Supportive or Destructive? Intergovernmental Relations During Refugee Crisis in Poland from Local Governments’ Perspective

Abstract

This chapter examines intergovernmental relations (IGR) in Poland during the first three months of the 2022 refugee crisis, precipitated by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. It explores how the existing IGR processes either facilitated or hindered the effective involvement of lower administrative levels in the crisis management, areas of tension and conflict within IGR, and the extent to which other organizations contributed as service providers or decision-makers within the IGR framework. The study highlights the challenges of coordinating a multilevel response to an unprecedented influx of over 2.5 million refugees, reflecting on the adaptability and effectiveness of IGR processes under crisis conditions.

Introduction

A crisis is commonly identified as an extraordinary situation, which results in escalated but temporary instability and uncertainty compared to the pre-existing status quo (Sahin-Mencutek et al., 2022). Such exceptional emergencies activate relationships, resources, procedures and actions outside any particular policy area. During a crisis, intergovernmental relations (IGR) become especially important insofar as different levels of government are forced to collaborate often within a hybrid form of multi-level governance (Liu et al., 2021; Eckhard et al., 2021). Decision-making authority in emergencies almost inevitably will disrupt existing IGR relationships, opening up an opportunity for the centre to intervene or the local government to grasp the initiative. In many established policy domains, democratic governments typically rely on negotiations and consultations across various policy levels to achieve shared objectives. However, the exigencies of crises can often compel a departure from this norm. While one might intuitively expect a more centralised, top-down approach during emergencies, the reality is multifaceted. The degree of centralisation or decentralisation in crisis management can vary based on the nature of the crisis, country-specific cultural and institutional factors, and the particularities of governance structures. Communication, decision-making process, logistical challenges, or funds allocation to address the immediate needs are examples of issues that distort IGR encountered in other policy areas. Consequently, the analysis of IGR during a crisis, will highlight issues and policy perspectives which studies of regular policy areas will miss.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 precipitated one of the greatest migration crises in Europe’s recent history. Being one of the neighbouring countries, Poland faced the challenge of receiving over 2.5 million war refugees within the first months of the war breaking out. The situation called for multilateral IGR responses to prevent a severe humanitarian crisis. The challenges faced by all levels of public administration turned out to be particularly difficult as Poland had no previous experience of emergency management relating to an extraordinary influx of migrants, having previously refused to accept refugees fleeing Syria under the so-called the EU Solidarity Mechanism in 2015. These exceptional circumstances almost inevitably led to difficulties in the absence of well-developed cooperation practices between the central, regional, and local governments in dealing with such a crisis.

The crisis management system in Poland is multi-level: in principle, at least, the central government tier provides important strategic decisions, overall coordination, and guidance, while the lower administrative levels are responsible for implementing local response efforts where needed (Walczak, 2009). On one hand, such a hierarchical type of organisation of the system only works effectively if it is possible to take quick decisions despite the existing allocation of tasks to the different administrative levels (Schneider, 1992; Waugh, 1994). On the other hand, such a hierarchical multi-level system may be susceptible to bureaucratic dysfunctions—confusion over poorly specified and overlapping competences, difficult decision-making and information gathering issues arising from unanticipated situations. Consequently, tensions and conflicts arise within IGR (Rourke, 1992; Elazar, 1997; Bier, 2006; Congleton, 2006; Rubin, 2007; Bryson et al., 2015).

The aim of this chapter is to analyse how IGR processes coped, and were adapted, in Poland during the first three months of the refugee crisis of 2022. We pose these questions relation to how IGR worked during the crisis: (1) Did the existing IGR processes enable or block the effective involvement of the lower administrative levels in the decision-making process? (2) What were the areas of tensions and conflicts in IGR during the refugee crisis? (3) To what extent did other organisations deliver services or even become decision-makers in a system role of network governance within IGR?

The above questions will give us a basis to determine which of the three types of contrasting IGR processes, identified by Bergström et al. (2022), best describes Polish IGR during the refugee crisis. This involves determine whether IGR processes during the refugee crisis were characterised by limited conflict between the layers of power (type 1: Multilayer policy processes); by central government dominance, while subnational governments remained largely excluded from participation at the central level (type 2: Centralised policy processes) or by dissenting views, contested rules of the game and communication difficulties occurred between the central and subnational governments (type 3: Conflicted policy processes).

There are few reasons why the case of the 2022 refugee crisis in Poland is interesting to study from IGR perspective. Firstly, the Polish refugee crisis response stands out from the assistance models dominating the experience of other countries, and UNHCR, which is based on building “camps” for refugees near border crossings and further relocation. The model developed in Poland can be described as “inclusive” and is based on providing broadly understood assistance and accommodation in public and private facilities. This has required exceptionally efficient mobilisation and coordination in a very short time (Firlit-Fesnak, 2022). A top-down response, emphasising the importance of leadership and authority in coordinating response efforts, fails to match the experience in this case. Instead, a bottom-up approach, reflecting local governments’ (municipalities) perspective on IGR as the lowest tier of administration, responsible for taking tasks commissioned by upper levels, matches this case. Our research concerns a unitary state with a multilayer crisis management system, characterised by the dominance of the central government reflected in the decision-making capacity, as well as the mechanisms for the distribution of financial resources. Different from revealed in previous studies dynamics and planes of conflicts could be expected in this case.

Crisis Management System in Polish Political and Administrative Settings

Poland is a unitary state, where IGR are aligned with the administrative and political power exercised at the central, regional and local levels. Since the establishment of local self-governments in the early 1990s, Poland embarked on a transformative journey of decentralisation that fundamentally reshaped the distribution of authority and responsibilities. This path to local governance was initiated with the enactment of the Local Self-Government Law in 1990, a pivotal moment that paved the way for the re-emergence of local governance entities. By 1999, this process solidified the tripartite territorial division of Poland into municipalities, counties, and regions. This level of decentralisation marked the ascendancy of regional and local governments as significant units of public administration, giving rise to a triad of administrative power. The coexistence of central and self-government administrations at the level of regions should be stressed. As well as directly elected regional authorities (marshals of provinces and provinces assemblies), governors (voivodes) are appointed to represent the central authorities within each region. The voivode is appointed and dismissed by the prime minister at the request of the minister responsible for public administration. Local governments (both on county and municipal level) are directly elected by citizens and perform public (commissioned and own) tasks not reserved for other authorities.

At the outbreak of the refugee crisis in Poland, the crisis management system was regulated by the Act of 2007.¹ The act explicitly assigns the roles and responsibilities of crisis management to specified public administration bodies. Their mandate encompasses a range of duties from pre-emptively preventing potential crises to active response during crises, and from mitigating the immediate aftermath to the longer-term restoration of resources and critical infrastructure. In terms of structural organisation, Poland’s crisis management framework mirrors its administrative divisions, segmented into central, regional, and local levels. Notably, Article 1 of the Act elaborates on the designated authorities, detailing their specific functions, the guiding principles underpinning their operations, and the fiscal mechanisms supporting their crisis management activities.

The allocation of crisis management responsibilities at each level of public administration is presented below (Fig. 7.1).

Fig. 7.1

Crisis management administrative system. Source: Own elaboration based on Government Centre for Security (https://www.gov.pl/web/rcb/obieg-informacji-i-rola-rcb-w-systemie-zarzadzania-kryzysowego, 12.01.2023)

This integrated crisis management system is officially characterised by a comprehensive linking of individual elements into a functional whole. Horizontal integration is reflected in the concentration in one decision-making centre. The Minister of the Interior and Administration holds all competences and powers regarding the use of the necessary forces and resources. At the voivodeship (regional) level, this centralised decision-making role is held by the voivod. The voivod oversees both the combined administration, which includes entities like the fire service and police, and the non-combined administration, encompassing units such as border guards and sanitary inspectors. Furthermore, within the voivodeship, tasks are delegated to both types of administration bodies as well as to local governments.²

There are both crisis management teams (CMT) and crisis management centres (CMC) established at the state administration and self-governments levels. The CMT perform an opinion and advisory functions. They include technical experts, who bring in-depth and specific knowledge, which is necessary to effectively deal with the crisis. The composition and procedure for establishing CMC varies depending on the administrative level, but generally, in emergencies, their tasks focus on being on duty, ensuring the flow of information for the needs of crisis management, analysing the situation, preparing warnings and messages for the population, coordinating course of actions and cooperation with other entities conducting crisis operations.

According to the Crisis Management Act, the Government Centre for Security, in cooperation with ministries, central offices, and voivodships, is responsible for developing the National Crisis Management Plan. Subsidiary documents are then elaborated on at all other administrative levels, i.e., voivodeships, counties and municipalities.

The Polish crisis management system aims to balance centralisation against local responsiveness to achieve effective governance during emergencies. This balance involves a recognition of the importance of a well-defined centralised role in terms of strategic coordination and resource allocation, while valuing responsiveness in the local context and tailored response actions. Central authorities can provide a comprehensive overview of the crisis and strategically coordinate response efforts, having greater access to financial, logistical, and technical resources. This includes resource allocation, deployment of personnel, and policy formulation. A centralised approach ensures that decisions are made swiftly and uniformly, reducing the risk of contradictory actions or confusion among different levels of the government. On the other hand, local responsiveness complements centralisation by addressing the unique aspects of each crisis and locality. Local authorities should initiate immediate responses, engaging communities, civil society organisations, and local resources effectively, fostering a sense of ownership and collaboration in crisis management. The real-time information and local insights can help central government to take decisions provided that the effective bottom-up communication is ensured. Ideally, these arrangements would lead to collaborative decision-making based on clear role definitions from both central and local governments.

However, the crisis management system in Poland has many planes of potential tensions and conflicts, which may hinder effective cooperation between individual administrative levels, as well as elements of their supporting systems. Firstly, the crisis management practice in Poland has been criticised for being too centralised at ministerial level and politicised, and ineffective in cases of natural disasters (Piwowarski & Rozwadowski, 2016). Subsequent assessment by the Supreme Audit Office (NIK, 2013, 2018) show that Poland does face problems in building a coherent system for solving crisis situations. The tasks assigned to crisis management structures and civil defence formations overlap, and their competences often duplicate. The necessary resources for proper crisis management are lacking and the available equipment is outdated and incomplete. Second, the four-level organisation of the crisis management system in Poland should be understood against the broader political context which creates issues in IGR. The government’s commitment to the process of decentralisation, which has been ongoing since the beginning of the political transformation, has been interrupted. Since 2015, the ruling coalition of two right-wing parties in Poland—Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and Suwerenna Polska (SP)—has taken the direction of systematic centralisation of political powers. Consequently, key decisions which limit the competence and financial independence of local governments have been made, including reforming the education system. Consequently, the power of central administration officers has been significantly increased at the expense of the local authorities’ discretion, and the centralisation of payments for water delivery and fiscal reform have further limited that discretion. The fiscal reforms have created a significant problem for local governments as they have reduced the share of communes’ own revenues in the budget. In return, the proportion of funds granted to local governments from the central government’s budget increased. However, these funds are distributed mostly based on political affiliations, with local governments linked to PiS receiving preferential treatment (Ladner et al., 2021; Swianiewicz & Łukomska, 2022). Furthermore, local governments have been systematically excluded from consultations on new laws related to local government. Since PiS took power, the percentage of bills that have not been submitted for consultation to the Joint Government and Local Government Committee has more than quadrupled. The consequent limitations on local autonomy are reflected in the results of the “Self-Governance Index” prepared by a group of scientists under the auspices of the Stefan Batory Foundation. The authors indicated that between 2014 and 2021, the value of this index fell by almost 17 percentage points. The largest decrease concerns the political power of the local government, then the systemic power, and the smallest—the task-financial potential (Lackowska et al., 2023). These results confirm the findings of Ladner et al. (2021). The authors of the report “Self-rule index for local authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries, 1990–2020” indicate Poland as the country (along with Austria) that in the past six years (2015–2020) has recorded the greatest reduction in the Local Autonomy Index score calculated per country.

Finally, the refugee crisis caused by the Russian aggression against Ukraine was an unprecedented event. Although both the National and Province Crisis Management Plans included a standard procedure to be implemented in the case of a mass influx of foreigners into the Polish territory (the so-called SOP-10), it has never, until February 24, 2022, been launched. As we noted in the introduction, Poland was spared the refugee crisis of 2015, and therefore, unlike countries such as Germany or Sweden, Polish administration did not gain experience and did not develop an IGR practice in managing this type of emergency (see Oehlert and Kuhlmann, in this volume).

Research Design

The study employs a qualitative methodology based on exploratory case study. As crisis management involves complex and dynamic systems that are difficult to fully capture through traditional survey or experimental research methods, the case study method enables the complexities of real-life situations to be captured in greater depth (Grynszpan et al., 2011). Territorially, the research focused on the Lubelskie region. This choice was dictated by the fact that it is a region located on the Polish-Ukrainian border, therefore local governments located in this region were “on the front line” at the outbreak of the crisis and as such had to be actively involved in the management of the extraordinary influx of refugees.

The case study involved in-depth interviews with representatives of local governments (i.e., mayors or crisis management team directors) located no further than 100 km from the border crossings in Zosin, Dołhobyczów, Hrebenne or Dorohusk. Between June and August 2022, we conducted 18 face-to-face and telephone interviews with local authorities’ representatives (mayors and employees of the crisis management department). Three additional municipal representatives decided to provide their answers in written form. The interviews were semi-structured as such elicit in-depth information and enable follow-up questions. Interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, and informed consent was given by all participants. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded into themes set through deductive content analysis. Presented in the next section quotes are linked to institutions rather than persons (Yin, 2009). To gain a broader perspective and to triangulate the data (Malterud, 2001), key documents and reports were also analysed. This included local and regional crisis management plans, guideline documents, and legislative documents.

IGR in Refugee Crisis Management: Local Governments’ Perspective

Initial Response: Roles, Responsibilities, and Overlaps in Crisis Management

Two days after the outbreak of the war, the government issued a statement on the initiation of the procedure for dealing with crisis situations, included in the National Crisis Management Plan. The rapidly growing number of people in need of immediate humanitarian assistance required speedy action.³ Most local authorities did not wait for decisions “from above” and started to undertake actions on their own, consciously going beyond established crisis management procedures. It was this first period that was characterised by the greatest tensions and conflicts between local and central authorities.

We [local government officials] were something like a rapid response team because we reacted much faster than any government agencies. In the first moments of the crisis, we were irreplaceable. Only later other institutions and services came to the action. (IDI 16).

The first tasks involved providing assistance to refugees at the border. Actions taken by the central authorities in the region on the border were strongly supported by local authorities. These included providing accommodation and food for various services actively helping at the border (firemen, medical workers, volunteers, and members of NGOs), providing gas cylinders for heating tents, delivering, and distributing gifts at the border, organising prams and prams for the disabled.

There was no medical assistance at one of the border crossings [provided by the government administration] (…). There was an appeal by the commandant of the border crossing point for us to help, and our ambulance and the Volunteer Fire Service were on duty for two months at the border crossing (…). Only later, because of some talks with the government administration, these ambulances were delivered. (IDI 5).

In the first days of the refugee crisis, the basic activities (arising from the crisis management procedures) of border local governments were to launch donations collection points and distribute gathered necessities among refugees. Over time, the central authorities (voivodes in cooperation with the Ministry of Health, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, and the Government Strategic Reserves Agency) began to create a coordinated system of organising, accepting, and distributing donations in larger border towns (setting up the so-called hubs). Nevertheless, due to bureaucratic procedures (e.g., goods coming from abroad in trucks had to be precisely described), local governments continued to coordinate the organisation and distribution of necessities on their own within the framework of horizontal cooperation. Some of the donations went to municipal collection points, some were transferred to neighbouring municipals, and some were sent to various institutions in Ukraine.

As part of the tasks ordered and coordinated by the central authorities, local authorities were obliged to run reception and information points under the supervision of the voivode. Some border municipalities took the initiative in organising these facilities on February 24, two days before the central authorities issued the official decision in this matter. Such facilities were to provide rest, food, and basic medical care, then to allocate refugees to permanent accommodation. This involved quickly organising equipment and providing food, hygiene products and other necessities. For this purpose, local authorities used horizontal, formal (within the association of municipalities), and informal networks of acquaintances. Most of the help obtained by local authorities was provided by municipalities from other parts of Poland or the world, domestic and foreign non-governmental organisations, and inhabitants. Only in the following days did the central authorities in the regions sanction the already-existing reception points and sign contracts with local authorities for their operation. They also started equipping reception points with the necessary equipment.

We got camp beds, first from the neighbouring municipality, then some more came from the voivode (…) We know who has what resources as with other municipalities we form a network of civil defence and crisis management. Hence, we know who has beds, who has sleeping bags. We got the first equipment from the municipalities with which we were cooperating before the war. Without any involvement of county authorities. (IDI 5).

Another task assigned to the local authorities under the crisis coordination system was the arrangement of accommodation infrastructures. The procedure was strictly defined in the Crisis Management Plans: communes reported their resources of facilities that could function as accommodation points, the voivode verified their suitability and then decided on their equipment and commissioning. Parallel to these activities, local government authorities undertook coordination of accommodation offered by private individuals. Relocation to other accommodations—another task that should have been coordinated by the central authorities in the region—at the peak of the crisis took place both within the system coordinated by the voivode and within the horizontal cooperation of municipalities with various entities.

On their own, by calling, finding out, posting announcements on Facebook and our website, driving them back or contacting those people who had the opportunity to accept refugees at home. We tried to use what the residents, owners of holiday resorts and tourist accommodation offered us. And in this first phase, until the end of March, we found such accommodation for almost 500 people. (IDI 15).

There were so many people that we also tried to find places for them somewhere further in Poland. For example: we heard that a large reception point has opened in Nadarzyn near Warsaw. Someone, I think some volunteer, knew someone there, so we called saying that we were sending them two coaches with refugees. (IDI 12).

Budgetary Strains: Tensions in Reimbursement

From the beginning of the war, the central authorities in the region assured local governments that they would use special funds to cover the costs of helping refugees, which created “a sense of psychological comfort” (IDI 2) at the time of making decisions related to incurring any expenses. Hence, while the costs related to setting up and operating reception points at the beginning of the crisis were covered by the local authorities within their own budgets, only after a certain period did the voivodeship office provide financial support (and reimbursement of costs incurred) under a special agreement. The fear that the central authorities might burden local governments with new obligations without granting them additional funds has not materialised. Already on March 1, the chairman of the National Council of the Regional Audit Chamber issued a communiqué allowing local governments to use funds from the crisis management reserve for expenses related to the refugee crisis. In the next stage, the Assistance Fund was established, the purpose of which was to provide funds for financing, co-financing, or reimbursement of expenses incurred for tasks related to providing support to refugees.

I will say this from the point of view of the frontline self-government: in cities like ours, where reception points were set up, we received government funds from the voivode’s reserve almost immediately. So, we can’t complain about money. (IDI 11).

Although there were no specific decisions, the municipalities were informed that the government was working on solutions, including those related to financial support. The initial lack of information was replaced by contradictory information. The greatest (albeit short-term) tension in relations between local authorities and central authorities occurred in the first two weeks of the outbreak of crisis. It was caused by issues related to the reimbursement of expenses incurred by local governments. Daily rates for refugee services for local governments organising accommodation points were changed to much lower than agreed.

It’s not about the [assistance] rates [for refugee], because we managed somehow to help refugees with the support of our organisations, but it’s about this unnecessary confusion. Why say one thing and then say another. (IDI 2).

In the beginning, we spent our own money, and we had no information from the voivode when the costs incurred would be reimbursed to us. There were no specific procedures for accepting refugees into the municipality, no legal regulations that would allow us to register them or give them places in schools. (IDI 11).

Another activity that caused tension regarding financial settlements between the central and the local authorities in the region was the organisation of transport from the border. The National Crisis Management Plan gives responsibility to the central authorities in this matter. Nevertheless, some local governments decided to organise additional means of transport, including fire trucks, to pick up people crossing the border on foot. Despite a later application for reimbursement of related expenses (firefighters’ equivalents, gasoline costs, etc.), the central authorities in the region refused to cover them, and the costs were charged to municipal budgets.

Only the State Fire Service was authorised to transport refugees, and they transported them in their vehicles. Unfortunately, we did not wait for these procedures from the government and took these people from the border. And now we are suffering such consequences that we have costs of about PLN 200,000 for fuel and for the work of firefighters and no one can return it to us, because allegedly we did not take action in accordance with the procedure. (IDI 4).

From Chaos to Clarity: Implementing Legal Measures in Crisis Response

The first days of the crisis were characterised by information and decision-making chaos. Local governments, through voivodes, appealed to the government to decide on specific procedures and financial solutions incurred as part of aid activities as soon as possible. This is particularly important in the context of the fact that some activities undertaken by local governments required legal and institutional authorisation (e.g., transport, medical care, and care for minors crossing the border on their own).

In my opinion, these decision-makers from the voivode had no information about what was going on at the border in the initial period (…) they paid special attention to formal issues, and unfortunately the situation was completely different, and we had disputes here regarding the performance of certain tasks. I say: ‘Mr. Voivode, do you see what is happening at the border crossings?’ If we acted in accordance with the procedures, there would be Dantesque scenes there. (IDI 16).

Gradually, the government adopted new solutions that enabled local governments to act more effectively. For example, on the third day of the conflict in Ukraine, the government adopted legislation that gave refugees the right to free travel and medical care. On March 12 the so-called The Special Act created the legal and financial basis for the effective provision of assistance by all levels of administration. The most important measures concerned legalising the stay of Ukrainians and public forms of assistance for refugees (e.g., access to cash and non-cash benefits, the right to use educational and care facilities, and the appointment of a temporary guardian for minor Ukrainian citizens without adult supervision). Local authorities thus gained legal and financial authority to help refugees.

Communication Channels: Bridging the Governance

A very important element that shaped IGR during the crisis were the communication channels, which enabled a quick flow of information both in the top-down and bottom-up direction. Firstly, a special telephone line operated by the Voivodeship Crisis Management Centre was used. Secondly, the Voivode organised regular meetings in the form of video conferences. They served both to provide information on the actions planned or taken by the government, but also to collect information from local governments on the situation in their area, existing problems, resources, etc. As a result, the government’s proposals for adopting certain measures were promptly confirmed by local governments and, if necessary, modified. Thus, local authorities have a sense of involvement in the decision-making processes and ensured flexibility of solutions introduced at the central level. Meetings with the voivode also contributed to build trust-based relations and a sense of community of purpose for all levels of administrations. Furthermore, in addition to the vertical flow of information, videoconferences served to exchange information horizontally, as all local authorities’ representatives (both municipals and counties) in the region participated in these video meetings.

To sum up, the higher levels of administration (central authorities in the region and the government) performed mainly four functions in relation to local governments. Firstly, they adopted a law that, on the one hand, created a framework for action, and on the other hand, gave local authorities a context and legalised their actions. Secondly, the voivodship level played the role of a “connector” in transferring government decisions to counties and municipalities and allowing information about problems and needs to reach the government. It should be clearly noted here that after controlling the chaos in the first days of the crisis, communication was effective and two-way. Thirdly, voivodes and counties were responsible for distributing and transferring funds to municipalities for the implementation of tasks commissioned in the field. For this purpose, the municipalities signed agreements on the operation of reception and accommodation points and sent applications for reimbursement of the costs incurred. Fourthly, voivodes functioned as institutions “for exceptional tasks”—if municipality or county were unable to deal with emerging problem, they could ask for help from a higher administrative tier to solve it.

Discussion and Final Remarks

At the beginning of the crisis, with slightly delayed and insufficient procedures and actions that should be provided by the central government, the local governments at the forefront took over the main burden of crisis management. Local governments were forced to make decisions that went beyond the procedures set out in the crisis management plans and even beyond their prerogatives. However, after the first few days, IGR began to develop in several areas i.e., opening information, reception and accommodation points. What is important, actions taken by local governments and central government services, with minor exceptions, did not overlap but rather complemented each other. An unclear division of tasks leading to duplication of actions taken is one of the factors that may hinder the smooth operation of IGR in critical situations and thus create obstacles to a rapid response to a crisis (Bier, 2006; Congleton, 2006; Deverell & Hansén, 2020; Bynander & Nohrstedt, 2020).

Although the participation of local governments in strategic decisions making was limited, the problems, needs and comments were successfully reported to higher levels of administration and eventually were considered in the adopted solutions. Moreover, IGRs were characterised by flexibility in terms of creation of network cooperation (often outside formal procedures and hierarchical administrative structures). It should be emphasised that not only vertical cooperation, but also horizontal cooperation functioned effectively—counties and municipalities exchanged information and possessed resources, which made it possible to act adequately.

The local government representatives were quite unanimous in a positive evaluation of the speed and effectiveness of actions undertaken by central government administration. This can be puzzling, considering that the central administration (including the crisis management system) had often been criticised previously before the war for its politicisation and incompetence. It seems likely that the relatively high level of trust and the absence of clear conflicts between the central government and local governments stemmed from the specific nature of this particular crisis. One should bear in mind that Ukraine was attacked by Russia—a country perceived by Poles as a historical enemy. Russia took part in the subsequent partitions of Poland (in 1772, 1793, 1795), and after World War II imposed in Poland a communist system, making the country a satellite state remaining under the political domination of the USSR. In successive surveys (conducted up until 2022), Russians ranked first among the least favoured nations by Poles. Therefore, the willingness to provide assistance went beyond purely humanitarian obligations and was perceived as aiding allies. These ideological considerations strongly united all groups and individuals engaged in assistance and served as a powerful motivator for action. In the face of a specific goal, potential differences in political preferences were also blurred. Another aspect to consider when seeking an explanation for the research results is that in the Lubelskie region, the ruling party had obtained the most votes in both local and parliamentary elections in the two subsequent terms. Moreover, local governments located close to the border are small, rural and lagging areas that had greatly benefited from fiscal reform and the discretionary grants distributed by the government. These factors can contribute to explain the willingness to cooperate, facilitate effective communication, and local leaders’ trust in the central administration.

The positive assessment of the central administration response could be also attributed to the political narrative spread by the ruling party immediately following the outbreak of the war. The then Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński propagated a narrative of the self-sufficiency of the Polish administration in crisis management and not seeking European Union support. In an interview, which received considerable media attention, Kaczyński pointed: “We have a rule—no relocations. If someone wants to stay here, they stay, and if they want to leave, they leave. We don’t force anyone to do anything. And the second rule—we do not hold out a begging bowl. Of course, we feel that we deserve some help, but we do not hold out a begging bowl.”⁴ Such a ruling party stance further mobilised politicians and officials aiming to demonstrate to the opposition and the European Union their proficiency in crisis management. Ultimately providing a narrative celebrating the crisis responses of the central government and local governments which are largely controlled by one party, that is, PiS.

Upon examining the IGR dynamics during the refugee crisis in Poland, one discerns a predominance of features akin to Bergström et al.’s (2022) Type 1: Multilayer Policy Processes. Despite the centralised nature of the Polish political and crisis management system, the IGR manifested predominantly as cooperative, multilayer interactions with the central government playing a pivotal, yet not hegemonic, role. This stands in contrast to a Type 2: Centralised Policy Process, where subnational entities might be largely side-lined. Minor conflicts that arose were expediently resolved, precluding a full alignment with the contentious characteristics of a Type 3: Conflicted Policy Process. The IGR processes in responding to refugee crisis based on two key issues that are generally recognised as crucial for effective cooperation in emergencies: a sense of community of purpose, and a properly organised, regular communication in multi-level and multi-actors context (Boin et al., 2005; Kapucu, 2006; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Ansell et al., 2010; Hermansson, 2019). The issue of ensuring financial resources for the implementation of tasks commissioned to local governments by the central authorities should also be assessed positively. The almost immediate activation of the reserves, the creation of the fund, was accompanied by the efficient signing of contracts and reimbursement of the costs incurred by local governments. Accordingly, the sense of communal purpose and structured multi-level communication, complemented by efficient financial resource allocation, underscored the synergy between central and local entities, reinforcing the classification within the Multilayer Policy Process framework (Type 1).

Drawing conclusions from the analysis of the IGR in the management of the refugee crisis, it should be stated that the crisis management system in Poland created proper conditions for the emergence of effective IGR both in the vertical and horizontal dimension. The active leadership of the government is often indicated as a success factor in crisis management (Waugh & Streib, 2006; Boin et al., 2013). In case of refugee crisis in Poland, the leadership of the central government revealed in making strategic decisions that formed the legal and financial background necessary for the activities of local governments in emergencies.

The development of the IGR during the refugee crisis in Poland proves that—despite the huge role of non-governmental organisations, private companies, and citizens—formal government institutions—at the central and regional level, but above all at the local level—played a key role in coordinating activities related to the management of crisis. It should be emphasised here that after the crisis, the established and strongly mobilised networks of entities from outside the administration weakened, while both the government and local governments continued to maintain the reception and accommodation points and did not cease to organise various types of assistance for refugees. Therefore, referring to the undoubtedly significant role of non-administrative institutions that were involved in the response to the crisis, it can be assumed that informal networks supplemented and supported but in no way replaced the formal role of the government and, above all, local governments in response to the crisis. Although in response to the crisis the phenomenon of “self-organising networks” (see: Denters & Rose, 2005; Rhodes, 2007) of various entities could indeed be noticed, public administration institutions were still the reference point for these networks. Rhodes’s suggestion (2007, pp. 15) that “central intervention will undermine the bottom-up governance structure” did not apply to the case under study.