Keywords

Introduction

EU places of worship (PW) such as churches, mosques, and synagogues constitute cases of public spaces in need of particular attention, in order to be efficiently protected. Such places, have been frequent targets of terrorist attacks in the previous years due to their highly symbolic value [1]. As a way to increase the level of Member States’ public space protection in anticipation of terrorist threats, the exchange of good practices, risk and vulnerability assessment guidance, along with protective measure guidance for local authorities, is strongly emphasized by the EU [2]. In this context, the EU-funded research project ProSPeReS (ISFP-GA 101034230) applied the vulnerability assessment checklist (VAC) developed by the European Commission’s Directorates-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) and provided to ProSPeReS for research purposes. The vulnerability assessment (VA) activities that were performed during the project, among others, consisted of in situ VA workshops with site surveys at various PWs and VA trainings targeted to the involved stakeholders. These activities allowed the identification of challenges in protecting PWs, common and distinct security gaps and needs among PWs of different types and religions, as well as the formulation of recommendations for increasing their protection level.

Scope

This chapter presents the applied vulnerability assessment (VA) methodology and the VA activities that were undertaken in the context of the project’s Work Package 2 (WP2)—Vulnerability Assessment & Needs Analysis of Religious Sites, accompanied by relevant findings.

Applied Vulnerability Assessment Methodology

The EU vulnerability assessment checklist (VAC)Footnote 1 (Fig. 29.1) is a tool meant to enable site operators (public space or other) or managing entities, to perform a VA for their site. It consists of MS Excel spread sheets, put together in a logical series, assisting the users to consider threats as well as attack scenarios against their facilities/area of interest, while accounting for parameters such as crowd concentration, existing security measures—and lack of— and other, concluding in vulnerabilities against these threats.

Fig. 29.1
A screenshot of vulnerability assessment. An Excel spreadsheet with detailed analysis.

Vulnerability assessment checklist screenshot [3]

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Prior to proceeding with the collection of information and analysis, the area of interest should be divided into six phases (similar to zones) according to the approach and access of pedestrians and vehicles to the main site of interest (or main facility or main area). This allows for a more thorough and effective examination of an area. The six phases are the following [4]:

  • Phase 1: Access to the site—public road systems that provide access to the site

  • Phase 2: Parking and transport—parking areas, garages, or public transport facilities with a high concentration of people

  • Phase 3: Approach to site—public access paths for pedestrians that can lead to a high concentration of people

  • Phase 4: Arrival at main site—entry or exit points

  • Phase 5: Main site without access control

  • Phase 6: Main site with access controlFootnote 2

The tool is mostly applicable for places with a high people concentration or large events. Essentially, the users can assess an area and its facilities based on a structured and creative step-by-step process. For a more efficient process, it can be performed by multidisciplinary working groups including experienced individuals in security issues, knowledgeable about the activities and operations of the area of interest.

In summary, the process of the ProSPeReS VA workshops, which included information gathering, discussion, and analysis, covered the following:

  1. 1.

    Examination of site characteristics

  2. 2.

    Examination of existing security measures

  3. 3.

    Identification of potential threats and incident scenarios per identified threat

  4. 4.

    Estimation of consequences and probability (likelihood) per identified threat

  5. 5.

    Evaluation of results and consideration of solutions

Vulnerability Assessment Workshops

The VA workshops that were implemented in 2022, focused on the identification of security weaknesses against selected PWs and proposal of measures to mitigate them, while heavily relying on the active engagement and collaboration of the stakeholders involved in the protection of the PWs.

Three VA workshops with subsequent site surveys were held at (1) the Orthodox Church of Saint Paisios in Ioannina, Greece, (2) Archcathedral Basilica of Stanislaus Kostka in Lodz, Poland, and (3) Nozyk Synagogue in Warsaw, Poland.

The participants of the workshops consisted of

  • Local law enforcement agencies (LEAs), namely police officers

  • Local first responders, including representatives of the fire brigade, emergency health services, and civil protection personnel

  • Religious and administrative staff of the PWs for which the VA was carried out

The total threats and attack scenarios against the sites that were selected by the participants for discussion and analysis included the following:

  • Firearms attack

    Attack against the crowd with a concealed automatic firearm.

  • Sharp object attack

    Attack with concealed weapons against the crowd.

  • Vehicle ramming attack

    Attack with a vehicle against the crowd near the main street of the religious site.

  • Improvised explosives device (IED) attack

    Attack with a bag discarded (unattended), containing explosives

  • Person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED) attack

    Attack by a suicide bomber against the crowd

  • Unmanned aerial vehicle improvised explosive device (UAVIED) attack

    Attack with drone against the crowd outside the PW, carrying explosive material

  • Vehicle ramming attack

    Attack with explosive material placed into a car parked near high crowd concentration areas

  • Chemical, biological, radiological (CBR) attack

    Attack with chemical agents outside the PWs

The workshops were executed and moderated by the scientific members, security experts, and religious organization members of the project’s consortium partners. They took place during the course of three days, and the activities were structured as follows:

  1. 1.

    A theoretical training to familiarize the participants with the concept of risk and vulnerability assessment, and the VA process as applied in the context of ProSPeReS.

  2. 2.

    AVA tabletop exercise where the participants performed a VA for a hypothetical site, based on a hypothetical attack scenario in order to gain hands-on experience.

  3. 3.

    Discussions with the PW operators were undertaken for gathering information about the sites’ activities, operations, and applied protection measures during their daily activities and high-profile religious events.

  4. 4.

    A site survey where an inspection of the site was performed, focusing on applied security measures and gaps, covering the PW facilities and immediate surrounding area.

  5. 5.

    A tabletop VA for the participants’ religious site, based on the vulnerability assessment checklist methodology (VAC).

Additional Case Studies

The findings of the VA workshops were complimented by additional quick VAs, performed at various PWs across Europe through additional site surveys, interviews with the site operators, and questionnaires developed for the purposes of the quick VAs. The additional sites were 10 in total, consisting of Lutheran churches, synagogues, Catholic churches, a Catholic monastery, a mosque, and an Orthodox monastery located in Finland, Poland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Greece, respectively.

VAT Lite

Upon the completion of the VA workshop and according to the end user needs derived from the participants’ feedback, ProSPeReS developed the tool VAT Lite, allowing site operators and staff to carry out quick vulnerability assessments on their own in a simplified way. The tool provides an overview of the site vulnerabilities to the operator during the PW’s daily operations. It combines the main elements of the VAC and the “EU Quick Guide to support the protection of places of worship” [5] in a concise yet elaborate template. The EU Quick Guide is a checklist-based tool for carrying out a brief and simplified security and safety assessment at PWs.

The principles of VAT LiteFootnote 3 are identical to VAC’s, including the steps of the VA and the PW’s area segmentation. However, instead of six phases, the area is now divided into three zones (see indicative example in Fig. 29.2), a popular approach among contemporary security risk assessment practitioners.

Fig. 29.2
An aerial view of the building with 3 concentric rectangles marked. The inner rectangle highlights the building interior, followed by the exterior, and surroundings.

VAT Lite area segmentation: zone 1: building interior; zone 2: immediate exterior; zone 3: surroundings

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By filling out the template once, the users can examine all three zones of their site per their vulnerabilities (lack of security measures), potential threats, and security solutions. The tool consists of four record templates that users must fill out, covering the aspects of site segmentation, vulnerability identification, threat identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation. Examples of the VAT Lite record templates can be seen in Fig. 29.3.

Fig. 29.3
Two sheets with main site information, checklist, and risk matrix.

Vat Lite record templates

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Vulnerabilities of Examined Places of Worship

Naturally, the security gaps and overall vulnerabilities identified during VAs varied among the examined PWs. Some sites were security oriented and more effectively protected than others, a result of numerous factors such as local crime rate, past incidents, significance of the PW, threats experienced by the religious communities of the PW, and, finally, the security culture and experience of the PW operators/managing bodies. Security and protection in a PW concern the people present during religious events (both stakeholders and visitors) and the infrastructure, including all relevant facilities.

The list below provides an overview of the reoccurring gaps identified at most of the surveyed sites [6].

  • Security training for personnel

    Insufficient training related to emergency incident response, evacuation drills, and risk awareness initiatives for the religious staff.

  • Incident response

    Lack of incident response and crisis communication means and procedures.

  • Interagency cooperation

    Unestablished/inefficient cooperation and information sharing between LEAs, first responders, and the sites’ operators on a local level, in light of religious events, or daily activities.

  • Detection of dangerous items

    Lack of measures or procedures for the detection of dangerous or suspicious items, substances, and material that may be carried into the PW.

  • Other security gaps

    • Crowd flow and control measures

    • Limited monitoring and CCTV capabilities

    • Insufficient lighting in secluded areas

    • Limited to no security personnel

    • No access control measures or access restriction to the site for vehicles and visitors

Recommendations

In order to effectively enhance the protection of PW, the operators or managing bodies must adopt a holistic approach toward security, beyond the limitations of conventional security measures that in many cases are difficult to apply due to factors such as the open nature of the sites, architectural elements and requirement to preserve their aesthetics, potential obtrusive results of security measures during the activities, and feeling of discomfort that excessive measures may generate for the congregation.

Considering the above, a summary of recommendations for conventional and contemporary measures and approaches proposed for enhancing the protection of PWs is presented below, broken down into respective categories.

Planning

Identification of Stakeholders

Prior to any activities related to the security of a religious site, the PW operator should identify the actors that are involved in the protection of their site during its daily activities or religious events.

Vulnerability Assessment

Following the identification of security stakeholders and in line with good practices for the security of public spaces in general [7], the operators of PWs should initiate a vulnerability assessment (VA) for their site. This will allow them to gain an overview of their sites’ actual security gaps and consider targeted solutions. A VA can take place via multidisciplinary workshops with the participation and guidance of local LEAs, first responders, or security experts. However, the operator of a PW is responsible for making a request for or initiating the VA.

Development of an Emergency Response Plan (ERP)

An ERP should be in place and updated, including evacuation procedures for the safety of both the religious staff and the congregation. Such plans can be developed through the cooperation of a site’s operator, local LEAs, security experts, and first responders.

Actions

Security Awareness and Training

Through basic safety, security, and threat awareness training, the religious staff of a PW can actively contribute to the protection of the people and the site. Such training may be targeted toward fire safety, evacuation drills, emergency incident response actions and crowd guidance, identification of suspicious items and behavior, crisis communication, and site surveillance. The training can be provided by local LEAs, first responders, or security experts. Emergency response joint exercises among a site’s operator local LEAs and first responders could also be planned in light of high-profile events.

Communication and Cooperation Between Stakeholders

The operators of PW are recommended to establish regular communication channels with local authorities and first responders in case of security incidents or in case of religious events where the adoption of ad hoc security measures is required.

Security Measures and Procedures

ProSPeReS has produced documents that provide an extensive list of technical measures and procedural recommendations for the PW protection. With respect to the sites examined during the VA activities, the recommendations generally focused on:

Surveillance and Monitoring

For example, using drones for surveillance of a site or during the presence of large crowds, sufficient lighting to eliminate dark areas, using modern CCTV systems and dedicated security/control rooms.

Alerts

For example, installation of alarm systems and panic buttons in critical areas.

Access Control

For example, restriction of vehicle access for crowd protection and restriction of visitor access to critical areas.

Protection

For example, protection of windows against vandalism/throwing objects by installing security window films and ballistic panels, and removal of litter bins from areas of high people concentration or evacuation routes.

Conclusion

This chapter presents the vulnerability assessment (VA) activities, implemented during the Work Package 2 (WP2) “Vulnerability Assessment & Needs Analysis of Religious Sites” of the EU*funded research project “ProSPeReS.” A VA prior to the selection of security measures for any site of interest provides an overall picture of the site’s actual needs against realistic and prioritized threats. Consequently, informed and targeted decisions can be made by a site’s management toward its effective protection. Aside from the protection of the site itself, the process of the assessment can be highly beneficial for the end users. The personnel of the PW, the local LEAs and first responders who participated in the VAs at the selected sites, had the opportunity to exchange knowledge, information, and good practices, while working together in the frame of the interdisciplinary executed workshops, which can potentially improve their future cooperation. This may translate into effective preparation of joint security measures before future events, protection of the PW during events, joint response to incidents, joint trainings, and exercises. Finally, all the stakeholders who participated in the relevant activities, including the ones who were present at the additional case studies, became aware regarding the security issues surrounding their religious sites locally and on a European level, and were engaged in discussions about the novel measures and methods that can be proportionally adopted to enhance the protection of their sites while preserving their open nature and the continuity of their activities.