Europarties and the Politics of Treaty Reform: Ascendance, Capacity, Locus

Abstract

Constitutional politics at European level has resulted in wide-ranging Treaty reforms over the past four decades, conventionally examined through the lens of intergovernmentalism. But what has been the role of transnational political parties in these processes? This chapter considers the impact of the Europarties and especially the European People’s Party but also the Party of European Socialists in Treaty reforms. It suggests that their impact can be explained in general terms by three factors: (1) the partisan composition of the European Council; (2) the cohesion and mobilization of Europarties; and (3) the choice of venue for deliberations and negotiations of Treaty changes. The chapter explores the influence of these factors empirically through illustrative evidence. It concludes that while the conditions for Europarty influence are demanding, the successive Treaties are to a considerable extent the result of transnational party-political contributions.

Introduction

The main political parties of the European Union (EU)—Europarties—are among its main agenda setters and have systematically been advocating Treaty reform. Through engagement with national member parties and political groups in the European Parliament (EP) as well as representatives in the other EU institutions, the Europarties can significantly shape bargaining and outcomes by fostering cooperation within their respective political families. To wield effective influence requires such ability to bring together the partisan networks, among other things.

To fully account for the continued activity and potential influence of Europarties it is vital to consider behavioural tendencies manifested in structural changes in the institutional environment. And here many of the goals of the Europarties that can be traced back to the 1980s, favouring stronger supranational institutions and especially the empowerment of the EP, have been met. Arguably, as seen over several decades there has been a gradual yet consistent shift away from intergovernmental cooperation towards supranational integration with ensuing incentives for parties to form transnational alliances.

In this chapter we once again analyze the role of Europarties and take stock of the academic literature on this topic. Doing so, we shed light on the under-addressed impact of the Europarties in studies of Treaty reforms in the EU, from the Single European Act (SEA) in the 1980s to the current Lisbon Treaty in the 2000s, including the Treaties of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union, TEU), Amsterdam, and Nice. The chapter also discusses the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was adopted by the Convention on the Future of Europe, also known as the European Convention, in 2003, primarily because the ‘convention’ format provides a different type of a forum, arguably more conducive to partisan influence, than standard Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC). Revisiting these Treaty reform processes helps deepen our understanding of a foundational element of European integration and the EU itself, of the forces behind EU Treaty reforms in the past and probably also in the future. During these decades, a period that spans a large part of the history of European integration, Europarties have advocated for the integration of Europe and have sought to further their cause including their own constitutional recognition.

We address two main questions: What impact do the Europarties have on the Treaty reforms? Under what conditions can they be effective, that is, when are they most likely to achieve their goals? To answer these questions, we centre on how Europarties have sought to shape the successive Treaty reforms. Our task is examining attempts at Europarty influence in the politics of Treaty reform, assessing whether Europarties and their networks have shaped the EU’s constitutional foundations. In doing so, we raise additional but related questions. Who are involved? And how do the various actors within the Europarty networks seek to make an impact?

Simplifying slightly, explanations of European integration fall into intergovernmental and supranational approaches. Here, we also build on transnational approaches to uncover forces and dynamics involving non-state or nongovernmental actors. They feature prominently in the EU political system and policy processes, not least through agenda-setting. The presence in the EU arena of advocacy coalitions and transnational networks, among others, suggests that to understand the nature of the EU one must go beyond intergovernmental relations. Scholars have identified the pressures on parties to adapt to the EU political system. Treaty changes in the 1980s and 1990s reduced national vetoes in favour of majority decisions in the Council and empowered the EP, which increased the pressure on parties to invest resources in European level coordination and cooperation (cf. Johansson, 1997). Not for nothing do purposeful actors align with one another in EP political groups and transnational party federations—and find common cause with broadly likeminded parties. IGCs and European Council meetings incentivized the federations to convene regular summits of national leaders from the time of the TEU negotiations onwards (Hix & Lord, 1997; Lord, 2002; more below).

Previous studies have found evidence that Europarties play a role in facilitating collective agreements in the EU. They offer venues for political leaders to discuss in anticipation of a zone of agreement in the European Council itself. An important part of that involves party summitry, largely composed of party and government leaders. The pre-summit meetings are influential in preparing various initiatives and in working out common positions. The party networks as advocacy coalitions are particularly relevant in terms of agenda-setting in EU governance; they influence the policymaking agenda of European institutions where transnational parties advance their own goals and coordinate their joint positions (Ladrech, 1997, 2000, 2006). Johansson (1999, 2002a) has documented this type of activity for both the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European People’s Party (EPP) and demonstrated their capacity to organize intra-party family relations (more below). The Europarties have extensive networks, which constitute a vital resource increasing their capacity needed to impact Treaty reforms.

But their influence goes further than agenda-setting and coordination. Through organizational capacity and transnational collective action, Europarties both shape and are shaped by the institutional structure of the EU and in many ways affect the policymaking environment in ‘Brussels’. They do so through activities which involve dimensions of agenda-setting and advocacy, performed by transnational partisan actors. But finding these transnational impacts is not straightforward. They may be hidden in various channels of communication. It may also be difficult to distinguish transnational impacts from other sources of influence. Specifically, political actors in these networks may represent both national parties and governments as well as Europarties. The test of whether Europarties matter is then mainly to see whether heads of government associated with a particular political family are mobilized along Europarty lines. Proving who participates is one thing. Proving effects is quite another.

This chapter thus explores the influence Europarties have had in past Treaty reform processes. It shows that the causes and effects of Treaty reforms are linked in more complex ways than the conventional intergovernmental prediction suggests. By contrast, guided by the over-arching question of how, and under what conditions Europarties affect Treaty decision outcomes, this chapter offers a different analysis of this relationship. We argue that Europarties are not alone able to shape bargaining outcomes but perform an important role in these processes. There is evidence in academic research to that effect. But the Europarties face obstacles. We can expect them to impact, but not without conditions. How much they manage to shape Treaties and EU governance overall, depends on factors such as domestic politics and peer pressure. More broadly, we argue in this chapter that three central factors shape the extent to which Europarties influence Treaty outcomes: the partisan composition of the European Council, the cohesion and capacity for mobilization of Europarties, and the choice of venue for deliberations and negotiations of Treaty changes.

We explore the influence of these factors empirically over a longer time based primarily on previous studies which rely on complementary forms of primary material such as extensive interviews and documentation. We centre on general tendencies in the material, based on multiple interviews, and only draw on individual interviews to exemplify common opinions among the interviewees. Speaking from experience, over time it became harder to gain access to data such as interviews that enable scholars to trace government leaders’ positions. This also reflects the development and status of the Europarties themselves in terms of political relevance at the highest level of decision-making in the EU.

While having a particular focus on Treaty negotiations and reform, we thus also explore the conditions under which Europarties can be expected to ‘make a difference’ or ‘matter’ with a view to other instances of Europarty attempts at influence. Existing research shows that Europarties really do have influence, but also that their influence is conditional (e.g., Johansson, 2016, 2017; Johansson & Raunio, 2019; Van Hecke et al., 2018). Under the right circumstances Europarties have wielded decisive influence, including circumstances in which they have found themselves in numerical supremacy in the European Council and have displayed evidence of internal cohesion. Depending on ascendancy or cohesion, particularly the two largest and most powerful Europarties, the EPP, comprising Christian Democratic and conservative parties, and PES, have left their mark on the Treaties. We compare their performances and track records as influencers. The third largest political family, the liberals, has also been represented in the European Council and other EU institutions. With fewer prime ministers, however, the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR)/Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) has been less successful in influencing the Treaties. Yet it has also organized leaders’ meetings, well-attended by government leaders overall. The chapter shows how the Europarties’ capacity to mobilize the networks and personal relations at the top level facilitates influence. In this way, they have been capitalizing on their vast party networks.

Exploring our argument that Europarties play an important role in EU politics and Treaty reform but not without conditions, two implications stand out. One is for the analysis of European integration. In contrast to accounts that emphasize intergovernmental relations and national bargaining positions, we stress preference formation through transnational mechanisms, such as party networks. The other implication is for studies on Europarties. This chapter contributes to the literature on political parties and groups at the EU level by mapping how participation in decision-making at this highest level of EU politics feeds back into the organization of Europarties. Europarties have gradually seized a bigger political role and are involved in policymaking across a wide range of issues.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Beyond this introduction, the following two sections briefly introduce the fundamentals of EU Treaty reform and coalition formation, respectively. After that a more substantive section divided into three subsections elaborates on the three factors assumed to be shaping the influence of Europarty politics in the European Council, specifying why and how Europarty influence is conditional. It analyzes the quantity and quality of Europarty presence in the European Council and impact in Treaty reforms through illustrative evidence. Through exploring the results of Europarty influence on the Treaties, it addresses the question of how much collective influence the Europarties have wielded over the content of these Treaties. We conclude by bringing together the theoretical arguments and central findings, as well as by discussing the broader implications of our findings for existing and future research and for future reforms of the EU itself.

Understanding EU Treaty Reform: Context and Complexity

Treaty reforms in the EU play out in a particular context and dynamic. They involve a complex set of actors, and this complexity also reflects the complexity of the broader EU system, general EU bargaining, and decision-making. But the existing literature on EU Treaty-making and particularly on IGCs often treats these processes as unique and as mainly involving national politicians representing governments. However, there has been a ‘partial eclipse’ of the IGCs, as governments no longer dominate this domain the way they used to do (Hodson & Maher, 2018). There is a much wider range of actors involved and the significance of their role in the Treaty reform process is a matter of empirical research. While the growing impact of the Parliament, and its strategies for self-empowerment, in overall Treaty reform has already been addressed by the literature (e.g., Christiansen & Reh, 2009; Corbett et al., 2016; Héritier et al., 2019; Rittberger, 2005;), the role of EP political groups has generally not been taken into consideration (for a rare contribution see Johansson, 2020; see also Fontaine, 2009).

An IGC is necessary to negotiate a new Treaty, which provides the EU’s constitutional basis. Treaty negotiations in IGCs have resulted in wide-ranging constitutional and institutional changes since the 1980s (Laursen, 2012a, 2016a, 2016b and references therein; Segers & Van Hecke, 2023 including chapters on Treaties and Treaty changes). IGCs constitute milestones in the history, process, and long-term patterns of European integration, and they have resulted in changes considered to be ‘history-making’ decisions (Moravcsik, 1998). Some of the most important decisions affecting the EU have been taken by IGCs, and that has set a pattern. The EU is based on Treaties negotiated and ratified by member states and these Treaties form a kind of ‘constitution’ for the Union. The member states are often described as the ‘masters of the Treaties’. But to describe them like that is to underplay the other forces at work, including Europarties that lie at the centre of this book.

The ‘history-making’ nature of IGCs and their explicit aim of producing Treaty reforms means that the relevant actors—at the highest level the prime ministers and presidents representing the member states—are keen to seek alliances along ideological or partisan lines, at least as a complement to their pursuit of national interests in the negotiation process itself. Working through Europarties brings significant advantages. While governments are at the centre of the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Treaties, to describe IGCs simply as an intergovernmental or interstate exercise is therefore one-dimensional and obscures the transnational and ideational forces at work. These partisan effects can be felt through the coordinated responses within the broader political families for which Europarties are the organizational platforms. It also bears noting that governments to varying extents have been keen to develop close relations with supranational institutions, including the Parliament. In the past, more federalist-minded member states, including the Belgian and Italian governments, have made their support for Treaty revisions conditional on the support of the EP. This has strengthened the EP political groups and the wider support needed behind comprehensive Treaty reforms.

Coalition Formation: The Partisan Hypothesis and Its Competitors

Theories of coalition formation address the question why actors form some coalitions rather than others; what the motives driving the choice of coalition partners are. The partisan hypothesis suggests that political actors form coalitions primarily based on ideological affinity, as defined by party affiliation. By contrast, competing theories point to power, interest, and culture as driving concerns. Ideological proximity thus constitutes one of several bases for coalition-building. In the context of EU negotiations, the Franco-German alliance is frequently considered a power-based coalition, formed for the purpose of producing pre-agreements that set the parameters for the broader negotiations (e.g., Krotz & Schild, 2015). The notion of interest-based coalitions receives extensive support in research on negotiations in the Council (e.g., Thomson, 2011). Cultural-based coalitions include, notably, the distinct North/South or North/South/East divides identified in European level bargaining (e.g., Naurin & Lindahl, 2008).

Political alliances may emerge for different reasons. Voting patterns in the Council may reflect strong common interests across ideological divides in addition to national interests. And EU decision-making, especially in the Parliament, has been built on a ‘grand coalition’ between the leading political families and their Europarties, EPP and PES. As was seen in the previous chapter, the Europarties combined into a broad coalition driving the regulation of ‘political parties at the European level’ including their funding (Johansson & Raunio, 2005; see also, e.g., Wolfs, 2022). That process showed cross-party consensus on a matter of both principles and interests. In this vein, Europarties and their EP political groups have often acted on powerful incentives to seek alliances or work out common positions across themselves.

In the study of EU politics, the partisan hypothesis receives extensive support in empirical research on the EP and its dimensions of contestation (e.g., Hix et al., 2007). This is present in the voting patterns of MEPs and in the organization of political groups. Since the formation of the first political groups in the then Common Assembly—the forerunner to the EP—in 1953 political families have organized themselves into such political groups.¹ Overall, research has shown that the EU political space is defined by two dimensions: the traditional left–right dimension, constituting the central dimension of contestation, and the independence–integration dimension particular to the EU, capturing attitudes towards European integration. The two dimensions are present in the positions that national parties take on European issues, and in the programmes and manifestos of the Europarties. However, these two dimensions have been supplemented by a third ideological dimension: the Green–Alternative–Libertarian/Traditional–Authoritarian–Nationalist (GAL–TAN), which is based on cultural and social values. The old conflict and divide between left and right has been challenged by structural shifts over the decades, reflecting new circumstances, and one of the main developments of such shifts is the rise of nationalist (populist) parties (e.g., Hix et al., 2024; Hooghe & Marks, 2018).

Even some assessments of coalition formation in the Council find support for the partisan hypothesis and for an ideological left–right dimension, observed, for instance, by shifts in member state positions as a product of changes in government (Hagemann, 2008; Hagemann & Hoyland, 2008; Manow et al., 2008; Mattila, 2004). These results, identifying party-political patterning, generate the expectation of coalitions based on party politics rather than nationally defined preferences. According to Manow et al. (2008: 24) ‘party affiliation constantly turns out to be a significant predictor for the observable voting patterns in the Council and in the EP, often a better predictor than nationality or regional economic interests. This even seems to hold for Intergovernmental Conferences…’² Their party-political ‘centre of gravity’ approach strongly suggests that fluctuations in the relative strength of political parties have been a major determinant in the history of European integration (Manow et al., 2008; also, e.g., Chryssogelos, 2022). For example, Europe’s shift to the left in the second half of the 1990s was important in facilitating the inclusion of the employment title in the Amsterdam Treaty or in the reinterpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Manow et al., 2008: 20).

Given the findings outlined above, coalitions among member states, and particularly in the Council, are predicted by the partisan composition of national governments. But the evidence remains mixed. Recent research, drawing on survey data, finds that member states with similar politico-economic systems have a greater tendency to cooperate with each other, and that governments’ ideological similarity has become more important over time, particularly as structured by the GAL–TAN and European integration dimensions (Johansson et al., 2023). If the countries are close to each other on these dimensions they are likely to cooperate to a greater degree. Their analysis concludes that this might be a consequence of an increasing politicization of European integration and of a greater prominence for conflict on issues structured by these dimensions rather than the traditional left–right dimension (Johansson et al., 2023: 12; see also, e.g., Hooghe & Marks, 2009). But according to that study, the cooperation between the countries does not change significantly when, for example, there is a change of government between the right and the left. There are somewhat different dynamics that can affect cooperative relations between governments, but it can be difficult to really determine exactly which dynamic is decisive. And their conclusions come with the important caveat that the strength of cooperative relations is likely determined by different factors, ‘some related to micro level factors of individual relations and some to member state characteristics or idiosyncrasies’ (Johansson et al., 2023: 13). The latter can be normative factors such as commitment to shared norms and values, among other things. Finally, they note that there is also variation in the strength of relations depending on policy areas.

Research results in this field are at best predictive but not deterministic. Notably, there are continual shifts in the partisan composition of governments. This is another field to pursue further. Nonetheless, a range of studies indicate that party politics matters for EU politics and has gained significance. In the words of Chryssogelos (2022: 452): ‘Focusing on EU institutions in particular, the growing role of party politics is also evident’. Translated to the context of European Council negotiations, the partisan hypothesis generates the expectation of a party-political divide, with heads of government coordinating their positions within the dominant transnational parties—the EPP, the PES, and the ALDE. The European Council, a traditional stronghold of interstate negotiations, may be described as a least-likely setting for party politics or partisan coalitions. Yet, one must remember the ‘high stakes’ involved in European Council summitry and the continuous interaction between leaders. For the heads of state or governments and of EU institutions participating at this level of politics, the top of the EU’s hierarchy, there are direct benefits from having like-minded ‘friends’ around the negotiation table. They build up useful contacts that can evolve into a substantial network of actors. Such networks facilitate policy influence and are one of the reasons for getting involved in the Europarties, which structure those powerful networking opportunities.

The Quantity and Quality of Europarty Presence in the European Council

In this section we will further outline our central theoretical argument. We then present empirical evidence to support the case for Europarty influence but also for the limits thereof—in the context of EU Treaty negotiations and reform. In Chapter 1 we raised the question of the impact of Europarties; whether they matter or not, whether they have influence, meaning successful attempts to shape an outcome from what it otherwise would have been in the absence of the action. But influence can be general or specific; it can be manifest or latent. The precise influence of Europarties is, of course, difficult to isolate in practice. One way to assess whether Europarties matter or ‘make a difference’ is to gauge the extent to which they attempt to mobilize and influence. In other words, to explore how Europarties, through their party networks, make efforts to impact political developments. We can track their attempts at influence through their actions and institutional presence, and we can seek to identify the ‘prime movers’.

There is certainly evidence of party-political mobilization through Europarties having been decisive for decision-making on EU Treaties. In particular, the EPP was significant in the processes preceding the adoption of the Single European Act (Budden, 1994, 2002; Johansson, 2002b), and the Maastricht Treaty (Johansson, 2002a). These reforms were significant in pushing European integration towards more supranationalism. This illustrates that a Europarty like the EPP can be conceived of as both an agenda-setter and an advocacy coalition, a transnational one, bringing together policymakers at different levels. It facilitated collective agreements at the level of the European Council. Let us next explore these developments in more detail.

In the 1980s, the call for a major Treaty reform came against the backdrop of a growing concern about the bloc’s competitiveness, as well as the challenges that enlargement and external relations posed. Eventually, the Milan European Council in June 1985 took a decision to open an IGC to revise the Treaties. It was welcomed as an opportunity to reinforce institutions and decision-making as well as to extend policymaking to new areas of activity. During the IGC, the Christian Democrats continued their coordination with a view to shaping the detailed agenda and the EPP contributed to advancing progress in the IGC. Issues on the agenda included the completion of the internal market and environment policy, as well as research and technology. The agreement included new decision-making procedures, with more majority voting (including on single market proposals). What was to become the SEA, which came into force in 1987, was largely the result of impact from Christian Democrat leaders in the EPP, and their determination to push through reforms to shift European integration in a more supranational direction. In 1985, the heads of the German, Irish, and the three Benelux governments were Christian Democrats, while the deputy prime minister (Arnaldo Forlani) and the foreign minister in the Italian government were Christian Democrats (Giulio Andreotti, the former and would-be prime minister). Of the original six member states, Christian Democrats were still in leading positions in five and out of altogether ten governments EPP member parties were represented in six. The Christian Democrat leaders knew each other well. At the time, the EPP Conference brought together some 30 high-level politicians, including leaders of national governments, political parties, and parliamentary groups as well as the presidencies of the EPP and of the EPP Group, along with Commissioners and leading MEPs from the Parliament.

However, despite significant results the Single European Act failed to satisfy the most federalist minded. Therefore, as an advocacy group or coalition, the EPP continued to keep up the pressure for a new and more fundamental Treaty review, one transforming the European Community (EC) to a genuine Union. In the making of the Maastricht Treaty or the TEU, the meetings of Christian Democrat leaders shaped both the agenda and the outcome of the negotiations. Previous studies display a clear link between the Maastricht Treaty outcome and the demands and positions of the EPP (Hanley, 2004: 250; Hix & Lord, 1997: 189; Jansen, 2006: 112; Johansson, 2002a: 887). Many of the EPP’s requirements made their way into the new Treaty. A comparative analysis shows that most of the EPP’s demands were satisfactorily met and that there was no progress at all on only one point, namely on the avis conforme—assent of the EP for new actions (Article 235) and revisions of the Treaties (Article 236). It is also worth noting that Wilfried Martens, EPP president and prime minister of Belgium, had drawn up most of the important demands in agreement with Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch prime minister who would chair the Maastricht European Council. In an interview, Lubbers said that at the time of Maastricht the EPP ‘did a lot as Christian Democrats together’, were ‘a strong family’, and ‘still a team in Maastricht’.³ Also in an interview, Martens noted that positions were ‘strongly inspired by the EPP programme’, although as some of the EPP prime ministers were in coalition governments there were no ‘purely EPP attitudes’ (see also Martens, 2008: 104–108).⁴ In sum, the six EPP heads of government formed a core of the advocacy coalition. It would be inaccurate to describe their political actions as just intergovernmental.

The EPP mobilized the network and was a cohesive family of mainly Christian Democrats. They shared a federalist thinking, although to varying degrees. They were inspired by the legacy of their ideological movement and its place in the history of European integration and were also seeking to alter its institutional architecture. Yet, there is also evidence that internal fissure and limits in the ambition and capacity to coordinate positions may reduce Europarty influence in processes of Treaty reform as well (Johansson, 2016, 2017). Indeed, as we already have discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 of this book, the Europarties have no formal powers to take decisions binding their government leaders and therefore successful ex ante policy coordination between national member parties is essential for Europarties to achieve their goals in the European Council. And individual Europarties carry more bargaining weight the stronger representation they have in the European Council (Hix & Lord, 1997; Johansson, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2016, 2017; Lightfoot, 2005; Tallberg & Johansson, 2008; Van Hecke, 2004).

The presence of such transnational partisan influence is not exactly surprising given that the Europarties gather and connect influential decision-makers. At the same time, government leaders are expected to act in the so-called national interest. In the European Council, where all decisions on constitutional change are made, partisan coalitions constitute one of several alternative forms of alliance. Under what conditions can we expect partisan coalitions to be the dominant pattern? What factors can be hypothesized to condition Europarty influence? In the remainder of this section, we explore the three factors hypothesized to shape the scope and influence of (Euro)party politics in EU politics, in particular Treaty negotiation outcomes: the relative numerical strength of Europarties, the cohesion and mobilization of Europarties, and venue choice.⁵

Relative Numerical Strength of Europarties in the European Council

The heads of government in the European Council represent national parties in office. Depending on the pattern of electoral success in the member states, the European Council has traditionally been dominated by, or divided between, socialists/social democrats, liberals, and Christian Democrats/conservatives. We hypothesize that the relative number of heads of government that each respective Europarty can gather will affect European Council decisions on a range of issues. Hence, the Europarties can be expected to matter (more) when they are in numerical ascendance, wielding stronger influence in the European Council when leaders from one party family outnumber those from others (Hanley, 2004; Johansson, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2016, 2017; Lightfoot, 2005; Tallberg & Johansson, 2008; Van Hecke, 2004).

Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the relative numerical strength of the Christian Democrat/conservative (EPP), socialist/social democrat (PES), liberal (ELDR/ALDE), as well as the national conservatives (European Conservatives and Reformists, ECR) and the left (Party of the European Left, PEL, and Left in the European Parliament, GUE/NGL) parties in the European Council over almost four decades (1985–2023) and at the time of the IGCs. During this period the EC/EU enlarged from 10 to 27 members (28 before Brexit).

Fig. 4.1

Source Adapted and extended from Tallberg and Johansson [2008: 1227] and drawing also on Drachenberg [2018: 3], with data about the political composition of the European Council from 1 January 2005 to mid-2018, and Drachenberg [2022a: 15–16], covering the 2009–2022 period. See also Drachenberg [2022b: 15–16])

Relative numerical strength of transnational parties in the European Council, 1985–2023 (Note The chart shows the situation on 1 January of the year concerned. Up to 2004 yearly scores are split in half when shifts in government occur. When prime ministers or presidents are not part of any Europarty, their ideological profiles have been approximated. Hence, Jacques Chirac (Rally for the Republic, RPR), Charles Haughey (Fianna Fáil), and Albert Reynolds (Fianna Fáil) as well as British conservative prime ministers—Margaret Thatcher and John Major—are classified as EPP, and Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (non-political), Lamberto Dini (non-political), Mario Monti (non-political), and Mario Draghi are classified as liberal (ELDR/ALDE). There are also instances of independent or non-affiliated members of the European Council.

The chart shows the political affiliation of European Council members and the shifting balance over these years, based on the various political families represented in the EP. It effectively illustrates how the three main political families have been continually involved in the European Council. It points to three distinct periods: Christian Democrat/conservative predominance in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, socialist/social democrat predominance in the second half of the 1990s, and Christian Democrat/conservative and liberal predominance in the 2000s.

These swings in the partisan composition of the European Council were an effect of general ideological shifts in national electorates, which translated into the empowerment of socialists/social democrats or Christian Democrats/conservatives/liberals in several member states within a limited period. Whereas the EPP had been in ascendancy at the time of the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty negotiations when the Christian Democrat heads of government met and agreed on fundamental points, the second half of the 1990s was a period of socialist/social democratic numerical ascendance in the European Council. At its peak, in the second half of the 1990s, and at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997, preceded by the recent victories of the British Labour Party and the French Socialist Party, socialists/social democrats formed all or part of 13 out of 15 national governments. Numerically dominating the European Council in the second part of the 1990s, the PES was bolstered. It was during this period that the European Council concluded the negotiations on the employment chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty, explored separately in a case study (Johansson, 1999; see below and in Chapter 2). While respecting the competences of the member states, employment policy was henceforth to be ‘a matter of common concern’.⁶ To have most of the heads of government in the European Council was crucial for the centre-left socialists. The PES also exerted an influence through successive EU Presidencies. The relative numerical weakness in the European Council, along with internal divisions not least over the employment chapter, weakened the EPP’s capacity to play the same crucial role as it did during the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty negotiations (Johansson, 2016; Van Hecke, 2004: 50).

A new balance of power emerged in the European Council. EPP government leaders were still an important part of it, but numerically weakened. And policy started to shift, but the shift was not playing out as some anticipated. The fact that Tony Blair (PES, sort of) and the Spanish conservative prime minister José Maria Aznar (EPP) were close allies in the work to reorient the EU agenda away from social regulation in a direction of structural reform and liberalization had a negative impact on the cohesion of both the PES and the EPP. And their cooperation combined with the new policy direction reinforced the suspicion that they were not really to be trusted within their respective party families. Since 1997, the British and Spanish governments frequently coordinated to push a deregulation agenda—yet the leading parties in these governments were members of the PES and of the EPP, respectively.

In the following decade, the period of socialist/social democrat supremacy gradually gave way to centre-right dominance from the early 2000s onwards. This partisan swing in the composition of the European Council coincided with the revival of Treaty reform within the EU, up to the point when the Lisbon Treaty was adopted in 2007. In March 2007 the EPP met at the highest level in Berlin to mark the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome. The event brought together leaders of governments and parties as well as the presidents of the three major EU institutions: Angela Merkel for the Council of the European Union (and European Council); José Manuel Barroso for the Commission; and Hans-Gert Pöttering for the Parliament. This event, during the German EU Presidency, was part of the preparations for a new constitutional reform initiative (more below).

The presidential and legislative elections in France further increased the influence of the EPP, at least in numerical terms. The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as president and his appointment of François Fillon as the prime minister meant that an EPP member party, Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), came to power in France and promised a way out of the constitutional crisis that followed the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch voters in the late spring of 2005. At its meeting in June 2007 the European Council decided to open an IGC, with the Portuguese Presidency of the EU taking on this task. The new Treaty was drafted during only a few months, but it contained essentially the same institutional reforms as proposed by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (more below). Hence, the EPP brought together a wide range of government leaders, and its numerical supremacy allowed the EPP to play a central role in the EU generally, and in Treaty reform specifically. An essential condition—the relative numerical strength of Europarties—was met. Yet, there are other essential conditions, and it is hard to assess which matters most.

Changes in the balance of party affiliation in the European Council do not automatically translate into policy shifts. Yet political affiliation can be expected to matter one way or another. The partisan composition of the European Council fluctuates over time. Drachenberg (2022b: 16) shows that, since 2002, on an annual average the EPP has included 39% of EU heads of state or government, 27% belonged to the PES and 20% came from ALDE-affiliated national parties. The high point for the EPP was in 2012–2013, when 52% belonged to this party family. The PES had its highpoint in 2002, with 47%, and the high point for ALDE was in 2018–2019, with 29%. The liberal family was, for decades, in third place in respect of affiliated European Council members, but between 2017 and 2020 it had the second highest number of affiliated heads of state or government in the European Council, which also partly explained its growing coordination activities. Drachenberg (2022b: 16) notes:

While in numerical terms all the three main political parties have had high and low points since the 2000s, it would neither be possible nor accurate to determine periods where one or the other main party ‘dominated’ the European Council. The post-2004 period should rather be considered as the end of single-party dominance in the European Council and an era of increased party diversity.

Drachenberg (2022b: 47) concludes that the numerical strength of the three main Europarties has fluctuated over time, and that since the 2000s none of them has ‘dominated’ the European Council. And that European political families can also influence European Council proceedings through other channels, as their national member parties are often in national coalition governments, albeit without providing the prime ministers. Which increases the importance of the coordination within and between Europarties, and across member states.

While members of the European Council almost all belonged to the three main political families until the early 2000s, the diversity of political affiliation has broadened in recent years. At the end of 2023 the European Council included ten members from the EPP (plus the Commission President), six from ALDE/Renew Europe (plus the European Council President), five from the PES/S&D, two from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), and four independent or non-affiliated members (Drachenberg, 2023).

Capturing the influence of Europarties through numbers is a tricky task. Numbers can be misleading. This has been especially true in those instances where the PES has been unable to convert numerical ascendancy in the European Council into power because it has been overall more internally divided than EPP, as discussed below. Although numbers can give a sense of how the balance of power is changing and may indicate where power lies at a certain point in time, much depends on other explanatory factors, not least the cohesion of the Europarties. In any case, Europarty influence is contingent on a certain presence in the European Council. It is a necessary precondition for a long-term impact. But a large quantity does not always translate into quality. We caution that simple maths and number-crunching might be misleading, however: to some extent divisions within Europarties reduce their potential influence. Heads of government do not necessarily adopt the same ideological position just because they belong to the same Europarty. The ideological profiles of national parties of the same political colour vary, and the Europarties, therefore, exhibit a level of heterogeneity. For instance, there is notable variation among the Christian Democratic and conservative parties of the EPP, and the socialist and social democratic parties of the PES, on issues such as liberalization, regulation, and strengthening social rights. There are issues that have not divided the European Council along clear ideological lines of left and right and which perhaps have not been party politicized. These issues have produced some strange bedfellows—and split natural ones, when leaders from the same political family have been on opposing sides. Hence, we identify the degree of ideological cohesion among the heads of government of a particular Europarty as a factor that shapes the capacity to translate numerical advantage into party-political influence.

Cohesion and Mobilization of Europarties

As we noted in Chapter 3, the Europarties rely more on voluntary consent and cooperation of national member parties, lacking the enforcement mechanisms that national parties (usually) enjoy. However, through their networks and activities the Europarties can disseminate the norms, principles, and standards that define the Europarty and guide the member parties in their conduct with each other. Such intangible factors, like commitment and skill, are part of the answer to the question of how Europarties impact and how we assess their effectiveness, independent of their quantity. But such factors are difficult to measure. The Europarties’ potential impact clearly depends on the ability to initiate and to carry out determined actions, which do not happen by themselves. They require certain underlying standards, principles, and values—in other words, what it means to be part of such transnational community and to act through it.

When it comes to impact, the evidence suggests that the number of representation matters, but that is not what matters most—it is the quality which is crucial. The underlying activity of Europarties and how they can adapt to changing circumstances matter. To properly understand these features and trends, analysts must consider the collective action capacity of each of the Europarties. Numerical superiority is therefore alone not a sufficient condition for influencing political outcomes in the European Council along party-political lines. In addition, the heads of government of a particular Europarty must be mobilized behind the common cause. Hence, we hypothesize that Europarties are more likely to influence the process and outcome of negotiations, the greater their cohesion and capacity for mobilization. As Hix (2005: 187; see also Hix & Lord, 1997: Ch. 7) noted, for parties to exercise influence in the EU, ‘translation from party strengths to policy outputs requires party actors in the same party family to cooperate, and winning coalitions to be constructed between different party families’. To this end, the Europarties organize meetings of party and government leaders just before the European Council summits, but also hold party summits and conclaves independent of the European Council (Van Hecke & Johansson, 2013a, 2013b). The purpose of such institutionalized networking is to discuss items on the agenda, develop strategies, and—whenever possible—hammer out a common line. Moreover, summits like these generate media exposure.

In addition to the leaders of the Europarty and of member parties, whether in government or in opposition, the attendees at these pre-summit meetings include individuals from the corresponding political group in the EP and from the Commission. For the heads of government, the Europarties offer a layer of coalition-building in the European Council, through which they may seek to improve the bargaining position of the member state they represent. However, the effectiveness and influence of the Europarties as vehicles for coalition-building in the European Council and more generally depends largely on their relative cohesion and capacity to mobilize ‘their’ heads of government for the party cause (Johansson, 2016, 2017; see also Van Hecke, 2004, 2010). The pre-European Council summit meetings among government and party leaders are a central aspect of this mobilization process, but their significance varies over time and across party families. The continued importance of Europarties—visible across them—is thus linked to the summitry phenomenon. At the top party and government level, Europarties are meeting regularly in advance of EU summits. By comparison, the EPP has utilized these pre-summit gatherings more effectively than the PES, with greater participation of heads of government and, arguably, more direct inputs to the agenda items of the European Council.

A case study of the nomination of the EU’s new institutional leadership in 2019 illustrates the importance of the Europarties’ role in coordinating between national and EU leaders in the European Council (Drachenberg, 2022b; see also Chapter 1). Most notably, it shows how the Europarties perform an important coordination role within the EU political system.

The growing politicisation of the EU, and notably of the European Council, and the increased coordination role of the European political parties in the context of the European Council, need to be seen as two complementary trends which reinforce one another. The politicisation of the European Council leads to increased attention being paid to this body by European political parties, which in turn further reinforces the politicisation of the European Council. Moreover, the fact that European political parties are strengthening their coordination activities, based on growing demand by their affiliates who are members of the European Council, supports this claim. (Drachenberg, 2022b: 49)

That study clearly indicates that Europarties contribute significantly to the functioning of the EU, not least through facilitating coordination across institutional barriers. And here the findings also attest to the Europarties’ role in the appointment of institutional leaders, including the Commission president (see also, e.g., Bardi, 2020). However, in the past such appointments have revealed tensions within political families. Notably, in 1994 the German chancellor Helmut Kohl blocked Dutch prime minister Ruud Lubbers from becoming the Commission president. This meant growing tensions in the family of Christian Democrats. As expected, however, a Christian Democrat became Commission president: Luxembourg’s prime minister Jacques Santer. In 2004 the EPP’s influence was apparent when one of its own, the prime minister of Portugal José Manuel Barroso, was appointed, then endorsed again by the EPP in 2009. To add a European element to the campaigns, and to link EP elections to the choice of the Commission president, 2014 saw the main political families choose lead or top candidates (Spitzenkandidaten in German) (e.g., Ahrens & Miller, 2023; Christiansen, 2016; Van Hecke et al., 2023). Jean-Claude Juncker, who was the candidate of the EPP/EPP Group, was then nominated by the European Council to be the next Commission president.

The Europarties again chose lead candidates ahead of the 2019 elections. However, the European Council could not agree on nominating the EPP lead candidate Manfred Weber as Commission president, reportedly because of opposition from French president Emmanuel Macron in particular. Disagreements among the Europarties were also behind the outcome, as Weber’s candidacy was not sufficiently supported by PES or ALDE (Crum, 2023; De Wilde, 2020; Heidbreder & Schade, 2020). Instead, in a quite typical compromise deal, they agreed on a different German EPP politician: Ursula von der Leyen, with the PES and ALDE lead candidates (Frans Timmermans and Margrethe Vestager) as vice-presidents of the new Commission. The entire package of candidates for the high-level EU positions finally agreed by the European Council’s heads of state or government ‘showed a clear division of the posts between the European political parties, confirming the politicisation of the European Council and the important role of European political parties’ (Drachenberg, 2022b: 46).⁷

Of course, participation of heads of government at pre-summit meetings is on a voluntary basis and their absence may decrease the influence of the Europarty. Nor can Europarties impose their views on decisions taken at European Council summits—at which the EU’s main policy orientations and decisions are agreed. Holding more Europarty pre-summit meetings cannot guarantee influence if participation is limited or if those participating fail to agree over key issues. In other words, an increased volume of such Europarty summits may be a necessary condition for influencing EU or European Council decision-making, but it is not sufficient by itself. Indeed, there is evidence, particularly from the PES, that a lack of commitment to these meetings among the heads of government has reduced their significance (Van Hecke & Johansson, 2013a, 2013b). Specifically, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder showed little inclination to attend. They apparently saw the PES pre-summit meetings as a waste of time. Their instinct was to see exclusively other prime ministers. Moreover, while Blair and Schröder, self-proclaimed Third Way leaders, backed a reform agenda as noted above, and Blair was continuously more supportive of structural reform including liberalization and renouncing dirigiste economics.

Hence, the PES faced limits in its mobilization capacity which negatively affected its ability to shape outcomes, even when enjoying numerical superiority. Yet, it was the PES which successfully advocated a chapter or title on employment in the Amsterdam Treaty. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is generally considered an example of successful transnational party politics, of a truly transnational policy contribution (Johansson, 1999; Külahci, 2002, 2004, 2010; Ladrech, 1997, 2000; Lightfoot, 2005; see also see also Johansson, 2017; Tallberg & Johansson, 2008). It was visible evidence of the influence and output of the PES network (Ladrech, 2000: 107, 112 and Chapter 6). It involved work through the party networks, as well as intensive consultation at the highest levels of party and government. While including governmental actors, the contribution can be largely seen as transnational given the patterns of agenda-setting and advocacy.

But in assessing the independent effect of transnational partisan advocacy coalitions, it is important to consider the links between what was happening transnationally and at the intergovernmental level (see Chapter 2). One interpretation is that Swedish and other proposals for an employment chapter outlined alternative arrangements for formally institutionalizing a form of coordination in this policy area that to some extent already existed. The contacts through the party networks then served to capture a zone of agreement in the IGC itself, as a conscious effort to use or instrumentalize those party networks. Still, they were crucial in gaining wider support for the employment chapter and subsequently for the new Treaty that came into effect in November 1999 and in shaping the coordination of employment policies put into practice through the new provisions. As noted above, it followed a shift in the European Council towards the social democrats/socialists, and it was an issue that divided the Christian Democrats, even though they were still pivotal despite the socialists’ numerical superiority. Together with particularly the liberals in the ELDR, the Christian Democrats in the EPP could oppose the socialists (Hix & Lord, 1997: 193).

Compared with the PES, the EPP (and ELDR/ALDE) has confronted fewer problems in securing the participation of its heads of government at pre-summit meetings. A reason for this is the continuous commitment on the part of the German CDU and its leaders. But participation is not all, as limits in the ambition and capacity to coordinate positions may reduce the influence of the Europarties. Yet these top-level discussions have proven useful in preparing the ground for the subsequent European Council, also in the context of Treaty reform.

For Europarties to exercise influence, they must exhibit a certain degree of cohesion in the internal arena, mobilize effectively, and work within domestic constraints on national parties and leaders. This complex picture of Europarties and what conditions their influence, notably domestic political limitations, is amply illustrated by the 1996–1997 IGC and the Amsterdam Treaty outcome. Part of the overall compromise signed in Maastricht was an agreement written into the text to re-examine some issues in a further IGC due to start in 1996. Thus, the agenda of the IGC was largely predetermined. That another IGC should be convened was something the EPP actively pushed for. As the EPP leaders were concerned about the small number of Christian Democrats in the European Council, and in response to concerns of the Dutch and Italian parties, Kohl, Santer, and the Belgian prime minister Jean-Luc Dehaene promised that the positions taken by their governments in the IGC would be closely coordinated with the policies of the EPP party (Hix & Lord, 1997: 194). The relative numerical weakness in the European Council made it even more important for the EPP to mobilize its heads of government.

An in-depth case study of the role of the EPP in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 documents its influence as well as the limits to such influence (Johansson, 2016; see also Johansson, 2015b). The case illustrates how factors pertaining to domestic politics limited the scope for the EPP to shape the outcome of the Treaty negotiations more significantly. Notably, such factors came to the fore in Germany and limited the room for manoeuvre of the governing coalition under chancellor Kohl, confronting the limits for a compromise over the new Treaty. A condition of a deal was parliamentary approval from both legislative chambers, perhaps the single biggest constraint on the federal government’s scope for negotiation. It was constrained from above and below.⁸ Kohl’s position was weakened by the social democratic majority in the Bundesrat, Federal Council, one of the two legislative chambers. Other national governments too had their concerns and faced domestic constraints, such as Ireland and Spain in justice and home affairs where considerable concern was also raised within Germany. Not least the sensitive immigration issue was bound up with asylum and refugee policy, with a more restrictive approach and tightening of German criteria for asylum.

Moreover, as we have explained, the EPP failed to influence the outcome more significantly first, and most importantly, because it lacked the relative majority from which it had profited before and, second, because the EPP suffered from internal ideological divisions among its leaders (Van Hecke, 2004: 50). The fissure and in some sense lowered ambitions gave rise to disappointment within the EPP among those who wanted to go further in terms of European integration (e.g., Martens, 2008: 137–138). But there were nonetheless significant achievements. To give one example, the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council which also indirectly increased the powers of the Parliament. And it is worth noting that the Amsterdam European Council adopted a resolution on the SGP, establishing its political basis and providing policy guidelines for its implementation. A key element of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), SGP emphasized budgetary management and discipline in view of member states entering the third stage of EMU. EU member states thereby agreed to strengthen the monitoring and coordination of national fiscal and economic policies to enforce the deficit and debt limits established by the Maastricht Treaty. This was a key priority for German chancellor Kohl. The EPP had a common position on this, with the EPP leaders emphasizing that SGP had to be endorsed in Amsterdam and amidst concerns that the new French socialist government under Lionel Jospin would not be able to finalize its position.

The Amsterdam Treaty may have been a modest reform in comparison with the SEA and TEU, but it kept the momentum alive for the hope among federalists of another breakthrough in the EU integration process. Specifically, a moment was building for yet another EU treaty reform, seeking solutions to the so-called Amsterdam leftovers. That brought about the 2000 IGC, which similarly resulted in both breakthroughs and frustrations. After the Treaty of Nice, which entered into force in 2003, the EPP among others called for a constitutional convention to prepare Treaty changes, to be further discussed in the next subsection.

Moving on to the Lisbon Treaty, which finally came into force on 1 December 2009, it is noteworthy that the process of Treaty reform was revived in June 2007 during the German EU presidency. One of its goals was to find common ground to get the EU constitution back on track. This was at a time of strong EPP representation in all the main EU institutions, including the Parliament where EPP was the largest political group since 1999. Despite the fact that the EPP had become less cohesive—struggling to cohere—it managed to mobilize its networks and to reach an agreement on a range of issues. As noted above, the EPP family gathered in Berlin in March 2007 on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome. The EPP event brought together over 60 participants and was hosted by German chancellor Angela Merkel—president of the European Council and undoubtedly the most important European leader at that point—and chaired by EPP president Martens. According to Merkel (2010: xv), the celebrations ‘were a significant driver’ of the new Treaty, since the European heads of state or government, in signing the Berlin Declaration, committed themselves to a set of shared values, tasks, and structures within the EU as well as to placing the EU ‘on a renewed common basis’. However, Merkel continued: ‘Converting this commitment into a mandate for an Intergovernmental Conference was by no means easy’. While difficult to measure, the importance of this event was in the renewed commitment to the EU from its principal actors across institutions and member states, reaffirming continued support for European integration. The interlinked goals adopted by all EPP member parties were influential behind the new initiative and compromise that facilitated a way out of the constitutional deadlock.

Throughout this period (2005–2007), the EPP network continued to coordinate party positions and pushed for a renewed effort, aiming for the EU to have a constitution in place by 2009. At the EPP Congress in Rome in March 2006, delegates voted overwhelmingly to continue ratifying the constitution and adopted a new document; new impetus should be given by the European Council in the first half of 2007 at the latest (Johansson, 2020: 126). The EPP Summit of heads of state and government also continued to meet in preparation for the next European Council. The EPP Summit continued to play an important role in coordinating the positions of EPP member governments, and the EPP continued to push for European integration and a constitution. In 2007, five EPP Summit meetings were held. Altogether, the EPP, as it seems more than the other Europarties, contributed to the agreement on the Lisbon Treaty later that year. The EPP, political group and the party, were thus influential in breaking the deadlock and moving on with the constitutional process. While concessions were made and the Treaty was not a proper constitution, there were important achievements for the federalist minded. Notably, the Parliament had been further empowered. Co-decision procedure, now officially called the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, became the standard mode for the making of EU laws. QMV and co-decision were extended to 40 new policy areas. In line with recent IGCs, de Ruiter and Neuhold (2016: 115) note, ‘the EP has come out of the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty as a winner insofar as co-decision was extended into a vast array of policy fields’. Widely considered a less ambitious successor to a failed EU Constitution, the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, or Constitutional Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty are substantively similar (e.g., Christiansen & Reh, 2009; Laursen, 2016a; Piris, 2010; Ziller, 2012). Despite the differences, some of which are purely symbolic, the content is much the same.

In sum, the extent to which Europarties are cohesive and able to mobilize their networks do matter for their chances of influencing bargaining processes and outcomes of Treaty negotiations. In this subsection we draw attention to the ways in which Europarties use party networks within and around the European Council to influence Treaty reforms. The sheer activity of the Europarties—mobilizing their networks for the common cause—contributed significantly to the outcomes of each Treaty reform, partly because of the momentum it generated and sustained towards major reform. The relevance of the networks emerges clearly in the various instances of Treaty-making. Over time, we have seen a shift in the ways in which Treaty reforms have been prepared and even negotiated. Hence, we have identified the choice of venue for deliberating or negotiating Treaty revision as an explanatory factor that conditions Europarty influence.

Venue Choice

We submit that a factor (positively) influencing the likelihood of Europarty impact is the choice of venue where Treaty revisions are prepared or negotiated. The locus, the place where something occurs or is situated, matters. Whereas Europarties gain from their links to national government and party leaders, their immediate connections with the EP political groups facilitate mobilization along Europarty lines in the context of Treaty revision. Arguably, the European Council is a ‘relatively inhospitable environment for party politics’ (Tallberg & Johansson, 2008: 1226). The scope for party politicization is less extensive there than in the other major EU institutions. Hence, shifting Treaty talks away from the European Council with its interstate character yields the expectation that mobilization along political family lines would occur more frequently.

As we discussed in Chapter 1, earlier research suggests that the format or institutional framework of the constitutional process matters, with the ‘convention’ model more likely to facilitate Europarty influence. And in Chapter 2 we highlighted the importance of venue in the theoretical frameworks of agenda-setting, advocacy coalitions, and transnational networks or coalitions. To reiterate, ‘venue’ is where and by whom the issue is debated and in the literature a distinction is made between ‘venue shopping’ and ‘venue modification’. While ‘venue shopping’ occurs among already existing venues, ‘venue modification’ means that actors may sometimes (also) ‘be able to modify the range of available venues to create one that is better suited to their purposes’ (Princen, 2011: 933). Further, within the EU, venue shopping may occur between EU institutions (horizontal venue shopping) and between the different levels in the multilevel system that the EU forms part of (vertical venue shopping) (Princen, 2011: 931). Institutional structures can thus affect the responsiveness of political actors to issues. As venues are locations where policies are made, which issues are discussed and how they are discussed depends largely on the character of a venue and the way venues are organized is not neutral (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2023: 210).

Hence, shift in venues is related to political strategy (more in Chapter 2). The underlying assumption here is that political actors have considerable scope to make decisions about places for their actions, whether by ‘shopping’ or ‘modification’ of institutional venue. Within the EU, as Sabatier (1998: 121) noted, the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) would expect coalitions to be seeking to maximize their advantage by ‘venue shopping’—‘as certainly seems to be happening, both among levels of government and among institutions at the European level’. For example, when Europarties seek out a venue that is preferable their choice is likely to reflect their own ambitions.

Perceptions of the EU itself—or EC before 1993—help explain why political parties have aligned with other broadly likeminded parties in available venues. Notably, the internal market project—‘Europe 1992’—increased EC policymaking since the adoption of the Single European Act and explains an emerging European level presence by many social democratic parties (Ladrech, 1993). This prompted transnational party responses, with initial steps taken since 1989 towards the enhancement of social democratic transnational party cooperation, manifesting itself on both a programmatic and an organizational level. To explain this development, Ladrech (1993) builds on the neofunctionalist logic of political spill-over together with a theory of party change. The socialist transnational party federation came more into focus for many of these national parties. And, overall, the more policy competencies have been transferred to the European level, the higher the incentives for European level cooperation for essentially all political families, the Eurosceptics included (see Chapter 1).

The issues on the agenda of Treaty reforms were until the turn of the millennium negotiated in intergovernmental forums, with the Parliament winning support for the representation of two MEPs in the proceedings leading to the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. But while the Parliament thus became more closely associated with the preparatory work and then the IGC itself, and their representation would enable parliamentarians to debate proposals in the run-up to and during the IGC, the inclusion of the EP had been contested by some governments (notably the British and the French). In that context, progress or lack thereof seemed bound up with the ways in which IGCs were prepared. The mainly intergovernmental approach, and IGCs themselves, can easily reach stalemate, as revealed in the IGCs held in 1996–1997 and 2000, with progress held back by inter-member state quarrels.

Against this background, there were calls for a new way of preparing and negotiating Treaty change. That led to the 2002–2003 Convention on the Future of Europe, which came about owing to pressures from Europarties and EP political groups. It marked a new phase in constitutional reform. Among the institutional actors, the Parliament—building on its increased powers and growing importance—was highly critical of the outcome of the IGC in 2000 as well as of its mode of negotiation that is of the intergovernmental method. It therefore demanded that the next IGC would be based on a more transparent process, through a convention. This requirement was primarily driven by the EPP, both the political group and party, but had widespread support across political families and not least in the EP. Eventually the Laeken European Council in December 2001 agreed to the establishment of the Convention.⁹ The outcome was the draft of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, adopted by the Convention in June and July 2003.

The initiative for the Convention to prepare the next IGC and the next Treaty, bringing together representatives of governments, parliaments, and the EP along with other institutions, implied a big difference from the narrower intergovernmental nature of the IGCs. The Convention commenced in February 2002 and lasted until June 2003. During this period, members of the Convention met as political families or groupings. Research confirms that party politics clearly mattered, not least in the networking among politicians within and around the political groupings at the Convention (e.g., Johansson, 2003, 2020; Norman, 2003; Van Hecke, 2012). These political groupings met before each meeting of the Convention to prepare for work at the plenary and they also put forward their own draft constitutions. Apart from these monthly meetings, the political families also convened for discussions outside Brussels.

The partisan dimension played therefore an important role throughout the Convention, not least when it reached its final stages. The bigger political families, and especially the well-organized EPP and centrist liberals, were crucial and built bridges between MEPs and national parliamentarians (Norman, 2003: 324–325; see also Johansson, 2003). The EPP, thanks to its numerical strength and commitment, managed to exert significant influence through its members and delegation leaders (Johansson, 2020: 115–122; see also Van Hecke, 2012). The partisan dimension was evident, not just towards the end of the Convention, and was reinforced by the convention method itself and by the venue. The format encouraged the formation of transnational political groups and MEPs gained from it, not least because of the actual physical venue, which was the Parliament, their home turf. Hence, the EP ‘was playing at home’ (Priestley, 2008: 37; see also Beach, 2007, 2012; Christiansen & Reh, 2009: 168; Corbett et al., 2016). The EP delegation worked for the Convention to be a much more ambitious exercise than previous instances of Treaty reform preparations. The Convention format benefited MEPs’ own cause to strengthen the EU and the Parliament. And in the process, they strengthened themselves. The convention format should also benefit the Europarties, as in IGCs the national governments are the central actors. But, as in the Convention itself, with its organizational hierarchies and different levels of status, at least in the EPP Convention Group there was a hierarchy and asymmetry of power, and therefore most likely also an asymmetry of information. Some obviously had more power than others. And there were signs of a vast gulf between national parliamentarians and MEPs. It seemed that national parliamentarians were outmanoeuvred. The choice of location was significant, not least through the institutional resources MEPs have in terms of personnel and overall infrastructure.

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe adopted by the European Council in 2004 was largely like the outcome of the Convention. But the negative outcomes in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005 meant a halt in the Treaty reform process. As shown above, the process was revived in 2007 and resulted in the Lisbon Treaty. In the 2007 IGC, the EP participated with three representatives.¹⁰ The heads of state and government were centrally involved, including through their key aides (sherpas) for EU and foreign affairs. The Lisbon Treaty was negotiated mainly using the traditional IGC method; that is, through negotiations between governmental representatives using unanimous decision-making. However, the convention method was now laid down in the Treaty for future major constitutional revisions. That was a major achievement for Europarties and an instance of cross-party consensus, too.

To sum up, the concept of venue and insight into the choice of venue helps to improve understanding of political strategies and outcomes. By questioning mainstream venues, political actors create conditions for greater influence. And these venues have their public funding. The importance of venue is here illustrated by the shift towards the convention or conference format for preparing Treaty revisions in the EU. Compared with IGCs, the convention method offers diverse participants a more open terrain to advance their goals and is more conducive to the influence of transnational advocacy coalitions. The convention or conference format therefore favours partisan politics more than IGCs do. Importantly, the choice of venue has consequences.

While negotiations and decisions over Treaties primarily take place on the intergovernmental level of EU politics, we have emphasized the nature of the venue; the places where actors get together for talks and decisions. The ‘conference format’ used in the Convention on the Future of Europe of 2002–2003 benefited the Europarties, as in IGCs the national governments are the central actors. Unsurprisingly, this was also the format of the 2021–2022 Conference on the Future of Europe (see Chapter 5) and is the format preferred by Europarties for preparing future changes to the Treaty.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have taken a deeper look at Europarties’ impact with a particular focus on constitutional processes and Treaty reforms and traced such impacts in decisions and negotiations leading to the adoption of Treaties from the 1980s to the 2000s. These multiple Treaty reforms hold broader lessons for our understanding of Europarties and their influence. At the outset of this chapter, we raised two main questions: What is the impact of the Europarties on Treaty reforms? Under what conditions can they be effective, that is, when are they most likely to achieve their goals? In addition, we raised two related questions: Who are involved? And how do the actors—within Europarty networks—seek to make an impact?

Europarties have undoubtedly had a strong impact, indeed a lasting impact, on decision-making in the EU and not only on constitutional or institutional matters but also across a wide range of policies. Europarties have shaped the Treaties, and therefore they have also shaped the future of the EU both regarding institutional questions and various policy sectors. Their actions have helped institutionalize and stabilize the Union. They have proven to be among the main drivers of European integration. Each of these Europarties could be seen as an advocacy group. What they do in terms of agenda-setting and advocacy lays the groundwork for crucial agreement on reforms and thereby shapes the broader, long-term development of European integration.

The Europarties have continuously advocated for a more integrated Union, supporting Treaty reforms over the decades, and mobilizing their forces to advance European construction. Our agenda, advocacy, and transnational frameworks help to uncover patterns of interaction and networking in the long quest for a proper Union. In turn, these patterns reveal that over a longer period there has been Europarty mobilization and influence. Europarties have provided a forum for cooperation and integration on a range of issues, and particularly through the top-level ‘summitry’ the Europarties can have a direct input into policymaking. A more complete picture thereby emerges of the EU political system and of the constitutional processes underpinning Treaties. It is in sharp contrast with the story often told about EU Treaty reform with a narrow focus on national governments and largely overlooking the role of Europarties.

We find heavy Europarty input in Treaty reform preparations. This influence involves the interaction of national political parties within Europarties, which themselves have undergone significant development. They work on many levels. Of the Europarties the chapter has focused largely on the EPP, the most influential Europarty, and to a certain extent also on the PES. There was significant activity in the EPP as well as in the PES, as they mobilized their networks. Preferences have converged, both inside and between Europarties. The EPP stands out because of its extensive representation throughout EU institutions. Part of its strength owes to the commitment of heads of government to participate in the leaders’ meetings; regularly convened before but sometimes independent of the European Council. By contrast, PES has experienced a lack of commitment to such meetings among ‘its’ heads of government which reduced its significance.

However, the PES championed the employment chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty. Several factors came together in the 1990s. First, a political initiative and a determined policy entrepreneur and growing support from the Nordics onto the wider EU context. Second, an underpinning advocacy coalition, not just partisan, consisting of most member states, MEPs and political groups, Commission officials, social partners, and political parties—national and transnational. Third, in framing their issue the advocates for an employment chapter emphasized that the fight against unemployment required a common European effort. Finally, the balance in the Council and European Council had shifted towards the socialists/social democrats and the PES. All these factors facilitated the transference of policy learning and ideas from the national to the supranational level, and eventually the deal.

In a similar vein, the chapter also holds deeper lessons for understanding the limits to Europarty influence. There is ample evidence of such limits. While much of the Treaty reforms were driven by or through Europarties, their influence is conditional. This conclusion raises questions about the effectiveness of Europarties. The conditions for Europarty influence are demanding. The influence of Europarties depends on both the quantity and quality of their presence in the European Council. Unsurprisingly, the sheer number of government leaders belonging to a particular Europarty has significance for decision outcomes. But numbers are not enough. Europarties’ effectiveness cannot be understood with numbers, relative numerical strength, alone. In addition to numerical supremacy, relative majorities, internal cohesion, and capacity for mobilizing the leaders and networks for the joint cause are also required. Moreover, it turns out that the venue or format for preparing and negotiating Treaty revisions matter. Notably, the convention format provides MEPs acting within political families a clearer status and potential impact relating to Treaty revisions. Over time, the Parliament has become increasingly involved in EU constitutional politics, thereby strengthening the (transnational) partisan dimension of Treaty reforms.

But the most significant factor is perhaps mobilization capacity. It helps to drive the networks of interaction and collaborative processes within the Europarties. It is particularly significant for the commitment of national parties and their leaders, in or out of government, to European integration in general and to Europarty activities in particular. Major decisions in the EU and in Treaty reform specifically depend on support from national parties and governments. They, in turn, can use the Europarty networks to push their arguments. But it also raises questions about the way forward for the EU itself. As we discuss in Chapter 6, the development of a more politicized EU may prompt a countervailing tendency towards weakening the influence of EU level parties.

This chapter and its results carry two broader implications for students of European integration. First, it shows that Europarties can significantly contribute to the cause of European integration overall. It also shows their vital role in shaping the agendas and outcomes of EU Treaty revisions. The result has been a considerable strengthening of EU institutions, not least of the Parliament. Second, there are important limits to the trend of party politicization in the EU more generally. Even as Europarties have been transformed and become less dependent on national member parties, especially in terms of financial support, they still rely on the latter for more important positions regarding programmes and policies. Europarties are both enabled and constrained. Their impact varies across time and Europarties, because of conditions such as numerical strength and internal cohesion. Even so, more should be done in developing explanatory frameworks and indicators for examining in a comparative fashion when and how these Europarties matter. And even when they can be assessed to count for something, it can be tricky to determine if their role is one of being a facilitator, rather than a decisive intermediary. As our analysis of the Treaty reforms also highlights, conditions can be created. It underscores the importance of paying attention to the interplay of intrinsic and extrinsic factors, including the intrinsic qualities of the Europarties themselves as well as outside influences.

Now that the EU is facing major challenges some are eying more Treaty changes, to put constitutional reform back on the agenda. While big constitutional and institutional reforms in the past have been partly driven by the Europarties, it remains an open question what might produce the next—potentially successful—Treaty reform. The last time there was a proper IGC was back in 2007, almost two decades ago. In previous rounds of Treaty reforms the motivation and drive were clear. It became less so after the Lisbon Treaty. The Europarties are internally divided on a range of issues, including the need for Treaty revisions. For instance, a pertinent question is whether EPP reform activism is exhausted since Lisbon, and, if so, why. Possible explanations include internal heterogeneity and pressure from right-wing populist groups with electoral impact, or other reasons. These days we do not hear much of any explicitly federalist ambitions.

Yet, the Europarties face a dilemma. Consider the EPP: for its own credibility as a leading force of European integration the EPP cannot allow its own member parties to fight against the further construction of Europe, otherwise it loses credibility. The same could be said of the other mainstream Europarties. Predictably, a movement to try to revise the Treaties has begun. While several governments continue to oppose Treaty revision, the main Europarties and EP political groups are preparing for a Convention to happen anyway, as if that was just a matter of time. We will continue this discussion in the following chapter, where we turn to the Conference on the Future of Europe that was held in 2021–2022 and show that, organizationally, the ‘conference format’ again benefited the partisan actors, advocating Treaty change and thus constitutional reforms.