Keywords

1 Introduction

Through provisions in international conventions, of which Article 194 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is arguably one of the most important, coastal states have a duty to set up and operate measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment (UNCLOS, 1982). While there are many sources of marine pollution, the release of toxic substances, especially oil spills, is a particularly severe threat to coastal states, due to their possibly very severe implications to ecosystems, economic activities, and socio-cultural activities and artefacts, over multiple time frames (Chang et al., 2014). Hence, a coastal state’s capacity for preparedness and response to marine oil spills is an essential component for protecting the marine environment and for the sustainable use of marine ecosystem services.

It is therefore unsurprising that there has been significant academic and industrial efforts to understand the fate and impacts of oil to marine environments (Wang et al., 2021), to develop models and techniques to monitor and predict oil spill drift and fate (Nelson & Grubesic, 2020), to propose risk assessment and management models and tools (Parviainen et al., 2021; Wu et al., 2021), and to develop technologies and strategies to respond to spills (Li et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2021).

Whereas most academic work on oil spill risk management has focused on empirical work, developing risk analysis models and decision support tools, there is a growing recognition of the importance of scholarship on organizational and inter-organizational risk management. For instance, Sepp Neves et al. (2015) proposed an oil spill management process based on the ISO 31000 risk management standard, Haapasaari et al. (2015) proposed a proactive approach for shipping risk policy-making tailored to the case of the Gulf of Finland, Pålsson et al. (2018) presented a social network analysis of the Swedish oil spill crisis management collaboration, and Parviainen et al. (2019) proposed an approach to incorporate ambiguity and multiple stakeholder frameworks of understanding risk into a collaborative knowledge production process.

The importance of improving the risk governance of oil spill preparedness and response in Canada is evident considering the effects of climate change, where ongoing and projected decreases in ice cover in Arctic Sea areas (Barnhart et al., 2016) provide prospects for increased shipping activity in the Canadian Arctic. Most traffic in the Canadian Arctic has historically been destinational (Brooks & Frost, 2012), which will likely only modestly increase due to population growth and given a moratorium on licences for exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in the area (CIRNAC, 2018). Uncertainties about transit shipping are largely due to technical, economic, and geopolitical factors (Lu et al., 2014; Beveridge et al., 2016; Fedi et al., 2018; Lasserre, 2022), but there are signs that in some market segments, notably cruise and tourism industries, activities are increasing (Halliday et al., 2018; Palma et al., 2019). Hence, there is a need for continued focus on preparedness and response to marine oil spills and improved governance processes to assess and manage the associated risks.

A useful approach to improve risk governance practices is systematically investigating deficits in existing risk governance mechanisms, which can be used as a basis for formulating pathways for improvement. This has been done, for instance, for search and rescue risk governance at offshore platforms in Greece (Liaropoulos et al., 2016), and frameworks have been proposed in the risk research community to systematically investigate such deficits (IRGC, 2009).

Recognizing qualitative differences in risk types in terms of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity, and anticipating the differences this nuanced and contextual understanding of risk implies for designing and implementing appropriate risk governance approaches, for example, in how risk perceptions are considered and what stakeholders are involved in the decision-making processes and in what capacity, has been put forward as essential qualities for good risk governance (Renn et al., 2011; Aven & Renn, 2018). Consequently, Goerlandt and Pelot (2020) explored the application of the International Risk Governance Council’s Risk Governance Framework (IRGC-RGF) in the context of shipping risks in the Canadian Arctic, proposing it as a suitable basis for making progress in improving governance of shipping risks in Canada. Cucinelli et al. (2023) performed an exploratory analysis of risk governance deficits for search and rescue in Canadian marine areas, using the IRGC framework as a basis for identifying deficits.

Considering the above, the aim of this chapter is to systematically explore the risk governance deficits of oil spill preparedness and response in Canada, distinguishing practices in different Canadian marine areas. This is done using an exploratory research design approach, through a combination of interviews with experts from federal agencies and a literature search, building on a framework of risk governance deficits based on the IRGC-RGF (IRGC, 2009), to ensure compatibility with the exploratory work by Goerlandt and Pelot (2020). To support this analysis, the current risk governance practices are briefly described, including the legal basis, roles and responsibilities, engagement mechanisms, and decision-making processes.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Sect. 10.2, the research methods and protocols are described. Section 10.3 gives a brief overview of the current practices of oil spill preparedness and response governance in Canada. Section 10.4 presents the results of the analysis, distinguishing deficits related to the assessment and understanding of risks and deficits concerning risk management. A discussion is provided in Sect. 10.5, interpreting the findings from an area-based management (ABM) perspective and outlining some implications for policy and management and an initial set of directions for improving the current situation. It also highlights some study limitations and avenues for future work.

2 Methods and Data

An exploratory research design is selected to achieve the stated objectives in Sect. 10.1. Such a design is appropriate for generating insights into a phenomenon to determine its main features, serving as a basis to generate initial ideas and direct further research (Bhattacherjee, 2012). It is an appropriate design for knowledge domains about which there is no systematic understanding, which is the case for risk governance of marine oil spill preparedness and response in Canada.

A multi-method approach, combining insights from semi-structured interviews and the literature, is used as data to generate a systematic understanding of risk governance deficits of oil spill preparedness and response in Canada, similar to, for example, Fedi et al. (2018) and Cucinelli et al. (2023). Interview questions were developed based on a list of risk governance deficits (IRGC, 2009), allowing consistency in terminology and enabling the drawing of comprehensive insights. The specific research protocols and methods, and the scientific basis of these risk governance deficits, are described in the following subsections.

2.1 Research Methods and Protocols

Data for this research was obtained through interviews and a literature search. The interview participants were selected using a purposive and snowball sampling approach, with experts recruited from civil servants in federal government agencies. According to Gläser and Laudel (2009), experts are people with special knowledge of a phenomenon or topic of concern. A strong understanding of rightsholder and stakeholder engagement, risk-based management, and maritime risk analysis in the context of oil spill preparedness and response was taken as selection criteria. Candidates were identified based on a three-stage process: (1) prior contacts of the research team, (2) the Government Electronic Directory Services, and (3) snowball sampling, where candidate participants are asked to recommend further candidates. In total, members of four organizations agreed to participate in the study: Transport Canada (TC), the Department of Fisheries and Oceans-Canadian Coast Guard division (DFO-CCG) (national and Pacific), and Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC). Nine interviews with experts from these organizations were conducted from September to December 2021. Notwithstanding the relatively small number of interviews, the organizations covered the intended target audience with the needed expertise well, in line with the selected exploratory research design. Ethics approval for the interview research was obtained under the authors’ institutional ethics board under file REB#2021-5458.

Participants received an interview package including a consent form, glossary, project objectives, and interview questions in advance to facilitate obtaining more in-depth, well-considered, and reliable responses. The interviews lasted between 1 h and 1.5 h each and were conducted via an online meeting platform. The participants were asked to provide their insights on possibly present risk governance deficits listed in the Appendix to this chapter. A conversational strategy to interviewing was adopted, seeking a natural flow of interaction (Patton, 2002), an approach generally used when interviewing experts (Berry, 2002; Fedi et al., 2018). Each deficit in the Appendix was handled in sequence. If no issue was identified, nothing was reported, and the next deficit was considered. All interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim using O-Transcribe software, and deidentified to the agency level, according to research protocols described by Ograjenšek (2016). Thematic analysis was then conducted using NVivo software (Wong, 2009), which allows the identification, analysis, and reporting of themes within the textual data. The key themes emerging from the considered list of risk governance deficits of the Appendix were then aggregated and reported, noting also in which response regions they were identified.

The results from this interview study were further supplemented using a narrative literature review process (Grant & Booth, 2009). The search was primarily devised from government documents published by the participating agencies (i.e., TC, DFO-CCG, and ECCC) using the Government of Canada virtual directory (Government of Canada, 2021). Additionally, documents published in Novanet Catalogue, an online consortium of academic libraries in Nova Scotia, Canada, were also considered (Novanet, 2022). This platform was selected over other popular academic search engines such as Scopus or Web of Science (Li et al., 2021) as it contains additional Canadian book and report sources. Search words for both inventories included combinations of the following: “marine”, “oil spill”, “preparedness and response”, “risk governance”, “risk governance deficits”, “International Risk Governance Council (IRGC)”, “Ship-Source Oil Spill Response and Preparedness Regime”, and “Oceans Protection Plan (OPP)”. The results of this search were filtered based on information provided in the abstract. Subsequently, the documents were thematically analysed using the same classification of risk governance deficits shown in the Appendix, using the NVivo software similar to the interview transcriptions.

2.2 Questions for Semi-structured Interviews: IRGC and Risk Governance Deficits

The questions used in the semi-structured interviews focus on understanding risk governance deficits. This of course requires a sound basis of what constitutes good governance of risks and why it is important. There is a wide consensus in the literature that stakeholder and rightsholder inclusion, equity, transparency, and accountability are key aspects of good risk governance (Graham et al., 2003; Ammann, 2006; UNDP, 2010). These four pillars promote trust-building and increase the legitimacy of risk-informed decision-making (Aven & Renn, 2018).

While there is varied literature on the principles of good governance, the risk governance deficits considered for our purposes are derived from the IRGC-RGF, shown in Fig. 10.1, and described in detail by IRGC (2017). This is a comprehensive framework for risk governance in democratic societies based on extensive academic work in the risk research community (Klinke & Renn, 2002; Renn et al., 2011). It consists of pre-assessment, appraisal, characterization and evaluation, and management phases and considers these in the context of cross-cutting aspects, covering communication, stakeholder engagement, and contextual factors. Each aspect consists of several elements, collectively covering the generation of knowledge about the risk, the value considerations necessary to determine risk acceptability in consultation with stakeholders, and the decision-making risk treatment activities for real-world impacts. The IRGC-RGF has recently been applied to shipping risks in the Canadian Arctic, focusing on the pre-assessment phase in terms of risk characteristics, including complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity, from which recommended paths for stakeholder engagement strategies, suitable discourses and communication approaches, and feasible roles for risk perceptions are elaborated (Goerlandt & Pelot, 2020). Given its comprehensiveness, academic rigour, and prior application in the context of shipping risks in the Canadian Arctic, the IRGC-RGF is taken as a suitable basis for our current purposes. This is because it explicitly considers different worldviews, for instance, in Western scientific thought and the worldviews of Indigenous peoples (Beveridge, 2020), which is relevant especially in Arctic areas (where pollution preparedness and response are particularly important) given the large uncertainties about shipping risks (Fu et al., 2021) and the significance of ambiguity (Parviainen et al., 2019).

Fig. 10.1
A chart represents risk governance framework. Cross cutting aspects is in the middle, surrounded by pre assessment, appraisal, characterization and evaluation, and management, connected to one another. Outside is a flow from understanding generating and evaluating knowledge to implementing actions.

IRGC Risk Governance Framework (IRGC, 2017). (Reprinted from IRGC 2017. Copyright permission from IRGC. This reproduction is an adapted copy of an IRGC work and was not produced in affiliation with, or with the endorsement of IRGC.)

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The IRGC risk governance deficits, which form the basis of the semi-structured interviews, are listed in the Appendix to this chapter. These are organized into two clusters, broadly covering the knowledge dimension (understanding and assessing risk) and the value dimension (managing risk), a distinction commonly made in risk research (Hansson & Aven, 2014). “Cluster A” focuses on deficits in the pre-assessment and appraisal phases, whereas “Cluster B” addresses the characterization and evaluation and management phases. These provide a comprehensive set of guide questions to explore shortcomings in the overall governance of marine oil spill preparedness and response in Canada.

3 Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response in Canada: Regulatory Context and Current Practices

This section briefly outlines some key international and national legislation governing marine oil spill preparedness and response. It also identifies the roles and responsibilities of key partners in the Canadian context, opportunities for stakeholders and rightsholders to become involved, and how decisions are made.

3.1 Legislation

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the main platform for developing international regulations, standards, and best practices for marine shipping, while signatory Member States such as Canada adopt these into national law through their national legislative processes (Chircop, 2015). Canada has ratified the following international agreements: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), which governs the delimitation of maritime boundaries and the associated sovereign and jurisdictional rights and responsibilities of flag, coastal, and port states for safety of navigation and environmental protection; the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS, 1974), which sets out standards for safe construction, equipment, and operation of ships; and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL, 1973/78), which sets forth regulations for minimizing pollution risks from ships, including oil spills.

Most other legislation governing oil spills and marine shipping in Canada relies very heavily on international and/or national cooperation. For example, the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC, 1990) aims to build response capacity by promoting resource sharing and contingency planning between member states to enhance cooperation during an incident and develop more integrated response plans. Canada has also signed a cooperation agreement with the United States to bolster response capacity in the Great Lakes (Government of Canada, 2017; TC, 2019). This agreement includes annexes which provide further details about how collaboration is established and performed in transboundary oil spill cases, for instance, in the Atlantic (CANUSLANT, 2016) and Great Lakes (CANUSLAK, 2022) areas. The Arctic Council is a political body mainly for Arctic states and Indigenous peoples living in the Arctic, involving also several non-Arctic states, promoting collaboration on various scientific and practical areas such as marine environmental protection, sustainable development, and ecosystems and human health monitoring. The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Working Group addresses pollution-related issues including guidelines for Arctic marine risk assessment and collaboration on research on oil spill remediation (Arctic Council, 2020). It has also facilitated the adoption of the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2013), which strengthens cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance on oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic.

The Polar Code (2014/15) is a key regulatory instrument for area-based management of shipping risks, adopted by IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in 2014 and by the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) in 2015 and entered into force in 2017. It is implemented into Canadian law through the Arctic Shipping Safety and Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASSPPR, 2017) under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 (CSA, 2001) and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA, 1985). The Polar Code outlines additional safety and environmental requirements for vessels operating in Arctic areas, for instance, stricter discharge requirements for ship-sourced oil pollution near the poles. The CSA 2001 is the leading legislation governing marine shipping in Canada, enabling various regulations to promote marine environmental protection from ship-sourced pollution, such as Small Vessel Regulations (2010), Response Organizations Regulations (1995), Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations (1993), Pollutant Discharge Reporting Regulations 1995 (1995), Vessel Pollution and Dangerous Chemicals Regulations (2012), and Environmental Response Regulations (2019). At the national level, AWPPA 1985 and its supporting regulations prohibit the discharge of any kind north of the 60 degrees parallel, in addition to pollution offenses included in CSA 2001, the Fisheries Act (1985), the Migratory Birds Convention Act (MBCA, 1994), and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA, 1999), which are applicable nationally. The Marine Liability Act (2001) addresses liability and compensation for pollution damages at the private law level.

The National Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Regime and Environmental Prevention and Response National Preparedness Plan (NPP) were established in support of the CSA 2001. The regime outlines the guidelines and regulatory structure to improve coordination between industry, government, and response corporations (TC, 2019). The NPP establishes national preparedness capacities in the different response areas and ensures that mechanisms are in place to provide that capacity. These response areas are the practical implementation of the NPP as an ABM tool, concretizing the governance and management measures related to oil spill preparedness and response. Canada has set out four geographical areas of responsibility for response organizations (ROs), with one each on its west and north coasts and two on its east coast (TC, 2018). The NPP also outlines the roles and responsibilities of response agencies and provides the framework to respond to marine spills (TC, 2016). This builds, inter alia, on the standards for response organizations (TC, 1995), which lay out requirements for the design and operation of the response system, addressing issues such as tiered response capabilities, response times, and equipment. These standards also define the geographic areas of response, further distinguishing designated port areas, primary areas of response, and enhanced response areas.

Other supporting legislation includes the Environmental Emergencies Regulations (2019), which, inter alia, requires facilities to identify hazardous substances that could pose an environmental emergency (including oil and petroleum products), prepare and implement Environmental Emergency Plans, and establish reporting requirements in case of an environmental emergency. The Emergency Management Act (2007) provides a framework for coordinated and effective emergency management to protect Canadians and enhance national resilience in case of emergencies, including oil spills. The Wrecked, Abandoned, or Hazardous Vessels Act (2019) addresses the prevention, removal, and disposal of wrecked, abandoned, or hazardous vessels to protect marine environments and public safety. Finally, the Oceans Protection Plan (TC, 2021) includes large investments to projects and activities to improve marine safety and protect Canada’s marine environment and coastal ecosystems through strengthened incident prevention and response and enhanced partnerships with Indigenous and coastal communities.

3.2 Responsible Authorities

The organizations responsible for marine oil spill preparedness and response in Canada can be divided into three general groups: (1) those that provide technical support and scientific advice, (2) decision-makers, and (3) responders (see Fig. 10.2). Transport Canada is the lead regulatory authority and is responsible for the development of regulations and standards concerning marine shipping and pollution. TC is also responsible for developing, enforcing, and implementing the national oil spill regime and the NPP and provides technical support, guidance, and oversight as needed for their partner organizations (e.g. CCG and response organizations) (TC, 2019).

Fig. 10.2
A chart has incident command system in the middle with unified command inside. Response organization, stakeholders, rightsholders, indigenous people and organizations representing indigenous interests, governments, and federal partners point to incident command system.

Overview of marine oil spill preparedness and response partners

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As a special operating agency under DFO, the CCG is the lead response state agency responsible for maintaining preparedness and response capacity for the oil spill regime and developing a national contingency plan for spill response (TC, 2016, 2019). CCG is also the lead decision-maker responsible for coordinating and managing the response and forming the Unified Command within the Incident Command System (ICS) (see also Sect. 10.3.4). In cases where the polluter is unwilling, unknown, or unable to respond, the CCG will step in as the on-scene incident commander (TC, 2019).

Other partners play a secondary but often essential role. Through standing agreements with shipowners, certified ROs are responsible for cleaning up the spill on behalf of the polluter and contributing to the national preparedness and response strategy (TC, 2016). If the polluter is known, able, and willing to respond, certified ROs will become part of the Unified Command and take on a leadership role as a co-decision-maker. In practice, ROs therefore often play a primary role in spill events, by providing the principal assets for spill combating.

ECCC provides technical support and scientific advice to inform the response while also leading the Environmental Unit (i.e. the Science Table) within the ICS (see Sect. 10.3.4). In addition, ECCC plays an important role in modelling spill trajectories, mapping resources at risk, and tracing mystery spills back to the polluter(s) to hold them accountable for their actions. Other agencies such as DFO; provincial, territorial, and municipal governments; and coastal communities also play a similar role in that they provide advice, develop their own regional or area-based response plans, and may assist in the ICS or actively contribute to the Unified Command, depending on the situation and their willingness to participate. Overall, Canada boasts an extensive oil spill response regime with a wide range of organizations involved to develop, exercise for, and execute localized response plans. Nevertheless, considering that oil spills are relatively rare events, historic spills have indicated that there are several areas of improvement in the regime; see, for example, the action review reports of the M/V Marathassa fuel spill in English Bay, British Columbia (Butler, 2015).

3.3 Engagement

Engagement opportunities vary depending on the region, where the West Coast of Canada is known for having more defined roles for both stakeholders and rightsholders. For example, there are several OPP initiatives available such as the Cumulative Effects of Marine Shipping (CEMS) initiative, Enhanced Maritime Situational Awareness system (EMSA), the Proactive Vessel Management (PVM) initiative, and the Planning for Integrated Environmental Response (PIER) programme, which aim to increase participation and enhance marine safety (TC, 2021). The West Coast also offers opportunities for representatives from First Nations to join the Unified Command as co-decision-makers in the ICS (see Sect. 10.3.4). In the Canadian Arctic, in the context of reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples, there is a need for, and ongoing work towards, collaborative governance with First Nations in relation to shipping, where also the topic of oil spill preparedness and response has been highlighted (Wang & Aporta, 2024; Dawson et al., 2019).

Under the ISC, rightsholders and stakeholders are invited to participate in the Environmental Unit to help identify areas of priority and resources at risk, participate in response training, and participate in other areas of the ICS (e.g. community liaison, in-field, or out-field support). For a less hands-on approach, interested parties across Canada can join various dialogue forums such as those offered through the OPP, the Canadian Marine Advisory Council (e.g. the Standing Committee on the Environment), and Transport Canada’s “Let’s Talk Transportation” virtual platform. Moreover, vessel owners that meet the requirements may also benefit from joining the Vessels of Opportunity programme to support on-water operations.

3.4 Decision-Making Process

Although there is no nationally standardized process within Canada, it is evident that each region has adopted similar practices to increase collaborative decision-making regarding how oil spill risks are assessed and managed. Prior to an incident, federal response partners attend regular meetings to develop integrated area-based response plans, discuss existing and future risks, develop appropriate risk assessments, discuss legislative changes, exchange ideas, and plan training activities to enhance preparedness capacity. The frequency and breadth of topics covered during these meetings vary depending on the region. At the time of an incident, notifications are directed to a central system and shared with the relevant parties (e.g. federal, provincial, municipal government, First Nations). From there, the CCG will typically establish an ICS to coordinate spill response and facilitate information sharing to support evidence-based decision-making. Currently, the ICS is more commonly used on the West Coast, although there are plans to implement a standardized approach across the country (TC, 2020).

The Incident Commander(s), also known as a Unified Command, if more than one agency is involved, are the lead decision-makers during a response and rely on sound technical and scientific advice from supporting agencies. Additionally, there are numerous decision-support tools available to facilitate a risk-based approach to oil spill preparedness and response in Canada, including spill trajectory models, geographic information system and surveillance programmes, net environmental benefits analysis, area and regional risk-based response planning, and area and regional risk assessments. Depending on the region, the ECCC may invite affected parties (e.g., Indigenous and coastal communities) to participate in the Environmental Unit alongside federal partners. This forum aims to identify and prioritize environmentally sensitive areas, wildlife issues, archaeological and cultural issues, and socioeconomic issues resulting from a particular spill to advise the incident commander(s) on how those risks should be assessed and managed. Similar to the ICS, the Environmental Unit varies between regions and is more extensively utilized on the West Coast. These tools are not formalized in legislation and are supplementary to experiential knowledge. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the Incident Commander(s) to implement professional judgement when executing decisions.

As mentioned in Sect. 10.3.1, there is a separate decision-making process for transboundary spill events between Canada and the United States, which is specified in the Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan (JCP) and its annexes. During an emergency, CCG is the lead Canadian agency in the Joint Response Team (JRT), which is a team with members from both countries. For significant incidents requiring multi-agency cooperation, a Science Table can be established to bring together relevant experts in the field of environmental protection. Members can include response agencies, all levels of government, Indigenous representatives, local communities, industries, environmental non-government organizations, and academic institutes. The JCP is tested periodically, with, for example, the CANUSLANT exercise in 2019, inter alia, focusing on implementing plans, policies, procedures, and cooperation agreements in a simulated pollution response scenario (CANUSLANT, 2019).

4 Results: Risk Governance Deficits in Canadian Oil Spill Preparedness and Response

Based on the data collected from the interviews and literature search, 19 of the pre-defined 23 risk governance deficits are present for at least one of the participating agencies, while 5 deficits were identified across all relevant agencies (highlighted in bold font) (Table 10.1). Considering each agency’s mandate and responsibilities as outlined in Sect. 10.3.2, the experts from TC chose to defer all answers for Cluster B to their partners at CCG, as issues concerning response are more aligned with their responsibilities and expertise.

Table 10.1 Summary of identified IRGC risk governance deficits by organization
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The results suggest that there are discrepancies in how risks are assessed and managed between agencies and between regions under the same agency (e.g. CCG) within Canada. This is expected as each agency operates differently in Canada, has different mandates, and must cater to their delivery to meet the specific needs in their region. For example, the relationship between stakeholders and rightsholders depends on past experiences, the level of trust between the groups, and how information has been shared. Some of these issues will be further elaborated in the discussion below as specific deficits. It should be noted here that considerations regarding transboundary spill preparedness and response, for example, between Canada and United States, are outside the scope of these findings.

4.1 Cluster A: Assessment and Understanding of Risks

4.1.1 Deficit A1: Early Warning Systems

The interviewed experts believe this deficit is present but poses little to no risk. One participant noted that although there is no formal early warning system for oil spills, the flow of information at the time of an incident is relatively smooth, allowing the responsible agencies to respond quickly depending on the severity of the incident. In general, participants believe that improvements could be made, for example, by increased digitalization.

4.1.2 Deficit A2: Factual Knowledge About Risk

The collected data suggest that there are numerous challenges pertaining to data, including issues with data collection, inconsistent data, data management, and data sharing. The deficit is location-dependent in that areas with low shipping activity (e.g. remote areas) lack scientific information to support the oil spill response regime, whereas areas with high shipping activity (e.g. major ports and corridors) are well documented. This data divide is more prevalent in the Canadian Arctic (north of the 60th parallel), while there is much more data available in the south. Interviewed experts expect this deficit to diminish in importance over time as new studies emerge, assuming there is enough capacity to maintain and update the information, which depends on resources such as funding and time.

4.1.3 Deficit A3: Perceptions of Risk

The data suggest that this deficit is present due to a lack of effective two-way communication between responsible agencies and rightsholders and stakeholders. There are ongoing efforts to close this gap, primarily through implementing various OPP initiatives aiming to increase rightsholder and stakeholder participation, offering platforms to exchange knowledge and build common understanding such as the EMSA and PVM initiatives (TC, 2021). In recent years, representatives from the provincial and federal governments have been working to inform the public of the various risks, explain how the oil spill regime works in Canada, and explain how the system is set up to respond. However, several cases indicate that the public’s perception of risk does not align with the factual data. For example, a 50 litre diesel spill located near a coastal community may be considered significant by an affected community expecting immediate remediation. However, from a federal government perspective, the spill is quite small and likely does not pose a significant risk to the environment or society. Thus, it is not always feasible or necessary to deploy a response team, and efforts could be allocated elsewhere. Experts agreed that more work is needed to increase mutual understanding and balance expectations to better align risk perceptions. It is important to recognize that this deficit is unintentional and not present due to the purposeful omission of knowledge as the definition of A3 implies (see Appendix to this chapter).

4.1.4 Deficit A4: Stakeholder and Rightsholder Involvement

The collected data indicate that this deficit is present due to time and financial limitations and the limited capacity of communities to participate, impeding stakeholder and rightsholder involvement. Historically, the emphasis has been on consultation rather than meaningful engagement. The OPP initiatives aim to increase engagement, although these opportunities are not available consistently across the country. For example, the PIER programme aims to engage rightsholders and stakeholders in the development of integrated regional and sub-regional oil spill response plans. However, this programme is currently only available on the West Coast. Similarly, on the West Coast, representatives from First Nations are invited to become co-decision makers in the Unified Command and participate in preparedness and response. However, other regions do not seem to have a formalized role in this type of engagement. In other regions, rightsholders and stakeholders are involved during the risk assessment process but remain absent from planning and response. Thus, the assessment parameters may not meet the needs of the participants, further reducing the legitimacy of the risk assessment process. More work is needed to address this deficiency, especially outside the Western region.

The federal government recognized that engagement can be expensive and that it is often the financial responsibility of the participants. To help alleviate this burden, Transport Canada has created the Community Participation Funding Program to increase involvement in decisions surrounding marine shipping (TC, 2021).

4.1.5 Deficit A5: Evaluating the Acceptability of Risk

The collected data indicate that this deficit is present across Canada. Interviewed experts recognize the opportunity to establish an Environmental Unit prior to an incident to help alleviate this deficit, as relevant parties (e.g. stakeholders, rightsholders, and scientists) work together to prioritize risks. However, the Environmental Unit is typically only established during a response, in which case, there is no formalized process for evaluating risk tolerance or acceptability. Experts added that discussions about risk acceptance are currently missing from the risk assessment process, which can be exacerbated if information about risks is incomplete (A2), if perceptions of risk are misaligned with factual knowledge (A3), and if rightsholder and stakeholder engagement processes are not well established (A4).

It was mentioned that because risks can be subjective, there is no clear understanding of what is acceptable and where decision-makers should “draw the line”. In the absence of focused discussions, they rely on the best available data and their professional judgement to make difficult decisions for the greater good. This deficit will likely continue to persist without additional resources to encourage these discussions among stakeholders early on.

4.1.6 Deficit A6: Misrepresenting Information About Risk

Experts linked the presence of this deficit to deficits A2 and A3, which identified issues with missing, outdated, and inconsistent data and the lack of consideration of risk perception. Thus, there is a potential to misrepresent information about risk due to the quality of the available information (A2) and the lack of a common understanding of perceived risks (A3). Experts considered this deficit, understood as indicated above, to be unintentional and currently unavoidable. There was general agreement that federal agencies are not purposefully misrepresenting information. Nevertheless, this finding strengthens the argument to improve factual knowledge about risk and to better understand and balance risk perceptions.

4.1.7 Deficit A7: Understanding Complex Systems

This deficit is present and is best captured by this quote from CCG-National:

The oil spill regime is very complex, and while individuals within the regime may know their part to play within the regime, there is still significant work to be done to build a common understanding of the complex interactions of oil spill risks across different consequences, as well as the relations to roles and mandates.

Similar to many government programmes, there is a push to shift from a highly compartmentalized approach to a more integrative approach to promote greater understanding of the problem space and to enhance collaboration. The experts believed that the ongoing OPP initiatives aiming to develop comprehensive response systems for marine oil spills and strengthen partnerships (e.g. government, industry, coastal, and Indigenous communities) are helpful to reach a common understanding of the system. For example, the Seamless Regime Response aims to develop an integrated framework for the preparedness and response of marine spills (TC, 2021). Although these initiatives do help bring all the partners together, some participants still feel that there is room for improvement. From an ECCC perspective, federal employees work within their capacity to assess and address the multiple dimensions of oil spill risks and their potential consequences.

4.1.8 Deficit A8: Recognizing Fundamental or Rapid Changes in the System

Rapid change is inherent to emergency preparedness and response. For example, shipping is dynamic as trade patterns and ship technology evolve, marine environments change, and society’s priorities and legal requirements change. It takes time to recognize these changes, communicate them, and adapt or react effectively. This is challenging due to the complexity of the oil spill risks and the preparedness and response system in its entirety (cf. A7), where a change that may immediately affect one agency or department can create ripple effects in other areas of the regime. Thus, it is important to understand how changes in the system affect the entire regime and to create appropriate channels to communicate these changes as they arise to ensure mutual understanding and appropriate adaptation. The interviewed experts raised this as a deficit, noting that little has been done to systematically address this issue, simply stating “we don’t do this”. Experts proposed more comprehensive education and outreach activities to increase awareness among federal partners as pathways forward.

4.1.9 Deficit A9: The Use of Formal Models

This deficit was identified at the national level as the oil spill regime lacks a truly common preparedness or operating picture that is accessible across all regions and departments/agencies. However, the interviewed experts did note that they are working towards improving models within their own department or agency to enhance decision-making and data management, which has resulted in the development of robust models that operate at a much finer scale, for example, based on net environmental benefit analysis approaches. The development of more integrated models and tools could, however, further facilitate better preparedness planning and a more rapid response by minimizing the time spent collating data from multiple sources that are not easily accessible between agencies due to compatibility issues or legal constraints. An expert from TC noted that:

The reliance on models varies drastically. In some cases, we see an over-reliance while in others we see an under-reliance. The models that are used have not been vetted or standardized. A standardized suite of vetted models is needed in Canada, similar to how the HELCOM “OpenRisk” project introduced a common suite of risk management tools to the Baltic states.

One participant noted that it is common practice for decision-makers to leverage experiential knowledge and execute professional judgement when data and/or tools are lacking. As a result, this expert felt the current approach is acceptable and is not currently causing a significant deficit, noting, however, that there is always room for improvement.

4.1.10 Deficit A10: Assessing Potential Surprises

The collected data indicate that there are cognitive barriers that have been institutionalized, which contribute to the presence of this deficit. For example, the Canadian oil spill regime is designed around a 10,000 ton response capacity (TC, 2016, 2019). However, this number was determined by a risk assessment in the late 1980s, whereas the risks have likely changed over time due to increases in marine shipping since then and due to larger vessel sizes. Thus, it is possible that target response capacity is no longer a realistic metric for preparedness, which may limit Canada’s ability to respond adequately to greater spills. Some experts expressed concerns that “it is nearly impossible to assess all different scenarios”.

However, participants at the national level strongly believe that Canada is well equipped to overcome challenges with potential surprises such as exceptionally large spills and that the operators have the experience needed to draw on multiple resources to fill in any gaps as needed. ECCC-National emphasized that their situational assessments do focus on outliers (i.e. rare, high-risk scenarios), recognizing that these events have the potential for greater consequences.

4.2 Cluster B: Management of Risks

4.2.1 Deficit B2: Designing Effective Risk Management Strategies

The interviewed experts identified this deficit given the lack of clear objectives and common risk-informed response strategies across the country. Various agencies have developed their own risk management approaches and best practices, such as ECCC’s net environmental benefits analysis and response planning within the CCG. However, response planning is departmental and not carried out consistently across the country, resulting in certain regions likely having more effective strategies than others.

Participants also noted that although the ICS may be helpful during a response to identify and inform decisions on how to manage risks resulting from a spill as outlined in Sect. 10.3.4, its primary function is to coordinate the response, not to design risk management strategies as such. The ICS also poses similar challenges, as it is not currently used consistently across Canada; it does not have specific risk-based targets, and is not inculcated in legislation. Thus, there is no obligation to use ICS. Respondents noted that American ICS offers a more structured approach that may be useful in Canada if implemented consistently.

4.2.2 Deficit B4: Designing Efficient and Equitable Risk Management Policies

Interviewed experts suggested that risk management policies are typically developed in silo, without much room for public input. This is further exacerbated by deficit A5, as it is difficult to design efficient and equitable risk management policies when there is a common understanding of what is acceptable is lacking. For example, if the risks posed by a spill (e.g. small scale, far from sensitive habitat) are considered acceptable, then there would be no need to deploy valuable resources to respond, whereas if the risks were unacceptable, then a response may be necessary. Currently, risk management policies do not reflect these nuances, and it is up to the discretion of CCG to initiate what they believe is a reasonable response depending on the incident.

4.2.3 Deficit B5: Implementing and Enforcing Risk Management Decisions

The interviewed experts generally agreed that there is little to no enforcement around risk management decisions and that the oil spill regime lacks effective enforcement measures. Moreover, without proper enforcement, it is difficult to ensure compliance. This deficit will likely continue to exist until there is a national risk management strategy (cf. B2) and a common understanding of risk acceptability in Canada (cf. A5).

4.2.4 Deficit B6: Anticipating Side Effects of Risk Management

Generally, participants believed that side effects are well considered given the nature of emergency response, where time is often the limiting factor. At the time of an incident, responders use the best available data and their professional judgement to make informed decisions to minimize residual impacts. However, this process is rarely documented, as decisions are made quickly to prevent the situation from worsening. Only one participant identified this deficit as present, noting that a more thorough evaluation could be conducted prior to decision-making, finding that making trade-offs based on limited information can be too demanding during emergency situations, possibly leading to poor consideration of the full spectrum of effects.

4.2.5 Deficit B7: Reconciling Time Horizons

Impacts from oil spills usually dissipate over time as the oil breaks down, eventually resulting in trace amounts in the environment. Moreover, oil spills can impact environmental, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions over different time frames. The interviewed experts highlighted this deficit because Canada does not have a formal recovery regime or policies to dictate how many resources should be invested in long-term monitoring across different impact dimensions.

This links back to deficits A5 and B4, as without a proper understanding of what is acceptable, it is difficult to develop efficient and equitable risk management strategies. For example, from an ECCC perspective, the spill response is complete once a decreasing trend in the amount of oil remaining in the environment is determined, while rightsholders or stakeholders might continue to push for long-term recovery monitoring for socioeconomic or cultural reasons, requiring a greater investment of time and resources. Thus, depending on the situation, it may be difficult to reconcile timeframes.

Moreover, seasonality poses an issue as the time of year influences response capacity and capability, which is particularly important for incidents occurring in the North. For example, the spill response is much more difficult outside the peak shipping season, as the presence of ice poses a significant barrier and limits the use of equipment such as booms. Similarly, if an incident occurs while many community members are away on the land (e.g. during hunting season), then there are fewer people who can be readily tasked in the area, and response assets may need to be sourced from southern areas, increasing the delay.

4.2.6 Deficit B8: Balancing Transparency and Confidentiality

The interviewed experts believe that there has been a lot of progress with respect to increasing transparency of the federal government, for example, through the Access to Information Act (1985), relationship building, and data sharing agreements. However, there are still issues with data sharing including legal constraints (e.g. privacy laws and nondisclosure agreements) and concerns with sharing sensitive information (e.g. Indigenous knowledge that is of sacred or cultural significance). This is thought to be less of a concern on the West Coast as First Nations are more heavily integrated in the response and decision-making through ICS and where there are processes in place and a mutual understanding to safeguard sensitive information. For example, ECCC has noted that “Indigenous Nations sometimes have data and information on the environment that they do not want to share, and this is fine, and we respect that”. In addition to these limitations, participants noted that there is also a lack of policy in place to support data sharing within the government as a whole, limiting transparency across regions. This deficit can act as a barrier to incorporating Indigenous knowledge in decision-making processes, for instance, if such knowledge is not appropriately considered or protected in decision support systems used for response planning purposes, as discussed in Chap. 6 in this volume.

4.2.7 Deficit B9: Organizational Capacity

The interviewed experts identified several deficits concerning organizational capacity. The most common is that agencies are not entirely clear on their exact roles and responsibilities related to risk governance (cf. A7 and B10). It was suggested that this exacerbates deficits pertaining to a lack of clear risk management objective strategies (B2) and mutual understanding of what are acceptable risks (A5). As a result, it is difficult for agencies to identify which risks are the priority, how much time and resources should be allocated to manage these risks, and how many people are needed to facilitate the desired response. In the absence of risk-based targets, it is difficult to predict whether more capacity is needed and where to allocate future resources to support long-term decisions.

Finally, participants identified a lack of community training to help share this responsibility among rightsholders and stakeholders to ensure that coastal communities have the needed capacity and are equipped to respond if tasked. Nevertheless, certain regions have been more successful at developing programmes to facilitate this, for example, through the PIER programme mentioned in Sect. 10.3.3.

4.2.8 Deficit B10: Dealing with Dispersed Responsibilities

The interviewed experts agreed that the Government of Canada has traditionally worked in silos but is actively seeking to address this through increasing collaboration by implementing horizontal initiatives. This deficit is closely related to deficit B9, where there is still a need to clearly define the responsibilities of each group (i.e., Coastal First Nations, stakeholders, and the Government of Canada agencies) and how they are expected to work together and support each other. Participants also noted that there are recent pilot projects and initiatives in place through the OPP that aim to enhance clarifying and aligning responsibilities, although not all programmes have been rolled out across Canada and their permanence depends on future funding.

4.2.9 Deficit B12: Managing Conflicts of Interest, Beliefs, Values, and Ideologies

The interviewed experts found this deficit to be present, adding that although conflicts may arise, they do not prevent effective risk management during an emergency response. Participants noted that one of the most common conflicts arises when traditional knowledge and western knowledge do not align, making it more difficult to agree in preparedness planning, on endpoints for response operations, and for determining which course of action is most appropriate. Recognizing that decisions made in the Unified Command are not always satisfactory to all parties, the CCG has noted that certain entities within the oil spill regime have agreements in place that outline the terms for conflict resolution when dealing with emergencies. These agreements ensure that once the emergency has subsided, there is a mechanism in place where those involved can regroup outside of the ICS and resolve the matter in hopes of preventing future conflict. However, these agreements are voluntary and are not always common practice across the country.

5 Discussion

5.1 Policy and Management Implications for Area-Based Management of Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response

As mentioned in Sect. 10.3.1, the geographical areas (shown in Fig. 10.2) in which the ROs are responsible for implementing the oil spill pollution preparedness and response management measures can be understood as the practical geographical implementation of the NPP as an ABM tool. These areas are associated with further legislative mechanisms stipulating requirements for shipowners, operators, and responsible authorities and specifying roles and processes for decision-making, scientific support, and engagement with stakeholders such as coastal communities and non-governmental organizations and with Indigenous rightsholders.

The complex structure of the legislative basis, the responsible authorities, engagement, and decision-making processes outlined in Sect. 10.3 can be seen as a description of a governance structure to establish preparedness and response mechanisms to mitigate the risks of oil spills in Canadian waters. Referring to Chap. 2 in this volume, the main risk object of these ABM tools is oil spills, with ships as the risk agent (the object causing the harm) and the marine and coastal spaces as the risk absorbing system (the object being harmed). In terms of the risk management phases (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery), it is evident that the focus of this analysis is on the preparedness and response phases of oil spill risk management.

Finally, while the risk problem type according to the IRGC-RGF is not explicitly assessed in the interviews with the experts, it is evident that aspects of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity are relevant for area-based management of oil spill risks. Complexity is, for example, evident from the multiple interdependent pathways in which oil spills can lead to harm to ecosystems, human health, economic activities, and socio-culturally significant sites, recognizing that data and information about these complex interrelations are not comprehensively available for all marine areas in Canada (cf. deficit A2). Complexity is also evident in the oil spill regime itself, from the multitude of legal instruments relevant to area-based management of spill preparedness and response, and from the wide array of actors, stakeholders, and rightsholders involved in decision-making processes, and in consultation and outreach activities, leading to challenges to attain a common understanding of the response system (cf. deficit A7). Uncertainty is relevant to oil spill risk, for instance, because of the challenges with the availability, consistency, and sharing of data about oil spill risks and its different pathways to impacts (cf. deficit A2), as well as due to challenges related to comprehensively including Indigenous knowledge in decision-making processes due to issues related to transparency and confidentiality (cf. deficit B8). Finally, ambiguity is present especially because the risk perceptions of rightsholders and southern Canadian actors and stakeholders may substantially differ (cf. deficit A3) and because the risk acceptability can therefore be understood differently by Indigenous peoples and other actors and stakeholders, due to their reliance on different worldviews and knowledge systems (cf. deficit A5, B4).

Identifying potential deficits is essential when seeking to improve policies and management approaches to achieve good governance. This research used an exploratory approach to understand deficits of preparedness and response risk governance in Canada, pointing to common issues across response regions and highlighting expert views on possible avenues for improving current practices.

While the analysis is not focused on the different geographical response areas of the ROs per se and does not specifically address issues related to transboundary preparedness and response, it is important to note that the identified deficits may present differently across the country. For example, some deficits were only identified within certain regions or were limited to certain agencies. This can be attributed to differences in programme availability, capacity of the response system (assets and personnel), geographical context (e.g. shoreline sensitivities, culturally significant areas), and relationships between government agencies and rightsholders and stakeholders. It was determined that standardized approaches to designing risk management strategies are lacking and that decisions are largely left up to the incident commander(s) at the time of the response. Although developing standardized processes is believed to be generally beneficial, for instance, by streamlining decision-making processes between different actors, stakeholders, and rightsholders, it is worth exploring in greater detail the benefits and downsides of standardization. Increased standardization may, for example, lead to burdensome bureaucratization or not be sufficiently attuned to local cultural differences, possibly reducing the agility and resilience of the pollution preparedness and response system.

The results suggest that it is difficult to fully eliminate all deficits, especially due to limitations in organizational capacity, that is, time, finances, and personnel. Correspondingly, certain deficits have been identified as being currently unavoidable but unintentional. For example, the unintentional misrepresentation of risk due to insufficient quality of the available information or a lack of a common understanding of the risk (deficit A6), together with challenges to anticipate outcomes of decisions (which stem from the complex system of the pollution risks and the various associated consequence dimensions; see deficit A7), can lead to insufficiently anticipating the side effects of risk management (deficit B6). Furthermore, certain deficits have the potential to pose a greater risk when coupled together. For example, in cases where there are inefficient and inequitable risk management policies and practices (deficit B4), this can lead to insufficient organizational capacity, with unclear roles and lack of local community capacity (deficit B9). In other cases, one deficit can act as a root cause leading to the manifestation of other deficits. For example, when lack of reliable scientific information about shipping risks or spill consequences is present (deficit A2), this can be seen as a cause of challenges of misrepresenting information about risk (deficit A6), for instance, by not adequately considering some ecosystem impacts or socio-culturally relevant consequences. Thus, the nature of relationships between deficits should be considered when developing management plans to understand the overall impacts of deficits and to improve current practices.

Certain deficits have been identified for having common stressors. In such cases, it is important to alleviate root causes to prevent cascading impacts. For example, the failure to properly manage conflicts of interest, beliefs, values, and ideologies (B12) may perpetuate issues in being able to anticipate the side effects of risk management (B6), designing efficient and equitable risk management policies (B4), and evaluating risk acceptability (A5). Experts from CCG proposed that efforts could be directed to develop a forum to promote standard practices for oil spill preparedness and response across the country. This aligns with the view by TC respondents to develop and decide on a set of commonly used risk assessment models and tools, similar to those developed for the Baltic Sea area (Laine et al., 2021).

A common challenge has been identified around the appropriate use of Indigenous versus Western knowledge. This is a pertinent issue because Indigenous peoples are rightsholders, having constitutionally protected rights in matters relating to resource development on their lands or that could infringe on their rights (Boyd & Lorefice, 2019). Given the conceptualizations of marine spaces by, for instance, Inuit people in their worldview, it could be argued that this right extends into marine areas (Beveridge, 2020). Generally, they have a right to be consulted; their free, prior, and informed consent is needed; and they can resort to legal procedures when this right is violated. The exact relation between risk perceptions and risks understood in Indigenous worldviews based on traditional knowledge and the implications this has for risk governance is not yet accurately understood (Goerlandt & Pelot, 2020). Nevertheless, it may be considered appropriate to increase education and give an appropriate role to both knowledge systems in the oil spill regime and formalize an approach to spill response guided by Two-Eyed Seeing. This approach fosters the development of collective knowledge to inform the “bigger picture” and can help strengthen relationships and collaboration. Moreover, Two-Eyed Seeing is a recognized approach to promote integrative science and has been adopted in numerous environmental plans, policies, and programmes across Canada over the past decade (Bartlett et al., 2012). This supports its potential role in the risk governance of marine oil spills in Canada.

Efforts are already ongoing to mitigate many of the identified deficits. A long-standing mechanism to compensate victims of oil pollution damage (including prevention-related costs) caused by ships, recovering the costs from the polluters or other responsible parties (if known) through the Polluter Pays Principle, concerns the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund. Recent efforts by this Fund to alleviate, for example, deficit B9 (lack of organizational capacity), include increased outreach efforts to municipal, local, and Indigenous governments and launching a compensation handbook targeted at these stakeholders and rightsholders (SOPF, 2023).

In recent years, the Government of Canada has invested in numerous horizontal initiatives to promote interdepartmental collaboration (B10) such as the OPP (TC, 2021). The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2021) has also published guidelines including a Horizontal Initiatives Framework detailing how departments are expected to work together to achieve shared outcomes. The OPP is thought to alleviate certain deficits (e.g. A2, A3, A4, A7, B10) by improving marine safety, environmental protection, and Indigenous engagement (TC, 2021). Specific initiatives include but are not limited to increasing data collection (e.g. Coastal Environmental Baseline Program), updating legislation (e.g. CSA, 2001 and Marine Liability Act), investing in modern environmental response equipment, increasing training, hiring additional staff, investing in Indigenous partnerships (e.g. PIER programme), investing in oil spill research (e.g. the Multi-Partner Research Initiative), and increasing situational awareness (e.g. EMSA). However, the OPP was designed as a 5-year plan with funding from 2017 to 2022, so that many of these initiatives were established as short-term pilot projects. In August 2022, the Government of Canada announced an additional 2 billion dollar investment over a 9-year period to renew the OPP (i.e. OPP 2.0) aimed at funding new projects. However, at the time of writing, it is unclear which of the existing initiatives will secure funding. This uncertainty may lead to future vulnerabilities in the system, an issue highlighted under deficit B7. Attention should be given to which OPP initiatives are most effective at alleviating the relevant deficits from a pollution preparedness and response perspective and efforts directed to adopting them into policy. Should existing initiatives not be renewed, then it may be worthwhile to reassess the identified deficits, particularly focusing on how the sustainability of effective activities implemented under the pilot programmes can be ensured, for instance, by expanding the PIER programme for all Indigenous coastal communities. The deficits identified through the presented exploratory analysis could also serve as input for prioritizing future initiatives.

Considering that many deficits have a lack of information sharing, communication, and engagement as root causes, it is recommended that the Government of Canada develop knowledge-sharing policies and data management systems to document and share data tailored to specific needs. In cases where such systems already exist, efforts should focus on cleaning and updating them. Standardized guidelines for record-keeping could be developed to promote consistency and to ensure that files are maintained in a format that is easily understood and accessible during emergencies.

Finally, the Government of Canada could direct efforts to establish a common operating picture to facilitate greater collaboration and domain awareness, where multiple agencies can access the same information during a spill response, possibly through online decision support tools such as the Next-Generation Smart Response Web (NG-SRW) developed for the Baltic Sea area (Fetissov et al., 2021). This would collate all relevant information to increase transparency (B8) and usability, enhance rightsholder and stakeholder engagement (A4), and enhance the capacity to understand complex systems (A7), among others. The information could be organized into a series of submodules based on need, as explained by Baber et al. (2013). For example, information specific to response measures could be separated from the information on sensitive areas, while the overall structure could allow users to toggle between nodes and information layers, exploring the various relationships depending on the level of needed detail. Using a formalized structure may also reduce human error and alleviate pressures on decision-makers as the connections are mapped out for them, outlining who should be involved in which processes and where that information is held to facilitate rapid response. Much of this information already exists in separate databases held within various agencies, so an integrated decision support platform could also help alleviate the deficit of dealing with dispersed responsibilities (B10). While the interviewed respondents did not make an explicit link to places of refuge (sites where a ship in need of assistance can work to stabilize its condition, among others for environmental protection), such an integrated platforms can help improve common situational awareness between actors, stakeholders, and rightsholders under the National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan framework (TC, 2007; John, 2010).

5.2 Study Limitations and Avenues for Future Research

As the aim of this work is to explore risk governance deficits in the Canadian oil spill regime, only a subset of experts from federal agencies were consulted. Their answers depend on their experience and region of operation and should be considered as a basis for identifying plausible starting points for further advancing an understanding of risk governance deficits. Insights into deficiencies as understood by different actors within Canada, such as rightsholders and stakeholders (industry, nongovernmental organizations), would enrich the analysis and would enable a more comprehensive prioritization of deficits to mitigate.

As mentioned in Sect. 10.5.1, while spill preparedness and response can be understood as an implementation of legislative AMB tools, the presented analysis is not focused on particular geographic areas. Future work could be dedicated to systematically and comprehensively understanding deficits in specific marine areas, such as areas of responsibility of a given RO. Furthermore, the presented exploratory analysis on risk governance deficits focused exclusively on the Canadian response, so that the joint marine spill response for transboundary incidents is not addressed in interviews. Future work could assess the performance of such joint spill responses for the different areas considered in the JCP and its annexes through a risk governance deficit lens, exploring agreements and disagreements between US-based and Canadian actors, stakeholders, and rightsholders.

A final limitation is that the risk governance deficits are considered separately in the current work, whereas it is observed that several deficits are in practice related to each other. Thus, understanding their joint effects from a systems perspective, across different rightsholders and stakeholders, may bring additional insights and help prioritize actions to improve the system. Hence, future research to assess these deficits more comprehensively in relation to each other, using dedicated systems analysis methods, is recommended.

Notwithstanding its limitations, the findings point to several worthwhile directions for future scholarship. This includes a systematic focus on the relation between risk perceptions as studied using Western scientific methods and risks as understood based on Indigenous worldviews and knowledge systems, including the implications this has for risk governance. This is pertinent and not considered within the existing IRGC-RGF (IRGC, 2017). Given the challenges raised to determine risk acceptability across decision-makers and rightsholder and stakeholder groups, making a synthesis of existing approaches to risk acceptability, and adapting this to the context of oil spill preparedness and response in Canada, would be worthwhile.

There is also an opportunity to develop an integrated set of models and tools to prepare for and respond to oil spill risks in Canadian marine areas similar to the risk assessment toolbox and collaborative spatial decision support systems developed for the Baltic Sea area (Laine et al., 2021; Fetissov et al., 2021; Tabri et al., 2018). In this context, considering the identified deficit of challenges to reconcile time horizons and the fact that state-of-the-art risk assessment models for preparedness planning mainly focus on the immediate response phases and far less on intermediate and long-term impacts (Parviainen et al., 2021), more research and development to improve risk models to account for different time scales are advisable.