Twenty-Five Years of the Swedish Municipal CEO

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the Swedish municipal CEO (MCEO). The development of the role over the last 25 years is analysed in terms of stability and change. The chapter discusses the changes that have taken place in terms of the demands and constraints of the role. These changes are further compared with changes in actual performance relating to the priorities of MCEOs. The results show that while contextual factors, background, and reasons for job termination have changed considerably, small or moderate changes can arguably be observed in the MCEOs’ role performance. The role of the MCEO is discussed as a stable and institutionalized role in an otherwise changing world. However, there are some minor long-term indications that the role may become either more of an extended arm of majority politicians or a professional, administrative head—or perhaps both. The findings are based on a large amount of survey data collected every five years for a quarter of a century.

8.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the Swedish municipal CEO (MCEO) and changes in the role and its context over 25 years. Building on extensive data from six surveys¹ conducted every five years and sent to all MCEOs in Sweden, the changes in the performance of the role are discussed in the context of changes in demands and constraints from a longitudinal perspective. The main question answered in the chapter is as follows: How have major changes in terms of context and background affected the role of the Swedish MCEO?

The bulk of the data presented here comes from six exhaustive surveys addressed to every MCEO in Sweden, that is, the most senior official in Sweden’s 290 municipalities. The first survey was conducted in 1995 and was part of the European Federation of Local Government Chief Executives (UDiTE) study (Klausen & Magnier, 1998; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). The survey has been repeated every five years ever since, with the most recent one in 2020. The response rate has been high in all the surveys (ranging between 72 and 78%).

The next section addresses developments in the Swedish municipal context, the first being a more long-term perspective so as to later focus more on the last 25 years. This is followed by a section on the background of the Swedish MCEO. The sections thereafter examine changes in the role based on prioritization relating to tasks (what) and actors (how) and the reasons for leaving the job. In the last section, the role of the Swedish MCEO is discussed in terms of stability and institutionalization as well as minor, long-term change.

8.2 Context and Historical Background

People and their actions are always interpreted and evaluated in a complex context (Goffman, 1959/2021). In this book (see Chap. 2 by Hansen and Solli), this is described as the embedded demands–constraints–choices model (see also Stewart, 1982a, 1982b; Stewart & Fondas, 1994) and is relevant for understanding the role of the MCEO—how it is interpreted and how this interpretation has changed. Various internal and external factors have the potential to influence the MCEO landscape, and the discussion below concerning the context of the role is based partly on available data and partly on the overall governance ideas that have permeated Swedish municipalities at different times. The section begins with an overview of the development of Swedish municipalities from their establishment to the present day and ends by focusing on a typical Swedish municipal organization and the position of the MCEO.

Municipalities were established in Sweden by law in 1862 and were created based on the classification used by the Lutheran state church. Local self-government was confirmed in the municipal regulations of 1862 and viewed as important for the inhabitants’ responsibility for and influence over common local issues. It has been enshrined in the Swedish Constitution since 1974. Around 2500 municipalities of various kinds were formed based on their size and rights in the country, called stad (city), köping (borough), and landskommun (rural municipality). The right to vote was based on the amount of taxes paid, and women were allowed to vote if they paid taxes. By enforcing this law, the abolishment of the four estates was initiated.

The activities performed by municipalities were, for the most part, very limited in nature, and elected representatives handled most tasks. Things looked somewhat different in the large cities where there were a few officials. It was not until 1931 that it became formally acceptable to hire administrators in municipalities (Bergevärn & Olson, 1987). Nevertheless, by this time, even the smallest municipalities had hired employees to, for instance, manage accounting and budgets. In 1943, the municipal division was examined, and the investigator found that most municipalities were far too small to be able to carry out the increasingly comprehensive tasks imposed on municipalities in the emerging welfare society. However, it was not until 1952 that general mergers were initiated, with mostly rural municipalities being merged, resulting in just over 800 larger municipalities. In the 1971 municipal reform, the various municipal types were abolished, and primary local-level municipalities were introduced (distinguished from secondary local authority, which then constituted the regional level). The municipalities were given equal rights, and some tasks that had been allocated to the cities were transferred to the central government administration, such as some of those within the judicial system. At the same time, further mergers were carried out. Today, Sweden has 290 municipalities. There are not many discussions concerning further mergers at the municipality level; however, there are discussions relating to the regional level. Nevertheless, the current discussion more often concerns the parts of municipalities that want to break free.

Today’s municipalities vary significantly in size, in terms of both land area and population. Kiruna, which is Sweden’s largest municipality by area, is 19,163 square kilometres, while Sundbyberg is barely 9 square kilometres. In December 2022, municipal populations varied from 2372 people in Bjurholm to 984,748 in Stockholm (Statistics Sweden²). The total population of Sweden at the end of 2022 was about 10.5 million people.

The public sector in Sweden is largely based on municipalities and county councils. According to The Economy Report from the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR), in October 2020, municipalities and county councils employed more than 1.2 million people and had a combined budget of approximately 1108 billion SEK,³ of which municipalities accounted for approximately 715 billion. Thus, municipalities are important in Sweden, as they are responsible for a large proportion of a comprehensive welfare system.

During the 25 years in focus here, the new public management (NPM) era has had a significant influence on the Swedish welfare model in the context of municipalities and has been the subject of substantial criticism. What has been described as NPM has also changed over time. In recent years, the number of governance mechanisms and organizational methods has also increased, creating numerous local solutions to the challenges facing municipalities (Hansen, 2010, 2011). According to Lapsley (2017), three waves of public sector reforms have been simultaneously ongoing for a long time in Sweden: public administration (PA), NPM, and new public sector governance (NPSG). During the last 25 years, all these waves have been more or less noticeable in municipalities and usually co-exist. Based on Lapsley’s analysis, the start of this 25-year period was characterized more by public administration, less by NPM, and hardly anything at all in the area of NPSG, although as time went by there has been a greater focus on NPM and NPSG in practice (see also Table 2.1 in this book). While PA is characterized by bureaucracy, NPM is characterized by managerialism, radical decentralization (such as outsourcing), and a view of the municipality as an organization that should and could be run like a company on a market. Furthermore, the influence of the professions (e.g. teachers, social workers, and nurses) within municipalities has been weakened in favour of the more top–down managerial control system (see Wenglén, 2017 for a discussion).

As mentioned in the introductory chapter (see Fig. 1.2), traditional public administration and NPM merged into a hybrid with co-existing and developing interpretations regarding how Swedish local government should be run. Also, NPSG emphasizes networks and partnerships as a counterforce to an overly one-eyed focus on organizational boundaries and financial results as an effect of comprehensive performance measurements undertaken in NPM. Although the ideas and thoughts behind NPSG may have taken hold in parts of the municipal sphere, however, it remains unclear the extent to which they have been transformed into practical implementation (Cregård et al., 2023; Lindberg et al., 2015; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Strokosch & Osborne, 2020; Vabø et al., 2022).

In the last 25 years, it is not an exaggeration to say that many municipalities have made tremendous efforts in the competitive tendering of public activities, performance and efficiency measurements, the creation of markets, and the division between the political and bureaucratic spheres (Bäck, 2003). Swedish municipalities were also early and eager adopters of the perceived values and ideals of the private sector (Blomqvist, 2004; Lapuente & Van de Walle, 2020). The corresponding effects on municipal activities and the municipal organization have been substantial, but so too has the critique. Therefore, since the 1990s, Swedish municipalities have introduced far-reaching reforms in the spirit of NPM while also trying to deal with the associated negative effects and tackle extensive societal changes.

In the Nordic region, many of the major societal issues are addressed at the local level, and in Sweden, municipalities have far-reaching responsibility for welfare issues in the broadest sense, as explained by Hlynsdóttir et al. (this book). Swedish municipalities face essentially the same challenges, albeit under dissimilar conditions. While there are metropolitan municipalities experiencing challenges due to a lack of both housing and competent labour in a rapid growth in both population and the business sector, there are also municipalities experiencing a rapid decrease in both population and resources. The differences can be found between urban and rural areas, the south and north, and coastal and inland areas (see maps in the introductory chapter). In addition to creating inequality, this also means that municipal politicians and civil servants have different conditions for interaction, strategic development, and leadership.

According to SALAR (2020), demographic development represents a challenge for the entire country, albeit in different ways. While the proportion of people aged 80 and over increases the most in rural municipalities, the proportion of people of working age increases the most in metropolitan municipalities—much of it due to immigration. At the beginning of the 2020s, approximately one-third of the nurses and care assistants in the welfare services were of a foreign background, and SALAR predicts that immigration will account for all of Sweden’s total increase in people of working age in the next 10-year period. Thus, the number of people born in Sweden will decrease. SALAR also indicates that municipal costs have increased by approximately 0.5–1% per year on average, beyond what can be explained by increased needs due to demographic change. In other words, the number of municipal employees has increased steadily, and according to Hall (2021), in recent years, the increase has mainly been reported among qualified administrators. These are experts in, for example, HR, communication, strategic planning, and finance. The increase in qualified experts in administrative and planning activities means more actors in the strategic arena. At the same time, the increased focus on performance measurements has resulted in additional focus on accountability and responsibility for the municipal organization’s managers and leaders.

Swedish municipalities may be (and are) organized in different ways, but they all build on party-based representative democracy. Figure 8.1 displays a basic and relatively common organization. The members of the municipal council are nominated by the parties and decide on the most important issues, such as taxation. The executive committee reflects the municipal council’s mandates, but it is the majority that appoints the chair and vice chair of all committees in the local government (Montin, 2015). From time to time, the concept of the majority becomes a complex matter in many municipalities, ranging from a strong and long-term single party majority, over a fluctuating assembly majority from left to right, to small minority control. The executive committee generally has a prominent role, and the chair of the executive committee is usually a full-time politician. In Sweden, there is no formally appointed mayor, but due to the visibility and influence of the chair of the executive committee, it is relevant to talk about a mayoral role (Bäck, 2005) in, for example, country comparisons, which is part of the premise of this book.

Fig. 8.1

The Swedish municipal organization—a traditional template

Note: Dotted arrows from the municipal council indicate that the mayor, the executive committee, the standing committees, and their chairs are all elected by municipal council after the election. The two-way arrows indicate triangles of frequent interaction related to decision-making and coordination. One-way arrows indicate the typical decision-making process

For the MCEO, the journey began when elected representatives no longer had enough time to lead and administer the municipality. In Sweden, the origin of the MCEO is in the municipalities themselves (Cregård & Solli, 2012b). Traditionally, neither the role of MCEO nor its relation to administration or politics was the subject of formal, legal regulation (Cregård & Solli, 2008). In the previous Swedish Local Government Act (1991), the role was mentioned only in terms of being non-eligible for political assignments in the municipality. For many years, both SALAR and the MCEO association (Kommundirektörsföreningen⁴) offered advice and organized seminars to support the clarification of roles between MCEOs and leading politicians. Municipalities have organized the administration and its management in different ways, and at the end of the twentieth century, it was not uncommon for them to lack the MCEO position. In the survey from 1995, 14% of the responding MCEOs stated that the position was newly established, which means that they were the first MCEO in the municipality.

However, through the introduction of the new Swedish Local Government Act (2017), the role of MCEO came to be more regulated. The new law clarifies that municipalities must have an MCEO who is subordinate to the municipality’s executive committee. He or she is responsible for managing the administration. Furthermore, the new law states that the executive committee shall determine how the MCEO shall lead the administration and clarify his or her other duties in instructions put in writing. As in the previous law, it is also stated that the MCEO is not eligible for political assignments in the municipality. Just as before, both SALAR and the MCEO association offer seminars, guidance, and templates for how to formulate written instructions. The MCEO association also supports their members in difficult issues, both regarding the development of the professional role and other joint development issues. Thus, although the role of MCEO is still weakly regulated by the legislator, it has now been established that it must be formalized and in what areas. However, the local government itself decides the way in which this is done. The next section captures the respondents’ background, which can be viewed as an indication of what is perceived as desirable when hiring an MCEO; thus, it is connected to the discussion regarding constraints and demands.

8.3 Background of the MCEO

MCEOs have grown older since the first survey (see Table 8.1) was conducted. During the first half of the study period, the average MCEO age increased at a rapid rate but levelled off during the latter half. Since the survey in 2005, the average age has been 56–57 years. Although MCEOs have grown older, their average time in the position has become shorter. Between 1995 and 2020, this has fallen from a mean of 7.0 years to a mean of 4.6 years. This means that, on average, someone working as an MCEO in 1995 began their job at the age of 43, whereas the corresponding age in 2020 was about 50.

Table 8.1 Background of Swedish MCEOs

The proportion of women consistently increased by 1% each year between 1995 and 2005, after which the rate increased by 2% per year up to the survey in 2015. In the last survey (2020), the rate of increase levelled off (but was still almost 1% per year). In 1995, the proportion of women MCEOs was 8%, while it was 41% in 2020, which means that Swedish municipalities have now reached a 40/60 gender balance among MCEOs. This is in line with the emphasis on gender equality in the Nordic—and especially the Swedish—local government model (see discussion in Hlynsdóttir et al., this book).

In general, MCEOs tend to be educated, particularly in the latter surveys. In 1995, 77% had attended more than three years of university education. Ten years later, the proportion of MCEOs with such an extensive education background was 83%. Another ten years later, the corresponding figure was 98%. On average, they had four years of university education in 2020. The most significant change between 1995 and 2020 is that the proportion of individuals educated in law, public administration, or political science had decreased. In the era of economism (Rombach & Berglund, 2005), one might think that the proportion of those with a degree in economics, finance, or business administration would increase. This proportion did in fact increase for some time, but in 2020, the numbers had declined moderately. Overall, this constitutes a marginal change in the direction of increasingly different educational backgrounds.

There is considerable variation in terms of what MCEOs used to do before their current position, from a municipal unit manager to an army major. There is a decreasing trend in the number of financial managers, HR managers, lawyers, and planners and an increasing trend in municipal department managers and MCEOs. More than 80% of the MCEOs were employed in the municipal sector in their previous job, which has varied very little over the years. There were few MCEOs from the central government sector in 1995 (6%) and even fewer in 2020 (2%). Six per cent of MCEOs were earlier employed in the private sector in both 1995 and 2020, and the share of those in the regional/county council sector increased from 5 to 8% between 1995 and 2020.

Thus far, this review has indicated that the external context has changed considerably in the 25 years studied. Since 1995, the MCEO role has been more regulated, and individuals from other more disparate backgrounds and with a range of experiences held more MCEO positions in 2020. What were the repercussions of these changes on the execution of the role? This is discussed below.

8.4 Changing Priorities

In this section, changes in MCEOs’ perceptions of priorities relating to role performance over the last 25 years are presented. First, the MCEOs’ task-related priorities are reported (i.e. what to do), followed by their network-related priorities (i.e. how (with whom) to do it).

The MCEO is positioned at what can be described as the golden interface between politics and administration—or as the purple zone, as Alford et al. (2017) called it (see also Brunsson & Jönsson, 1979). The tasks involve managing contact between politicians and civil servants and, thus, working with administrative issues and supporting the political level. The role also includes more general leadership tasks related to achieving development and innovation as well as attaining organizational cooperation. Table 8.2 summarizes answers to the question of what emphasis is given to different tasks as part of daily work, that is, leadership priorities.

Table 8.2 Swedish MCEOs’ leadership priorities

First and foremost, Table 8.2 displays remarkable stability between the six measurement points regarding the leadership tasks of high priority (i.e. stimulate cooperation between departments; formulate visions; improve efficiency; influence decision-making process; and develop norms of relationships between administration and politics). Also, giving technical advice to politicians was mainly considered a high-priority function. In terms of the high-priority leadership tasks, the changes between the years are marginal, even though improving efficiency was prioritized more strongly during the period.

At all six measurement points, two leadership tasks were deemed to be of low priority (i.e. giving political advice to politicians and guiding staff). Also, enforcing rules and handling fiscal management received relatively low scores, even if they (especially the latter) were prioritized somewhat more in 2015 and 2020.

The differences among the respondents’ priorities did not change significantly over the years. They disagreed the most about giving advice to politicians, both technical (high priority) and political (low priority), and they agreed the most about stimulating cooperation and influencing the decision-making process (both high priorities). Improving efficiency was also something they agreed was of high priority.

The ambivalence towards giving advice to politicians may be understood as complicated. Entering the political arena by giving political advice, for example, to the mayor may jeopardize the basic idea of separation between politics and administration and may be risky for the highest official to engage in—if they are to keep their job (Cregård, 2004). This is not to say that MCEOs refrain from influencing the political arena. Table 8.2 shows that giving technical advice, building relationship norms, and influencing decision-making are high leadership priorities. Furthermore, over the 25-year period, the single most obvious change was the steady increase in the provisions of political advice to the mayor. However, the values remained low even after this increase, and the standard deviation was high, indicating that there was variation in how the MCEOs responded to the question.

Upon merging the tasks into four areas, we could see that integration and cooperation and innovation fluctuated moderately or even marginally during the investigated period. Administration, which had the lowest priority in 1995, was also deemed to be of the lowest priority in 2020; however, it did approach the other three combined areas during the 25-year period, scoring between 43 and 54 on average (i.e. from low to moderate priority). In this category, fiscal management was an important reason for the increase, since it recorded the largest increase during the investigated period (from 37.3 to 58.3, i.e. from low to moderate). Also, the category advice to politicians (including both technical and political advice and building relationship norms and influencing decision-making) increased in importance during the 25 years.

Table 8.3 presents an alternative way of looking at priorities relating to MCEOs’ work, where eight response options were arranged into two ideal categories, that is, focused on the civil servant factor. This draws on Putnam’s (1975) categorization of classic political bureaucrats (see also Klausen & Magnier, 1998).

Table 8.3 The classic versus political bureaucrat

Table 8.3 shows that the classic bureaucrat was less prominent than the political, indicating the intricate position of the Swedish MCEO as close to and sometimes even intertwined with the policy process (Cregård & Solli, 2012a). We can also see that both the political and classic bureaucrats increased in importance—the classic slightly more than the political. The increase is not extensive, but it is interesting that so many categories increased (marginally) during the period of investigation—few decreased.

All in all, the task priorities appeared to have changed little over a quarter of a century, and the same tasks were highly prioritized in 1995 and 2020. During the 25 years of stability in the prioritized leadership tasks, there were some minor variations. Above all, the changes consisted of small or moderate increases in importance. Handling fiscal management, enforcing rules, and giving political advice to politicians increased the most, and the respondents appeared to be slightly more akin to both political and classic bureaucrats. The variations between the MCEOs also appeared stable.

The MCEOs were asked to indicate how often they met with 16 actors. Measured in terms of frequency, four groups were identified:

• 1. Daily: The MCEOs met most often with the mayor, the financial manager, department managers, and a few other employees. Almost all the respondents met these actors several times a week, and most of them met the actors on a daily basis. This remained stable throughout the period.

• 2. Weekly: The second group included people or groups whom a majority of the MCEOs met at least once a week. This group consisted of other politicians in the municipality (including the opposition leader), municipal citizens, and other MCEOs (since the survey in 2015). According to the surveys, other MCEOs were increasingly among the respondents’ frequent contacts. Interestingly, both journalists and private business interests were moving in the other direction, as the MCEOs reportedly met them increasingly infrequently. These changes are noteworthy.

• 3. Monthly: The above-mentioned changes concerning the frequency with which MCEOs met with journalists and private business interests indicate that both of these actors slid down into the third group, a group consisting of contacts that the MCEOs would meet with roughly once a month. Other leading actors (e.g. NGOs) were also found in this group of contacts.

• 4. Seldom: In general, most of the MCEOs met with people in the fourth group of contacts from seldom to almost never. This group consisted of officials from other levels of the public government, officials from SALAR, and union representatives. Nevertheless, there were variations among the MCEOs in relation to this group.

Overall, the contact patterns remained stable over the 25 years, especially concerning the most important ones. However, there was some variation between the six surveys: the MCEOs met more frequently with other MCEOs and regional government officials and less often with private business interests, journalists, municipal citizens, officials from SALAR, and central government officials. There was also a declining trend with political opposition leaders. Thus, it appears that the MCEOs were increasingly infrequently involved in work concerning the municipality’s relations with the outside world, at least in part. Other MCEOs were of course also part of the outside world but belonged to the same occupation. One question that can be asked is whether the role of MCEO is becoming increasingly focused on the municipal organization as such and has become more of an instrument for the political majority.

8.5 Departure

Background data on the MCEOs show that they remained in the position for gradually shorter periods: from 7.0 years in the 1995 survey to 4.6 years in the one from 2020 (see Table 8.1). One can leave a job for many reasons, and it can be voluntary or otherwise. The reasons for leaving might say something about how the MCEO perceived the role (e.g. was it feasible? Should I leave for a better one?) or how their superiors perceived their performance (e.g. is it good enough?).

It is usually difficult to uncover the real reasons for turnover (Cregård et al., 2017). In the surveys, this difficulty was circumvented by a question concerning the MCEOs’ perception of the reason behind their predecessor’s departure. The responses are summarized in Table 8.4.

Table 8.4 Why did your predecessor quit?

Table 8.4 implies that the increase in turnover was due to both voluntary (e.g. career and workload/pressure too great) and involuntary turnover (e.g. problems cooperating and sickness/death). A clear trend was the managers’ perception that their predecessors quit for a new job. There were also signs of problems related to cooperation, particularly in recent years. The respondents indicated that cooperation problems with politicians were the main reason why their predecessors quit. This is important, as there was a noticeable increase in problems cooperating with other officials. It is worth noting that age/retirement was not a dominant factor over the years in explaining turnover among MCEOs, even though MCEOs were getting increasingly older (although there has been a marginal decrease). Other important factors were overly high workload/pressure and sickness/death. Furthermore, as mentioned above, in 1995, it was not uncommon for the position to be new, which was not the case in 2020.

One way of explaining the change in the perceived reasons for the departure of predecessors is through the mismatch between constraints, demands, and choices (see Table 2.3). One suggestion is that the expectations (mainly from politicians who had the mandate to hire and fire) of MCEOs today have changed, although their role performance has not changed to a corresponding extent. Another suggestion is that the small changes observed in the performance of the role (e.g. regarding increasing advice to leading politicians, reduced focus on local business life, and the increased prioritization of fiscal management) created friction in relationships with those who often had the mandate to draw the line between appropriate and inappropriate behaviour and good and bad performance. In addition, the surveys showed that the MCEOs increasingly deemphasized the handling of issues that facilitated interaction between different roles, such as negotiations and conflict resolution. This might well contribute to increased turnover.

Yet another suggestion is that the increasing turnover among MCEOs is part of the role context, that is, the role of MCEO is increasingly perceived as short-lived, where frequent replacements are perceived as reasonable and relevant, especially if the office holder is not seen as sufficiently responsive towards leading politicians. Several of the (increasing) categories characterizing the political bureaucrat (e.g. giving the mayor advice and influencing the decision-making process) might be perceived as requiring interaction between the mayor and the MCEO based on similar political views, and the mayor might perceive that he or she should have ‘his or her own’ MCEO. If this was the case, the turnover of MCEOs would increase shortly after each election. A review of the number of appointed MCEOs during the period under study showed that it was also possible to trace such a phenomenon. The number of appointed MCEOs peaked one year after the 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2018 elections but not after the 2010 and 2014 elections. Thus, while the correlation exists, it is not indisputable. It should also be noted that such a development, where the MCEO was more or less formally appointed as the majority’s extended arm, would not be regarded as unproblematic in Swedish local government.

An associated development is that of the notion of career. The reasons for termination suggest both voluntary and involuntary departures. The role of MCEO has become more short-term on average; thus, approximately five years in the post could perhaps be considered appropriate or that it is a good idea to swap to another municipality at the time of an election.

8.6 A Stable Role in a Changing Context?

In this section, the findings are discussed in terms of stability/change and similarity/difference among the MCEOs (see Table 8.5). Furthermore, the signs of change and variation in the empirical material are discussed, including their significance for the Swedish MCEO.

Table 8.5 Stability and change versus similarity and difference

There were several substantial changes in the context of the MCEO over the 25 years under study, which arguably imply demands and constraints on the role. For instance, a large proportion of Swedish municipalities have implemented various forms of governance and management models that aim to increase efficiency or democracy or both (Niklasson, 2016). At the same time, the formal role of the MCEO has been the subject of debate, especially in relation to the political sphere, which has resulted in an increased legal and administrative formalization of the role. Furthermore, the investigation of the MCEOs’ background illustrates different patterns of experiences in 2020 compared to 1995. Is this an indication of a change in requirements and, thus, the demands and constraints faced by the MCEOs in 2020 compared to those from 1995? Alternatively, is the changed background a sign of a desire for increased differentiation without a change in the demands and constraints of the role (e.g. ‘it’s time for a woman in the top position’; ‘it’s important to broaden the skills profile to enable more applicants’; etc.)?

In many respects, MCEO performance has not changed very much. The priorities and focus of their daily work have remained relatively stable over the 25-year period. Their priorities indicate that tasks related to administration (e.g. fiscal management and bureaucratic regulation) and advice to politicians (including political advice) have increased in importance; however, the increases were generally moderate or small. The combination of tasks into classic and political bureaucrats showed that both increased slightly. Thus, according to the surveys, the ‘what’ in the role of the Swedish MCEO has not changed very much, nor have the standard deviations in the answers increased or decreased significantly; that is, the differences between the managers’ responses were roughly the same over the years. This means that the additional legal and administrative regulation has not had much of an impact in this respect, at least not yet.

Turning to the ‘how’, that is, the network used for performing the job, the main actors remained the same over the 25 years: the mayor, financial manager, department heads, and a couple of other municipal employees were the most prioritized actors, as the MCEOs met with them daily. However, there were some minor changes in the network among the not-so-important actors. The MCEOs seemed to deprioritize actors outside the actual municipal organization, such as journalists, private business interests, and opposition politicians. However, the decrease was also marginal in this respect. At the same time, the MCEOs met more frequently with MCEOs and regional government officials from other municipalities.

Although there were several minor indications that the role of the MCEO has changed in some ways, it largely remained the same over the 25 years; it was mainly the context, the background, and the departure that seemed to have changed more considerably. Thus, the role performance, at least in terms of task- and contact-related priorities, seemed institutionalized, and the linkage between the discussed context, background, and performance seemed relatively weak.

How can we understand the stability of the role performance of MCEOs? One explanation could be that the constraints and demands examined here have not been the most relevant for the Swedish MCEO’s role performance. Additional contextual factors might create stability in the role (i.e. something that resists changes in governance due to, for instance, NPM and that does not appear to be significantly affected by the age, gender, or years in the MCEO position). One such factor could be a consistent common principle of division of labour between politicians and civil servants, developed from within the municipal organization. A substantial number of MCEOs came from the municipal sector itself—predominantly as managers close to the political arena. Administrative expectations to fulfil the values of loyalty, neutrality, and professional independence (Jacobsen, 1960) are difficult to achieve because, among other things, they may come into conflict with each other. Here, continuous dialogue is required and an awareness of the division of labour—values that need to be balanced in everyday life. Jacobsen et al. (2021) discussed the cooperation and mutual understanding at the intersection of administration and politics (see also Brunsson & Jönsson, 1979). They investigated the relationship between MCEOs and the political leadership in Norwegian municipalities and concluded that there was a clear line between the two in many respects. According to the MCEOs, political loyalty and giving in to political pressure were irrelevant or even inappropriate. The authors call this perception institutionalized. They also conclude that many municipalities are small-sized, which means that dialogue and cooperation are a natural way of working together. In a study on Swedish middle managers in local government, Åström et al. (2022, p. 1036) found that ‘it seems to be perfectly possible for public managers to support the principle of neutrality and still be deeply involved in policy politics’. However, they also indicated that the intersection of politics and administration (the top position) was a complex matter that needed to be developed into a nuanced understanding of neutrality alongside politicians (see also Brorström & Norbäck, 2020).

Another interesting contextual factor is the MCEO association. It is plausible that because of the association’s strong and broad membership among Swedish MCEOs, it influences the perceptions and, therefore, the negotiations around the division of labour between administration and politics. The association is given higher priority and is actively working to strengthen the role and perhaps maintain stability. Furthermore, the association offers knowledge and advice in the form of templates and information in order to spread a common view in the local government sector of what an MCEO is and what they do, including targeting politicians. It could mean that the association supports a common and long-term view of how an MCEO should act—perhaps not as the only influencing factor but as a factor that reinforces an already pervasive thought about the proper performance of MCEOs. Also SALAR offers education and programmes for politicians and top-level officials.

A quarter of a century is a long time—and this time has been permeated by the influences of NPM, its advocacy, and resistance, and it is reasonable that a role—even if broadly characterized by stability—also has some variations. In the extensive empirical material available on the Swedish MCEOs, some results point out that, from a long-term perspective, the role is slowly developing more towards administration, with a focus on the internal organization and its effectiveness. This may be compared to the general development of the civil servant in the state apparatus:

Nowadays, the public servant is definitely not an old-fashioned bureaucrat, but nor have the influences of NPM made him/her a fully fledged manager. Instead, the contemporary Swedish public servant is perhaps best characterized as a ‘private servant’. (Ehn, 2016, p. 344)

The MCEO role appears to have become more professionalized—with the benefit of the MCEO association and the fact that MCEOs are increasingly meeting each other. They spend more time meeting their own people and can therefore further develop a common jurisdiction—a professional, strategic, and administrative municipal top leadership. This change also includes MCEOs leaving certain tasks to other professional managers in the municipality who handle external issues, such as communication with journalists and meetings with business interests. Furthermore, greater importance was placed on financial and performance management and technical advice to politicians. If the role of MCEO develops towards more general, professional, and administrative leadership, the position itself may be regarded as a step in this career, and it would come as no surprise when the manager decides to leave for a new position—a point indicated in the MCEOs’ responses to questions concerning predecessors’ previous jobs.

The potential development towards a so-called private servant was, however, not the only one indicated. There were also some minor indications that the role was becoming increasingly political. One such indication was that political advice to politicians increased somewhat in priority. It should be pointed out, however, that the MCEOs did not fully agree. Another indication was that the MCEOs met less frequently with the political opposition. Therefore, it is interesting that cooperation problems with politicians are an increasingly common reason for the termination of the respondents’ predecessors. Further, there was some linkage between elections and turnover and Swedish MCEOs, perhaps suggesting that when the political majority is replaced, so too is the MCEO. Askim et al. (2021) stated that one reason for a new political party to take greater control over the administration is a distrust concerning its willingness to comply with the new order, especially if the new party is in fact new or has been in opposition for some time. The increase in what is called the political bureaucrat in Table 8.3 provides a glimpse of the future MCEO. However, whether this MCEO will develop towards a more private servant and fully fledged manager, or an extended arm of politics remains to be seen.