibility for marriage is connected to his ability to earn’.

All the respondents agreed that the lack of education and poverty is responsible for child marriage. However, there are those who object to child marriage among the Rohingya, as one of my respondents told me,

I am now 19 years old and unmarried. If I were from another family, I was supposed to be married when I turned 12 or 13 years old. However, my mother did not do that as she understood that setting marriage for a very young girls in not healthy and safe. As I got the opportunity to study here and live in the city [Cox’s Bazar], it also has an impact on not getting married early. However, most importantly, early marriages vary from family to family and by educational and economic background. (Interview: 2022MRF7)

Other gender-specific aspects of child marriage stream from feelings of insecurity. Insecurity comes in the form of being susceptible to physical or sexual violence by males in camps. When asked what kinds of insecurity women experience, one interviewee replied,

Child marriage occurs due not only to poverty but also to different kinds of insecurity in the camps. For example, when we pass through a road, even a very adult male teases us. Sometimes some adult males abduct females in the camps. In the camps, it has become so fierce that we had to hide even a very young girl child. One is abducting another’s young girls, disregarding whether she is young or adult age. Therefore, marrying her to others is a way to get rid of such problems. (Interview: 2022MRF8)

Another respondent told me, ‘When our girls turn 11 years old, parents start off setting their marriage and within a year they must complete it. It’s a relief for the parents’. When asked why this was so, she replied, ‘In one family, if there are three/four girls staying idle at home, parents are in constant fear. Fear of many things. Fear of what others will say about their unmarried girls, fear about how to feed all these girls and fear of teasing by a male in the camps. Additionally, a parent can empty the crowded space in their house getting their girls married as early as possible’ (Interview: 2023MRF7).

Due to the lack of space in the camps, large numbers of people are stuck living together. It is interesting to know how lack of space has contributed to child marriage as a negative coping mechanism. As another respondent explained,

In our camp, our houses are tiny. In such a small house, it is impossible to accommodate a large family. For example, in my family, we are seven members, and the house size is 10 yards (appx. 9 sq. meters). Where will my parents sleep, where will my brother sleep and where will his wife sleep? Just imagine the situation when parents, adult girls, and their brothers and in-laws have to sleep in a very small space and under the same roof. In such a 10-yard house, we all are living jam-packed like a sack of potatoes. No privacy, no intimacy, it is just a disaster. It is not a human life, but something else. No space to breathe here! In other camps, there are more specious houses. Therefore, I have seen in my camp, that parents are coping with the scarcity of space by getting rid of their daughters by arranging early marriage for them. (Interview: 2022MRF8)

It is crucial to comprehend the complex dynamics and the interplay between subjective interpretations of religion, notions of piety, and the instrumental use of Islam as a means to justify one’s actions. This becomes evident when examining the justifications articulated by the Rohingya community, where the practice of multiple marriages, for instance, is often attributed to the example of the Prophet of Islam and his multiple marriages. However, a discrepancy arises when Rohingya men abandon their sick wives and neglect their children, contradicting the teachings and actions (Sunnah) of the Prophet. In such instances, individuals seek to manipulate the religious beliefs of the ordinary Rohingya, exploiting Islam to provide legitimacy for their actions and to fulfil their personal needs.

With regard to the issue of multiple marriages, there is insufficient governmental and international organisational intervention. According to some respondents, obtaining permission from the Camp-in-Charge (CiC)Footnote 4 to marry within the camps takes around a year. As a result, Rohingya men opt to marry with the assistance of camp elders, avoiding the expenses that the bride’s parents would otherwise incur during the waiting period for CiC approval. During the marriage process, the groom and his relatives traditionally visit the bride’s home until the completion of the marriage ceremony. Thus, if CiC approval is delayed, the bride’s parents would need to entertain a larger number of guests during that time. Consequently, parents find it more practical to organise marriage without the CiC’s permission.

From Personal Hygiene to Mental Trauma

During the interviews, it was evident that refugees suffer from different diseases and mental trauma. All the respondents, regardless of their gender identity, told me they are still bearing mental trauma from their forced relocation and current precarious living situation. For example, one respondent said,

The girls who are inside the house suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder because they have had nothing to do since they fled from Myanmar. Now, they are suffering from some kind of mental imbalance. There are many NGOs here that deal with mental problems. Although mental health means mental wellbeing, Rohingya people think they are treating mad people. Therefore, they think that mentally sick people are being treated here. Why should we go to those who treat the mentally retarded? The family thinks that if they go to a mental hospital, they will be laughed at and talked about so much that they do not want to go there. (Interview: 2022MRN3)

However, women and young girls suffer more from different kinds of gender-specific problems and diseases. One such problem is the difficulty of maintaining personal hygiene. Women respondents explained how difficult it is to use public bathing and toilet facilities. One respondent told me,

NGOs have arranged toilets and showers for us, but they are far away from home, and many families share one or two toilets. As a result, girls cannot use the toilets during the day even if they want to. Because there are many boys and people on the way to the toilet, it is very difficult to go. Although the shower can be done at home, the toilet cannot be done anywhere else. As a result, we have to wait until the evening. In addition, if it is very important during the day, then we must wear a burqa to go to the toilet. It is very much a problem. (Interview: 2022MRF7)

Another respondent told me, ‘Holding urination for a long time to find a suitable space to do it is creating infections among us, including myself’ (Interview: 2022MRF8). Unfortunately, there do not seem to be any immediate solutions for toilets and water and bathing issues. One of the respondents told me they had requested the volunteers to increase the number of tube wells and toilets, but with no results yet. As she said, ‘in our camp, we have only two toilets. We have requested our volunteers. Every time they come, they take the request list with them. However, we haven’t seen any action yet’ (Interview: 2022MRF8). In addition to urinary tract infections, all the respondents agreed that there is an increased prevalence of hepatitis A and B among males and females in the camps. However, an increase in infectious diseases has also led to divorce. As one of my respondents told me, ‘As hepatitis increased in the camps, I have seen a woman who was infected with hepatitis B. Her husband didn’t have the ability to treat her, and no NGOs helped her with the treatment. As a result, the man left his wife and got married to another woman. However, this woman’s life is ruined, and she has four kids to take care of’ (Interview: 2022MRF4). This relates to the issue of women’s lack of agency, given that men have greater power to decide whom to live with.

There are several other gender-specific problems in the camps, including personal hygiene. For example, issues with menstrual hygiene are difficult to deal with, as it is attached to issues with Rohingya social structure, stigma, and the physical facilities in the camps. As one of my respondents explained,

NGOs provide girls with sanitary pads to use during periods. The sanitary pads provided cannot be dried inside the house or in the bathroom which are located outside of the house. However, when we were in Burma, we could let it dry nicely behind the bathroom, which no one could see but myself. Now if we let it dry in the bathroom, all sorts of people come in and see it! This is a shame. If you cannot let this thing dry in the sun, then the thing will not be usable, insects will come there. In addition, at home, it cannot be allowed to dry because the brothers are watching, and the father is watching. Because of this, the wet pad is being used repeatedly. Due to this, we are facing various diseases. (Interview: 2022MRF4)

Access to Justice and Gender Issues in the Camps

During my interviews in the Rohingya camps, it became evident that the formal justice system in the camps is very limited, particularly as it relates to violence against women. As they have no access to the Bangladeshi formal legal system, women rely mainly on the informal justice mechanism. Some NGOs work on GBV and provide women a friendly space for counselling, or simply a place for women to meet and share experiences in the camps. Nevertheless, getting justice after domestic violence is quite difficult. One of the respondents, who is employed by an international organisation, shared with me that GBV survivors in the camps tend to avoid seeking refuge in the available safe shelters.Footnote 5 There are two primary reasons for this. First, there are numerous bureaucratic and administrative hurdles associated with accessing these shelters. For instance, an individual may urgently require shelter, but the CiC might need to contact relevant personnel, engage in discussions, and subsequently take some time to provide the necessary assistance. This prolonged process creates a sense of reluctance among survivors to utilise shelter facilities. Second, there is a social stigma surrounding these safe shelters. When survivors return to the community after their stay, they often encounter a cycle of violence and face numerous inquiries. The community members may question the survivor about her prolonged absence. A prevailing perception within the community is that women engage in transactional sex outside the camp during their absence. Consequently, the woman becomes stigmatised, leading to her reluctance to accept the offer of safe shelter. Furthermore, if the survivor has children, she faces additional challenges regarding their care. Questions arise regarding where she can leave her children and whether she can bring them along. If bringing the children is possible, the duration for which they can stay in the shelter becomes a concern. The safe shelter option thus becomes untenable for many survivors in such circumstances.

Often, violence against women, particularly sexual violence, goes unaddressed and remains silent because of the unavailability of services, existing social norms, and customary practices. Some Majhi might intervene in settling disputes (small-scale conflicts, family-related disputes, etc.) and the CiC becomes involved in it if the Majhi fails to settle the dispute. However, this process is quite complicated, as it is embedded in asymmetrical power relations and too bureaucratic. One of my respondents told me,

In many cases, it is not possible to obtain proper justice from the Majhi. As the Majhi is always a man, and the perpetrator is also a man, he has more access to the Majhi. He can easily influence the Majhi to bring justice in his favour. I know perpetrators often bribe the Majhi. Therefore, women are always victims and do not get the justice they deserve. They receive unfair treatment from the Majhi. (Interview: 2023MRF1)

This informal justice system, as my respondent told me, often does not bring any punishment against the perpetrator. Rather, the offender is forced to ask for mercy from the victim and provide a written commitment that he will not repeat such an act of violence in the future. I asked this respondent why this is the standard. He replied that these days there is enormous insecurity and criminality in the camps. Moreover, the authorities aim to bring harmony and resolve disputes rather than punish the offenders. The government has recently withdrawn the military from the camps and deployed the Armed Police Battalion (APBn). During my last visit to the camps in 2023, it became clear that refugees want the military to be back in the camp for security and for resolving all other disputes in the camps. However, this is not likely to happen.

Another respondent told me why it is so difficult to reach the CiC. He said, ‘We are a powerless human being living the camp. CiC sir is always surrounded by many people, such as his assistants and the Majhi. If you want to reach him for some reason, you must pass through so many people to reach him, and it can take even more than a year to reach him’ (Interview:2023MRM2). Another respondent added, ‘as it is a too lengthy and tiresome process which requires back-and-forth steps to reach CiC to get formal justice, women just abandon the hope for justice. In the end, women just accept injustice’ (Interview: 2023 MRF1).

It was also reportedFootnote 6 that after a six-year-old Rohingya girl was raped and found unconscious, the mother of the girl wanted to file a report with both Armed Police Battalion (APBn) and the CiC, but struggled. She recalled,

The APBn told me that, since it’s a ‘sensitive case,’ I could only file a complaint with the CiC. I was determined to take legal action, but I need the support of the CiC or Bangladesh authorities to do so, since I’m Rohingya. It’s not like I can just go to the police station like Bangladeshi people can. But unfortunately, the CiC didn’t give me permission or even meet me again for another five days. (Human Rights Watch, 2023, para 52)

After her struggle, she managed to reach the local police, but the police denied her claim on the grounds of a false medical document. Now, she and her little daughter are in constant fear as they are threatened by the man who the girl identified as the rapist.

To date, all if the CiCs in Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar have been male.Footnote 7 A female CiC, though a government official, might endeavour to acknowledge the plight of Rohingya females and intervene in GBV instances. While her capacity to ensure justice in such cases would be limited, she could play a significant role by recognising the vulnerabilities faced by Rohingya women and taking proactive steps to address and mitigate their challenges.

ARSA, Gangs, Insecurity, and Women Refugees

It is clear from the different news media outlets that the camps are experiencing increased criminality, drug trafficking, and conflicts over the control of resources, particularly among young adults. One report claims that ‘Arson, kidnapping, trafficking, drugs, and fights were listed as the most common crimes in the camps. 90% of those interviewed said that kidnappings were a problem’ (Root, 2022, para 8). There is an enormous internal conflict among the contesting youth groups. As one of the respondents said, ‘Before the murder of Mohibullah,Footnote 8 there was unity in the camps. If any problem and conflict were to happen in the camps, he would help to solve them. After his murder, the situation deteriorated in the camps. Nobody would listen to anybody. Everyone is against everyone’ (Interview: 2022MRF5). Thus, it is important to understand how criminality and insecurity in camps affect women and young children. As women are facing multidimensional insecurities, many of the women respondents told me they became victims of public sexual harassment by Rohingya youths. As one of the respondents told me,

I feel scared to go out, particularly in the afternoon. Many times, when I went out during the afternoon, there were some young adults sitting idly on the street and doing nothing. They started following me and stalking me. I then started walking fast and stopped going where I intended to go. It has not happened just with me, also with many other young girls. (Interview: 2022MRF7)

Another form of insecurity stems from ARSA. News media in Bangladesh have reported that ARSA was involved in the killing of Rohingya leader Mohibullah, six murders in the camps, and extortion in the camps (Bdnews24.com, 2022). However, in an interview with a Bangladesh TV channel,Footnote 9 the chief of ARSA denied any connection to these killings (Jamuna Television, 2022). According to the police and news media, there are other ‘terrorist’ groups in the camps, such as ‘Munna Bahini’, fighting for control in the camps (Prothom Alo, 2022). According to a leading Bengali national newspaper, Daily Prothom Alo, ‘Around 14 armed criminal gangs are active in the 34 Rohingya refugee camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf upazila in Cox’s Bazar. Seven of these groups are active in Ukhiya and seven in Teknaf. These groups are involved in various crimes, including Yaba [a synthetic drug which combines methamphetamine and caffeine] and gold smuggling, kidnapping, extortion and human trafficking’ (Prothom Alo, 2021, para 1). The presence of different terrorist groups in the camps poses security threats to the ordinary Rohingya and Bangladeshi states. When asked about what they know about ARSA, one respondent told me,

A bad group is born among the Rohingyas. Earlier, some Rohingyas left Pakistan, from which some people came back again. Then, some people came from Saudi Arabia. To be honest, the Rohingyas were not allowed to study, which is why they are still uneducated. Those uneducated people who came from outside, have formed a group within the Rohingya community. The main purpose of forming their party was to make the Arakan State independent. They demanded a contribution from the Rohingyas, saying that Arakan State would be independent. If anyone did not pay, he would be beaten up. In that way, there are many big and wise people among the Rohingyas; they used to ask them to go to Burma with them, and they also said that they will go to Burma to fight, they will need weapons, and for that, they need money. By saying this, they used to charge more money from them than usual and beat them if they did not pay. In addition, there is such a record that they killed many people before killing Master Mohibullah! (Interview: 2022MRM1)

It is also important to understand how this could threaten women’s security in the camps. One respondent claimed that, although the extent of their presence in the camps varies, ARSA has committed extortion, forced marriage, and physical torture against some women. She stated that ‘ARSA [members] forcibly marry women and often they marry multiple times’ (Interview: 2022MRF9). Another respondent shared her story about how she was abducted and tortured by ARSA:

I, along with another woman named Rokeya, were abducted by ARSA last year. As I was doing some community work, they abducted me and demanded money from me. However, I told them I don’t have money. Then, my husband and other relatives negotiated with ARSA and released me after giving them a written commitment that I would not continue my work. However, I think it was not the main reason, since the wife of Munna who led a rival gang used to come to my community work, they abducted me to take revenge against the Munna gang. I was lucky that ARSA did not torture me. They kept Rokeya in custody for more than a week. Most often, when they abduct men, they torture a lot and often kill them. (Interview: 2023MRF1)

It is clear from the respondents that compared to men, women and young girls have strong feelings of insecurity, whether this comes from ARSA or any other gangs. As one respondent said, ‘When talking about insecurity, the first thing that comes up is that we cannot move freely! We must always walk in fear! If we want to go outside, we feel that if the gangs want something from us and if we cannot give it, then they will torture us or even kidnap us. Therefore, we could not go out for these. When we had to go to the hospital or for various urgent needs, we were in fear of kidnapping. In addition, there are trafficking—people who sell women, we are more afraid of them!’ (Interview: 2022MRM1).

Ordinary Rohingya, as they claimed during interviews, have no connection or interest in ARSA. One of the respondents told me, ‘Since we came to Bangladesh from Myanmar, we have been seeing some miscreants using the name of ARSA doing some bad things’ (Interview: 2022MRM3). Although only one of my respondents was kidnapped by ARSA, all the respondents claimed that they knew someone who was tortured by ARSA. Whether it is ARSA or other gangs in the camps, there is a clear increase in criminal activities in the camps. When asked why, my respondents identified many reasons, including the lack of job opportunities, no education, drug addiction, greed, engagement of a criminal gang from the host communities, the presence of Yaba smuggling routes in this area, the absence of military in the camps, the absence of the security police in the camps during the evening and at night, etc.

Rohingya Men in Bangladesh: ‘Monstrous Other’ on the Creation

It has been more than five years since the Rohingya were stranded in the camps in Bangladesh. Over the last few years, crimes, the drug trade, and murders have increased in the camps. According to the Daily Star, a leading national daily, Bangladesh Police databases show that at least 21 Rohingya individuals were murdered during a four-month period (June–October) in 2022. The police have filed approximately 2441 cases (1644 cases of drugs, 88 rape, 115 murder, and 39 abductions) against 5226 Rohingya over crimes at the Rohingya refugee camps (Khan & Yousuf, 2022). Although most local people in the host community were welcoming to the Rohingya, some of our respondents showed quite a negative attitude towards them, particularly those who became directly affected by their relocation. For example, during the first phase of interviews, one of my respondents, a small grocery shopkeeper near Camp Five, complained, ‘Now I became a refugee myself’. When asked how that is possible, he replied,

Look, I and my family have been living here in this place (next to the camp). You see, on the right side, I used to have my agricultural lands on which I used to live. However, now, you see, it’s been taken by the government to rehabilitate the Rohingya. You see, part of the land of my house has been cut off, and the rest will go away soon. Don’t I then become a refugee in my own land? (Interview: 2018LM5)

I observed the same kind of frustration among some of the respondents who were day labourers. During my interviews with them in Ukhiya, they told me how the Rohingya young men and children are taking their jobs away. One respondent told me, ‘Rohingya children work almost for free in restaurants and in other shops now. It means less opportunity for us’ (Interview: 2018LM4). However, on the contrary, a local shopkeeper in the same area told me, ‘as the Rohingya came in an enormous number in the small place, it created a large demand on the local supply chain. Even small shops like one of mine are benefiting from this’ (Interview: 2018LM6). Despite the initially welcoming attitude towards the Rohingya, people started becoming frustrated and felt deprived of international aid and other kinds of help. As time went on, the security situation worsened and criminal activities rose in the camps. This led to distrust, feelings of burden, and insecurity among the people in the host community. Local people started to think of Rohingya men as drug leaders and kidnappers and as a threat to the security of the region. To some, their ‘Muslim brother’ (Rohingya) has turned into a ‘common enemy’ (to the host). As one of the respondents told me, ‘When they first arrived and asked for shelter in our land, knowing our Muslim brothers’ sufferings in Myanmar, we became empathic toward them and welcomed them … It was such a mistake our people have done. These are criminals and Yaba traders. We now regret that we gave them shelter here’ (Interview: 2023LM3). The host community has gradually become less and less sympathetic towards the Rohingya; as one of the respondents told me, ‘Why should we care about these outsiders? They are job snatchers, resource destroyers and dakoits. They are becoming monsters’ (Interview: 2023LM1). All the Rohingya respondents I interviewed during the second and third phases of my interviews agreed on the increased criminality in the camps. They listed the most common types of crime in the camps as harassment, extortion, kidnapping, illicit drug trade and consumption, and gang-based crime.

The feeling of insecurity among the host community also stems from thinking about the future of the Rohingya crisis. As one of the respondents told me, ‘I don’t think they will go back to Myanmar. I am worried about the future of our kids. When they mix up with them, their prospects will be ruined’ (Interview: 2023LM3). In addition to these concerns, the presence of ARSA makes the camps and nearby areas more vulnerable to the rise of militancy, pushing the host community into further trouble.

Ordinary and Empowered Rohingya Women: Unpacking Complexities

During my interviews with local people in Cox’s Bazar, one respondent told me, ‘Rohingya women are looking for sympathy and attention from the presenting them as very vulnerable’. When asked why he thought so, he replied, ‘they are probably lying about their sufferings to get attention. They are too conservative and lazy, doing nothing’ (Interview: 2023LM3) Though this might not be a prevailing perception of the Rohingya women, a negative perception and an enemy discourse is under construction among the host community, as noted above. Yet, against all odds, some—if not many—Rohingya women are becoming empowered through different activities with gender-based programmes in the camps. Many Rohingya men and women have been working as volunteers in NGOs, including international and UN organisations. One respondent who works with such an organisation explained how she thinks the empowerment process is on its way to them. She explained, ‘Now I work with CPJ [Centre for Peace and Justice, BRAC University] as a volunteer. I have been gaining work experience, and one day I hope I will achieve an even better position. My family gives importance to my opinion in decision making’ (Interview: 2022MRF2). Like her, many men also work as volunteers and run their own refugee-led organisations (RLO). For example, one interviewee, who runs an RLO, believes that his organisation contributes to the empowerment of volunteers and other participants. A respondent named Nahar told me,

When we came to Bangladesh, we learned about rights. Here, we learned that boys and girls have equal rights. I work with TDH [Terre des hommes] and UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] from where I have learned many things. Having learned these things, I now feel much more aware. I am also trying to spread this knowledge among my Rohingya brothers and sisters. (Interview: 2022MRF5)

All the volunteers and leaders of the RLOs I interviewed are in a better position to claim their rights and are aware of their obligations to the community.

However, pathways to empowerment are not easy for these displaced people. Obstacles include the Rohingya social structure, gendered identity, (lack of) access to resources, and the camp governance structure. For example, one of my respondents told me,

There are many of our Rohingyas who do not want girls to go out of the house. They think that girls are bad if they go out of the house. As a result, the girls who work and go out of the camp are looked down upon and considered bad girls. They think “why girls should work, there are boys for that”. (Interview: 2022MRF7)

None of my male respondents, who also work as volunteers and run RLOs, faced the same problems as female respondents. Beyond this gendered social structural dimension, access to resources and human capital in the form of skills and education play a significant role. All the respondents who work as volunteers for different NGOs have a certain level of education and most of them are youth. Thus, relatively older and uneducated Rohingya are left out of such empowerment procedures. In addition, generally, no female works as a CiC in the camp. Understanding women’s issues and providing support accordingly to the women remains a challenge due to the governance pattern of the camp. Moreover, there are restrictions on movement for the Rohingya, which makes it difficult for them to leave the camps. It eventually affects the empowerment procedures for the Rohingya.

Conclusion

The vulnerabilities of Rohingya men and women living in the refugee camps in Bangladesh are multidimensional and gendered. While they are still bearing mental trauma and physical scars, the securitisation of Rohingya refugees is in the making. Women are experiencing different structural, cultural, and symbolic violence in the forms of intimate partner violence, polygamy, child marriage, insecurity, and a lack of wellbeing. Many Rohingya men are becoming involved in crime. The host community’s initial sympathy towards the Rohingya is turning into hostility and Muslim brotherhood to enmity. This form of ‘othering’ of the Rohingya community has led to the construction of the Rohingya men as a ‘monstrous other’. It is, however, undeniable that in the camps, there is a different life—a highly unsecured and gang rule prevails. In the public psyche of the host community, the word ‘Rohingya’ is being used as an offensive term. Often, they use the term to tease someone or to indicate ‘criminality’. Despite all odds, some of the Rohingya women are on the way to being empowered.