Keywords

Introduction

This and the next three chapters (Chaps. 6, 7, 8, and 9) present the results of the narrative analysis of the four main narratives identified. Taken together, they make up the master narrative about Sweden that is presented in Chap. 10. There are overlaps between the narratives not only because of the methodology, but because of the storytelling techniques by which RT and Sputnik construct their strategic narratives. The narrative connections and overlaps affect the meaning making of the messages in the news coverage. This is discussed in reference to the story telling techniques in Chap. 10. It should be noted that the sub-narratives identified in the analysis are presented, in this and the other empirical chapters, with few comments on how they are interpreted or what position is taken to them by the analyst. The aim is to project what the sub-narratives are according to Sputnik and RT and how they are told.

As is discussed in Chap. 4, while the framing analysis centered on how the problems reported on were defined, who was responsible and whether there were solutions to the problems, the narrative analysis ran deeper, and focused on the storytelling of each news item; that is, the way in which the pieces were told, or the plots. Attention was therefore particularly focused on how malign messages merged into the coverage and took on meaning by way of the different narrative components, their interrelationships, and how the stories unfolded by way of the sequential ordering of the events. In this first narrative chapter, the focus is on the negative consequences Sweden is said to have suffered by clinging on to liberal leftist ideas. The chapters that present and analyze the four narratives are structured according to sub-narratives. The first narrative presented in this chapter “The liberal left: A threat to traditional Sweden” is made up of the following sub-narratives: “Freedom of expression and freedom of religion pose problems, and cause incompatibilities”; “Political divisions over liberal democratic values”; “The Swedish church: a troublesome liberal with a diminishing congregation”; and “The Swedish media is left wing and supports the state and the establishment”. It is well established in research on Russian disinformation that liberalism and liberal democracy are key targets (see Chaps. 1, 2, and 3), and that Sputnik and RT are known to be supportive of rightist conservative parties (Colliver et al., 2018, p. 5). During the time period analyzed the Social Democrats (SAP) and the Green party (MP) were in government forming a left-green coalition with the SAP party leader as prime minister.

Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion Pose Problems and Cause Incompatibilities

Two basic pillars of liberalism were particularly prominent in the narrative about the liberal left: freedom of expression and freedom of religion. These two human rights were repeatedly used in the anti-liberal narrative of Sputnik and RT to demonstrate the negative effects of the implementation of liberalism and liberal democracy on social stability and a well-functioning society.

Sweden’s supposedly strong defense of freedom of expression was depicted as an oxymoron. In various articles, Sputnik and RT argued that principles said to be of such significance were mostly lip-service or, when it was effectively applied, the news outlets argued that what was treated as a sacred principle in fact led to nothing but chaos, confusion, and antagonism between people. Freedom of expression turned out to be a Pandora’s box that once opened, was beyond any state actors’ grasp or control. Perhaps the strongest critique of liberalism came to the fore in pieces arguing the incompatibility between freedom of expression and freedom of religion. There were reports, for example, about the debate surrounding the hijab, and about attacks on and defense of the sanctity of the Quran (see below), showing how freedom of religion took precedence over freedom of speech. There were reports in which foreign-born Swedes expressed similar concerns, assigning responsibility to left-leaning politicians who, they argued, had made it impossible for people to criticize or express their dislike for Islam and Muslim traditions (see e.g. Sputnik, March 7, 2020f). If Swedes expressed their dislike for Islam, they risked being sued or charged in a court of law, accused of racism. Plots arguing the primacy of freedom of religion over freedom of speech showed how supposedly liberal Sweden was not so liberal after all. On the contrary, Sputnik and RT argued, Swedish elites and law enforcement agencies politicized opinions and fueled polarization by denying people the right to debate openly or to show their dislike for norms and values that went against liberal Swedish values.

While publicizing these struggles, Sputnik and RT were at the same time reporting how the Swedish authorities and government refused to acknowledge any social tensions. Plots were structured to show the hypocrisy of elite groups, depicting them as tiptoeing around issues and trying to silence voices, for example, about Sweden’s involvement in World War II, or representation of the Swedish flag as a symbol of oppression and slavery (Sputnik, July 2, 2020k; Sputnik, July 15, 2020m), as well as involvement of the Swedish church racial biological studies on Sami people and other forms of abuse (Sputnik, October 8, 2020x).

This added to the image of Sweden that ran through all the narratives: that Sweden is not what it appears to be (see e.g. Chap. 7 on the narrative on the pandemic). Coverage showed how talk about freedom of expression weighed lightly when it came to coverage of Islam and Muslims. It was unacceptable in Sweden to write sarcastically or critically about Muslims. At the same time, it was claimed that political leaders and other authorities, such as the police, were prevented from intervening in cases of abuse, discrimination, or violence because of liberal legislation and the significance it assigns to freedom of religion, which provides leeway for all sorts of behavior.

Schools were reported to have removed traditional hymns from graduation day, which had been sung by Swedish school children for decades—because the singing of hymns was seen as disrespecting Muslim schoolchildren and in breach of the principle of a secular Swedish school system (Sputnik, November 11, 2019i). There were plots about Swedish pupils who were forbidden to wear necklaces with a Christian cross (Sputnik, October 12, 2020y) while Muslim women and girls were allowed to wear the hijab (Sputnik, January 15, 2020a; Sputnik, February 14, 2020c); and there were stories of non-Muslim pupils forced to pray to Allah as part of religious teaching (Sputnik, March 6, 2020e). Among the different actors in the plots, leftist politicians were depicted as especially weak, oversensitive, and indecisive with regard to freedom of expression. They were reported as giving in to special interest claims and adding restrictions according to what was considered politically correct (Sputnik, July 21, 2020n; Sputnik, March 7, 2020f). Despite fancy and lengthy liberal talk by politicians and state authorities, when it came to criticism of the Muslim population and Muslim customs and traditions, freedom of expression appeared no longer valid.

Sputnik showed how Swedish values and principles were being challenged by foreign cultures and traditions, and succumbing to the pressure. The plots showed how an overemphasis on liberal democracy prevented any defense of Swedish culture and values, and like the sub-narratives about the party political disputes, liberal democracy was found to cause destabilization and the disintegration of the state. Credulous state and church authorities gave permission for any kind of organization to register as a religious community as long as it claimed to favor feminism, social justice, and environmental protection, and to support LGBTQ+ rights. Even Satanists were accepted. A background paragraph explained:

However, since the Church of Sweden was separated from the state in 2000, a push for a more equal treatment of other faith communities was initiated. In recent years, a plethora of religious societies have been registered in Sweden, from the Islamic fatwa agency to the Scientologists. (Sputnik, August 2, 2019b)

Liberal leadership was depicted as so keen to defend freedom of speech and freedom of religion that it downplayed the responsibility to maintain order and stability, leading to violence and riots as a consequence. In a television report from the south of Sweden, RT, with a reporter on site, showed how the country had literally been thrown into chaos. Street fights and clashes between protestors and the police had followed online streaming of a Quran-burning in Malmö by anti-Islamism activists from the Danish political party, Hardline. The anchor introduced the piece, “Torched Faith”:

There have been violent scenes in Sweden after unrest was triggered when anti-Islam activists burned a Coran and streamed it online. Police say that more than 300 people outraged at the event took to the streets in protest. However, the situation descended into riots with demonstrators starting fires and clashing with police. (RT, August 29, 2020)

The accompanying pictures showed young men in hoodies fleeing from the police and police cars chasing after them. There were numerous police cars in the street lit up by sirens and streetlights. The police task force, in full riot gear, was on site and blurry pictures from a chaotic scene showed them moving violent protestors by carrying them and placing them in police vans while gunshots were heard in the background. The anchor in the studio said the police had admitted that they had lost control during the violence. He also told how the founder and leader of the Hardline party, Rasmus Paludan, had been banned from entering Sweden, and that three of “the members of the party are being arrested on suspicion of inciting hatred”. There was no criticism of the tardiness of the Swedish authorities in acting against the Coran burning campaign or the Danish activists. Nor were there any reflections made on what Sweden was willing to endure to protect freedom of speech. The violent pictures spoke for themselves, or so it might be assumed. Nor was there any mention of the alleged instigator of the riot, Rasmus Paludan, being banned from Sweden.

The fact that an event such as a Coran burning was allowed despite the risk of ensuing violence was commented on by Kent Ekeroth, a member of the national conservative right-wing Sweden Democrats (SD) party. Ekeroth was ascribed an expert position in the plot. He was depicted as an anti-liberal critic and someone who helped make sense of the violent event. He gave his opinion that what had just been witnessed in Malmö showed how the Swedish state had lost control over immigration and over its territory. Ekeroth made a connection between what he termed Sweden’s “huge demographic problems” with immigrant groups “becoming a bigger part of Swedish society”, and how this incident would familiarize Swedes with the Danish anti-Muslim party. Ekeroth framed the problem as an immigration issue over which the government and the police had no control. His definition of the problem closed the story (RT, August 29, 2020).

Like RT, Sputnik reported on the Coran-burning staged by Paludan and his Swedish colleague Dan Park, but in a series of articles. The plots were the same as the one in RT: the Coran was set on fire and the authorities stood perplexed and indecisive in the face of street violence. Paludan and Park argued that they were exercising their right to free speech, while the police feared continuing riots and an escalation of violence in Muslim communities. Day after day of coverage amplified the image of the powerlessness and passivity of the police. When freedom of expression was challenged by Islam, Swedish society appeared weak and indecisive about how to defend it. Although identified in the plots as radical defenders of freedom of speech, the plots assigned Paludan and Park the roles of known instigators of social unrest and men with criminal records. The coverage made clear the extremes to which Swedish liberal principles had taken the country, and that those defending the principles appeared to be right-wing extremists and former criminals.

One Sputnik article, sourced from the reports of two Swedish far-right news media outlets, Samhällsnytt and Nyheter Idag, told how the police had denied Paludan and Park the right to burn the Quran in the Malmö district of Rosengård (a suburb it defined as “vulnerable” and a “no-go area” with a large Muslim population), since this was seen as a security risk. The police were said to have offered them an alternative site for their protest, which was likely to be seen as a provocation of Muslims and against Islam. In response, Park was quoted as telling Nyheter Idag: “I told the police; you’re bowing to the violence. You are afraid that there will be violence, so you give in. The violent ones get to decide on freedom of expression”. Paludan told Samhällsnytt: “The Swedish police obviously love Muslims and dare not do their duty. A shameful chapter in Sweden’s history, the day when the Swedish state rejected freedom of expression and freedom of assembly” (Sputnik, August 18, 2020r). Such provocative and antagonistic language was often given a voice in Sputnik, which came to associate freedom of speech with depictions of a state imploding from within. In one article, Paludan was quoted as saying that “Sweden is going to hell”; in another he accused the law enforcement agencies of “running Islamists’ errands and functioning as a ‘sharia police’”, thereby alleging that the Swedish police favored the protection of Muslims over freedom of expression (Sputnik, August 31, 2020s). Other articles depicted Paludan as a former lawyer whose activism in the name of religious freedom and freedom of expression had forced him to request constant police protection, costing Danish taxpayers huge sums of money (Sputnik, August 5, 2020q), but also as someone whose zeal in protecting these rights had caused unrest and riots.

Taken together, the news plots about the Coran burning presented a clear message: When the state grants its citizens freedom of expression, chaos breaks out, riots ensue and only people like Park and Paludan dare to stand up for what Sweden claims is a foundational principle of liberal democracy (Sputnik, August 18, 2020r; Sputnik, September 11, 2020t; Sputnik, February 26, 2020d; Sputnik, August 5, 2020q: Sputnik, August 31, 2020s; Sputnik, September 14, 2020u). This was not just depicting a society in chaos, but also evidence of the threat that liberal ideas pose to law and order, and to society’s moral values.

Political Divisions Over Liberal Democratic Values

A second sub-narrative focused on political divisions, including party political disputes over liberal democratic values. While the depictions of a vague and incompetent leftist government played a key role in the plots for demonstrating that Swedish society had been weakened and lacked a firm leadership, little attention was paid to either Left Party or social democratic ideologies. Instead, the left was lumped together with “inadequate liberals”, and like them was said to be contributing to the demise of the Swedish state by ignoring rising crime rates and the problems of mass immigration, and instead focusing all its attention on climate change activism, multiculturalism, feminism, and LGBTQ+ rights.

The political issues on the domestic agenda were off-track and showed that the Swedish authorities did not understand where society was heading or the real problems that needed to be addressed to halt further decline. The length to which Swedish society was about to decline was illustrated by a news story in Sputnik, which reported on a school project where pupils were taught to eat insects to cut waste, using 3D-printed toys (Sputnik, September 23, 2019f). This was said to be part of a solution to the problem of climate change. The agency running the project was depicted in the plot as seemingly oblivious to how extreme their teaching was, talking about the need to “switch from high-carbon beef to low-carbon bugs”. A photograph of the so-called play food, to persuade children to approve the new menu, led the article depicting a close-up of unappealing insects on a skewer with the caption: “grilled maggots for human consumption”. In a playful manner, the project had named the dishes Algae Ball, Bug Mac, and Tasty Waste, but underneath the humorous and ridiculous wording Sputnik made reference to this being the “food of the future”. The source of the item was Veckans Affärer, a well-established, highly credible, prestigious journal. Use of Veckans Affärer added to the message that this was an example of what was being seriously debated in Sweden. At the same time, it provided further proof of the absurdity of political life/space in Sweden.

The story used a number of quotes from the organizers, arguing that the sustainable food they were introducing was “vital for mankind’s survival”, with the word vital in quotation marks. It was therefore logical to get children accustomed to this diet. In this way, the plot balanced between humor, absurdity, and future survival. An image from a Veckans Affärer tweet inside the plot showed colorful toys standing in stark contrast to the photograph of a skewered insect that introduced the article. Thus, what began as an image of an unpleasant, almost repulsive future scenario was somewhat moderated by the emphasis on “sustainable eating”, as it was termed. However, tweets from the public in response to the future of food were less conciliatory. Some seemed not to take the project seriously; others expressed their disgust. One person tweeted: “Feels a little soon. The zombie apocalypse is not here yet”; another tweet predicted that children would “die of starvation and cold. We see a new totalitarian ideology being born, climatism, which will result in the de-industrialization and self-destruction of Western civilization”. Another tweet argued: “No adults can possibly stop it”.

This plot is an example of how Sputnik in particular demonstrated the silliness and absurdity, on top of mere criticism, of how Sweden led by liberal leftist ideas engaged with marginal topics or serious topics in a ridiculous manner while refraining from taking proper action on core political and social problems. Individual plots, as in the case of the above news item, might not be structured as conflicts between opposing parties, even if the responses to the teaching on future foods received strong comments. Instead, by mixing this type of colorful article—pushed to extremes and often centered on problems of climate change, LGBTQI issues, or multiculturalism—with news about the government’s inability to deal with problems of crime or the spread of Covid-19, Sputnik and at times RT made clear how far liberal leftist ideas had led the country astray. Instead of dealing with violence in the suburbs, or the mental health problems of the young people, projects were teaching children that bugs were edible.

Later the same year, and in response to the government preoccupation with what it treated as questions of the liberal left, Sputnik reported that a new communist party was being launched with a stated objective of turning attention back on to the defense of working class interests. The story did not link the new party to the liberal influences on the traditional left, but stated that there was disappointment among the working class that there was no longer a leftist party defending working class interests. Nils Littorin, one of the initiators of the new party, and the narrator of the plot, was quoted:

Pride, for instance, has been reduced to dealing with sexual orientation. We believe that human dignity is primarily about having a job and having pension insurance that means that you are not forced to live on crumbs when you are old. (Sputnik, December 20, 2019p)

According to this plot, as a consequence of the left abandoning the working classes, Sweden had ended up in a situation where far-right and far-left parties were both competing for the same group of people, and they also shared the same critique of the traditional left and the establishment (Sputnik, December 20, 2019p).

The sequence of events as part of the plot made it clear first that a new party was being launched and then that this was due to the left abandoning its policies and the interests of the working class. The plot moved on to describe how the left had created its own problems as well as problems for its traditional voting base. Reference was made to Littorin’s claim, in Sputnik’s words, that the left was “going through a prolonged identity crisis”. Littorin, serving as narrator of the plot, then explained the crisis in greater depth, saying that since the left was now focused on elite issues, such as Greta Thunberg’s climate activism, immigration, and multiculturalism, and was more concerned about justice and equality for migrants than for the workers, this had led members of the working classes to turn to right-wingers, a move criticized by communists, to which Littorin belonged, and this was a reason for the launch of the new communist party. The underlying problem, he argued, was a “chaotic immigration policy”—an explanatory factor that appeared repeatedly in Sputnik and RT coverage of a variety of social problems—with its connections to cultural clashes, segregation, honor culture, and clan mentalities. This choice of terms clearly positioned migrants as the foreign and troublesome “other”. Moreover, questions that preoccupied the left such as LGBT+ issues and the climate movement drew attention away from socio-economic issues. The plot ended with a reaffirmation of the critique of the left in a statement of another regional left-wing leader. Markus Allard was quoted as saying that “socialists don’t belong to the left”. In a stark formulation, he said that the left had abandoned the working classes in favor of “parasitic grant-grabbing layers within the middle class”. The launch of a new communist party was thus given salience by fellow working class representatives and the view that the left had gone astray was reinforced.

The Sputnik and RT coverage also projected how the promotion of liberal values posed internal problems for Swedish liberal and progressive politicians. These stories gave the impression that liberalism could not be taken seriously and attracted only naive groups, and that the liberal ideology was shooting itself in the foot and contributing to the demise of a well-functioning society. Exaggerated individual freedoms were likely to lead to chaos and an ungovernable country where people used their freedom to limit that of their fellow citizens.

The most telling examples of the dysfunction of liberalism were found in stories about the newly elected liberal party leader, Nyamko Sabuni, “a rising political star” who had “shocked many with her views”. She was said to have created a rift in the party by abandoning core liberal values and launching right-wing policies such as tightening regulations on immigration, and social policies, and getting tough on crime. The very fact that she as a liberal had taken these measures confirmed the difficulties surrounding liberalism. In an RT piece, Sabuni was said to have exacerbated problems that already existed in the party. The RT commentator noted: “Sure, she’s been to gay pride parades and has served in the Swedish ministry for gender equality, but when it comes to multiculturalism, she says she wants to [here he uses air quotes] ‘bury it’”. The contradictions between her identity and political opinions were emphasized when the commentator presented her as “black” and “an immigrant”, and as other party members were quoted as saying she was too right wing and too strict on migration for senior members’ approval. This all added up to Sabuni personifying the internal contradictions and impossibility of a functional liberal left.

Sabuni having expressed tougher measures against migrants and turning her back on the traditional social liberal values of the party appeared no longer as a true representative to her party friends, some of which were reported to leave the party as a result (RT, July 1, 2019b). This was substantiated with quotes from party members and electorates expressing dislike against Sabuni for turning away from what they considered liberalism and social liberalism.

The plot about the deep internal troubles of the liberal party, exasperated by its new leader, can be seen as one of several plots that contributed to the sub-narrative about liberal democratic values being at the center of party political disputes, and proponents struggling to survive. The relatively short RT piece on Sabuni made obvious, however, by capitalizing on the personal identity of the new leader, how low the odds were on a viable liberal ideology. Not even a black migrant woman with past engagement in protests against honor violence, female mutilation, and the hijab for young girls was willing to hold on to core liberal values such as multiculturalism and a generous migration policy. Not even the head of the party sympathized with its core tenants (RT, July 1, 2019a).

Negative assertions of the liberal left, which went far beyond the liberal party, were sometimes projected by RT and Sputnik as absurdities or as impossible to take seriously, since leftist proponents tended to possess a distorted conception of reality. It was not uncommon for these news reports to be structured to project anti-establishment views and to show that the authorities (liberal left representatives) were out of touch with reality and with the views of the public. This was illustrated by a story in Sputnik that took its point of departure from a recently published annual report by the Swedish security services (SÄPO), the security police and MUST, the intelligence services (Sputnik, March 27, 2020g). This report stated that in contrast to similar studies from previous years, domestic right-wing extremism and not Islamism posed the main threat to Swedish society; and that the former was “fueled by ‘influence campaigns’ from Russia and China”. The plot, however, revolved as much around what the narrator depicted as the absurd idea that right-wing extremists were being lumped together with anti-feminism, animal rights activism, and climate activism as security threats.

The headline, “Swedish report that lumps anti-feminism, climate activism with ‘right-extremism’ is ridiculed”, was accompanied by a sketch of agitated women with their fists in the air and banners in their hands. The caption read: “8 March, March on/Keep up the fight (upp till kamp), feminism” framing the problem to be understood as a redefinition of the Swedish feminist struggle from emancipation to a security problem on a par with rightist extremism. In combination with the headline’s incredulous slant on the message as something to be laughed at rather than feared, the plot was set in a tone of disbelief, the security services clearly having gone too far in their assessments at the cost of their credibility.

The introductory paragraph of the article indicated that the report had been received with skepticism and it was explicitly said to have “raised many eyebrows”. The story then cut to the threat from Russia and China. Claims were made that the alleged right-wing threats were spurred by these two countries.

… the terrorist threat from violent Islamists is waning across the Western world, as opposed to that from right-wing extremists, fueled by “influence campaigns” from Russia and China. The “extremists” are said to be radicalized by violent propaganda on the Internet and social media. (Sputnik, March 27, 2020g)

Russia was allegedly working to destabilize and polarize Sweden, but these were threats that came from within (Sputnik, March 27, 2020g). Ahn-Za Hagström, senior analyst at SÄPO and assigned the role of expert in the plot, was reported to talk about the broadening of right-wing extremism in which she included nationalism, resistance to LGBTQ+ activism, racism and xenophobia, and criticism of feminism. She was also said to have “lambasted internet free speech as a major problem”, having written, “I cannot stress enough the importance of the Internet for violent extremism”.

The phrasing by Hagström made it seem as if SÄPO found free speech a problem. It was a statement that received no further comment, but to which was added that extremist propaganda was facilitated by the use of the digitalization, which SÄPO exemplified using messages such as “the country we once knew is gone” and “politicians have lost their grip”—seemingly harmless conservative views that are far from what could be called radical or extreme.

Overall, the Swedish SÄPO report was, according to Sputnik, regarded as untrustworthy and even somewhat absurd, as it claimed that Islamism was not as serious a threat as right-wing extremism, that the internet was to blame for violent extremism and that phrases published on internet forums, such as: “the country we once knew is gone”, would be considered extremist propaganda.

It was a general tendency for RT and Sputnik to represent phrases or wording in favor of democratic liberal values, as stated by actors or narrators, as weak, absurd, or stupid. At times, assigning such epithets to liberal spokespeople was used to reaffirm the hypocrisy of elites, at other times it served to demonstrate that these values were not only useless, but also destructive to society. Hagström’s quote could thus be seen as revealing the security services’ anti-liberal stance, but it could also be interpreted as providing confirmation of the ways in which liberal values weakened a society from within.

Having therefore established that the security services saw threats and security risks from sections of Swedish society that had previously tended to be characterized as Sweden’s strength, the narrator continued to list the external threats that the report had identified, which emanated from Russia and China. The allegations against Russia were strongly refuted and the accusation that Russia was involved in intelligence activities against Sweden in order to stir polarization was presented as preposterous.

It was similarly noted that climate activism was also seen as a security threat—an issue where Sweden often presented itself as a frontrunner—and quotes from the tweets of ordinary citizens expressed both surprise and disbelief at this statement. One tweet alongside a photograph of Greta Thunberg asked: “So climate issues are now violent extremism?”; another said: “SÄPO, now a proud member of the activist government left”. Taken together, SÄPO and MUST were depicted as representing a liberalist establishment so keen on defending leftist liberal values of feminism, climate activism, and animal rights that they ended up drawing conservative rather than liberal conclusions and seemed not to notice. Sweden must be protected from foreign and domestic antagonistic forces, and this led to a skewed perception of reality and an exaggerated and perhaps even distorted view of security threats. In this way Sputnik once again highlighted the absurdities in the establishment’s defense of liberal values (Sputnik, March 27, 2020g; See also Sputnik, April 8, 2020h).

A vulnerable domestic Swedish security situation, at the heart of which lay liberalism, was depicted in a variety of emotionally charged ways from drastic and radical formulations about the threat—Russia was claimed to have extremist groups active in Sweden—to laughable and ironic depictions of the analysis and conclusions of the security services: that internet free speech and climate activism were key problems, and that Sweden was an unsafe place. In contrast to the heightened threat image, lame and weak evidence were presented that could not be seen as convincingly underpinning the threat scenarios and implicitly cast doubt on the credibility and competence of the security services. (Seemingly mild messages interpreted as threatening, social media publishing conservative views and Greta being the primary threat.) The allegations that Russia had supported right-wing Swedish radicals were interpreted accordingly. Taken together, the plot concluded that liberal values caused serious security problems that the Swedish security services were far from capable of containing, especially as they seemed to see threats where none existed and neglected to look for them where they were most likely.

Two weeks later, the SÄPO report once again featured in a news article about its controversial threat assessments, repeating that internet free speech was a Swedish security threat along with “resistance to LGBT activism”, while jihadism was now less of a threat. Sputnik did not formulate its critical stance in the form of arguments, but in a fact and figures paragraph:

At the same time, Sweden remains one of Europe’s leaders in terms of jihadists per capita, having provided about 300 ‘Daesh travelers’, as they are sometimes referred to in official parlance. About half of them have returned “home”, almost none faced prosecution for crimes committed in the Middle East. Several, however, were later convicted of crimes committed on return to Sweden. (Sputnik, April 8, 2020h)

Making implicit connections between narratives to create meaning—the Swedish approach to Islam with the defense of liberal values—was a storytelling technique that Sputnik and at times RT tended to make use of. A lax attitude by the Swedish security services to jihadists returning “home” from the Middle East was set against the scare of internet free speech, or so one might understand from the juxtaposition of these two views. Both reaffirmed an image of Sweden as letting its uncompromising defense of liberal leftist values and its ensuing reluctance to acknowledge Islamic security threats take priority over proper national defense.

The Swedish Church: A Troublesome Libertarian with a Diminishing Congregation

To the group of liberal and leftist-liberal institutions posing threats to traditional Swedish values and contributing to the demise of the nation was added the Swedish church, which had formerly been affiliated to the state but independent since 2000. Its left leaning liberalism was reported as causing conflicts with the Christian conservative right, which feared that the Swedish values and traditions that the Swedish church had represented, maintained, and defended were about to be abandoned.

The Church of Sweden was said to be no longer defending national Christian traditions, or caring for landmarks of national heritage such as old churches in the countryside or Christian artifacts and symbols. Instead, it had transformed into a progressive public actor engaged in Greta Thunberg’s climate movement and in defense of mass immigration, multiculturalism, and LGBTQ+ rights, while its membership was in rapid decline—a fact mentioned repeatedly in the news. Many smaller congregations, especially in the countryside, experienced severe financial troubles and some had been forced to close church buildings, which were often also sites of cultural heritage (Sputnik, December 25, 2019q). Inefficient state subsidies had aggravated the situation, as had the church’s separation from the state in 2000.

The sub-narrative about the Swedish church as a libertarian was linked to theological disputes only to a limited extent and members leaving the church were rarely depicted as a problem of a growing secularism. The problems surrounding the Church of Sweden were instead mainly connected to its diminishing role as a national actor on tradition and morals. Markus Dahlberg, responsible for cultural heritage within the Church of Sweden, was quoted commenting on what a loss the closure of a church entailed: “Many associate churches with their family history, and remember ‘this is where grandma and grandpa got married’, or ‘this is where mom is buried’. It may also be that the building carries much of the countryside’s history”.

The problems faced by the Church of Sweden and implicitly its inability to resolve them was thus a serious threat to the national heritage, church history, and local historical memories, but the plot also connected the problem to the disruption of families’ connections to local and provincial locations. In this plot, as in others, the Church of Sweden seemed no longer prepared to defend Swedish cultural and historical heritage, and to ignore the connections families felt with provincial churches and religious sites. The plot’s temporality stressed the significance of the connections between past and present, and the role of the Church in the continuity of people’s family histories.

The plot ended with a paragraph that provided context on the problem, adding to its meaning, and repeated themes and phrases that were continuously used in articles about the Church of Sweden:

The Church of Sweden is known for its liberal position on issues such as homosexuality, mass immigration, and climate change and is often blamed for its perceived “activist” position. Archbishop Antje Jackelén has sparked controversy by attacking the “Patriarchy” and “destructive masculinity”, most recently in her Christmas message. In contrast, Bishop Eva Brunne stirred outrage by claiming she had more in common with Muslims than the so-called Christian right. (Sputnik, December 25, 2019q)

Against the centrality of the plot focused on historical continuity and tradition, the Church of Sweden appeared no longer willing to pay attention to national customs and Swedish national heritage, but was depicted as an institution engaged in liberal ideas to the point where going against the right became more important than representing Christianity. These liberal ideals were said to have caused division within the Church over how far its activism should be allowed to go.

Added to this anti-traditionalism, articles depicted the church as de-emphasizing and diluting Christian theology and becoming increasingly eclectic. The broadening of the theological perspective was treated by Sputnik as a kind of hyper ecumenical approach where collaboration with mosques was given higher priority than uniting the Christian community (See e.g. Sputnik, December 11, 2019n; Sputnik, December 25, 2019q; Sputnik, September 28, 2020w; Sputnik, November 4, 2020ab). The ambivalence of the Church of Sweden to continue to be the carrier of a traditional Swedish legacy was also reported in stories questioning Christian symbols and traditions because of their exclusive effects. Representatives of the church argued that Christian customs and traditions might be perceived as offensive to non-Christians, and some argued that they might best be removed and replaced with more inclusive, secular customs and habits (Sputnik, December 11, 2019n; Sputnik, July 15, 2020m).

Despite its progressive stance, the church was presented as an insecure liberal activist that appeared indecisive on how to project its new image. This was demonstrated in stories about a new altar piece, named “Paradise”, which depicted gay couples and transsexuals. The altar piece was inaugurated in St Paul’s Church in Malmö on first of advent but taken down just one week later. The criticism of the piece, which was initially praised by both the media and church officials, was that the serpent in the painting was depicted as a trans person (Sputnik, December 2b, 2019l; Sputnik, December 12, 2019o). The representation of evil in connection with trans people was not the message the church wanted to deliver, however unintended, and the altar piece was promptly removed.

The standard Sputnik ”facts and figures” background paragraph that closed the articles centered, in the case of the sub-narrative about the Church of Sweden, on the church having joined the liberal movement and seemingly lost members because of it—a causal relationship hinted at but never explicitly argued. This was, in some articles, complemented by a reminder of the fast-growing Muslim community. With few variations, the standard final paragraph about the Church of Sweden read as:

The Church of Sweden maintains a rather liberal position on a plethora of issues, such as homosexuality, mass immigration, and climate change. At over 5 million members, it remains Sweden’s largest religious organization and Europe’s largest Lutheran denomination, despite a rapid decline in worshippers (at a pace of about 2 percent annually). The Church of Sweden went from 95 percent of the Swedish population to barely 57 percent within a matter of decades. (Sputnik, December 2b, 2019l)

Just as it does the liberal left government, mainstream media and public service, Sputnik defines the Church of Sweden as part of the establishment and positions it in opposition to ordinary citizens with regard to its values, roles, and functions. When the reports on various events are added together, it gives the impression that citizens disagree with the activism of the Church, such as its support for feminism and LGBTQ+ rights, the closure of provincial churches, and collaboration with Muslim congregations (Sputnik, October 28, 2020z; Sputnik, May 7, 2020j; Sputnik, April 13, 2020i; Sputnik, December 11, 2019n; Sputnik, January 28, 2020b). It is especially notable that the growing number of Muslims was compared with the drop in the membership of the Christian church, but that trend was apparently being ignored by the Church of Sweden or only passively noted (see Chap. 8 on the narrative “Islamic takeover”). Instead, it was foreign actors who were warning against increased Islamist influence and even possible Islamist rule in a future Sweden (Sputnik, December 2a, 2019k; Sputnik, August 18, 2020r; Sputnik, July 3, 2020l).

The Swedish Media Is Left-wing and Supports the State and Establishment

A strong theme in the Sputnik and RT narrative on the liberal left was the threat it posed to the notion of, and assets connected with, traditional Sweden. There were repeated revelations of underlying mistrust between groups of citizens, and between citizens and public institutions, where the former often appeared representative of the old ways and the latter pushing forward with left-wing radical ideas not supported by the public. The division and mistrust between state media—Swedish television (SVT) and Swedish Radio (SR)—and the citizens were particularly stressed. The conflict was set in an anti-establishment context that projected the hypocrisy of the establishment. Here were powerholders acting in their own interests contrary to their protestations of serving the public and failing to protect core liberal democratic values such as freedom of expression. What appeared to be a liberal left working in the name of the citizens was in fact a government with a double agenda supported by the state media. Sweden was not what it seemed. Public service broadcasting was depicted as a broadcaster more in the service of the establishment than in the service of the public. Moreover, the complexity of problems associated with the liberal leftist insistence on widespread freedom of expression was being further emphasized by the links between the Swedish public broadcasters and the leftist government. In contrast, Sputnik and RT presented themselves as truth-tellers, showing society as it was and offering platforms where the public’s voices could be heard. This approach was well in line with the journalistic role conceptions of Sputnik and RT.

News pieces told how SVT sided with the (left-leaning) establishment on the normalization of Muslim traditions (Sputnik, October 11, 2019h), on feminist standpoints, and on what came to be defined as politically correct with reference to discriminatory terminology (Sputnik, July 21, 2020n), as well as on issues of provocative modern art (Sputnik, September 17, 2019d) and sustainable eating (Sputnik, December 4, 2019m)—all of which were in opposition to the SVT audience’s views and preferences. Just as the government was out of touch with its electorate, SVT was shown to be at odds with the public. The views of the audience, most often represented in the plots by ordinary citizens but sometimes politicians, were presented through individual tweets and Instagram posts, and expressed right-wing or conservative opinions in opposition to the authorities, the government, and the media. The public thus represented were said to be “slamming it”, by rebelling, scoffing, and responding with irony.

A Norwegian survey referred to in numerous Sputnik articles found that an overwhelming majority of Swedish journalists (70 %) sympathized with left-wing parties (see e.g. Sputnik, October 7, 2019g). This led Sputnik to conclude that journalists “do not harmonize with the political viewpoints of the general public”. The overrepresentation of left-wing journalists, it was reported, gave rise to trust issues between the Swedish press and right-wing (or a majority of) voters (Sputnik, July 28, 2020o). Twitter comments by right-wing and liberal-conservative politicians were brought to the fore to show support for the argument:

As might have been expected. The fact that the phenomenon is not seen by people on the left is, of course, because they themselves do not suffer from constant angling and bias…. Perhaps not so strange that we on the right prefer to have direct unfiltered contact with our voters via social media instead. (Sputnik, July 28, 2020o)

In an environment where the identitarian left takes over the newsrooms, isn’t it natural that words like Indians, cowboys and Eskimos are getting banned from the broadcasts? (Sputnik, July 28, 2020o)

The latter comment referred to a program broadcast a week before, and reported in Sputnik under the headline: “Swedish radio sparks uproar by banning ‘racist words’ like ‘Red Indian’ and ‘Eskimo’” (Sputnik, July 21, 2020n). The story gave a brief account of how SR had acted to prevent and combat racism, discrimination, and xenophobia in their programming. The decision to ban the words “Eskimo” and “Red Indian” was said to have been influenced by the ice cream maker Triumfglass, which had recently announced that it was changing the name of one of its products from Sitting Bull. The plot gave only brief attention to the reason of the SR decision, and instead emphasized the numerous comments from the SR audience. Among them was Katerina Janouche, a well-known author and journalist in Sweden who appeared in several of Sputnik articles during the time period: “So you have been away from social media for a few hours and when you come back ‘Eskimo’ and ‘Red Indian’ are both ‘racist words’. You can’t make this s**t up. What’s next? Jew? Swedish? Russian?” Another person wrote:

Speak of public service idiocy, Indians and Eskimos are both proud peoples. Now the state media wants to marginalize and bundle them together under the collective name Inuit. What clumsy inventions will come next? (Sputnik, July 21, 2020n)

These and similar social media comments emphasized the extent to which the general public found sound judgement lacking in state-funded media and that SR had lost all rhyme and reason in its attempt to be politically correct. It sought to demonstrate that public service media failed to reflect the public interest, stirred conflict, and was defined by its audience as part of the establishment.

In yet another Sputnik story, public service broadcasting featured as similarly out of touch with the public it was intended to serve. In a story headlined “Swedish National Broadcaster in a Pickle Over ‘Propaganda Offensive Against ‘Fake News’”, SVT was reported to have launched a campaign to promote its own type of journalism, what in quotation marks was named “factual journalism” as if Sputnik wanted to distinguish itself from the channel and its ethics (Sputnik, October 7, 2019g; see also Chap. 10 on storytelling techniques, where the use of quotation marks is further discussed). The campaign film Hen of a Feather aimed to counter disinformation (or fake news as it was termed in the report) and to defend proper journalism, but it “sparked criticism on social media” in particular on Flashback, referred to as “Sweden’s most popular forum”. This plot was typical of a Sputnik story and took its point of departure from the problem that had arisen as a result of a failed disinformation campaign meant to make audiences aware of harmful information influencing activities, but which had been perceived instead as state leftist propaganda.

The plot elaborated on the causes behind the failure and a point was made about disinformation having been connected to right-wing conservative presidents Putin and Trump.

A lavish advertising campaign by tax-funded national broadcaster SVT that highlights the importance of “factual journalism” in combating “fake news” and features images of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his US counterpart Donald Trump has landed the broadcaster in hot water. (Sputnik, October 7, 2019g)

It then transitioned over to the audience side of things through use of an emphasized “however” that marked the irreconcilable differences of opinion between the actors. The audience was given voice before the end paragraph provided the context for the hostility between the state media and the public.

The criticized film featured a story about President Putin ordering a disinformation campaign against Sweden. Once published, it gave rise to several tweets. More significantly, it was also depicted as inspiring President Trump to launch his smear campaign against Sweden. The Sputnik story thus alluded to the 2017 Trump campaign that became known as “Last night in Sweden”, in which he had given a biased view of the domestic situation in the country at that time.

The Sputnik report on the SVT film centered on the criticism from Swedish viewers. The initiative was scornfully described as a ridiculous “propaganda offensive” and people were quoted urging SVT to shut it down. For its part, SVT defended the campaign. Its CEO, Hanna Stjärne, stated in a press release that: “With the first film ‘Hen of a Feather’ we want to stand up for all the good journalism in Sweden, whether it is done by public service broadcasters or private sector actors, at a time when journalism is needed most”.

SVT marketing manager, Christer Mellstrand, interviewed in the Swedish journalists’ newspaper Resumé refuted the allegation that SVT had adopted a political stance when it depicted a Russian official giving orders to a troll-factory in the fictive campaign film. In response to Mellstrand’s quote, the narrator of the Sputnik plot wrote in an ironic tone of voice that the marketing manager perhaps did not see how the episode might be seen as a political statement: “Portraying a Russian official giving orders to a so-called troll factory is ‘not in any way’ taking a political stance, he stressed” (Sputnik, October 7, 2019g). The Sputnik reporter went on to quote Mellstrand, who stressed: “It is important that we proactively explain why SVT exists….Sweden’s image is under attack”. These statements were followed by a few netizen quotes that expressed mistrust of the public broadcaster. One netizen tweeted: “Hi SVT, is this movie for real or are you kidding with yourselves?” A user on YouTube wrote: “Pure propaganda, you should be shut down right now”.

In typical Sputnik fashion, the plot was concluded with a facts and figures background paragraph, in this case about SVT. The background paragraphs generally in the Sputnik coverage tended to have a great influence over the message of the plots (see also Chaps. 7 and 9). Often without any explicit transition, the end paragraph provides an interpretative framework for what had just been read and positions the problem of the plot in a specific context with the help of facts and figures. In this case, it informed how SVT is modelled after the BBC, is funded by taxes and that over 50% of staff support the left-wing Green Party, which received only 4% of the votes in the 2018 general election. This summing up of the story therefore used facts to further underline the biased, left-wing slant of SVT and added to the series of plots that showed the extent to which the corporation was out tune with its audience (see e.g. Sputnik, February 14, 2020c).

Conclusions

The narrative that the liberal left is a threat to traditional Sweden came to expression first and foremost in projections of democratic liberal values giving rise to domestic polarization between citizens and powerholders, a dissolution of respect for law and order and progressive attitudes that give freedoms to individuals that got far beyond government control. Taken together, it was the attitudes of and activities in line with the liberal left that explained the erosion of the Swedish state, according to Sputnik and RT. The government and key public institutions, such as public service media and the Church of Sweden, were particularly targeted.

The threat that the liberal left posed to traditional Sweden was often through its passivity and ignorance, rather than forceful and determined measures; and when measures were taken, they appeared misdirected. Their roles appeared obscure and their decision making indecisive or reactive, rather than active, but regardless of whether they took measures, they were constantly at odds with their citizens. The police stood passively by as rioters burned cars in the name of freedom of speech, public service media decided against the use of “eskimoe” as a denigrating term, to the incomprehension of its audience, the secret services warned about the risks of the internet but downplayed Islamic fundamentalism; the Swedish Church saw its membership fall and traditional church buildings close, but turned their focus to LGBTQ-rights and engaged in climate activism (see e.g. Sputnik, February 26, 2020d; Sputnik, September 19, 2019e; Sputnik, July 25, 2019a).

The response of ordinary people to the anti-liberal and hypocritical revelations took the shape of screen shots of ordinary people’s tweets or Instagram posts (with images) integrated into the plots. These were made to represent the public at large, which confirmed that the political leaders and other decision makers were not trusted and that there was a conflict between them and the Swedish people, the latter arguing that political correctness had gone too far. The establishment was criticized for trying to limit freedom of speech, and this critique appeared in several news items connected to the role of mainstream media, and in particular public service media (see below), which was seen as severely problematic (Sputnik, November 3, 2020aa; Sputnik, September 15, 2020v), and literature (Sputnik, November 30, 2019j; Sputnik, July 2, 2020k, July 29, 2020p).

Issues of freedom of speech and freedom of religion caused particularly strong controversies in these sub-narratives because they were approached by RT and Sputnik as incompatible. In most cases, freedom of speech drew the shortest end of the stick. There were few establishment actors in the plots that were depicted as daring to infringe the right of Muslims to practice their customs and traditions. This strengthened the expressed view that Sweden was not what it appeared to be; that the left liberal leadership and public authorities claimed to defend freedom of speech but were unwilling and unable to do so. The impression was that the liberties so strongly promoted by Sweden were mere talk, implemented only when it served those in power and did not risk stirring antagonisms between groups in society. Yet, the liberal discourse about freedom of speech and freedom of religion gave powerholders and decision makers plenty of problems, leading to protests, chaos, and even street violence. The narrative demonstrated how the liberal leadership naively thought their various interventions promoted and defended democracy and social integration, but repeatedly ended up exposed for doing something unethical, tasteless, or idiotic—all of which, RT and Sputnik argued, further fueled divisions in society.