The Conference on the Future of Europe and Political Families: Pushing for Reform

Abstract

The Conference on the Future of Europe brought together politicians and citizens across the European Union to discuss the future of integration. While designed as a bottom-up forum for listening to citizens, it offered an opportunity for the Europarties to advance their own objectives. This chapter examines how successful the three largest Europarties were in shaping the agenda, debates, and final outcome of the Conference, particularly regarding institutional reform. Inside the Parliament, the EP political groups formed large coalitions behind parliamentary resolutions calling for stronger EU level democracy. Europarties in turn remained throughout the process in a smaller role, while the political foundations contributed actively with events and various documents. Content analysis of the positions of the Europarties confirms their continued support for supranational democracy but shows also interesting variation in their more detailed objectives.

Introduction

Theoretically, the policy influence of the Europarties should vary depending on the venue. As we argued in Chapter 2, political actors can seek to purposefully select venues that facilitate the advancement of their objectives (e.g., Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Princen, 2011). More supranational formats should benefit the Europarties and their European Parliament (EP) political groups, while intergovernmental forums should in turn be less conducive to transnational partisan politics. However, while European Council summitry and Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) convened for the purpose of Treaty reform may be dominated by national governments, Chapter 4 nonetheless uncovered clear evidence of partisan influence also in such settings. Yet, venue choice should matter, and the empirical analysis in the previous chapter also showed that the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002–2003) was strongly impacted by the Europarties, not least their EP groups and members of the European Parliament (MEP).

The purpose of this chapter is to continue this line of inquiry through exploring the role of Europarties in the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFE).¹ It offered yet another opportunity for the Europarties and their EP political groups to shape both the direction of integration and the institutional set-up of the Union. Designed as an innovative, bottom-up exercise in deliberative democracy, bringing together citizens across the European Union (EU), the start of the CoFE was delayed until May 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Chaired by the EU institutions and utilizing a combination of virtual platforms, national events, citizens’ panels, and plenaries, in May 2022 the CoFE reached conclusions and recommended ways forward for the Union. However, the full impact of the CoFE is not clear since a range of member states remain hesitant or opposed to a constitutional convention and Treaty changes suggested by the CoFE in its final document adopted by a large majority of members.

We examine not just the positions of the Europarties but also what they did—individually and as a coalition of forces—to drive the process and advance their ambitions in the run-up to and during CoFE. We focus on the three largest Europarties, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), the centre-left Party of European Socialists (PES), and the centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), and their corresponding EP political groups. We address two main questions: What did the Europarties do to influence the Conference? Secondly, how effective were they in shaping the course and outcome of the Conference, that is, to what extent did they achieve their goals? In answering the questions, the chapter explores the various avenues and strategies through which the Europarties and their EP political groups sought to influence the Conference: coalition-building in the Parliament, and links with the Commission, national member parties, and European political foundations linked to the Europarties: for EPP the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (WMCES), for PES the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), and for ALDE the European Liberal Forum (ELF). It also analyzes the division of labour or balance of power between and within Europarties and their EP political groups regarding the Conference as well as the substantive priorities of these transnational partisan actors in CoFE. In terms of temporal coverage, the analysis focuses on the build-up to CoFE and its proceedings but does not examine developments after the Conference concluded its work.

Theoretically, this chapter leans on the two analytical approaches, agenda-setting and the advocacy coalition framework, identified in Chapter 2 of this book. Methodologically, the chapter is based on novel data collection through an inventory of CoFE material, including plenary speeches, documents consisting of resolutions, press releases, and other material from EU institutions and political foundations, Europarties and political groups in the EP, especially position papers, and interview evidence, supplemented by other primary material such as news reports, and partly on participant observation through the FEPS. Document analysis enables us to understand the sequencing of the events and whether the position papers of the Europarties and EP political groups influenced the CoFE agenda, debates, and final outcome. The interviewees were from the offices of the Europarties and the EP political groups, as well as individuals from the Parliament and the political foundations. The interviews were semi-structured and carried out between 2020 and 2022. The interviews and observational evidence were particularly useful in uncovering how the Europarties and the EP political groups attempted to shape the CoFE.

To structure our analysis, we formulate a series of expectations. First, in terms of organizing CoFE, we expect that the transnational partisan actors specifically campaigned for the ‘conference format’ as opposed to more intergovernmental approaches. The ‘conference format’ is close to the ‘convention’ model utilized in the Convention on the Future of Europe two decades earlier and is by design more supranational, giving a strong role for the citizens and the plenary—with the latter a very familiar forum for parliamentarians. Regarding the division of labour between the Europarties and their EP political groups, the expectation is that the latter are more centrally involved in CoFE than their extra-parliamentary Europarties. MEPs are more ‘present’ in the EU policy process, have considerable experience of direct inter-institutional bargaining, and also have substantially stronger resources. Moreover, CoFE was not designed as a formal IGC resulting in Treaty changes, and thereby national heads of government were not directly involved. Regarding coalition-building, we expect to see active collaboration between the individual Europarties and/or their EP political groups, as they clearly had common objectives regarding the ‘future of Europe’. MEPs understand that parliamentary unity should help the EP in reaching its goals. In terms of the balance of power within the political groups, we expect the group chairs to be the dominant or at least the most visible actors. The rationale here is that to increase the chances of the EP’s voice being heard, political group chairs should take an active role in guiding the issues through the Parliament and in expressing the positions of the EP and the political groups. As for the position papers, we expect to find strong convergence in the Conference between the objectives of the three Europarties and their EP groups regarding institutions and EU democracy.

The chapter contains three sections. The first part examines agenda-setting and advocacy coalitions of transnational partisan actors in the run-up and also during CoFE, while the second empirical part analyzes the correspondence between the position papers of the main Europarties and the final outcome of the Conference. The results provide strong evidence of how CoFE, like the EU in general, has a significant transnational partisan dimension. The concluding section summarizes the findings, discusses the question of impact, and expands on the broader implications of this chapter for existing and future research.

Shaping the Agenda and Format of CoFE

The Road to the Conference

The Conference on the Future of Europe needs to be understood in the context of the turbulence experienced by the EU since the early 2010s. Both the euro crisis and the refugee crisis revealed strong tensions between the member states and different political families, with particularly the populist and radical right parties benefiting from the increased politicization of integration. Brexit in turn fuelled concerns about the rise of Eurosceptical movements and the democratic legitimacy of integration. In the wake of the Brexit vote in the summer of 2016 several key figures—notably the French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker—gave high-profile speeches that included initiatives for debates about the future of integration. The Commission headed by Juncker (EPP) proposed five scenarios for the future of Europe in March 2017, and this was crucial in triggering the subsequent reflections and concrete initiatives for reforming the Union.²

Simultaneously the Commission had experimented with wide-ranging consultations with citizens (e.g., Butcher & Stratulat, 2019). The European Year of Citizens was in 2013 and saw the emergence of the more regular Commission’s Citizens’ Dialogues (the first one had taken place on 27 September 2012 in Cadiz, Spain), essentially ‘town hall’ type of discussions on the future of Europe. Juncker’s Commission, appointed in 2014, intensified such efforts, so that ‘since the beginning of the Juncker Commission, 1,572 citizens’ dialogues have taken place in 583 locations. In addition, on 9 May 2018 the Commission launched an online consultation on the Future of Europe, with questions designed by a panel of citizens reflecting the diversity of Europe.’³

In September 2017, President Macron proposed ‘citizens’ conventions’ throughout the EU,⁴ and the idea was endorsed by the European Council in February 2018. In addition to the above-mentioned actions of the Commission, such ‘European Citizens’ Consultations’ were to be organized by governments in their respective member states. These consultations did materialize in all member states except Italy and the United Kingdom (which was about to exit the EU in any case). The Parliament had continued its long-standing tradition of adopting resolutions in favour of both deeper integration and of increasing its own powers.⁵ Antonio Tajani, the EP President, invited the heads of state or government of EU countries to give their visions on the Future of Europe in the EP plenaries.⁶ Building on these plenary debates with national leaders, in February 2019 the Parliament outlined its vision and priorities for the future of Europe.⁷ In the report, the Parliament exhibited once again strongly pro-integrationist goals, including commitment to the Spitzenkandidaten process. In March 2019 Macron, in an ‘open letter’ addressed to all Europeans, specifically called for the establishment of a ‘Conference for Europe’ that should proceed ‘without taboos’ and be based on wide-ranging consultation with citizens and civil society actors.⁸ The European Council in May adopted the Sibiu Declaration, outlining ten commitments for the future of Europe.⁹ And MEPs surely felt relieved when turnout increased in the EP elections held the same month quite significantly to just over 50% and the predicted rise in the Eurosceptical vote did not materialize.

In terms of agenda-setting, there was thus clearly in the aftermath of the multiple crises a ‘policy window’ open for debates about engaging with citizens and improving the democratic credentials of the EU. And in terms of the origins of the agenda items, we note the influence of both the international environment and the interests of the actual stakeholders, the EU institutions, and actors within them. Much of the efforts rested on the belief in a ‘democratic’ Europe and in an understanding that, in the words of Alemanno (2020: 508), ‘once Europe’s democratic genie is out of the bottle, it will be difficult to put it back in’.

The Parliament did not appreciate the European Council held in early July 2019 ignoring the Spitzenkandidaten process when choosing the candidate for the Commission president. But the candidate, Ursula von der Leyen (EPP), needed the majority of MEPs behind her. Thus, under the heading ‘A new push for European democracy’ in the guidelines for her Commission, von der Leyen expressed her commitment to a Conference on the Future of Europe:

I want citizens to have their say at a Conference on the Future of Europe, to start in 2020 and run for two years. The Conference should bring together citizens, including a significant role for young people, civil society, and European institutions as equal partners. The Conference should be well prepared with a clear scope and clear objectives, agreed between the Parliament, the Council and the Commission. I am ready to follow up on what is agreed, including by legislative action if appropriate. I am also open to Treaty change. Should there be a Member of the European Parliament put forward to chair the Conference, I will fully support this idea.¹⁰

The same guidelines stated that CoFE should address both the Spitzenkandidaten system and the introduction of transnational lists in EP elections. Not surprisingly, both items have long been on the agenda of both the Europarties and the Parliament. In particular, the Spitzenkandidaten mechanism has been defended by referring to fundamental values such as democracy and citizen participation. Von der Leyen further specified her thoughts on the Conference in the ‘mission letter’ to Dubravka Šuica, at that point the vice-president-designate for Democracy and Demography.¹¹ Šuica, a former MEP and vice-chair of the EPP Group, was responsible for dealing with the Conference in the Commission.

In subsequent position papers we can detect elements of both issue framing and venue shopping. On 26 November 2019, France and Germany published a paper that could be interpreted as trying to steer the process in a more intergovernmental direction and as an attempt to keep CoFE more focused on policies instead of institutional questions.¹² However, the joint contribution from France and Germany simultaneously gave a ‘strong push’ for the Conference (Fabbrini, 2019: 6), offering legitimacy and highest-level political support for the project amidst some more lukewarm receptions in select member state capitals—and of course it was Macron who had initiated the whole Conference with his ‘open letter’. The European Council of December 2019 gave a mission to the Croatian Presidency to prepare the Council position, underlining the need to focus on policies instead of institutional questions.¹³ Also various interest groups intervened. For example, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) called for the inclusion of social and labour market issues on the agenda.¹⁴

The Parliament and its main political groups had actively campaigned for the ‘conference format’, both in the various documents, including the final EP resolution adopted on 15 January 2020, and in their informal interactions with the Commission and other actors. On 22 January 2020 the Commission presented its Communication,¹⁵ according to which CoFE should deal with policies and institutions. Regarding the latter, the Communication restated the need to re-examine the Spitzenkandidaten process and the idea of transnational lists. While largely agreeing with the viewpoints of the Commission, critical voices among MEPs saw that the Commission was not as ambitious as the Parliament, both in terms of the format and the outcome of the Conference.¹⁶ On the Council side, the General Affairs Council addressed the issue on 28 January 2020, concluding that ministers ‘underlined the need to ensure a balanced representation of the three EU institutions and to fully involve national parliaments’.¹⁷

But after the COVID-19 pandemic set in, there was mainly silence until in early February 2021 the Council adopted its position.¹⁸ This paved the way for the joint statement of the three EU institutions adopted on 10 March, which outlined that CoFE operates under the authority of the Joint Presidency (presidents of the EP, Council, and Commission) and has an Executive Board where the three institutions have three seats each—Guy Verhofstadt from Renew Europe (the liberal group) was a co-chair of the Board and the other two MEPs were Manfred Weber from EPP and Iratxe García Pérez from Socialists & Democrats (S&D); accordingly the three biggest political families were represented. CoFE revolved around a multilingual digital platform,¹⁹ citizens’ panels organized nationally and by the EU institutions, and a Plenary.²⁰ It was officially launched on 9 May 2021, Europe Day, and reached its conclusions a year later. Table 5.1 contains the organizational set-up of the Conference.

Table 5.1 The organization of the Conference on the Future of Europe

CoFE was thus a mix of bottom-up deliberations and more top-down leadership (see e.g., Abels, 2023a, 2023b; Alemanno, 2020; Fabbrini et al., 2021; Oleart, 2023; Patberg, 2023). The Plenary and the Executive Board were expected to base their discussions on ideas emanating from the digital platform and the citizens’ panels. The Parliament was represented in the Plenary, the Executive Board, and the Joint Presidency, and especially the Plenary provided the EP political groups a direct channel of influence. Throughout the preparatory phase there were disagreements between the EU institutions about the organization of CoFE, including who would chair it, its content, as well as whether it could result in Treaty changes. The position of the Council was decidedly more intergovernmental than those of the EP and the Commission, with most national governments against or at least very hesitant about Treaty change and other binding outcomes.²¹ Also the Commission was hesitant about public commitments to Treaty reform. The institutional set-up of CoFE thus reflected contestation between more intergovernmental and supranational approaches, but the Commission and particularly the EP managed to win support for the ‘conference format’. Here the initiative of Macron was clearly influential.

Partisan Advocacy: Alone and Together

Turning to partisan activity, we explore first coalition-building in the Parliament before analyzing the advocacy of the Europarties. We can see from the beginning the EP trying to claim ‘ownership’ of the Conference. There was clearly from the outset rather high interest in the Conference among MEPs. As expected, the leaders of political groups were strongly involved. The Conference of Presidents—the body responsible for organizing Parliament’s business that consists of the EP president and the political groups’ chairs—established in October 2019 a Working Group on the Conference on the Future of Europe, with the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) having the main responsibility for dealing with the matter. Chaired by the late EP president David Sassoli (S&D), the Working Group brought together representatives from the party groups, including Paulo Rangel (EPP), Gabriele Bischoff (S&D), Verhofstadt (Renew Europe), and Tajani (EPP) in his capacity as the AFCO chair.²² AFCO did not appoint a rapporteur, as it did not issue a report, just the opinion mentioned below.

AFCO organized a public hearing on 4 December 2019 that featured a long list of speakers from EU institutions, academia, and civil society.²³ AFCO adopted its opinion on 9 December but not before sifting through the 238 amendments tabled by the MEPs seated on the committee.²⁴ This was the only ‘outreach’ effort by AFCO, but interviews suggest that MEPs spread the word about the Conference in different ways, from engaging with civil society actors to blog texts to speaking about the Conference within their national parties or with colleagues from domestic legislatures. The Working Group reported to the Conference of Presidents on 19 December, stating that the ‘note reflects the current consensus among a majority of the political groups on the scope, governance and outcome of the Conference’.²⁵ The fact that the preparations for the Conference were overseen by the Conference of Presidents indicates the high salience of the topic in the EP—and was simultaneously also meant as a signal to the other EU institutions that the Conference deserves to be taken seriously.

The main contents of the Working Group paper were included in the subsequent EP resolution adopted on 15 January 2020.²⁶ The motion for the resolution was tabled by MEPs from all political groups with the exception of the two Eurosceptical groups, European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID). On behalf of EPP it was signed by Weber, Rangel, Tajani, and Danuta Hübner; from S&D by García Pérez, Bischoff, and Domènec Ruiz Devesa; and from Renew Europe by Dacian Cioloş, Verhofstadt, and Pascal Durand.²⁷ The EP plenary discussed the issue in the presence of commissioner Šuica and the Council Presidency, with active input from across political groups.²⁸ The debate reflected the broad partisan consensus, with the Eurosceptics adopting more critical positions.²⁹ After the debate and votes on 37 amendments, the Parliament adopted its rather detailed resolution with 494 votes to 147 and 49 abstentions. In the EPP Group cohesion was 97.3%, in S&D 95.7%, and in Renew Europe 95.5%.³⁰ Examining the composition of the Working Group and the actors involved in the Parliament, we note the presence of group leaders—Weber and vice-chair Rangel from EPP, García Pérez from S&D, and Cioloş from Renew Europe—and other seasoned veterans, such as Verhofstadt, of inter-institutional bargaining.

The EP resolution highlighted listening to the citizens, identified a broad range of policies to be tackled, and opined that ‘issues such as the lead candidate system and transnational lists should be taken into consideration’. According to the resolution CoFE plenary should involve representatives from the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, national parliaments, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, as well as EU level social partners, but it did not hide the ambition of the EP to lead the Conference. The next day the Conference of Presidents outlined its proposal for the composition of the Executive Coordination Board for the Conference, with MEPs from EPP, S&D, and Renew Europe and a representative each from the Council and the Commission. According to this plan, Verhofstadt would have been the Conference president, with Weber (EPP) and a representative of the S&D Group as his deputies.³¹ After the COVID-induced silence, on 10 June 2021, the EP’s Conference of Presidents announced the names of the 108 MEPs, members of the EP delegation, to take part in the CoFE Plenary.³² Respectively, 28, 23, and 15 seats, were allocated to the three biggest political groups. Key MEPs had a strong base in their respective political groups but also acted in concert to promote their ambitions.

These political dynamics inside the Parliament, with group leaders prominent in guiding the issue through the committees and the plenary where the resolution reflected the tradition of building large coalitions between the main groups, indicate the salience of CoFE for the political groups and the EP as a whole. Overall, the political families have a legacy of advocating both deeper integration and a stronger position for the Parliament and the Europarties, and certainly the ‘future of Europe’ featured consistently in the various documents and events of the three political families. For reasons of space, the analysis below does not cover all their events or documents. Instead, it focuses on the main events that are also more directly linked to agenda-setting and advocacy. It is also important to note that in the political families the caucuses organized by the EP political groups were significantly larger than just MEPs; they also consisted of members from other delegations such as national parliamentarians. Let us next examine the activities of the three largest Europarties.

EPP/EPP Group

The EPP came up with a staunchly pro-integrationist vision for CoFE. However, the EPP Congress in November 2019 in Zagreb had a particular focus on climate change. Had it been someone from their own ranks and not President Macron who took an initiative to establish the CoFE, then perhaps the EPP would have shown more interest in the issue. In any case, it is evident that from early on it was the EPP Group that was more actively involved in the CoFE, not the Europarty.

The EPP Group organized various meetings and events involving its members and its partners. Notably, the EPP Group on 21 April 2021 hosted the live webinar event ‘The Future of Europe’, which brought together several participants including German Chancellor Merkel and EPP Group leader Weber.³³ Merkel said that she wanted ‘concrete’ proposals to emerge from the Conference.³⁴ She was not opposed to Treaty change to reset the bloc’s future. The comments from Merkel reflected a strong will to extend the competences of the EU in particular areas. Weber in turn commented that ‘we should use the upcoming Conference on the EU’s future, to think long and hard as to whether we need Treaty change.’³⁵ Among the speakers in the specific panel on the CoFE were two MEPs who were members of the EPP Group Task Force on the Future of Europe—Vladimír Bilčík and Jeroen Lenaers. Soon they would be appointed as EPP Group members of the EP delegation to the Conference. Concluding remarks were given by Rangel and Commission vice-president Šuica, who in the Commission dealt with CoFE and is also from the EPP family. The event demonstrated that this political family was fully committed to reinvigorating the debate on European integration. Another example of Europarties facilitating links between EU institutions came when the Bureau of the EPP Group met in Rome on 20–22 September 2021 to discuss with members of the Italian government and parliament various topics including ‘the future of Europe’. Commission President von der Leyen addressed an internal meeting with EPP Group members (in camera), and among the speakers were other members of the Commission, including Šuica.³⁶

Interaction between the EPP and the EPP Group took place primarily through the EPP Group Caucus, constituted in June 2021, with Rangel as the EPP vice-president and EPP Group vice-chair a key figure and interlocutor. Rangel also chaired the EPP Group Task Force on the Future of Europe, a de facto working group, which monitored proceedings in CoFE. As EPP Group chair, Weber also was centrally involved in the various activities of the EPP Group in relation to CoFE, for example when the EPP Group Position Paper on the Future of Europe was adopted on 19 May 2021 (see below). A year later, just before the CoFE was about to end, Weber stated that ‘it is time to organize a convention to prepare Europe for the new realities of the decades to come’; and Rangel said: ‘Now we have to follow up the Conference with a convention to give institutional and concrete answers to European citizens’ expectations’.³⁷ However, the EPP Congress at the turn of the month in May-June 2022 cautiously called for a ‘follow up’ on the proposals endorsed by the CoFE, including a stronger EP, without explicitly suggesting a constitutional convention and saying that it ‘can include treaty changes’. That reflects compromise and the lack of consensus inside the EPP over treaty change and what should happen next in the process.

PES/S&D

The PES political family has also invested resources in ‘the future of Europe’ for a longer time, with various resolutions adopted and working groups established that deal with both the future of integration and the role of the PES family in the process. As with EPP, these resolutions have called for a stronger EU with more supranational elements. The S&D Group and PES organized a range of events relating broadly to the ‘future of Europe’. For example, they organized jointly a streamed event in Brussels titled ‘The Political Vision of the EU’s Constitutional Future’ on 6 February 2020, with representatives from EU institutions, FEPS, civil society actors, and academics among the speakers.³⁸ Later that year, in December 2020, the S&D Group adopted its strategy on CoFE, claiming their political family ‘has the most far-reaching vision on the future of Europe’.³⁹

A few weeks ahead of the launch of CoFE, the S&D Group on 16 April 2021 launched the #Progressives4Europe initiative as a debate platform to promote ‘progressive’ views and voices to feed into the Conference on the Future of Europe.⁴⁰ This initiative, developed in cooperation with PES and FEPS, among others, was promoted at a high-level hybrid event in Rome on 3 May,⁴¹ with several more events organized across Europe. Moreover, the initiative included a multilingual debate platform in 24 EU languages alongside a Facebook page (Progressives 4 Europe) that encouraged people to submit views and ideas online and to help shape the Progressives’ contribution to the debate on the future of Europe. Events continued in autumn 2021 and included a citizens’ debate or a conversation on the topic of the future of Europe with the group chair and others; a meeting in Malta of S&D Group members including an event with citizens in the context of CoFE; and an S&D/Progressive family meeting in Florence on 11 December 2021 to debate the future of Europe.⁴²

The day before the inaugural Plenary of CoFE, the first ‘Progressive Caucus’ took place in Strasbourg on 18 June 2021 to set priorities.⁴³ The meeting was co-hosted by the S&D Group and PES, with contributions from S&D Group chair García Pérez, PES President (and MEP) Sergei Stanishev, and EP President Sassoli. The caucus meeting brought together MEPs, MPs, Commissioners, and the Portuguese EU presidency. A week later, after the inaugural Plenary session, there was the PES conference on the Future of Europe, gathering ‘progressives’ in Berlin on 25–26 June 2021 to set out their ambitions for Europe.⁴⁴ The event brought together leaders and prime ministers of PES member parties. Ties between the PES and the S&D Group were strengthened by the fact that the PES president Stanishev, from Bulgaria, is also an MEP. And García Pérez (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, PSOE), the chair of the S&D Group, is the first vice-president of the PES. These ties make it easier to reach out to the entire political family. S&D MEPs centrally involved in CoFE included Ruiz Devesa, S&D spokesperson/coordinator for AFCO, and Gabriele Bischoff, AFCO’s vice-chair and a member of the EP’s Working Group on the Conference on the Future of Europe. Responsible for CoFE within S&D, Bischoff took a leading role in the group’s internal work with the Task Force. Bischoff was also involved and active in FEPS.⁴⁵

Ahead of each meeting of the CoFE Plenary, a political caucus was organized by the PES with the social democratic members of the Plenary. This offered an opportunity to discuss policy priorities with local and national CoFE members—showing thus how the European, national, and local levels coordinate inside the political family. While the PES (co-)organized various events, the S&D Group was more influential in relation to CoFE itself. Drawing on EP resources, not least staffing, the group provided the framework for CoFE activities. S&D organized a horizontal Task Force on thematic priorities with partner organizations, experts, and national as well as local politicians. This horizontal working group was open to all S&D members. Cohesion among the social democrat members of the Conference plenary was described in the interviews as ‘strong’.

ALDE/Renew Europe

The third largest political grouping, the liberal family consisting of ALDE and Renew Europe, not only presented a strongly pro-European vision for CoFE but also underlined the group’s role behind it. When the Parliament in January 2020 adopted the resolution backing the CoFE, the Renew Europe Group claimed the resolution included most of its proposals and those of its negotiators Verhofstadt (Open-VLD, Belgium) and Durand (Renaissance, France).⁴⁶ The next day, another press release even claimed that ‘Renew Europe put forward the proposal on the Conference’ and noted that ‘our family will play a central role in driving it’, referring to the proposed leading role of Verhofstadt.⁴⁷

As is typical for the congresses of the Europarties, institutional questions and the ‘future of Europe’ featured on the agenda of the ALDE Congress held in Athens in October 2019.⁴⁸ ALDE had made plans prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic about organizing events involving member parties and individual party members to collect and shape ideas feeding into CoFE. In November 2020, ALDE Council issued a rather detailed position paper on the Conference, recommending a series of concrete changes to how the EU institutions work—and that after CoFE, ‘a European Convention should be convened in order to implement necessary treaty adjustments’.⁴⁹ ALDE also stated that it ‘will, in the second half of 2021, organize its own Conference on the Future of Europe’.⁵⁰ However, it appears that no such event took place.

In early 2021, ALDE launched an Action Plan on the Future of Europe, which included a dedicated digital hub, a series of townhall meetings organized with ALDE member parties, as well as an (intended) ALDE conference dedicated to CoFE.⁵¹ Throughout October 2021, ALDE member parties and partners across Europe held a series of events to discuss the future of Europe, also involving MEPs, and events on Europe’s future, focusing on the CoFE, were organized by member parties—for instance, in Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, and Spain.⁵² Furthermore, ALDE partners, such as the European Liberal Youth (LYMEC) and the Renew Europe Group in the Committee of the Regions, which is part of CoFE, contributed to the ongoing debate on democracy and citizens’ engagement in the context of the Conference.

Renew Europe launched on 1 June 2021 a series of monthly ‘Values Talks’ with the participation of the then Renew Europe chair Cioloș and leading politicians of the Renew Europe liberal and pro-European family.⁵³ Against the background of CoFE, the talks included questions from civil society organizations, citizens, and journalists. In a series of interviews (from June 2021) with members of its CoFE delegation, Renew Europe addressed the same set of questions, one of which was ‘Renew Europe has initiated the idea of the Conference. What will be the Group’s priorities?’⁵⁴ And on a more individual level, ‘What topics will you be focusing on?’ While there was much consistency in the answers, particularly relating to citizens and democracy, including transnational lists for EP elections, it is obvious that the members were not controlled by any common talking points. In connection with CoFE’s second plenary in Strasbourg on 22–23 October 2021, Renew Europe organized a Caucus meeting on 22 October to discuss common priorities.⁵⁵ Durand, coordinator of Renew Europe in AFCO, coordinated the group regarding CoFE, while Verhofstadt, co-chair of the Executive Board of the Conference, coordinated matters at that and the EP level and was the spokesperson for Renew Europe on CoFE. Cohesion within the Renew Europe Conference Caucus was said to be ‘fine’, but an important cleavage in Renew Europe/ALDE is the one over the EU itself, regarding European integration. The majority of the liberal members is pro-integrationist and with Renew Europe MEPs and staff active in the Spinelli Group, a pro-federalist approach comes naturally for them with, for example, calls for transnational lists in European elections.⁵⁶

The cases of EPP and PES already showed that the EP political groups were more present in CoFE than the actual Europarties, and this applied perhaps even more so in the liberal party family. According to an interviewee, ALDE was ‘not very much present in the Conference’. However, ALDE organized, occasionally together with ELF, different events, sometimes upon requests from the Renew Europe Group. There seemed to be limited political coordination between Renew Europe and ALDE regarding CoFE. That said, there were individual MEPs who held prominent positions in ALDE,⁵⁷ and thereby interaction between ALDE and Renew Europe was stronger, at least on a personal level. There may also be a natural explanation for ALDE being less active in the CoFE, as the degree of overlapping membership between ALDE and Renew Europe is significantly lower than between the EPP/EPP Group and PES/S&D (see Chapter 1). It appears as if the latter two political families tend to have stronger cooperation and coordination overall. That said, ALDE continued to set out its vision for the Future of Europe, suggesting the launch of a Convention ‘to implement the conclusions of the Conference and lay the foundation for a European Constitution.’⁵⁸

Political Foundations

The contribution of political foundations attached to the Europarties should not be underestimated, even though their influence is more indirect and harder to detect. Most of the interaction between political foundations, Europarties, and the EP political groups is informal and active, with overlap in terms of personnel. WMCES, FEPS, and ELF hosted various events and produced a steady stream of publications, often drawing on academic expertise, which specifically either directly dealt with CoFE or more generally with the future of Europe and institutional or policy questions. WMCES organized events and published material about CoFE on its website, including blogposts.⁵⁹ ELF was an additional resource for ALDE/Renew Europe,⁶⁰ with, for example, the ELF’s Liberal White Book: Europe 2030 (2021) intended to feed into the future of Europe debate and ELF also organized events specifically linked to CoFE.⁶¹ FEPS was also highly active and the publication Our European Future (May 2021), containing proposals to CoFE, was among its contributions to the debate about the future of Europe.⁶² Other contributions were made through the FEPS Policy Brief, for example.⁶³ The political foundations also provided platforms for activists in the respective political families to outline their goals for the CoFE. Finally, the political foundations collaborated, for example through organizing in September 2020, with the Former Members Association and the European University Institute, a webinar on ‘Together for the future of Europe’.⁶⁴

To summarize, the transnational party networks were clearly active regarding CoFE and the broader theme of the ‘future of Europe’. EPP/EPP Group, PES/S&D, and ALDE/Renew Europe each organized a variety of events and produced documents and resolutions, but in all three families the EP political group was more prominent than the Europarty. The networks are horizontal, bringing together MEPs, Commissioners, the political foundations, European level interest groups, members from the Committee of Regions, as well as the youth and women’s organizations of the Europarties—and vertical, as they also include national member parties and occasionally also activists. These networks have developed over decades, but they can essentially be understood as networks or advocacy coalitions of European and national party elites. Overall, the (transnational) partisan networks keep up the momentum and join together European and national politicians to discuss the future of the EU.

Comparing the Positions of the Europarties and the CoFE Conclusions

This section of the empirical analysis explores the objectives and priorities of the three political families and compares them with the conclusions of CoFE. We focus deliberately on institutional questions, but include also policy issues, as often the two are directly related, for example when the documents speak about extending qualified majority voting (QMV) in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) or deeper economic integration. As detailed above, the Europarties and their EP political groups adopted a variety of resolutions and documents relating both to CoFE and the broader theme of the ‘future of Europe’. Most of these are fairly short texts about current decisions and policy processes. Hence, we focus in our analysis on the key position papers of the Europarties or their EP political groups on CoFE that are longer and cover the entire spectrum of issues—essentially these position papers are comparable to the party or election programmes of national parties or the Europarties. We first explore the political families individually before providing a comparative summary of their positions.

EPP/EPP Group

The EPP Group adopted its position paper on the Future of Europe on 19 May 2021.⁶⁵ The paper is in line with EPP’s long-standing pro-European heritage and demonstrates a willingness to reform the Union, institutionally and structurally. EPP links the Conference directly to Treaty change: ‘we might consider designating the [Conference] with the task to prepare a new Convention to draft a revised treaty’. This is significant given opposition to Treaty change among national governments, and the cautious wording used by EPP Group chair Weber on various occasions.

We want the Conference on the Future of Europe to be meaningful in developing the future polity and policy of the EU. Hence, we want to put forward profound questions about Europe’s democratic future. It is important that the Conference will not be misconstrued as an alibi event for pursuing only cosmetic changes to the EU’s political system. Otherwise, we risk our legitimacy and gamble on the future of Europeans. The European People’s Party has always been the driving force behind European integration. We are proud of the legacy of leaders like Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer. Now our generation is called upon to do its part and start a new chapter in the history of the European Union.

Treaty change is thus openly advocated, and reforms are linked to global crises:

We want to further equip our Union with the right and sufficient resources and structures to be able to tackle effectively the next emergencies, including the climate challenge. The European Union has to be the problem-solver of the next crisis and at the forefront of the technological and environmental challenges in the coming years.

The EPP sees Europe’as a democratic role model for the world’. It believes in a ‘strong and united Europe’ and recognizes that

answering people’s concerns might demand institutional and structural reforms, at Union and national level, that make Europe stronger and more resilient while building a real connection with citizens across the EU. These reforms shall not be limited to internal matters, but shall also envisage an international and global orientation. Europeans need to assert themselves in a world of uni-laterally acting superpowers with which no European state can compete alone.

EPP calls for accountability and transparency, while emphasizing that ‘all levels of the European Union need to communicate with one voice and provide solutions to political issues’.

The solution is stronger EU level representative democracy. The EPP sees Europe ‘as a democratic role model for the world’, and it wants

to ensure greater citizen participation and engagement, greater accountability for decisions, with a livelier parliamentary democracy at the national level and a stronger European Parliament at its core. Democracy and the safeguard of human rights and freedoms, the rule of law and separation of powers are at the heart of our European identity. But democracy needs to be deepened and developed at European level.

The European Parliament is at the core of the argument:

The European Union has to become a representative democracy where people have a greater say on matters of EU competence: we want to show that the European Union can be the leading role model for the effective representation of its citizens. Only with political competition at European level will the people have a clear say about their own future. ‘Take back control’ was the Brexiteers’ slogan. Brexit has instead shown that being out of the decision-making process only results in a loss of control. The European Parliament, as the people’s representation, ensures that Europeans have a say in the future of our Union. For this reason, we want to boost representation and parliamentarism at the European level.

The Parliament ‘should have full legislative and budgetary powers, including the right to initiate, amend, and repeal any European legislation in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. The MFF [Multiannual Financial Framework] should have the same time frame of the Parliament’s mandate’. In terms of accountability, the EPP sees that

the Commission must become more accountable to Parliament by strengthening Parliament’s political control through an updated and effective right of inquiry, the ability to impeach single Commissioners as well as the introduction of a constructive motion of no-confidence, allowing the European Parliament to choose the new President of the Commission with an absolute majority.

The EPP also opines that ‘each Commission should be built on a concrete coalition agreement based on the political guidelines and concrete projects’. Regarding the European elections, the EPP Group wants to reinforce the Spitzenkandidaten system:

To strengthen democracy at European level and accountability in the eyes of Europeans, we also want to reinforce the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ system. This means that the biggest party shall form the governing majority and will get the right to nominate the President of the Commission, who then needs a majority support of the EP (‘biggest party has the first choice’ rule). The candidature of every lead candidate shall be conditional on the support of their respective national parties and they shall undertake a process of democratic nomination from European parties. To strengthen the democratic selection of the Commission, it would be convenient if every future Commissioner could also run in a prominent position in the elections in his respective Member State. This will contribute to increase the transparency of their nomination in the European executive and show a real impact on citizens’ preferences. As a consequence, every Commissioner can be a Member of the European Parliament.

However, the EPP reiterates its earlier negative position on transnational lists:

As in every multi-level governance system, such as the European Union, the geographical representation is, next to ideological representation, crucial. Therefore, we reiterate our disagreement over transnational lists as they run against the principle of territorial representation, and they would put smaller Member States’ candidates at a competitive disadvantage compared to those of larger Member States. We want to reform the electoral law to create a vibrant party competition that mirrors the nature of our Union and ensures that every European voter has an equal and broad right to participate in European elections regardless of his or her place of residence and every Member of the European Parliament is connected to his/her constituency.

The EPP Group further notes that

a strong democracy requires lively political parties and civil society. Therefore, we should reflect on a reform of the party law at European level to improve citizens’ involvement in European democracy. Furthermore, we want to strengthen the democratic links between the various political levels in the EU. For example, there should be the possibility of permitting the President of the European Commission and Commissioners to also hold functions in their respective parties.

Overall, the position paper is strongly in favour of deeper integration across policy domains while referring to the EU’s values and solidarity. It calls for more powers to the various agencies of the Union. Regarding external action, the EPP argues that new institutions are needed:

In a world in turmoil, we should take a step further and work closer together when it comes to defence. The EU should establish its own military unit, with Joint Headquarters, based on volunteers coming from the Member States. Such a unit, complementing national military forces and compatible with NATO, could be an important European defence capability. This military unit would be financed by the EU, would report to a newly established Defence Affairs Council and hold a duty to involve and report to the European Parliament. For Europe to act as one, a new Defence Commissioner should also be established.

QMV should apply to all areas that enhance the external action capability of the European Union. ‘Only then will we be able to truly speak with one single voice as Europeans’. For this purpose, the European Union should move towards holding a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, as an additional seat to the one held by France. In addition, in economic governance the EPP believes in institutional reform:

We intend to strengthen and deepen the Single Market further, especially in the area of free movement of services, to speed up on the completion of the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union and implement a forward-looking reform of our Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, we must strive to develop a well-functioning Single Market for retail financial services. For a well-functioning Economic and Monetary Union, economic convergence between Member States should be further stimulated and our fiscal policies aligned in a more effective way while considering further progress towards a European Monetary Fund.

Other goals include ‘a Health Union that brings true added value for the Member States and operates in fields that cannot be covered by Member States alone’ and a digital tax as part of stronger own resources: ‘For the EU to act more effectively, the EPP Group intends to make significant progress on the European Union’s own resources, proposing the introduction of a basket of new sources of revenues for the EU, without increasing the overall tax burden on citizens’.

PES/S&D

Next, we turn to PES/S&D, which was the first of the three biggest political families studied here to outline its priorities in a position paper presented on 9 June 2020.⁶⁶ The paper reflects the position of the S&D Group—in the preface portrayed as ‘the most progressive and pro-European family’ in the Parliament—on the constitutional future of Europe. It also intends to offer a first contribution regarding the institutional dimension to CoFE. In the preface, S&D further notes that this exercise comes two decades after the launch of the last official debate on the future of Europe: European Council of Nice, 2000, followed in 2001 by the Laeken Declaration.

The S&D position paper has a lot in common with the EPP’s equivalent document, both regarding overall commitment to the European project and more specific institutional questions. However, S&D emphasizes strongly the social dimension of integration while devoting less space to CFSP/CSDP and other forms of EU’s external action. It also uses the crises as a starting point for arguing that the EU needs to be reformed and strengthened. Without reforms, the EU will not be able to tackle future challenges. S&D is ready for Treaty change but sees that steps forward can also be taken in the current constitutional framework.

A deep debate on the revision of the treaties – after almost 20 years – can be envisioned: it is time to start by taking stock of the State of the Union as well as by finding solutions within the provisions of the existing treaties, as the EU constitutional structure is only half built but has shown to be unfit for dealing with important crisis (migration, Euro area, health).

This can be realized by making the best possible use of the planned Conference on the Future of Europe, but also by concentrating on the parts of the current Lisbon Treaty that still need to be fully exploited…

In terms of institutional reforms, S&D states that

The Conference should concentrate its reflections on the options about a possible deeper political integration of the EU and discuss the parliamentarisation of the Union, a strengthened right of legislative initiative, unanimity, qualified majority vote in Council on key policy fields such as foreign affairs, climate, energy, taxation, social policy, a stricter political control on the application of the rule of law. … The above-outlined political goal of discussing the implementation of new and more advanced rights should orient the reflections of the Conference on the European Parliament’s prerogatives, in line with the parliamentary tradition of the majority of Member States and with the goal of achieving a true European political system founded on the European parties.

S&D puts forward a list of its political priorities for the Conference:

• Full exploitation of the Lisbon Treaty to ensure the best execution of European policies, including the activation of passerelle clauses for extending Qualified Majority Voting in Council,

• Completion of the monetary union with the financial union and reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and of the mandate of the [European Central Bank] ECB,

• Constitutionalization of new policies and competencies on social Europe, climate change, and public Health Union,

• A stronger European budget backed by new own resources, including common taxation and more power for the EP on revenues,

• A stronger European Parliament: right of legislative initiative, full co-decision, stronger political control over the Commission,

• Substantial improvements in the transparency of the institutions, notably within the Council,

• Including the Social Progress Protocol and European Pillar of Social Rights in the event of Treaty changes,

• Permanent and structured forms of citizens’ participation—based on gender and social balance—and new models of EU citizenship education,

• Improvement of the Spitzenkandidaten process,

• Introduction of transnational lists for the election of part of EP members, with rules that ensure the respect for balance between large, medium, and small-sized Member States,

• Defence of the quality of democracy in the EU and in the functioning of the European Institutions as well as of the EU democratic project.

The S&D thus has a long ‘shopping list’ aiming at a major ‘update’ of the EU’s institutional structure:

We believe our European constitutional framework requires an update on its contents (policies), resources, decision-making (procedures) and democratic legitimacy, thus resulting in a stronger, more perfect political union. These three dimensions are closely connected, since we realise that the implementation of our ambitious progressive agenda in the social and ecological fields depends also on more democratic and efficient decision-making at the European level.

Essentially the social democratic party family wants to strengthen supranational policymaking:

This process should aim at shifting the executive authority towards the Commission, which needs to be turned into the government of the EU. In this respect, more coherent and effective decision-making can also be fostered by making the [Commission’s] composition more reflective of electoral outcomes, as well as by rebalancing the role of the European Council.

The Council’s working methods should become more ‘efficient and transparent, notably by respecting the provisions on the public deliberation of the Council and the publicity of Member States’ positions’, while QMV should apply ‘in all policies (own resources, taxation, foreign policy, social affairs, etc.), initially by activating the passerelles in the Lisbon Treaty’. A further empowerment of the European Parliament is at the core of S&D’s agenda: extending co-decision procedure to all legislation, the right of legislative initiative, stronger control of the Commission, and consolidation of budgetary powers. Here S&D makes historical references:

Given this environment, stronger European unity is a necessity, as a fully democratic Union of democratic states. Thus, the historic mission of building a sovereign European transnational democracy in the form of a parliamentary political union, as envisioned in the Ventotene Manifesto of 1941, is now more valid than ever, by underlining the constitutive intertwining between EU and Member States and by developing true and clear multilevel governance.

S&D has also specific proposals concerning the political accountability of the Commission: full implementation of the Parliament’s right of inquiry; detailed commitments set out in a renewed and enhanced framework agreement; the introduction of a periodic Question Time in the plenary; and introducing mechanisms to hold individual Commissioners to account. At the same time, S&D suggests further developing existing frameworks of interparliamentary cooperation and endowing national parliaments with the right of proposing initiatives to the European Parliament. S&D is in favour of both the Spitzenkandidaten process and transnational lists:

Firstly, consolidating the Spitzenkandidaten process, in line with the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions and based on the Parliament’s requests to appoint as President of the Commission the candidate which can be backed by the majority of its component members. Secondly, by adding to this process an ambitious electoral reform that sets up once for all a pan-European constituency in the Union electing part of the EP Members, while taking into account the need to ensure geographical balance, particularly as regards the smaller member states. This could enhance the European dimension of EU elections, and strengthen the democratic life of the Union.

Regarding economic governance, S&D supports a ‘real financial union’, ‘transnational redistribution’ measures, and more budgetary resources. S&D has an ambitious agenda and recommends the establishment of several new institutions: a European treasury financed by common forms of taxation and empowered to issue Eurobonds; a potential Employment and Social Affairs (EPSCO) ministerial Euro Group besides the existing Financial Ministers’ Euro Group; the Commissioner of Economics should act as the Euro Area Finance Minister and in this capacity, chair the Eurogroup; the European Stability Mechanism should be incorporated into the Treaties; and the MFF should be aligned to the duration of the EP mandate. The paper states that ‘a key feature of any serious European Anticyclical Tool, avoiding the mistakes of the post-2008 aftermath, is a set of strong own resources for Europe, making public budgets and social safety nets stronger through raising revenues at EU level that could not be raised at national level’. Potential sources of revenue are ‘a fraction of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, the Financial Transaction Tax, the digital tax, income from ETS/C02, ECB profits, etc.’. Other goals include “raising the ‘constitutional’ profile of the European Pillar of Social Rights” through integrating it within Treaty provisions, and a ‘public health union’ as ‘a key component part of vision for a Social Europe, together with the introduction of a European System of Minimum Wages and decent minimum old age pension as well as with a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme, and with a strengthened common framework for the reception and integration of refugees and migrants into the increasingly multi-ethnic, multi-cultural European society’.

ALDE/Renew Europe

For the liberals we rely on two documents. The Renew Europe’s position paper from spring 2021 addresses priorities for CoFE.⁶⁷ However, the document focused very much on policies and values without more detailed objectives regarding institutional questions. Hence, we also include a second document, ‘A liberal vision for the Future of Europe’, adopted in the autumn of 2021.⁶⁸ At the outset, the former document notes how the Renew Europe, ‘dedicated pro-Europeans’, ‘campaigned for the setting up of the Conference on the Future of Europe’. It also highlights CoFE as an opportunity for strengthening and democratizing the Union. Like the other position papers, this one also emphasizes the role of citizens and their active involvement.

On democracy, Renew Europe is in line with EPP and S&D in calling for greater involvement of the European Parliament:

Renew Europe believes that fostering transparency of EU decision making and democratic legitimacy is fundamental to regain trust in the Union and to promote citizens’ involvement in shaping EU policies. We pledge for substantial changes to enable better democratic control of the decisions made by the national governments within the Council and we support strengthening European democracy by having genuine European elections, with candidates that campaign through European political parties on transnational lists in a joint European constituency. Reinforcing the concept of European citizenship and, finally completing the Parliament’s right of legislative initiative, are also direct tools to improve democratic legitimacy and participation.

The document ‘A liberal vision for the Future of Europe’ lists several goals:

• A single European Parliament seat in Brussels, with the power to initiate legislation and remove individual Commissioners.

• Harmonization of EU Member States’ laws for European Parliament elections.

• Introduction of transnational lists.

• Reduction of the number of EU Commissioners to 18, nominated by the European Commission President-elect.

• Strengthening of the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs.

• Launch a Convention on the Future of Europe to implement the conclusions of the Conference and lay the foundation for a European Constitution.

From these objectives we can infer considerable similarity with the positions of EPP and S&D. Importantly, the final point concerns time beyond CoFE, the conclusions of which should be used as a starting point for drafting a proper EU constitution. This readiness for Treaty change is another factor in common with EPP and social democrats. Transnational lists are supported, but there is no mention of the Spitzenkandidaten mechanism.

Throughout the document, Renew Europe places a lot of emphasis on companies, entrepreneurship, individual rights, as well as emphasizing the rule of law principle. The further development of the single market and EMU is deemed as important, with investments in research and innovation and creating a ‘true common, borderless, digital European ecosystem’. Like EPP and S&D, Renew Europe also supports a ‘European Health union’. However, the liberals do not really present any institutional reforms in economic governance beyond arguing that the EP should have a stronger say in economic and monetary policy, including improved accountability of the ECB through an inter-institutional agreement. On the budget, Renew Europe calls for ‘higher resources’, including new own sources of revenue, and again a stronger role for the Parliament:

we shall strengthen the efficiency of the legislative decision making as well as democratic legitimacy and accountability of the Union budget and its own resources by granting the European Parliament enhanced competences and a more active role in the monitoring of the implementation of the own resources system. We therefore call for a deep review of the design and the adoption process of the EU budget, including a discussion on the possibility of approving the MFF through co-decision, within the framework of the Conference for the Future Europe.

Regarding external relations, Renew Europe envisions streamlined decision-making:

The EU must move towards [QMV] in foreign policy. As a first step, the passerelle clause, article 31 (3) TEU, should be put in force. QMV should be expanded to other areas of CFSP decision-making as well, with a particular focus on human rights. Furthermore, there should be a clear division of tasks between the Commission President, the Council President and the [High Representative], in which the latter should get a stronger mandate to act combined with a strengthened role for the European Parliament to increase the democratic oversight in foreign policy matters.

Renew Europe also supports a ‘real European Defence Union’, and as ‘European Defence is advancing, a formal Defence Council should also be put in place, as the proper forum for discussion at Council level. By analogy, a fully-fledged Security and Defence Committee should be set up in the European Parliament to make sure that the European citizens’ voices are properly reflected’. The document ‘A liberal vision for the Future of Europe’ includes several concrete goals: institutionally reinforcing the European External Action Service and the High Representative of the EU, who should act as an EU Foreign Minister; a European seat in the UN Security Council and other organizations; QMV for decisions on foreign and security policies; and the establishment and implementation of the European Defence Union subject to parliamentary control.

Comparative Summary

Turning to the comparison of the positions, Table 5.2. summarizes the main findings.

Table 5.2 Comparing the positions of the EPP/EPP Group, PES/S&D, and ALDE/Renew Europe on the Conference on the Future of Europe

The first point to note is the discourse and framing of the positions. The Europarties legimitize their pro-integrationist objectives with big words such as ‘democracy’, ‘participation’, ‘transparency’, and ‘representation’, in general arguing that the voice of citizens should become stronger in EU politics. Such framing is ever-present in the advocacy of Europarties and should be understood in the context of the gradual empowerment of the Parliament and Europeal level democracy (Héritier et al., 2019; Rittberger, 2005). The multiple crises, Europarties claim, only reinforce the need for change as otherwise the EU will fail to meet the demands of its citizens.

The Europarties are ready for Treaty change, which stands in contrast to the positions of the majority of national governments (Ålander et al., 2021). In fact, the Europarties tended to see the CoFE as a kind of sounding board and platform for proper Treaty reform resulting in a European constitution. The Europarties did not directly call for major changes to the balance of power between the EU institutions. The S&D was the only one explicitly arguing that the Commission should become the government of the EU, although the EPP Group mentioned that the Commission should be based on a concrete coalition agreement. However, all three political families supported considerably stronger competences for the Parliament—extending the co-decision procedure to all policy areas, the right of legislative initiative, increased budgetary powers and involvement in economic governance and external relations, and improved control of the Commission, including the right to remove individual Commissioners. In the Council, the Europarties favoured the application of QMV across all issues. As a result, the Europarties agreed about reinforcing both the role of the Parliament and the leadership capacity of the Commission—thus signalling their clear support for strengthening supranational elements in EU decision-making.

The position papers of the EPP Group and S&D contained only short remarks regarding Europarties, but obviously the empowerment of the Parliament as well as the Spitzenkandidaten mechanism and transnational lists would elevate their status in EU governance. The EPP Group and S&D supported the Spitzenkandidaten system, while S&D and Renew Europe were in favour of transnational lists while the EPP was against. Therefore, we again find the transnational partisan actors pushing for reforms that do not enjoy similar support among the governments of the member states. Turning to external relations, we note strong convergence as all three Europarties envisioned the EU becoming a stronger and more independent actor on a global stage. This requires more efficient decision-making, with the EPP Group and Renew Europe, in particular, putting forward concrete proposals for institutional reforms. The EPP Group, S&D and Renew Europe also championed stronger institutions and democratic accountability in economic governance. On the budget they all recognized the need for stronger resources and new sources of revenue. Interestingly, they argued that the current seven-year cycle of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) should have the same time frame as the Parliament’s five-year mandate. This reform would certainly streamline budgetary rules and potentially make the EU’s budget a more important part of the campaigns in European elections (e.g., Leino-Sandberg & Raunio, 2023).

Overall, as expected there were striking similarities between the position papers. This applies to institutional questions as well as policy issues. To be sure, there were also differences stemming from the ideological backgrounds of the political families. The social democrats emphasize a ‘social Europe’, while EPP and liberals devote more space to reforming and deepening the single market. Referring to the crises, they all argue that the EU needs stronger institutions and more policy competences. Without such reforms, so the argument goes, the EU fails to provide leadership in tackling the challenges. Considering that COVID-19 pandemic coincided with the Conference, it is not surprising to find the Europarties and their EP political groups advocating a European health union.

CoFE Conclusions

Comparison of the Europarties’ objectives with the final CoFE report suggests that the transnational partisan actors were highly successful in mobilizing support for their initiatives during the Conference.⁶⁹ In fact, the convergence between CoFE conclusions and the positions of the Europarties is remarkable. The only major difference regarding democracy and institutions, perhaps understandably, is that the CoFE report strongly underlines the need to engage with citizens and the civil society, for example through ‘increasing the frequency of online and offline interactions between EU institutions’, ‘a user-friendly digital platform where citizens can share ideas, put forward questions to the representatives of EU institutions and express their views on important EU matters and legislative proposals, in particular youth’, ‘online polls’, ‘a system of local EU Councillors’, ‘holding Citizens’ assemblies periodically, on the basis of legally binding EU law’, and summarizing ‘elements of citizens’ participation in an EU Charter for the involvement of citizens in EU affairs’.

Under the heading ‘democracy and elections’ the Plenary proposal basically repeated the shopping list of the Europarties. The CoFE report recommended:

• ‘Conceiving a EU wide referendum, to be triggered by the European Parliament, in exceptional cases on matters particularly important to all European citizens’

• ‘Amending EU electoral law to harmonise electoral conditions (voting age, election date, requirements for electoral districts, candidates, political parties and their financing) for the European Parliament elections, as well as moving towards voting for Union-wide lists, or ‘transnational lists’,⁷⁰ with candidates from multiple Member States, having taken into account the views expressed among citizens across the EU Member States on this issue. Some of the Members of the European Parliament should be elected through a European Union-wide list, the rest being elected within the Members’ States.’

• ‘European citizens should have a greater say on who is elected as President of the Commission. This could be achieved either by the direct election of the Commission President or a lead candidate system.’⁷¹

• ‘The European Parliament should have the right of legislative initiative.’

• ‘Political parties, civil society organisations, trade unions should be more lively and accessible in order for citizens to be more involved and engaged in European democracy. This would also contribute to stimulate the inclusion of EU topics in public debates via political parties, organised civil society and social partners, not only during European elections but ahead of national, regional and local elections as well’.

Under the heading ‘EU decision-making process’, the proposals included:

• ‘All issues decided by way of unanimity should be decided by way of a qualified majority. The only exceptions should be the admission of new membership to the EU and changes to the fundamental principles of the EU as stated in Art. 2 TEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.’

• ‘The European Parliament’s right of inquiry should be strengthened’

• ‘Inter-parliamentary cooperation and dialogue should be strengthened. National parliaments should also be closer involved in the legislative procedure by the European Parliament, e.g. by way of participation in hearings.’

• ‘Considering changing the names of EU institutions to clarify their functions and respective role in the EU decision-making process for citizens … For example, the Council of the EU could be called the Senate of the EU and the European Commission could be called the Executive Commission of the EU.’

In economic governance, the report recommended that ‘European Parliament should decide on the budget of the EU as it is the right of parliaments at the national level’.⁷² Regarding foreign and security policy, the CoFE report sought a stronger and coherent EU on the global stage, and that ‘in the area of the CFSP, issues that are currently decided by way of unanimity to be changed, normally to be decided by way of a qualified majority’.

Conclusions

This chapter provides further evidence of how Europarties and their EP political groups shape the agenda and debates at the European level, in this case debates that will also have potential consequences for the division of competencies between the EU and its member states. Connecting our findings to the agenda-setting literature, we see these transnational partisan actors justifying their pro-integrationist or federalist-minded positions with reference to ‘democracy’, ‘participation’, and other such keywords, arguing that without reforms the EU and its member states will fail to tackle future challenges. This discourse is typical in the advocacy of the Europarties and their MEPs, and the CoFE, held in the middle of COVID-19 pandemic and preceded by multiple crises affecting the EU, provided another ‘window of opportunity’ for advancing their objectives.

In terms of the venue, the partisan actors were not the only ones pushing for the ‘conference format’ as opposed to a more intergovernmental set-up. The initiatives of Macron and the Commission were influential, but clearly the CoFE model benefited especially the MEPs. The EP political groups in particular did their best to make the Conference more supranational, and they succeeded, at least partially, as the format of CoFE was very much in line with the vision of the Parliament. It is obvious that the Europarties utilized their networks and experience for shaping the debates throughout the Conference. Here the advocacy and agenda-setting preceding the start of CoFE was significant, with the rhetoric of the Europarties feeding into the debates in not just the Plenary but also in the citizens’ panels and the digital platform. Interestingly, under the topic ‘European Democracy’ on the multilingual CoFE digital platform, the most endorsed ideas were ‘Stronger together: A democratic European Federation’, ‘For a clarity mechanism on the right to self-determination’, ‘Abolish the Council Veto!’, ‘A reform plan for a citizen-based European Democracy’, and ‘There can be no real European democracy without an autonomous fiscal power of the EU’, thus suggesting that Europarty activists may have contributed to the online debates.⁷³ While the Europarties had stated that the Conference should proceed ‘without taboos’, the partisan actors nonetheless outlined clear objectives before it was even launched, objectives which included the strengthening of the EP and the Commission, support for the Spitzenkandidaten mechanism and transnational lists (although not by the EPP), extending QMV to all issues in the Council, and in general further empowerment of the EU through new and bigger resources, speaking with one voice in external relations, and deepening economic integration. The convergence between the three political families was striking, and obviously was facilitated by their continuous interaction in the framework of EU institutions.

In similar vein, we see a clear pattern of agenda-setting and continual advocacy of further European integration in its broadest sense. The ‘future of Europe’ featured consistently in various documents and events of the three political families. Agenda-setting and advocacy are thus constantly intertwined. The transnational partisan networks serve to keep up the momentum and join together European and national political actors to discuss EU reforms. These transnational networks bring together Europarty headquarters, MEPs, Commissioners, political foundations, various interest groups, youth and women’s branches of the Europarties, as well as national member parties. In the run-up to and during CoFE these networks facilitated the diffusion of ideas and positions as well as policy influence.

Inside the Parliament the usual pattern of coalition-building was evident, while the strong presence of political group chairs signalled that the issue was of high salience for the EP. The EPP Group, S&D, and Renew Europe worked together in guiding the preparations for CoFE from the initial working group to committee stage (AFCO) and to the eventual plenary resolution. Inside the political groups it was easy to identify key personalities: group chairs and vice-chairs or otherwise seasoned veterans of institutional questions—individuals that often also hold or have held important positions inside the Europarties. Hence, during constitutional reform processes the balance of power shifts towards political group leaders, unlike in normal legislation where particularly rapporteurs and MEPs seated on the respective committees are influential in shaping group positions. The actual Europarties were more in the background, but nonetheless together with their political foundations facilitated the exchange of ideas.

Our final remarks concern the nature of CoFE and next steps after it. The timing of the Conference was of course unlucky, as first COVID overshadowed it and then Russia invaded Ukraine three months before CoFE finished its work. We have deliberately avoided addressing the question of the legitimacy and ‘success’ (however one measures it) of CoFE, but even before the Conference was launched, it attracted strong criticism on the grounds of being too top-down and elitist, with particularly civil society actors calling for genuine dialogue with citizens.⁷⁴ Returning to the three types of agendas outlined in Chapter 2, there is hardly any evidence of the public finding the Conference salient, as most Europeans, including politically active ones, probably were not even aware of it, national medias covered CoFE only very sporadically if at all, and thus it was an issue belonging to the agenda of political decision-makers. It would be unfair to blame the EU, as the European level actors can only do so much in terms of reaching European citizens. At the same time, CoFE was genuinely unique and innovative, and reflects the broader trend towards more direct participatory mechanisms (e.g., Alemanno, 2022; Alemanno & Organ 2021; Hierlemann et al., 2022; Gjaldbæk-Sverdrup et al., 2023; Oleart, 2023; Patberg, 2023; Seubert, 2023).

Almost two years after the conclusion of the Conference, it remains unclear whether it will result in more concrete changes. Both the content and format of CoFE were contested among the EU institutions and the member states, and this same disagreement is evident in how to move the process forward—or, if to move it at all (see also Abels, 2023a). But the main Europarties and their EP political groups are guaranteed to keep pushing for Treaty reform—especially reforms that would further empower the Parliament and increase the ‘partyness’ of the EU regime (Jacqué, 2022). Links constituted between the Europarties and the Commission are crucial in this respect, as is broader mobilization inside the Europarty networks. While the Europarties were clearly less important than their corresponding EP political groups over the course of CoFE, that pattern may well shift in the event of a constitutional convention (or similar) to prepare Treaty revisions (see Chapter 4). As one of our interviewees explained, the Europarties become more prominent in intergovernmental processes (such as IGCs), while in more supranational, inter-institutional bargaining the EP political groups are strongly engaged. These are among the issues we will address in the concluding chapter of the book.