Keywords

1 Introduction

In the contemporary context, the adoption of routeing measures as area-based management (ABM) tools to enhance the safety of international navigation and shipping and mitigate the impacts of shipping is a responsibility exclusively assigned to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nations (SOLAS, 1974, reg 10(2)). However, as the quintessential ABM tool in shipping, routeing precedes IMO, and indeed in his 1855 “Letter Concerning Lanes for Steamers,” Maury recommended “two steam lanes; across the Atlantic, viz: one for the steamers to go in, and the other for them to come in” and that “the adoption of these lanes; would do away with collisions” (Maury, 1855, 4–5). The idea influenced the North Atlantic Track Agreement of 1898, and in 1911 one-way routes were introduced in the Great Lakes region (Paton, 1983). However, the modern use of ABM, including routeing, to enhance maritime safety, prevent pollution, etc. followed the operationalization of IMO in 1958 and the designation of the first traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Dover (IMO, n.d.; Paton, 1983). Marine protected areas (MPAs) for marine conservation, as another form of ABM, have younger vintage, and their additional purpose to mitigate the effects of shipping on the marine environment is a more recent development (Humphreys & Clark, 2020).

The ABM measures used in shipping are created by diverse public authorities at the international and domestic level in Canada. In addition to IMO routeing measures, other ABM measures may involve the competence of different international organizations, and therefore IMO may collaborate with such organizations in the adoption of measures in areas of shared competence, as with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) with respect to meteorological forecasting areas known as METAREAS.

Today, ABM tools are widely considered as vital to address complexity and conflict in the pursuit of sustainable ocean use, conservation, and management. They are used separately from or within the context of ocean management and marine spatial planning (MSP) to produce a range of safety, security, and environmental protection outcomes. Most recently and of great significance, ABM has been introduced to play a prominent role in the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement, 2023) (see Chap. 4, this volume).

There is extensive literature on ABM in the marine environment, most especially on MSP and MPAs, respectively, for managing user conflicts and promoting marine conservation (Ehler & Douvere, 2009; Ehler, 2021), but to a lesser extent with respect to maritime safety (Boisson, 1980; IMO, 2023). Surprisingly perhaps, there is little literature that treats the full scope and scale of ABM tools in shipping in a consolidated work, in comparison with works limited to routeing, special areas for vessel-source pollution prevention, and particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSAs) (IMO, 2023; Roberts, 2007; Roberts et al., 2010; Chircop, 2018).

This chapter attempts to contribute to the general literature on the use of ABM in shipping by proposing classification and taxonomy to clarify the purpose and scope of tools and the nature of the relationship between risk, spatial definition, functions, and social license in supporting multiple ocean uses and interests. The governance of shipping in Canada is used as context because of this jurisdiction’s extensive experience in various ocean environments and the authors’ familiarity with it.

The chapter starts by setting out the conceptual approach, with a focus on definitions, classification, and terminology at the international level and in Canada. Next, a risk perspective on ABM tools and processes is proposed as a lens to understand ABM tools and processes, focusing on the risk object of ABM tools and related risk management and governance aspects. This is followed by discussion of the social license expectations of ABM tools in the governance context. The chapter concludes with reflections on ABM design.

2 Conceptual Approach

2.1 Definitions

Defined in basic terms and not limitedly to shipping, an ABM tool “is an approach that enables the application of management measures to a specific area to achieve a desired policy outcome” (UN Environment, 2018). We would add that the chosen management measures are designed to perform designated functions to achieve higher order policy goals. In the context of shipping, ABM tools consist of a wide range of measures adopted by different public authorities at various geographical and temporal scales for the setting and management of the standards, operations, and impacts of shipping and the provision of services to navigation and shipping.

ABM measures may also be defined for specific applications, for example, to address the needs of a particular instrument. For example, the BBNJ Agreement, defines “area-based management tool” to include “a marine protected area, for a geographically defined area through which one or several sectors or activities are managed with the aim of achieving particular conservation and sustainable use objectives in accordance with this Agreement” (BBNJ Agreement, 2023, art 1(3)). In this chapter, we use the broader definition in the previous paragraph to include a wider range of ABM tools than simply for conservation and sustainable ocean use but at the same time include the BBNJ definition within our scope.

2.2 Classification and Terminology

Given the wide range of ABM tools used in shipping, we propose a high-level classification that divides these measures in two major groups. The definitions of terms are set out in the glossary appended to this chapter. At the highest level of classification, a distinction may be maintained between (a) shipping-specific measures and (b) non-shipping-specific measures that have an impact on shipping. The first group consists of tools adopted under the authority of international maritime law instruments and Canadian maritime legislation to regulate navigation and shipping represented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. The second group in Table 2.3 consists of tools mandated mostly by Canadian environmental law to enable marine spatial planning and marine conservation.

2.2.1 International Maritime Law ABM Tools

International maritime law ABM tools are adopted primarily by IMO, some jointly with other international organizations. In addition to its own constitutive instrument, the IMO derives its authority from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS), various provisions of which imply an ABM regulatory role for IMO, and various international maritime conventions for which it is responsible, including its own constitutive instrument (UNCLOS, 1982; Chircop, 2015).

Table 2.1 sets out such tools by type of tool, issuing authority and source of mandate, purposes, functions, and spatial scales. The list is not exhaustive and serves to illustrate the diversity of ABM tools and approaches in shipping. The principal issuing authority at the international level is IMO. However, in the case of some tools, IMO shares or exercises joint authority with other international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and WMO. The purposes of the listed ABM tools vary, and while most are regulatory in character, some perform other purposes such as to organize and facilitate the delivery of specific services (e.g., weather forecasts, search and rescue) and facilitate international cooperation. The functions performed are primarily the enhancement of maritime safety, pollution prevention and response, marine conservation, maritime security, and protection of public health. The various tools operate at designated geographical scales, mainly at the regional, subregional, and local levels. The bulk of the tools serve safety at sea and environmental protection and will be next discussed from these perspectives.

Table 2.1 Shipping-specific ABM measures adopted at an international level (in alphabetical order)

The principal international ABM safety tools concern load lines, METAREAS, NAVAREAS, routeing and reporting measures, polar safety standards, as well as places of refuge and search and rescue areas. Load lines and polar safety standards share the common purpose of regulating construction, design, or operations standards. A major maritime safety instrument for which IMO is responsible, the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (ICLL), and its 1988 Protocol use an ABM approach for the load of ships according to navigation zone and season to address identified safety risks (see Sect. 2.3.2) (ICLL, 1966/88). The regulation of polar shipping is also informed by an ABM approach at the regional level. Operating under the authority of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), Part I of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) provides safety standards for regional shipping in Arctic waters and the Antarctic Area (SOLAS, 1974; MARPOL, 1973/78; Polar Code, 2014/15, Part I-A).

Routeing measures are regulatory in nature and adopted by IMO under the authority of UNCLOS and SOLAS, usually for application at the regional, subregional, and local levels. In enabling coastal States to designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes in the territorial sea—including for tankers, nuclear-powered ships, and ships carrying dangerous or noxious cargoes—UNCLOS requires them to consider IMO recommendations (UNCLOS, 1982, art 22(3)). In the case of straits used for international navigation, the coastal State has a legal duty to refer proposals for sea lanes and traffic separation schemes to IMO with a view to their adoption, and IMO “may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be agreed with the States bordering the straits, after which the States may designate, prescribe or substitute them” (ibid, art 41(4)). There is a similar duty with respect to archipelagic sea lanes passage (ibid, art 53 (9)). IMO has powers to recommend the breadth of safety zones around artificial islands, installations, and structures in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and on the continental shelf when the breadth exceeds 500 meters (ibid, art 60(5); art 80 by extension). In the case of clearly defined areas within the EEZ requiring additional protection, IMO is empowered to facilitate the designation of special mandatory measures for the prevention of pollution which may be legislated by coastal States (ibid, art 211(6)).

The purpose of ships’ routeing systems is to contribute to maritime safety, navigation efficiency, and environment protection, and routeing measures may be mandatory or recommended (SOLAS, 1974, Ch V, reg 10). Although States are expected to submit proposals to IMO, it is possible they may adopt routeing systems without doing so, in which case they are encouraged to follow IMO guidelines and criteria. A routeing system is defined as “[A]ny system of one or more routes or routeing measures aimed at reducing the risk of casualties; it includes traffic separation schemes, two-way routes, recommended tracks, areas to be avoided, inshore traffic zones, roundabouts, precautionary areas and deep water routes” (IMO, 1985, 2019a). The various measures in the routeing system are defined in the Appendix to this chapter. States are duty-bound to ensure their ships adhere to IMO routeing measures, and in turn ships using mandatory systems are required to log their use. Also adopted under SOLAS Chapter V, reporting measures apply to defined areas and may serve multiple purposes, such as safety, pollution prevention, and security and may be adopted separately from or together with routeing measures.

Differently, METAREAS and NAVAREAS are not regulatory tools and are facilitated by WMO in concert with IMO for the provision of services and facilitation of international regional cooperation. They consist of 21 regions within which designated States are allocated reporting responsibilities under the Worldwide Met-Ocean Information and Warning Service and the Worldwide Navigation Warning Service (WWMIWS, 2022). Authorities in the designated States provide regional meteorological forecasts and navigational warning services to mariners. Search and rescue areas facilitated by the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (SAR Convention) and related regional agreements are also not regulatory instruments and rather facilitate international cooperation at those levels (SAR, 1979).

Except for some jurisdictions, such as the European Union, places of refuge for ships in need of assistance (including places of safety in salvage operations) are not regulated ABM designations in international maritime law (EU, 2002). Place of refuge, by definition, is at the local level and defined as “[a] place where a ship in need of assistance can take action to enable it to stabilize its condition and reduce the hazards to navigation, and to protect human life and the environment” (IMO, 2003). Despite an international customary norm concerning the provision of assistance to ships in distress, many coastal States are of the view that they are not bound by a legal obligation to provide an actual place of refuge beyond humanitarian assistance to passengers and crew (Chircop et al., 2006). While the International Convention on Salvage, 1989 is expected to consider that the completion of salvage requires the delivery of the vessel to a place of safety, there is no obligation to provide or an international regulation on such places (ISC, 1989, art 11). Conscious of this gap, IMO developed guidelines (updated in 2022) to assist coastal State authorities, masters, and salvors in assessing the risk and informing the decision to grant refuge, which can be a port or sheltered waters (IMO, 2003, 2022).

Although not strictly maritime ABM or safety specific, the World Health Organization (WHO) International Health Regulations provide for “‘affected areas’ in dealing with outbreaks of infectious diseases that also apply to shipping, and further contain rules for ‘container loading areas’” (IHR, 2005, art 1). Affected areas “means a geographical location specifically for which health measures have been recommended by WHO under these Regulations” and container loading area “means a place or facility set aside for containers used in international traffic” (IHR, 2005, art 1). Container loading areas must be “kept free from sources of infection or contamination, including vectors and reservoirs” (IHR, 2005, art 34).

The principal international environmental ABM tools concern MARPOL emission control and special areas, Polar Code pollution prevention standards, PSSAs, places of refuge, and pollution emergency planning and response. MARPOL provides for the designation of special areas and emission control areas (ECAs) for the prevention of vessel-source pollution (MARPOL, 1973/78). Under MARPOL Annexes I (Chap. IV reg 34), II (Chap. V reg 13), IV (Chap. III reg 11), and V (Chap. I reg 6), IMO has designated and regulated numerous special areas restricting the discharge of oily wastes, noxious liquid substances, sewage, and garbage in designated marine regions (IMO, 2019b). Special area is defined as a “sea area where for recognized technical reasons in relation to its oceanographical and ecological condition and to the particular character of its traffic the adoption of special mandatory methods for the prevention of sea pollution by oil is required.” The same definition applies to noxious liquid substances, sewage, and garbage (MARPOL Annex I Chap. I reg 1.11, Annex IV Chap. I reg 1.6, Annex V Chap. V reg 1.14; IMO, 2013).

Under Annex VI, IMO has further designated and regulated ECAs for the prevention of air pollution from ships. An ECA is an “area where the adoption of special mandatory measures for emissions from ships is required to prevent, reduce and control air pollution from nitrogen oxides (NOx) or sulphur oxides (SOx) and particulate matter or all three types of emissions and their attendant adverse impacts on human health and the environment” (MARPOL Annex VI). By way of example, the North American Emission Control Area (NAECA) was designated at the request of and based on a joint US-Canada proposal and provides heightened protection against emission of NOx, particulate matter (PM), and SOx (IMO, 2009). Although not establishing special areas, the Polar Code belongs to this category of ABM because it provides heightened standards of protection under MARPOL Annexes I, II, IV, and V (Polar Code Part II-A). However, prior to the adoption of the Polar Code, the Antarctic area had already been designated a special area under Annexes I, II, and V (MARPOL, 1973/78).

Separately from special areas and ECAs, and under the authority of the parent convention rather than MARPOL, IMO has adopted guidelines for the designation of PSSAs and has designated numerous such areas around the world to mitigate a range of impacts at regional, subregional, and local areas from specific impacts from shipping (IMO Convention, 1948; IMO, 2005). A PSSA is an “area that needs special protection through action by IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological, socioeconomic, or scientific attributes where such attributes may be vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities” (IMO, 2005). The designations are accompanied by selected or fashioned routeing or reporting measures, such as those described above, adopted under SOLAS Chapter V or measures authorized by other IMO conventions, and are regulated at the domestic level by proponent States (IMO, 2005).

Finally, places of refuge also belong to the environmental ABM tools because, in addition to ship safety considerations, the provision of places of refuge serves to protect the marine environment from the prospect of a ship casualty and the loss of its cargo and fuel. Further, and as a preventive ABM, the OPRC Convention and its HNS Protocol establish a framework for States to develop oil pollution emergency plans and capacity for response within their jurisdiction and in cooperation with other States (OPRC, 1990; OPRC-HNS, 2000). This type of ABM provides a service to shipping and coastal communities at the subregional and local levels, but it may also involve regulated duties for shipowners trading in oil, as in the case of Canada (CSA, 2001 s 167).

2.2.2 Canadian Maritime ABM Legal and Policy Tools

The ABM tools for shipping in Canada frequently reflect international counterparts but may also include measures unique to Canada’s maritime context. This section sets out the tools for discussion in Table 2.2, which are not exhaustive and are chosen because they represent diverse uses. Again, they are discussed with respect to types of ABM tools, the authorities responsible for their administration and legislation and policy mandates, purposes and functions of tools, and their spatial scale. While the administration of most ABM tools in shipping is the responsibility of Transport Canada, several are the responsibility of or shared with the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and other federal departments. Their purposes are generally regulatory, provision of services and pursuit of international cooperation. As in the case of the international tools, the functions tend to concern maritime safety, pollution prevention and response, marine conservation, maritime security, and protection of public health. They also operate at the regional, subregional, and local levels. The discussion next addresses these tools according to functions served.

Table 2.2 Shipping-specific ABM measures in Canadian waters (in alphabetical order)

The ABM approach is used to address maritime safety functions in various ways, including shipping safety control zones (SSCZs), Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System (AIRSS), icebreaking, low-impact corridors/Proactive Vessel Management (PVM), pilotage, places of refuge, reporting and routeing measures, and the governance of the St. Lawrence Seaway. Arctic waters as an entire region have long been defined and designated by the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) as a maritime region with heightened standards for construction, design, equipment, and operation of vessels (AWPPA, 1970). The region is divided into 16 SSCZs by an order under the AWPPA establishing navigable areas according to ice severity, vessel capability, and season, and to establish a zone-date system (SSCZ, 2010). Vessels navigating in the SSCZs must carry a valid Arctic Pollution Prevention Certificate. AIRSS was introduced to provide greater flexibility to extend the navigation season if ice conditions permit (Transport Canada, 2017). Following the implementation of the Polar Code through the Arctic Shipping Safety Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASSPPR), navigation in Canadian Arctic waters will gradually transition to the requirement for a polar ship certificate and the use of the Polar Operational Limit Assessment Risk Indexing System (POLARIS) which, while applying a regional standard to the safe navigation of ships based on ice conditions risk assessment, does not rely on safety zones (ASSPPR, 2017; Polar Code, 2014/15).

Transport Canada launched PVM as part of the Oceans Protection Plan (OPP) initiated in 2016 as a collaborative framework to facilitate the management of vessel traffic issues in Canadian waterways and to enhance maritime safety and environment protection (Canada, n.d.; Transport Canada, 2020). The actions include reduction of conflicting uses of waterways, including through routeing, speed restrictions, and areas to be avoided. The current pilot sites are Cambridge Bay in Arctic waters with the Government of Nunavut, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, and the Nunavut Marine Council and in British Columbia waters with the North and Central Coast First Nations (ibid).

On a larger regional scale, for the last few years, the federal government has been in the process of developing low-impact shipping corridors in Arctic waters as a region, based on consultations with Indigenous communities and stakeholders active in the region (Chénier et al., 2017). The proposed corridors are based on historical use data, and establishing them will enable focusing of investments in infrastructure and services. At this time, the intention is for the corridors to be voluntary, and thus it is unclear whether they will also serve a regulatory function.

Also at the regional level, and as indicated above, NAECA applies to NOx, PM, and SOx emissions from ships in the waters under the jurisdiction of both states in the Atlantic (including Great Lakes and Seaway) and Pacific waters (VPDCR, 2012). The NAECA is a regulatory tool performing pollution prevention and public health functions by significantly tightening ship emissions in waters under Canadian and US jurisdiction. NAECA does not include Arctic waters; however, Canada recently submitted a proposal to the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) to designate Canadian Arctic waters as an ECA with similar emission restrictions (IMO, 2023).

Separately from the PVM, recently Canada legislated the Oil Tanker Moratorium Act to introduce restrictions on the oil tanker trade in an area off the coast of British Columbia (OTMA, 2009).Footnote 1 As a pollution prevention measure, oil tankers carrying more than 12,500 metric tons of crude oil or persistent oil in bulk in their hold are prohibited from mooring or anchoring in ports or marine installations in the designated area. Further, ABM pollution prevention measures include reporting and routeing prescriptions, salvage and places of refuge (PORCP, 2007; WAHVA, 2019). ABM tools concerning reporting identified earlier with respect to maritime safety also perform a pollution response function, together with pollution emergency response. In Arctic waters, Canada has a mandatory ship reporting system for vessels entering, navigating through, and exiting those waters that serves both safety and environmental functions (NORDREG, 2010). Ships experiencing a pollution emergency in any waters are expected to notify Canadian authorities (VPDCR, 2012, s 132). In addition, and as part of Canada’s polluter pays approach to oil pollution response, ships trading in oil are required to maintain standing agreements with private organizations certified by the CCG (CSA, 2001, s 167).

Routeing measures are usually associated with maritime safety, but in Canada they have also been applied to perform marine conservation functions in association with other protective measures, such as MPAs, or in emergencies. For example, at Canada’s request, IMO designated a seasonal area to be avoided to protect the North Atlantic right whale in the Roseway Basin off Nova Scotia (IMO, 2019a). A system of zones (static zones, seasonal management areas, dynamic shipping zones, voluntary seasonal slowdown zone, and restricted area) and speed restrictions have also been designated in the Gulf of St. Lawrence to protect that species (Transport Canada, 2023). Speed measures have been further applied in the Strait of Georgia in BC waters to protect the Southern Resident killer whale in association with other measures (Government of Canada, 2023).

As part of decarbonization initiatives, some major ports in Canada have collaboratively designated green corridors with overseas partner ports. Montreal and Antwerp and Halifax and Hamburg concluded memorandums of understanding to facilitate the decarbonization of the transatlantic trade routes linking those ports through actions concerning bunkering, infrastructure, and renewable technologies in the respective ports (Chamber of Commerce, 2022; Port of Halifax, 2022). In addition, green corridors serve to facilitate international trade, and, in this respect, the management of the St. Lawrence Seaway is another form of ABM to enable the integrated management of the Canadian portion of the Seaway under the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation and in coordination with its US counterpart (CMA, 1998, Part 3).

Reporting measures are also used to serve security functions and at times are tied to sovereignty protection. For example, NORDREG mandatory reporting in Arctic waters reinforces Canada’s sovereignty (NORDREG, 2010). In other instances, pre-arrival information required from international shipping visiting Canadian ports serves security functions (MTSR, 2004, s 221).

Finally, ABM shipping environmental tools promote international cooperation, as in the case of green corridors and NAECA. Perhaps even more to the point, Canada and the United States have adopted cooperative arrangements under the authority of the Great Lakers Water Quality Agreement 1972 (GLWQA) to enable cooperation in pollution emergency response in the border areas of Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific waters, as well as the Great Lakes (GLWQA, 1972).

2.2.3 Canadian Environmental Law and Management Tools

The last group of ABM tools to be considered are measures not dedicated to shipping per se but which impact shipping in pursuing larger environmental goals. The principal examples of these are listed in Table 2.3 as non-shipping-specific tools and discussed by type of tool, responsible authority and legislative mandate, purpose, functions served, and spatial scale application. The tools primarily concern the planning and management of ocean space and marine conservation.

Table 2.3 Non-shipping-specific ABM tools impacting shipping in Canadian waters (in alphabetical order)

In principle and as adopted under the ocean planning and management provisions of the Oceans Act, MSP and large ocean management areas (LOMAs) are the highest order ABMs in Canada’s ocean space and serve as frameworks for ocean uses in the designated areas and therefore by implication serve as an umbrella for other more technical and local ABM tools. The Oceans Act designates the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, and by implication the Department, as the lead to develop the national oceans strategy and integrated plans for ocean management in collaboration with other federal bodies, provincial and territorial governments, Indigenous organizations and bodies under land claims agreements, and coastal communities (OA, 1996, ss 29–33).

Most ABM tools in this section are measures to regulate marine conservation goals. To the layperson, they may all come across as MPAs, despite the nomenclature, but each class of ABM tool concerned with marine conservation tends to focus on habitats or species or both and for the specific purposes of the enabling act. Marine conservation aside, it is interesting to note that some ABM tools also protect Indigenous rights and heritage values. Irrespective of the function served, the tools described here are applied at various spatial scales and tend to affect shipping in an incidental manner because of actual or potential limitations on mobility in the areas concerned. The federal bodies concerned are varied and use ABM tools in legislation for which they are responsible.

While the Minister and Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) lead ocean management, in practice, the various federal departments and agencies enjoy their own ABM mandates for the purposes of the legislation they are responsible for. While in theory they may pursue their own independent initiatives, in practice DFO, Parks Canada Agency (PCA), and Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) consult and coordinate and have adopted a federal strategy (Government of Canada, 2017). Interestingly, this strategy focuses on the federal bodies that have express ABM powers for marine conservation, although other bodies, such as Transport Canada, also enjoy ABM powers. In this respect, the strategy anticipates that Transport Canada, as well as the Department of National Defence and Natural Resources Canada, will cooperate to enable these bodies to “incorporate the marine protected area objectives into their programs and activities” (ibid).

3 A Risk Perspective on ABM Tools and Processes

3.1 The Risk Concept as a Lens to Understand ABM Tools and Processes

In a shipping context, ABM tools as defined in Sect. 2.1 can be readily interpreted as measures to mitigate risks associated with the operation of ships in marine areas. Referring to the sociological conceptualization of present-day societies as “risk societies” in Chap. 1 of this book, ABM tools can be seen as an illustration of how societies concerned with risks and uncertainties conceptualize, organize, and operationalize concerns related to risks in ocean spaces. The functions of the various legal and policy tools presented in Sect. 2.2 (maritime safety, marine conservation, environmental protection, public health, and security) can be considered as high-level classes of risk-related objectives relating to ships and marine areas, necessitating risk characterization, management, and governance.

The basic definition of an ABM tool presented above shares the preoccupation on achieving a desired outcome with the widely used ISO 31000:2018 standard’s risk definition as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives” (ISO, 2018). Conceptually, compared to the ABM definition, risk stresses the importance of uncertainty in achieving the desired outcomes, as highlighted also in the proposed definitions of risk by the influential Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) and the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) as “uncertainty about the consequences of an activity or event with respect to something that humans value” (SRA, 2018; IRGC, 2017).

This conceptual focus on uncertainty and values in the definition of risk provides a nuanced perspective on ABM tools in two ways. First, the “uncertainty” dimension highlights that ABM measures often are decided upon based on incomplete information about the severity of the possible negative consequences of events occurring in various marine spaces. This uncertainty also relates to the possibility that ABM measures are not as effective after implementation as believed at the time they are decided upon. Second, the “values” dimension, which concerns principles or qualities that individuals or groups consider important and desirable, highlights the fact that different societal groups may prioritize different values, so that, for instance, some groups will prioritize environmental protection, while others will prioritize economic development.

Due to the multidisciplinary nature of risk research, there are various ways in which risk can be conceptualized (Althaus, 2005; Aven, 2012). For the present purposes, three risk lenses are selected as a basis for exploring ABM tools in terms of risk: (i) the risk object, (ii) the risk management phase, and (iii) the risk problem type for governing ABMs. These different conceptualizations are illustrated for selected ABM tools in the following sections. Selected implications and issues for the design and operational use of ABM tools are next discussed through a risk governance lens.

3.2 The Risk Object of ABM Tools

A first risk lens concerns the risk object which the ABM tool intends to manage. In general, two interrelated objects can be focused on when analyzing a system: the “risk agent” (the object causing the harm) and the “risk absorbing system” (the object being harmed). In a context of shipping and area-based management, the system can be conceived as consisting of a vessel (or vessels) operating in a particular marine space. Depending on the risk the ABM measure aims to address, either the vessel or the marine space can be regarded as risk agent or as risk-absorbing system. This is sometimes simplified as “risks to ships,” for example, wave or ice conditions posing risks to the stability of a vessel, or its structural integrity, and “risk from ships,” for example, risks from ship-induced oil pollution, or from ship-source noise to marine species (Kujala et al., 2019; Halliday and Dawson, 2021).

Some ABM tools aim to protect the vessel (here, the risk-absorbing system) from the environmental context of the marine space (here, the risk agent). An example of an internationally applicable ABM tool concerns the system of load line zones as mandated by the ICLL described above. This convention aims to prevent ships from being overloaded by requiring a minimum freeboard, ensuring the stability and safety of the ship, the people on board, and the cargo. Hence, the ICLL divides the world’s waters into several zones, which are used to determine a ship’s maximum allowable draft based on physical factors of the marine environment in those zones. Factors considered to delineate these zones include the water density, which varies with temperature and salinity and which affects a ship’s buoyancy, and the seasonal variations in weather and sea conditions, which affect the ship’s stability (Lewis, 1988). An example of an ABM tool in Canadian waters intended to protect the vessel concerns the SSCZ. The division of Canadian Arctic waters into 16 zones is accompanied by a tabulated zone/date system prescribing the opening and closing dates for each zone and distinguishing nine Arctic class ships and five ship types. These zones are based on typical prevailing ice conditions in different periods in the year, which consider the challenging ice conditions that can cause damage to a ship’s hull and appendages and loss of stability (Riska et al., 2007).

Other ABM tools aim to protect the marine space (here, the risk-absorbing system) from the operation of a vessel in that space. An example of an internationally applicable ABM concerns MARPOL ECAs. The emission restrictions are established to reduce the impacts on the marine environment, for example, to prevent acidification and eutrophication, and to reduce health impacts of populations living near the ECAs (Maes et al., 2006). Ships can comply with these regulations through various means, including operationally switching to low-sulfur fuels before entering an ECA and installing exhaust gas cleaning systems (scrubbers) and selective catalytic reduction systems (Hassellöv, 2023). An example of an ABM tool in Canadian waters aimed to protect the marine space from vessels operating therein concerns the oil tanker moratorium, which prohibits the mooring, anchoring, loading, unloading, and transport to and from ports of vessels carrying more than 12,500 metric tons of crude or persistent oil in marine areas in northern British Columbia. With the environmental and sociocultural impacts of oil spills well-documented (Chang et al., 2014) and recognizing that accidental spills from smaller tankers are generally smaller than from larger ones (Klanac et al., 2010), limiting the size of tankers allowed to trade in this area clearly protects the marine environment while also having risk-reducing effects on economic and sociocultural activities in the related marine and coastal areas.

3.3 The Risk Management Phase in Focus of the ABM Tools

A second risk lens through which ABM tools can be approached concerns the risk management phase(s) that the ABM measure aims to affect. It is common to distinguish four (often interrelated) phases of managing risks: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Meyer and Reniers, 2022). Mitigation focuses on the activities and design and operational measures taken to identify, prevent, eliminate, or reduce the likelihood of an unwanted event occurring and/or to reduce its impact, should it occur. Preparedness focuses on actions taken to prepare for emergency response and recovery, that is, improving the readiness and capability of response systems in case an unwanted event occurs. Response addresses the risk management phase in which actions are taken in direct response to an imminent or already occurring unwanted event. This phase focuses on operational activities aimed at minimizing the loss of life, environmental, economic, and sociocultural impact of the emergency. A final risk management phase is recovery. For organizations, this phase concerns measures taken to restore operations and return to normalcy, which can be achieved through prioritizing the restoration of critical functions, assets, and systems. For marine environments, the recovery phase addresses the process of restoring ecosystems, habitats, and environmental services following a disruptive event, contamination, or prolonged degradation.

The Polar Code is an example of an ABM tool to mitigate shipping risks (Polar Code, 2014/15). The Code requires vessels intending to operate in Arctic and Antarctic waters to obtain a Polar Ship Certificate, which classifies vessels into three categories depending on the severity of sea ice conditions for which they are designed to operate. The Code includes various provisions aimed at mitigating risks to increase the safety of vessels and crew and protect the marine environment. An example of a ship design measure aimed at reducing the likelihood of accidents is the requirement for bridge windows to have means to clear melted ice, freezing rain, snow, mist, and spray. An example of an operational measure is the requirement for bridge crew to have completed appropriate training for operation of vessels in ice conditions. A measure aimed to eliminate certain types of environmental pollution includes the prohibition to discharge oil or oily mixtures, as well as sewage, unless an approved sewage treatment plant is installed: then discharge may occur only if far sufficiently far away from land, fast or shelf ice, or areas with specified ice concentration.

An example of an ABM tool aimed at preparedness and response risk management phases is search and rescue (SAR) zones, which are internationally agreed upon through the SAR Convention (1979) and implemented in Canada through the CSA 2001. State parties establish rescue coordination centers (RCCs) to coordinate SAR operations and facilitate appropriate preparedness and response capacities. Examples of preparedness measures to achieve this include emergency planning, establishing communication protocols, training and exercises, and stakeholder education, whereas response activities include firefighting, search and rescue, and provision of emergency medical assistance.

An example of an ABM tool which addresses recovery is the designation of critical habitats under SARA (2002, s 2). Aimed at protecting wildlife species at risk in their habitats, this is a non-shipping-specific ABM that can have implications for maritime shipping. For instance, in cases where critical habitats overlap with shipping routes, speed limits, navigation restrictions, or special reporting requirements may be put in place to facilitate the recovery of species at risk from past anthropogenic disturbances.

3.4 The Risk Problem Type for Governance of ABMs

A final risk lens through which ABM tools can be framed is the risk governance problem type. The IRGC risk governance framework (IRGC-RGF) is a comprehensive framework for understanding, analyzing, and managing risks in pluralistic democratic societies in cases where various actors are involved. This framework is based on extensive academic work (Renn et al., 2011) that has been introduced by the IRGC (2017) and has been applied in various contexts, including in the maritime domain (Goerlandt and Pelot, 2020).

The first phase of the IRGC-RGF concerns pre-assessment, which frames the problem in relation to issues that different societal actors may associate with the risk, setting the boundaries to achieve a common understanding of the risk issue, or to establish awareness of different risk perceptions. In the context of ABM in shipping, this implies gaining an understanding of what risks different stakeholders are concerned about in relation to a given marine space. This phase also includes performing prescreening to assign a risk to a suggested risk governance strategy. This is done by agreeing whether a risk is “simple,” “complex,” “uncertain,” or “ambiguous,” which is then used to devise risk governance strategies.

This is followed by a risk appraisal phase, which aims at enhancing understanding about the risk through knowledge-focused activities. This can concern a technical/scientific assessment of the risk, providing knowledge about causes and consequences of the risk and/or vulnerabilities, possible mitigation measures, and associated uncertainties. In an ABM context, use can be made of a variety of risk analysis techniques depending on the problem at hand, for example, those proposed in the IMO Formal Safety Assessment Guidelines (IMO, 2018) for ship design and equipment related risks, the Risk Management Toolbox by the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) (2022) for navigational risk assessment in waterways, or using marine conservation analysis techniques such as Marxan (Ball et al., 2009). This phase also can include a concern assessment, providing insights into risk perceptions and addressing questions from societal actors about social and economic implications of the risk and identifying possible mitigation measures. For these aspects, social science research methods and economic analysis techniques can be applied (IRGC, 2017).

In the characterization and evaluation phase, a judgement is made about the acceptability of risk, bridging the knowledge and value dimensions of risk governance. Risks are considered acceptable when their occurrence likelihood and the consequence severity are limited, such that no risk reduction measures are required. If the risk is not considered acceptable, additional measures are required to reduce the occurrence likelihood or the consequence severity. In an ABM context, the type of risk, along with the knowledge from the risk appraisal phase, can be used to decide which ABM tool to implement or to decide on what specific measures should be implemented as part of the ABM.

The risk management phase addresses the concrete design and implementation of actions and measures to prevent, reduce, transfer, or increase preparedness for the risk. In an ABM context, this may, for instance, consist of developing and implementing a warning system for communicating whale sightings so that a ship’s officers can decrease speed to lessen the occurrence of ship strikes and lower their severity should a strike occur. Risk management can also include implementing monitoring systems to ensure compliance with the ABM measures, for example, through aerial surveillance campaigns to monitor compliance with SOx and NOx emission requirements (Van Roy et al., 2022).

As mentioned above, in the pre-assessment phase, a risk prescreening is performed by categorizing the risk problem as “simple,” “complex,” “uncertain,” or “ambiguous.” In this context, complexity is a characteristic of the analyzed system and refers to a condition where it is difficult to identify and analyze the causes of events and consequences. This can be due to the large number of causal factors with (possible) relevance to the event occurrence and its consequences, interactive effects among the causal factors including nonlinear feedback loops which modify the relative importance of causes as the system under study evolves over time, or long delay periods between cause and effect. Uncertainty refers to a state of knowledge of an assessor or group of assessors in which the likelihood of adverse consequences, or the severity of these consequences, cannot be accurately described. This uncertainty can manifest due to limited relevant data being available, the existence of wide variations of expert estimates, significant simplifications and inaccurate results of models, or the important role of assumptions in the evidence base. Finally, ambiguity concerns the condition where there are significantly different concepts about what can be regarded as tolerable, acceptable, or equitable among the relevant stakeholder groups. A condition of ambiguity emerges where there are difficulties in agreeing on the appropriate values, priorities, or boundaries in defining possible consequences and analyzing risk, which is rooted in different stakeholder groups adhering to different worldviews and value systems. If none of these characteristics are present, a risk can be considered simple.

The main purpose of categorizing a risk in a risk governance problem type is to achieve a consensus among stakeholders about what risk governance strategy should be pursued. ABM tools have an effect on marine spaces, addressing risks about which multiple user and stakeholder groups likely have different concerns, views, and understanding. Decision-making and management of risks in such situations require interaction, coordination, and possibly reconciliation between various roles, perspectives, goals, and activities. In the IRGC-RGF, this is approached through a risk governance escalator, which suggests using different strategies for developing the mechanisms for the risk appraisal, characterization and evaluation, and management phases. Depending on the dominant risk category (simple, complex, uncertain, ambiguous), different approaches are recommended for the type of discourse to focus on, what actors to include in the risk governance processes, what types of conflicts may be expected to underlie different views on the risk severity and the acceptability of the risk, and what role is given to risk perception. The risk governance escalator is shown in Fig. 2.1 based on which a set of example ABM tools and measures are explored for the different routes associated with selected problem risk types to illustrate the concepts.

Fig. 2.1
A table has 5 columns and 5 rows. The row headings are role for risk perception, type of conflict, actors, type of discourse, and dominant risk characteristic. Dominant risk characteristic comprises simple, complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity.

International Risk Governance Council risk governance escalator. (Source: F. Goerlandt and R. Pelot, “An exploratory application of the International Risk Governance Council Risk Governance Framework to shipping risks in the Canadian Arctic”, in Chircop, A., Goerlandt, F., Aporta, C. & Pelot, R. (eds.). Governance of Arctic Shipping: Rethinking Risk, Human Impacts and Regulation (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 15–41)

A risk in an ABM context may be characterized as complex, if there is a large number of causal factors, interindividual variations, interactive effects among causal factors, and/or long delay periods between cause and effect. However, the evidence for analyzing the risk is strong, involving good models, relevant expertise, and good data to analyze event occurrences and associated consequences. Moreover, there is a broad agreement among the key societal actors in framing the risk and what constitutes acceptable risk. An example ABM tool could be the design and implementation of ship routeing systems and reporting requirements. As evident from accident analyses (Puisa et al., 2018) and waterway risk methods (see Chap. 7 this volume), many factors can affect the occurrence of navigational accidents and control mechanisms to ensure navigation safety involves multiple actors and information flows. Available models and expertise can be applied to understand risks and propose mitigation measures. The main purpose of the analytical work is to understand causal mechanisms and obtain insights into the complexity, that is, the challenge is cognitive and the governance approach focuses on ontological and epistemological discourses. These involve various stakeholders, primarily regulatory bodies (e.g., aids to navigation authorities, port authorities) and industry experts (e.g., pilotage authorities, commercial fishing companies, and commercial ship operators). External scientists can support the analytical work by proposing new analysis techniques or by performing risk analysis and investigating the effectiveness of risk control measures.

The northern low-impact Arctic shipping corridors mentioned above are another example of an ABM tool in a risk governance context. In this context, Indigenous peoples are rightsholders and have a right to be involved in matters affecting their sovereignty, including impacts of shipping related to environmental and sociocultural aspects of marine space and the related use and spiritual connection of Indigenous peoples to that space (Boyd and Lorefice, 2018). Indigenous worldviews differ substantially from standard western scientific paradigms, view humans as indivisible from nature, include values related to relational accountability in knowledge systems, and rely on participatory and knowledge-inclusive methodologies, to understand multiple socially constructed realities to achieve collective well-being. In contrast, western scientific worldviews often see humans as detached from or in control of nature, focus on aiming to understand a single knowable reality, aim to exclude non-epistemic values in the pursuit of knowledge, and rely on experimental and deductive methods. In such contexts, shipping risks can be categorized as ambiguous. While scientific models can be used to understand complexities and risks of operating vessels in Arctic environments (see, e.g., Fu et al., 2021), there is a need to address the Indigenous and local community concerns, knowledge, perspectives, and priorities, for example, through community-based participatory mapping work (Dawson et al., 2020).

4 Social License of ABM Tools

Social license, entailing society or community endorsement of the balance between risks and benefits, is necessary in the design and application of ABM tools in the marine environment. Social license as a concept originated in the mining industry in the late 1990s, mostly as the industry’s response to public resistance to new projects, with the objective of gaining social acceptance and approval of mining developments (Bice & Moffat, 2014). Gradually, the concept became more broadly defined, and it was adapted and adopted to a variety of social and environmental assessments beyond mining (Ibid.).

The shipping industry does not often fully appreciate that navigation routes may occur in areas of vital interest to Indigenous and coastal communities, including their homelands. While the employment of ABM tools serves to mitigate potential impacts, obtaining a social license for them is crucial for specific coastal and marine management areas. The concept extends beyond simply gaining permissions from communities through mere consultations. Rather, it involves strategies and efforts to properly engage with local (often vulnerable) communities and stakeholders, often in cross-cultural settings. ABM approaches in shipping should indeed engage local actors whose interests and livelihoods are affected (positively and/or negatively) by shipping activities.

In the Canadian context, the Oceans Act and subsequent Canada’s Oceans Strategy promote participatory approaches and local engagement as integral parts of the legal and policy basis for planning and decision-making in ocean and coastal waters, implicitly introducing community engagement as a requirement for ABM (OA, 1996; Oceans Strategy, 2002). The Oceans Act prescribed collaboration as a governance model for integrated management, including among federal agencies, provincial and territorial governments, coastal communities, and Indigenous organizations. The Oceans Strategy proposed “inclusiveness” in planning, decision-making, and implementation of policies through the establishment of collaborative frameworks for ocean governance:

In Coastal Management Areas, local community groups and individuals will play essential roles in helping to understand the management area and issues, ensuring that the planning process and associated actions are relevant to the area, and providing “on the ground” expertise and capacity for plan implementation, monitoring and compliance promotion. (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2002: 13)

Canada has been developing a particular approach to governing shipping activities, which aligns with these broader ocean policy frameworks, ultimately advancing toward integrated, area-based, and participatory governance approaches. The latest iteration of this approach was clearly laid out in the OPP, which established directions for the implementation of comprehensive measures to further enhance safety in Canadian waters (Canada, n.d.).

The OPP’s PVM initiative is itself a collaborative framework to facilitate the management of vessel traffic in Canadian waters, and it clearly articulates the nature and mechanisms of the engagement with local actors:

Transport Canada will work with partners to develop regulatory and other tools to engage Indigenous and coastal communities to better respond to local marine traffic issues.

While the national interest and economic drivers would still be considered, Indigenous and coastal communities could, for instance, request restrictions on speed and routing of certain sizes and classes of ships to minimize safety risks, establish areas to be avoided around sensitive sites, prohibit sewer discharges near harvesting areas, and other measures that would contribute to safety and environmental protection objectives. (Canada, n.d.: 2)

Concerning Indigenous peoples, the pursuit of social license is a legal obligation on public authorities, as Indigenous rights are defined and protected under sect. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (CA, 1982), as well as land claims agreements, treaties, and Supreme Court of Canada decisions. The federal government’s acceptance of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report and Canada’s implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) through the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act are fundamentally impacting the relationship between Canada and its Indigenous peoples (UNDRIP Act, 2021).

While Canadian courts have articulated the federal government’s duty to consult Indigenous peoples on matters affecting their rights, UNDRIP introduced the broader concept of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), which is characterized by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) as “an international human rights standard that derives from the collective rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination and to their lands, territories and other properties [including] the right “to give or withhold their consent prior to the approval by government, industry or other outside party of any project that may affect the lands, territories and resources” (FAO, 2014: 4). In the Canadian Arctic, where all coastal communities are predominantly Indigenous, the Inuit Nunangat Declaration on Inuit-Crown Partnership established the basis for “entering into a bilateral partnership with the Government of Canada to take action on shared priorities” (Canada, 2017).

Establishing and obtaining social license affects not only the acceptability but also the sustainability of ABM initiatives. Interventions regarding shipping governance (including routing, speed measures, places of refuges, SAR, prevention of oil spills, implementation of ECAs, pollution emergency response, etc.) have significant impacts on local communities and require community support and engagement not only to be effectively implemented but also to increase the protection of sensitive environmental and cultural areas and to benefit local communities. As explained in the previous section, risk conceptualizations, perceptions, and assessments must also consider the points of views and sensitivities of local affected communities. This is especially relevant for risk problems that are characterized as ambiguous.

There are several challenges and obstacles in securing a social license in ABM, including community mistrust, cultural differences, perceptions of inequity, and disagreements about the potential environmental impacts of projects. When involving Indigenous peoples, some of the challenges also relate to the broader historical background of colonialism, cultural loss, and marginalization. The context of shipping governance is not foreign to these issues, as shipping traffic can impact not only local activities and environments but also the livelihood and food security of coastal communities. At the same time, ABM can potentially become an instrument for good governance and engagement if properly defined and implemented, particularly if the process of engagement is included in all planning stages (see Chap. 6, this volume).

Some examples of collaboration in shipping measures in the context of ABM are promising. They include strategies for local participation and engagement that, in principle, seem to align with FPIC. The Enhanced Maritime Situational Awareness (EMSA) initiative, which was introduced through the OPP, is a collaborative initiative between Indigenous partners, industry, and Transport Canada. The Canadian Arctic Shipping Risk Assessment System (CASRAS) was also developed through collaborations to allow Arctic stakeholders to access different kinds of information relevant to marine safety in the Canadian Arctic (Kubat et al., 2017). The Arctic Corridors and Northern Voices (ACNV) program is meant to document Inuit perspectives on shipping governance, and it is expected to influence Canada’s low-impact shipping corridors (Dawson et al., 2020).

There are also examples of proper community engagement in ABM initiatives that are broader than shipping. They include MPAs (e.g., Tarium Niryutait in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region), national marine conservation areas (e.g., Tallurutiup Imanga), and MSP (e.g., the Marine Plan Partnership for the North Pacific Coast (MaPP)). MaPP, in particular, is considered groundbreaking in establishing co-governance models involving Indigenous peoples (Diggon et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2022; Wang, 2023).

In the Nunatsiavut Region, the Imappivut Marine Plan is explicitly formulated to be guided by the values, knowledge, and interests of Labrador Inuit and conceptualizes the national marine conservation area as an Inuit Protected Area. This initiative, through the integration of local knowledge, scientific models, and new technology, is leading to the discovery of “deep-water hidden biodiversity toward the advancement of both local Indigenous and global conservation goals” (Cote et al., 2023). It shows that local engagement can result in better ways to create base data, assess risks, mitigate effects, and create governance frameworks that are not only inclusive but also more effective and connected to local realities.

The bottom line for ABM in general and shipping governance in particular is that without public acceptance and support, even legally sanctioned projects may face operational issues, opposition, and potential failure, points that are amplified in the context of Arctic waters, where the environment and communities are more vulnerable to impacts and where geographic remoteness presents significant logistic and infrastructure challenges. The development of partnerships between government, industry, and local communities and organizations, in this context, is essential. But such partnerships must be conceived through collaborative processes, built on trust, and they must account for local views, knowledge, and conceptualizations.

It is also crucial that ABM initiatives offer clear and tangible benefits for coastal communities, which could include job creation, conservation of resources, increase of local capacity, and improved infrastructure. The planning process should be dynamic and responsive to the needs and concerns of local stakeholders and rightsholders, accommodating their input wherever possible. Incorporating these elements into the planning process can significantly enhance the legitimacy of plans, not only in terms of garnering support and acceptance from affected communities and stakeholders but also by creating positive change and improving governance.

It has been noted that in the realm of impact assessments, unlike biophysical impacts (which only start when new activities or developments start), “social impacts happen the moment there are rumours about a potential project” (Vanclay, 2012). This is particularly important in the context of Arctic waters, where projections of shipping traffic and speculation of new activities and developments vary widely, mostly in connection to the trajectories of climatic changes and sea ice loss, generating anxiety, anticipation, and speculation. Projections of increasing activities, however important for the shipping industry and the economic and geopolitical situation of Canada, will be most impactful for local communities, whose resilience has been historically proven but relatively untested to the speed and scale of the present trajectory of climate transformation.

As early as 2005, Sheila Watt-Cloutier stated at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that climate change, in the Inuit context, was a human rights issue and that countries contributing to climate change were violating the human rights of Arctic peoples (Watt-Cloutier, 2005). In a sense, proper community engagement in ABM has also become a human rights issue given the current vulnerability of communities to external factors that may affect livelihoods and sustainability.

5 Conclusion

Like terrestrial areas, ocean space within national jurisdiction is subject to complementary and competitive human uses that require management to minimize conflicts and promote complementarities to the extent possible. While the use of terrestrial space is multifarious and not dependent on any one transportation platform, most industrial uses of ocean space require the use of ships as platforms to enable actual ocean use. Hence, the distinctive characteristic of ocean use regulation to not only concern the actual extractive and non-extractive uses but also to address the platforms that enable those uses, namely, ships. By extension, hence, is the importance of ABM of shipping for the management of ocean space.

This chapter has demonstrated that there is no one individual ABM tool for regulating the movements of shipping, because the different ocean uses have different needs and employ ships in various ways to enable extractive and non-extractive activities. The regulation and management of ocean uses reveals the use of a wide variety of tools to promote development, safety, security, and environmental protection of each use, giving rise to complexity. However, diversity and complexity of ABM tools are not necessarily negative attributes, but rather there is a rich array of risk-informed tools to support ocean uses and prevent, manage, or respond to problems at sea. Indeed, ocean managers and maritime administrators have at their disposal a rich toolbox of spatial tools that they can use in a nimble manner.

Nonetheless, given the diversity of ABM tools, the utility of developing an understanding of the big picture of ABM shipping tools to support both marine transportation and other ocean uses is clear. This comprehensive survey of ABM tools used in shipping clarifies the purpose and scope of these tools and how they address the interrelated risk, spatial definition, functions, and social license embedded in them, using Canadian practices as context and for examples against the backdrop of international rules and standards. The taxonomy of ABM tools used in shipping and in support of ocean uses has been clarified.

Several useful insights into ABM design are underscored. First, while the importance of an overarching integrated ocean management framework and the use of MSP as its core tool in the context of multiple competing and complementary ocean uses cannot be underestimated, the value of ABM tools in targeting problems should be highlighted. Second, although consistency in managing ocean uses is understandable and desirable in the interests of efficiency and equity, the practice of ABM tools demonstrates nimbleness and flexibility. ABM tool design should be informed by the risk or problem aimed at and as such does not need to be necessarily standardized for all uses in all situations. Rather, they should be fashioned according to the functions they are expected to perform and the actual spatial application and temporal scope needed. The practice and approaches considered here underscore the importance of proportionality of the tool to the problem addressed, the contingent costs for shipping and other ocean uses, and their effectiveness in terms of the outcomes achieved. Third, and lastly, ABM tool design should not simply be considered as a scientific and management exercise conducted by experts but must also be informed by the rightsholders and stakeholders affected. The legitimacy and effectiveness of ABM tools are dependent on social license.