Keywords

Introduction

Organised criminal groups (OCGs) involved in drug trafficking are increasingly becoming poly-criminal in a range of criminal activities, while the profits from illegal drugs are used to fund other forms of criminal operations, and even, on some occasions, to finance terrorism. Perpetrators are constantly evolving their modus operandi to cope with law enforcement agencies’ (LEAs) anti-crime operations. In the last years, OCGs have advanced their smuggling methods with the advantages that new information and communication technologies (ICTs) offer [1], leaving LEAs in a disadvantageous position.

Tackling drug trafficking is one of EU’s priorities in the fight against serious and organised crime [2]. According to the latest European Drug Report, the availability of all types of drugs in Europe remains high while the diversity in the substances consumed today may pose a greater risk to the health of consumers [3]. While cannabis remains the most widely used drug in Europe, opioids cause greater harm to societies since they may lead more easily to fatal overdoses (ibid.).

In this context, the Mediterranean and Black Sea network of practitioners (MEDEA) [4] analysed the relevant challenges and needs of practitioners and other stakeholders involved in combatting drug trafficking. MEDEA is an EU-funded Coordination and Support Action project, aiming to establish and further develop a regional network of practitioners and other security-related actors in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. Its practitioners are grouped into four thematic communities of practitioners (TCPs). The third TCP pertains to the ‘fight against cross-border crime and terrorism’ and focuses on the identification of new forms of terrorism—such as radicalisation, smuggling of illicit drugs, weapons and prohibited goods, as well as the exchange of security-related intelligence across EU Member States (MS), along with the aspiration to develop a roadmap for addressing operational capability gaps in data management. The following sections outline the methodology used in the context of TCP3 and offer the findings from the analysis as well as policy recommendations to overcome the challenges faced by LEAs in their anti-drug trafficking operations.

Methodology

MEDEA developed a realistic heroin trafficking scenario to study and analyse the challenges of practitioners. The scenario was focused on trafficking heroin (since it is Europe’s most commonly used illicit opioid [3]) from Asia to the EU through the Balkan route, which is the main heroin trafficking corridor linking production countries to the European market. The Balkan route traverses the Islamic Republic of Iran (often via Pakistan), Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria across Southeast Europe to the Western European market, with an annual market value of $20 billion [5].

The scenario was jointly developed by first-line police officers involved in anti-drug smuggling operations. Other security stakeholders also contributed with their tacit knowledge. The scenario analysis first revealed several security gaps [6]. Next, these gaps were further analysed and processed to formulate the main challenges that the security practitioners are facing. Further interaction and processing of findings pave the way to recommendations that shall guide policy and decision-makers and benefit security practitioners.

Challenges

Lack of Intelligence Exchange and Cooperation Between Security Stakeholders

One of the biggest challenges for practitioners is the lack of intelligence exchange, not only between EU MS, but also between the competent authorities at the national level, especially in countries where more than one LEA are involved. However, the cross-border nature of drug smuggling makes intelligence exchange from the early stages an imperative to fight it effectively. Complementary to the above, the cooperation of security stakeholders and implicated countries should be further enhanced to combat drug smuggling. This collaboration should concern all affected countries, be it EU MS, other European countries that act as transit and third countries (where drugs are produced or transited). Apart from a new framework that needs to be developed to frame and promote this cooperation, existing ones shall have to be amended so as to not impede cooperation with third countries. The EU Police Cooperation Code proposed by the Commission [7] is crucial in tackling current difficulties.

Some of the specific challenges of intelligence exchange are (i) differences in legal frameworks and standards: different countries may have distinct laws and regulations regarding the collection, processing and sharing of intelligence, especially when it involves personal data or sensitive information; (ii) lack of trust and reciprocity: intelligence cooperation requires a high level of trust between partners as they share sensitive information that may expose their sources and capabilities. However, trust may be undermined by divergent interests or priorities and (iii) technical and operational challenges: intelligence cooperation also involves technical and operational challenges, such as ensuring the compatibility, dependability and consistency of communication systems and platforms, and establishing common standards.

Lack of Advanced Technological Solutions in the Fields of Intelligence Analysis, Scanning of Freights and Lawful Interception (LI)

To set the basis, a few terms will be defined: lawful interception (LI) is the process of legally obtaining and monitoring communications of individuals or organisations, such as telephone calls, email and instant chat messages, or web browsing activities, under the authorisation of a court order. Intelligence analysis is the process of collecting, processing and analysing information gathered from several sources, such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) or open-source intelligence (OSINT), to yield actionable intelligence for security practitioners. Scanning of freights is the process of inspecting and detecting the contents of cargo containers, or vehicles, by means of numerous technologies (scanners either X-ray or gamma-ray, radiation and chemical detectors, etc.).

Some needs and challenges are related to the existing technologies and current capabilities of respective LEAs. Investigations of organised crime require access to electronic communications data in order to detect existing links between OCG members. There is also a need for additional capabilities in SIGINT, IMINT and OSINT technologies, as well as in the surveillance tools deployed in land and sea routes used by criminals for drug smuggling. Advanced technologies and portable solutions are also needed to detect concealed drugs. More specifically, there is a need for an improved and coordinated monitoring and analysis of the threats posed by digitalisation, particularly the accessibility of illicit drugs via social media platforms, apps, Internet/darknet marketplaces, as well as the use of online payments (including cryptocurrencies) and encrypted digital communication together with the tools for facing those threats. ICT advancements, like 5G and end-to-end encrypted communication applications, provide criminals with a significant head start as they offer safer and difficult-to-decrypt communication channels, making existing tools and procedures followed for LI by LEAs increasingly outdated. Additionally, for easier detection of drug smuggling cases, increased monitoring-surveillance capabilities, detection devices and intelligence gathering-analytical tools by LEAs would be proven extremely beneficial.

Legal Obstacles

Several challenges have more legal grounds, instead of technological. The strict legal frameworks in place and the new EU regulations may impede LEAs from following the flow of money of drug smugglers that use cryptocurrencies [8]. The process of following the money flows of drug smuggling becomes more difficult due to the lack of commonly accepted terms at the international level, along with the absence of harmonisation of the legislative frameworks among states. Thus, following the money flows of drug smuggling may include differences in national laws and regulations regarding cryptocurrencies and money laundering; lack of international cooperation and coordination among LEAs and judicial authorities; challenges in tracing the transactions involved in the exchanges; difficulties in seizing and confiscating the proceeds of crime; and risks of violating data protection rights of legitimate users of cryptocurrencies.

Policy Recommendations

Interconnect Existing EU Databases

The importance of information and intelligence exchange between MS with the aim of combatting serious crime is already known, and various steps have been taken to enhance the cooperation and information sharing [9]. Databases and frameworks to accompany their usage have been developed for enhancing data sharing, like the European Arrest Warrant, the European Criminal Records Information System and the Customs Advance Cargo Information System. The EU bodies should move towards the interconnection of the existing EU databases used by practitioners and the unification of their frameworks under one single framework that will constitute the basis of a more structured information sharing, taking into consideration the national legislations.

Expand the Mandate of Passenger Information Units (PIUs) to Other Modes of Transport

In 2016, the European Parliament adopted the directive on the collection, processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data of extra-EU flights that would be handled by the PIUs of each MS [10]. Since then, most of the MS have established their PIUs, and it has been recognised that they play an important role in the fight but also the prevention of serious crime including drug trafficking. One important aspect of the PIUs is that they can share intelligence with other PIUs but also with other national competent authorities, working as a link between the cooperation at national and EU levels. The expansion of the mandate of the PIUs to collect and handle data of other modes of transport, like railway and maritime data, seems very promising regarding the information exchange and crime prevention as they already count success stories with the data collected by air carriers. In fact, some MS have already expanded the obligations of the PIUs to other modes of transport even though this is not foreseen by the directive (ibid.). Research should be made to explore how this expansion is feasible from a legal, technological and organisational point of view.

Harmonise the Lawful Interception (LI) Process

At the EU level, the legal framework for LI is based on the non-binding Council Resolution of 1995 on the LI of telecommunications [11]. In 2006, the EU issued Directive 2006/24/EC [12] to define the time of data preservation and the type of information to be stored. However, no harmonised process among MS has been established for LI, and each communication service provider has to follow a different process each time an LEA initiates the process. A coordinated legislative initiative is required to harmonise the legislation between MS for requesting LI from telecom providers and software application companies, having in mind what is more convenient and less time-consuming for both LEAs and service providers.

Better Regulate the End-to-End Encryption (E2EE)

The rapid proliferation of 5G technology and E2EE poses significant challenges to LEAs. From a technical aspect, LI in ‘traditional’ voice communication is addressed by the 3GPP SA3-LI working group, which published a set of specifications (3GPP TS 33.127 version 16.6.0 Release 16) for the implementation of LI for 5G technology. E2EE, which is currently supported by many companies, poses a major challenge for LEAs since encrypted conversations cannot be decrypted. To address this issue, software application companies must support the option to disable E2EE after request by judicial authorities.

Develop a Framework for the Seizure of Cryptocurrencies

In January 2020, the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) [13] came into effect, bringing cryptocurrency exchanges under the scrutiny of EU legislation, on the grounds that they can be used for money laundering and terrorist financing. Since then, various proposals have been made to increase the transparency of the use of cryptocurrencies while protecting their users. This framework should include the steps to be followed for seizing, storing and handling seized crypto assets and should be implemented at EU level. It is recommended that the crypto assets be included in the proposal for a directive on asset recovery and confiscation, and further research to be done on the development and possible implications of an EU database for seized cryptocurrencies.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the main challenges and policy recommendations for combating drug trafficking in the EU based on the findings of the MEDEA project. The need for enhancing intelligence exchange and cooperation between security stakeholders at the national and EU levels, as well as for developing advanced technological solutions in the fields of intelligence analysis, scanning of freights and LI, was highlighted. Moreover, legal obstacles that hinder the effective fight against drug trafficking, such as the use of cryptocurrencies, end-to-end encryption and lack of harmonisation of the lawful interception process, were explained. A series of concrete measures to overcome these obstacles were proposed.