Tunisia

Abstract

The chapter highlights that Tunisia leveraged its well-trained medical staff and specialized health institutions at the National level, which were mobilized immediately to manage the crisis. The speed of the response and the significant restrictions that were introduced allowed the country to dodge the first wave of COVID-19. However, the continuity of services and their quality proved to be a constraint, particularly in the context of the specific needs associated with the health crisis. The health crisis also weakened the social protection programmes and worker protection focus that was in existence. At the same time, the reallocation of government budgets and international donor investment projects allowed for the acceleration of the allocation of resources to vulnerable groups. However, despite the urgency, administrative procedures delayed the release of international funds. The multiple constraints in reaching vulnerable groups form a structural problem that should be overcome by strengthening social protection institutions.

Introduction

Tunisia, like every other country in the world, was hard hit by Covid-19 and suffered social and economic consequences (Hasell, 2020). Indeed, the crisis began in a situation of relative instability in which the development model was losing momentum and in which there were also distinct inequalities in labour markets relating to location, sex, and differences in levels of education (Assaad et al., 2018; World Bank, 2015). The existence and the post-revolutionary extension of social protection in the form of cash transfers (PNAFN) and free access to health care (AMGII) for the poorest made it possible to mitigate the social consequences of sluggish growth for families most in need (CRES, 2017; Krafft et al., 2020).

Tunisia went into this crisis with few financial resources and against a background of government instability since 2019. Nevertheless, it had the advantage of well-trained medical staff (many of whom have been emigrating to Europe for a decade) and health institutions, such as the National Observatory for New and Emerging Diseases (ONMNE) or the Pasteur Institute that were mobilized immediately to manage the crisis. Psychological support units were also established quickly by civil society.¹

To contain the spread of the pandemic and mitigate its likely impacts, the Tunisian authorities opted for a proactive strategy that emphasized protecting lives and supporting vulnerable families and people in precarious employment (Krafft et al., 2021). The government adopted a battery of staged preventive measures, with a total lockdown preceding a phase of gradual relaxation. The action taken by the authorities also focused on introducing a set of measures to support affected businesses and people, in addition to the additional spending on managing the pandemic's effect on health. The budgetary cost of these interventions exceeded 7.2%² of G.D.P. in 2020.

This unprecedented crisis and the total lockdown have had severe effects on the economic and social fabrics (I.N.S., 2020; Krafft et al., 2021) due to the specific features of the economic structure prior to the crisis, viz. a high level of openness and structural fragilities (World Bank, 2015). Sectors vulnerable to the crisis, such as tourism, employ large numbers of people, with implications for the economic activities in the sectors (Marouani & Minh, 2020); Krafft et al., 2021). Socially, low-income households and those who lost their jobs were particularly hard hit. Despite the large-scale government intervention, the crisis accentuated social inequalities (I.N.S., 2020; Krafft et al., 2021; I.N.S./World Bank, 2020).

In this chapter, we combined an objective analysis of all the data sources available to date with the assessment including interviews with stakeholders. First, we examined the impact of the pandemic on various socioeconomic groups. We also showed that the households’ pre-Covid-19 situation conditioned how this shock affected them. Second, the interviews highlighted the contribution of non-State actors and the limits they faced while trying to support the vulnerable.

The Pandemic and Crises

The focus here is on managing the first wave of the pandemic, although we also analysed restrictions and impacts during the second wave. The management of the second wave was radically different, as in many countries of the world, due to economic constraints and social considerations. The analyses will be backed up by interviews with governmental and non-governmental actors.³

The first case of Covid-19 in Tunisia was recorded on 2 March 2020. At the Scientific Committee's recommendation, the Tunisian authorities adopted staged preventive measures (e.g.: installation of thermal cameras in airports, cancellation of congresses and cultural events, prohibition of gatherings, curfews, etc.). A total lockdown was decreed from 20 March to 4 May 2020 before the country entered a phase of gradual relaxation between 5 May and 14 June of the same year.⁴

In addition, strict health protocols were put in place for people entering the country, including a mandatory quarantine in hotels. This seems to have been the most effective measure of stopping infections from outside the country. At the same time, a screening strategy was put in place to identify clusters and to help establish a clear picture of the spread of the pandemic. The measure made it possible to contain the pandemic reasonably during the first wave. However, these measures proved inadequate and relatively ineffective in managing the second wave. Indeed, infections rose to 220,000 and deaths to more than 7000 in early February 2021, as opposed to 4679 cases and 96 deaths in early August 2020.

The economic cost of the measures implemented to parry the impact of the pandemic and the lockdown was relatively high for the Tunisian economy, which was faced with a dual crisis of an unprecedented supply crisis due to production shut down and a demand crisis due to the fall in individual consumption caused by lower household demand and a breakdown in investment due to global uncertainty.

The impact of the pandemic was first felt in sectors focusing on the external market and then, in a second round and after the lockdown, in sectors focusing on the internal market. Remote working as an appropriate way of safeguarding the continuity of business operations affected only one in ten workers and one in three for the richest quintile.⁵

The Covid-19 crisis also accentuated social inequalities and highlighted the problems of inclusiveness in the Tunisian economy and society. Before the pandemic, the resources allocated to the poorest households were relatively low compared to the actual needs of this population. In the context of a sanitary emergency, the needs in terms of liquidities, goods, and services increased while the resources available to manage the crisis were even scarcer compared to the pre-pandemic situation. Moreover, informal workers who had access to fewer benefits before Covid-19 suffered a double burden with dwindling employment opportunities and social protection (except those benefiting from PNAFN cash transfers).

Measures to Mitigate Covid-19 Impacts

In addition to the health, economic, and social issues, this crisis required the implementation of article 70 of the Constitution, which empowers the head of the government to issue decrees to address the consequences of Covid-19. This is an exceptional extension of regulatory power in the legislative domain. The laws support businesses and preserve jobs and relate primarily to the temporary suspension of specific provisions of the Labour Code. They were also in relation to the execution of employment contracts following an enforcement order (hours lost because of a collective work stoppage, etc.) and support for companies and employees affected by the total lockdown and exceptional measures (Fig. 13.1).

Fig. 13.1

Source Compilation by authors

Government policies and measures to mitigate the impact of the crisis ()

The efficient management of the first wave in Tunisia originated from the government's prompt and strict responsibility to manage the first cases of Covid-19 within the territory. However, the economic crisis was at the core of the government’s preoccupations and social policy as restrictions eased at summertime (27 June). Two months later, the second wave started to hit the country, leading to stricter restrictions (4 October). The case count was about 200 cases per day at the beginning of September, while in mid-October, the country was witnessing 3000 cases per day (first peak).

Access to health services was almost exclusively limited to cases of Covid-19 and very urgent cases. The Ministry of Health prepared a strategic reserve of medicines (amounting to 150 million dinars) at the Central Pharmacy and guaranteed minimum staffing of public establishments by medical professionals. Schools were also shut down as a Covid-19 prevention measure.

Approximately 332 million dinars were allocated to vulnerable groups⁶. The allocation was to be used to help the poor and groups with specific needs during the total lockdown. This consisted of support for the families in need programme in the form of direct aid to be paid to the vulnerable groups directly affected by the crisis. The Ministry of Social Affairs managed this support. Direct cash transfers were granted to:

• (i) 260,000 families in need (50 dinars in addition to the initial monthly aid of 180 dinars);

• (ii) 464,000 families with limited incomes (200 dinars per family);

• (iii) 382 families caring for children without support (200 dinars per family), 121 families caring for the elderly (200 dinars per family), 286 families caring for persons with special needs (200 dinars per family), 120 foreign families and students (200 dinars per family).

An exceptional welfare payment of 100 dinars was made to 140,000 retired persons receiving a pension of less than 180 dinars (a total of 60 million dinars).

Electricity and water subsidies were also introduced for a short term. In addition, the government postponed the introduction of measures to rationalize the subsidies for essential commodities and raised the volume of grain subsidies by 616 million dinars to cover additional food needs. At the same time, exemptions and financial support were granted, such as the deferral of repayments of bank loans for 6 months for employees with a salary of less than 1000 dinars a month and three months for employees with a salary of more than 1000 dinars.

In parallel with the cut in the central bank’s key interest rate by 100 pbs, the authorities introduced a package of measures⁷ to shore up companies affected by the crisis and cushion the harmful effects of the lockdown. The package announced by the government amounted to 2500 million dinars (see Box 13.1 in the Annex).

Special assistance in the form of a bonus of 200 dinars per employee was paid to 12,250 companies (which were identified in the “Help Enterprise” procedure⁸ launched by the Ministry of Social Affairs) employing about 247 thousand workers who were laid off temporarily. The payment of the remainder of the remuneration remains the responsibility of the employer.⁹

In addition, approximately 34,000 self-employed workers affected by the lockdown measures and registered on the Batinda platform received a provisional exceptional allowance of 200 dinars. The global package was 100 million dinars. These allowances were charged to the budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs.

At the same time, the government provided financial support packages to businesses amounting to 1700 million dinars in total, consisting of bank guarantees and investment funds (see Box 13.1). Other financial support has been granted to the business. It includes the deferral of repayments on bank loans for six months for companies affected by the crisis. A deduction of one working day for 2020 accruing to the State budget¹⁰ was decreed by the government. This contribution was deducted for the month of April 2020 and paid to the Treasury based on the same terms and time limits as those applicable to the deduction of tax at source.

At the same time, the government took austerity measures to address the impact of Covid-19. These include freezing civil service recruitment, except for priority specialization of an urgent nature, and the rationalization of the performance bonus awarded to employees so that it did not exceed an average of 80%. In addition, promotions for 2020 were to come into effect only in 2021 and those for 2021 were postponed to 2022, and the packages of bonuses and overtime will be reduced by 50% for all departments except for Defence, the Interior, Health, and the Presidency of the Republic. Although these measures helped to control the spread of the pandemic, they were inadequate to compensate for the effects of the lockdown, particularly on working-class people and inland regions.

Impact and Perception of Pandemic Support and Mitigation Strategies

Surveys were conducted by various institutions since the lockdown phase (I.N.S./World Bank, IACE, ERF, ANRS etc.).¹¹ They made it possible to compensate for the lack of regular surveys of household living condition in Tunisia.¹² These surveys made it possible to conduct a regular evaluation of the effects of the pandemic and the views of the various actors and beneficiaries of the measures adopted.

First, the I.N.S. collaborated with the World Bank on a telephone survey of a panel of 1339 households to study and monitor the impact of Covid-19 on the daily lives of Tunisians. Five rounds were completed successfully between late April and early October. Second, The Arab Institute of Business Managers (IACE) conducted two surveys, one in April (with 600 businesses) and a second one in December 2020 (950 businesses with 10 employees or more, 200 businesses in creation and 1000 individuals of 18–35 years old) to assess the socioeconomic consequences of Covid-19 on employment. Third, the Economic Research Forum, with the support of the I.L.O., conducted four waves of household (2000) and firms surveys (500), starting in October 2020 (Covid-19 MENA Monitor)¹³. The CORES project survey¹⁴ was conducted in July/August 2020 to assess the economic consequences of the lockdown on 1200 SMEs in April/May 2020. All the surveys employed the C.A.T.I method, except the ANRS survey where face-to-face interviews were conducted with the enterprises.

To complement the analysis of the available data delivered by the above surveys, we conducted semi-directive interviews with the above-mentioned set of governmental and non-governmental organizations based on a questionnaire adapted to the needs of this report.

The results of these surveys were backed up by interviews with numerous institutions about the views of government actors, civil society, and international cooperation agencies relating to the management of, and responses to Covid-19. The main findings show that 44.1% of these institutions maintained their activities at a distance and that 29.4% have cut back on their activities. In addition, 50% of the associations continued their activities with a total workforce.

The Economic and Budgetary Impact of the Crisis

The negative growth rate expected in 2020 (-7% according to the I.M.F.) can be primarily explained by the direct and indirect repercussions of the pandemic but also by the structural problems, which were accentuated by the crisis in some economic sectors.

The results of the econometric analysis¹⁵ (conducted based on the difference between the growth forecasts made in February 2020 and the growth update in October¹⁶) to distinguish between the impact of Covid-19 and the structural impact shows that the effect of the pandemic exceeded 70% in 2020 (Table 13.1).

Table 13.1 Structural impacts of Covid-19 on economy

Impact on the State Budget

The urgency that characterized the government's response to this unprecedented crisis, particularly in the first wave, led to exceptional interventions and spending in three areas: safeguarding the continuity of public services, the procurement of essential materials and equipment, and support for groups in difficulty. Against a backdrop of falling tax revenues and little budgetary room for manoeuvre, decisions must be made, particularly in prioritizing crisis management spending and social transfers.

The measures announced by the government, which were not budgeted for, and the reallocation of some spending to the health sector, had an impact on public finances and required the adoption of the complementary Finance Act for 2020. The sharp decline in economic activity combined with the fall in private consumption had a substantial impact on tax revenues (direct and indirect). The shortfall in the State's revenue was estimated to have been nearly 5600 million dinars,¹⁷ in 2020, the equivalent of 5.1% of G.D.P. At the same time, state expenditure increased because of additional interventions in response to the crisis (social transfers, support for affected businesses, procurement of medical equipment, strategic stockpiling of medicines at the central pharmacy, etc.). The total budgetary cost of the pandemic in 2020 was approximately 7.2% of G.D.P., requiring more significant levels of additional financing.

Impact on Household Living Standards

The crisis has highlighted the absence of detailed statistics for regularly monitoring household living conditions. Many households have seen their living conditions deteriorate because of the lockdown. The various post-lockdown surveys found a relative improvement in the situation with the gradual lifting of restrictions prior to October when the socioeconomic situation began to deteriorate again.

Indeed, in the survey conducted by the I.N.S. of household living conditions during the first wave, 60% said they had been affected in one way or another by the pandemic. This number fell to 38% during the second wave. During June, 40.8% of households experienced a deterioration in their standard of living, with 10.2% being more seriously affected.¹⁸ Of the poorest 20% of households, 58% suffered a deterioration in their living conditions. The suspension of work was one of the main factors where 57% of respondents reported being laid off before the lockdown. This number was 41% in the second round, and 5% for October. After the termination of the lockdown, 5.9% of workers lost their jobs, and 29,000 unemployed people did not return to work, even when their employers resumed their activities.¹⁹ Sixty per cent of the respondents could not obtain their salary. This number rose to 80% in the poorest groups (see Fig. 13.2).

Fig. 13.2

Source I.N.S. 4th round of the household living standards survey

Spread in retention of salary in Tunisia

The inter-quintile difference is a persisted where according to the results of the fourth round, 70% of households in the first quintile were able to obtain their salary, and 17% of them were unable to do so. The figures were 92% and 4% respectively in the richest quintile. During October, the vast majority were able, ultimately, to obtain their salaries in full.

It is interesting to note, however, that the sectors developed differently from one period to the next. For example, industry and agriculture were most affected in the first round. After that, many service sector workers were most likely to be unpaid (73% as opposed to approximately one-third for both agriculture and industry). This is because industry and agriculture were no longer subjected to the restrictions imposed on the service sector.

This deterioration was mainly seen in the incapacity to pay fixed charges, as 28% of the households surveyed were unable to do so. However, this improved since this proportion was previously more than half in the two quintiles (40%) with the poorest respondents. Therefore, these results show that the distribution of financial aid to families in need or households that lost some or all their income during the suspension of economic activity was not adequate to cover the needs of those households (Fig. 13.3).

Fig. 13.3

Rate of failure to pay fixed charges by type (Source I.N.S. Survey—fourth round of the household living standards survey)

The survey results show that the poorest people found it more difficult to pay expenses associated with education (33%) or health (34%). Despite these fluctuations, the number of households able to find a sum of 200 dinars in an emergency rose from 44% in the first round to 55% in the second and 62% in October.

Nevertheless, the ERF survey shows that, when restrictions were reintroduced, 51% of households experienced a drop in income relative to February (of more than 25% in 38% of households and less than 25% in 13%). More specifically, the socio-professional categories most affected were farmers, of whom 61% experienced a loss of income, the self-employed (69%), regular informal workers (63%), irregular informal workers (61%),²⁰ and the unemployed (60%).²¹

Vulnerable people do not only belong to the first wealth quintile. According to Krafft et al. (2021), the second and third quartiles have experienced the most significant losses (49%) while at the same time, the richest have experienced an increase in their income (13%). In addition, a small share of the population is getting richer while the losses are consistent in time for a large part of the population (it is important to note that data on the richest people in Tunisia are not included in this survey) (Krafft et al., 2021).

In addition, it should be mentioned that these realities were experienced differently depending on gender. The pandemic has been experienced as a “double lockdown” for many Tunisian women, which can sometimes lead to parental burnout. At first, we can still note the large share of women in the public sector in Tunisia, which was also one of the most protected sectors during the pandemic. In addition, many women work in the informal sector, particularly in domestic and agricultural work, and, on the one hand, they are over-represented in frontline jobs, those related to the hospital environment. Also, the pre-pandemic trends were catalysed by the pandemic. It should be noted that women tend to leave the labour market for family reasons relatively earlier compared to men (Selwaness & Krafft, 2020). This is even more true due to Covid-19-related issues (Krafft et al., 2021). Thus, women are present in many essential sectors for the proper functioning of society and, paradoxically, are subject to insecurities related to working conditions and employment.

In summary, the various surveys show a relative improvement in the situation with the gradual lifting of restrictions until October, when the socioeconomic situation began to deteriorate again. Indeed, nearly 44% of respondents stated that their finances were worse in early October than before the crisis.

Impact on Employment

Since employment is the primary determinant of income, our analysis will begin with the social impact of this variable. As stated above, the most acute effects were seen during the lockdown phase, but the subsequent improvement was patchy given the restrictions and social distancing measures. To complete and refine the analysis of the impact of employment, we draw on rounds 2 and 3 of the I.N.S. National Population and Employment Survey and the ERF survey. The ERF survey focused on a more recent period which allows for a more concrete analysis of the consequences of the pandemic in late 2020 (Table 13.2).

Table 13.2 Pandemic effects on employment indicators

The health crisis led to a rise in the unemployment rate to 18% in the second quarter of 2020 compared with 15% in the first quarter and a loss of 161,000 jobs, 132,000 of which involved salaried employee. The unemployment rate fell to 16.2%, with an increase in the number of people employed of 107,000 by comparison with the second quarter of the year. According to the ERF survey, the unemployment rate in November was 3 percentage points higher than before Covid-19. This increase was seen primarily among men, particularly those who had completed primary education. Indeed, working women are generally better educated and prefer public service when they can.

Secondly, there is the impact on salaries. According to the ERF survey,²³ the employment situation in November was still affected even though it had improved by comparison with the situation during the total lockdown. Thirty-two per cent were laid off temporarily, and 13% made redundant. In terms of the number of hours worked, 29% of workers were working for fewer hours. In addition, the wages of 21% of the respondents declined, and there was a delay in the payment of wages for 36%. The tourism sector was the most affected sector.

Moreover, the consequences were more manifest in specific socio-professional categories. Farmers were most affected where 8% employed before the pandemic were no longer engaged in active employment. In addition, 16% of private sector workers who were still employed in February were unemployed (6% of informal workers and 2% of farmers).

During the previous 60 days, 32% of employees were laid off temporarily, and 13% were made redundant; 36% were experiencing delays in payment, 29% were working fewer hours, and 21% were being paid less. The survey found that irregular and regular informal workers were most affected during this period.

The trends were consistent over time, but we can still note a less significant integration into the labour market for women according to the results of the surveys conducted by the Economic Research Forum. For example, between November 2020 and February 2021, the labour force participation (standard) increased significantly more for men (79 to 87%) than women (47% to 46%). It is also the case for the employment rate. Men (69 to 77%) were more employed than women (27–28%).

These results indicate that precarious employment was most affected. That type of employment is most common in small and medium-sized enterprises.²⁴ An understanding of supply-side effects and the coping strategies of business is needed for a better analysis of the results described here.

According to the first round of the I.N.S./World Bank survey, private sector businesses made limited changes during April 2020.²⁵ About half (50.1%) of businesses reported making no changes, 18.7% reported giving paid holidays and 9.6% unpaid holidays. Another 11.5% of businesses reported wage cuts. Only 4.5% of enterprises said they had implemented redundancies in April, and 1.2% said they took on new employees. In particular, the construction sector and the mechanical and electronic industries made most employment-related changes.

According to the I.N.S. survey,²⁶ 59.0% of businesses made employment-related changes in July: 17.7% of them implemented redundancies, 18.2% granted paid leave and 7.2% unpaid leave, 10.9% cut wages and 27.1% cut the number of hours worked, while 4.8% took on new staff. According to the ERF survey, 38% of domestic businesses implemented temporary layoffs, and 28% implemented redundancies.

According to the ANRS survey, more than half of the companies declared they had not received government assistance. The measures that have benefited most companies are the postponement of the payment of contributions from the CNSS for the second quarter for three months (22%) and the postponement of tax payments for three months from April 1 (16%). Employment remained stable for April (77% and 81% of companies declare stability in terms of employment) despite a decrease that remains to be considered (20% in April and 16% in May). Full payment in April and May remains the minority and represents around 1/3 of the companies surveyed. During June, no reductions were known within the companies.

Paradoxically, the businesses that needed assistance most were not those which submitted most applications to the authorities. Only a quarter of them applied for assistance or are in the process of receiving it.²⁷ During the crisis, the financial assistance granted to companies under the “Help Enterprise” platform or in the Batinda context has not been adequate to preserve jobs, particularly during the lockdown.

Overall, according to the four rounds of the Household Living Standards Survey, only 5% of respondents who had been employed before the lockdown had not yet returned to work by early October. The vast majority of those who returned to work did so with the same employer (90%), and they received their full salary (85%).²⁸

Impact on Informal Employment and Social Protection

The formal sector recorded a decline of 86,000 jobs, in comparison with an increase in the number of jobs in the informal sector of 31,300. According to the third round of the 2020 Employment Survey, the agriculture and construction sectors were in first and second place in terms of the proportion of informal jobs (85% and 72%, respectively), followed by the commercial sector (66.2%). Income losses for workers in the informal sector were quite significant, particularly during the lockdown. Indeed, the hardest-hit sectors were those with a high proportion of workers in informal employment.

Otherwise, 44.9%²⁹ households surveyed by the I.N.S. during the month of June reported that they could not find paid work. After deducting the proportion of households that lost wages as reported by their employers (5.9%)³⁰ during the same period, we can conclude that 39%³¹ of workers in the informal sector lost their jobs.

Vulnerable groups face multiple situations reflecting combinations of factors that exacerbate their vulnerability. Examples include the situation of workers in the construction industry^.32 Sixty-eight per cent of workers in the construction sector are employed informally. The condition of workers in the context of the pandemic reflects three main factors namely, transport, wage system and delivery assistance crises. They are two categories affected namely administrative poverty (holders of cards for free health or a “white book”) and the category of persons with free health insurance (AMG II), commonly known as the “yellow book,” which are not covered by any health protection scheme. In addition, workers in this sector report a sense of injustice and indifference towards the government, mainly because of the perceived inconsistency in the conditions for obtaining assistance. Moreover, obtaining a “white book” is controversial because the list of legal beneficiaries has not been updated. In addition, a successful application process sometimes requires a bribe.³³

The circumstances of workers in the agricultural sector have been affected due to knock-on effects and the position of their sector in the value chain.³⁴ For example, the shutdown of the tourism sector has significantly impacted the demand for agricultural products because of the border closures. Although demand has been high during the lockdown for essential commodities,³⁵ many farmers have been faced with the interruption of supplies of inputs such as imported feed materials or plant protection products. According to an ERF survey, 58% of the farmers surveyed used fewer inputs due to this reason.

On top of mobility restrictions, this specific situation has been conducive to speculation and monopolization in some food supply contexts. The National Anti-Corruption Authority also stated that 300 reports were received daily from the public about speculative practices. Moreover, the authorities seized basic food products such as semolina, subsidized flour, and vegetable oil. The same applied to large quantities of sanitary products. For example, delegates were dismissed, including the delegation of Kalaat Sinan on the Algerian border were arrested for having concealed a large quantity of semolina to resell it in Algeria.³⁶

Like construction workers, farmers are also exposed to the risk of having no social security cover. Initially, the circumstances led to an actual and expected fall in harvests for three-quarters of the farmers surveyed.³⁷ This issue has already been targeted by civil society action, particularly concerning women working in agriculture through the Ehmini project, which involves identifying women working in agriculture to benefit from social security.

Ultimately, informal sector workers were excluded from the scope of the measures implemented for households and businesses, except for some types of assistance granted to families in need, and they were therefore affected more by a loss of income. More specifically, there is an important share of women working in the informal sector (domestic workers, agricultural and textile-related workers). Furthermore, workers’ challenges might differ depending on the sector or the region. For instance, businesses in some regions tend to operate less than nine years due to fiscal advantages permitted by the law investment, who must proceed by the mean of delocalization to re-operate after that. Workers are then left in difficult situation, especially older people.³⁸

Their proportion increased significantly after the crisis since the proportion of informal workers reached 46.4% in the third quarter of 2020, by comparison with 44.8% in the previous year (fourth quarter of 2019), as did the proportion of precarious jobs. This exacerbates the severity of the impact of possible major crises on employment, poverty, and household living standards.

Concerning social assistance, only 14.2% of households surveyed by the National Institute of Statistics in May reported receiving social assistance in cash. It is important to point out that the share of public transfers in the assistance granted during the lockdown (transfers of money, food or other assistance) amounted to 88.1%,³⁹ which reflects the importance of the social role of the State in times of crisis.

On the poverty scale, it emerged that there were targeting errors in the distribution of households receiving money transfers by quintile. Only 27.9% of the poorest households received cash assistance. In other words, fewer than 6% of the households that most deserve social benefits received cash assistance. It should be noted that the PNAFN currently covers nearly 9% of the Tunisian households that automatically qualify for exceptional assistance. Paradoxically, the survey results showed that 6.5% of the richest 20% of households received financial assistance.

According to ERF MENA Covid-19 Monitor (Krafft et al., 2021), the percentage of this population benefiting from regular social assistance (PNAFN/AGMII) or recent Covid-19 related programmes decreased from 22% in November 2020 to 20% in February 2021. Nevertheless, a considerable share of beneficiaries belonging to the fourth quintile (9%) of income was receiving this support from the State (Krafft et al., 2021).

In summary, the allocation of financial assistance suffered from a major targeting problem that has limited the expected impact in terms of mitigating negative effects on the living standards of households. Moreover, during the lockdown, only 4000 families were covered by the PNAFN programme⁴⁰ (Fig. 13.4).

Fig. 13.4

Source I.N.S. 2nd round of the household living standards survey

Households receiving financial aid by wealth status ()

According to the ERF survey, 18% of respondents were able to obtain government assistance. The socio-professional categories⁴¹ more likely to receive government assistance were regular informal workers (35%), the self-employed (23%), the unemployed (22%), people not included in the labour force (21%), irregular workers (20%), farmers (12%), and regular formal workers (12%).⁴²

Nevertheless, with the return of restrictions, the ERF survey shows that 51% of households experienced a drop in income in February (more than 25% for 38% and less than 25% for 13%). More specifically, the socio-professional categories most affected were farmers, of whom 61% experienced a loss of income, the self-employed (69%), regular informal workers (63%), irregular, informal workers (61%), and the unemployed (60%).

The spatial distribution of households receiving assistance favours non-urban households, where poverty is more highly concentrated than urban households. Moreover, the targeting of financial assistance was better at this level (Fig. 13.5).

Fig. 13.5

Source I.N.S. 2nd round of the household living standards survey

Percentage of households receiving financial assistance ()

Regarding service delivery, the I.N.S./World Bank survey showed that 14.7% of governmental and non-governmental institutions offer services that strongly emphasize the most vulnerable groups. This proportion is higher for governmental institutions with a social or health focus (28.6%) and national associations (37.5%). During the spread of the first wave of Covid-19, the overall demand for the services offered increased for 41.2% of the institutions surveyed. This increase was more pronounced for government social and health institutions (71.4%) and national associations (75%). The interviews revealed the lack of monitoring of the most vulnerable households by almost all the institutions interviewed. About 85.3% of the organizations interviewed are dissatisfied with the level of government assistance delivered to businesses and households. Moreover, 61.8% of the organizations believe this assistance falls short of the actual need (Fig. 13.6).

Fig. 13.6

Satisfaction with assistance allocated to businesses and households

Most actors said that they believed government assistance was not adequate for the most vulnerable groups. In addition, those most in need have not been able to obtain assistance because of problems with organization and resources. A failure to identify vulnerable persons was also noted. The difficulties of finalizing the response devised to process applications and the follow-up to those applications are more problematic. In addition, a series of interviews with agricultural workers⁴³ confirms this. The distribution of the assistance is thought to have been uncoordinated because the assistance was not covered by the circulars issued by the State due to infrastructural problems.

Impact on Poverty

Overall, the pandemic undoubtedly weakened population groups that were not necessarily vulnerable previously, resulting in the emergence of a category of “new poor”.⁴⁴ This category represents all the new poor, and the marginal population thought to have left the poverty category in 2020.⁴⁵ This definition is particularly relevant in administrative poverty and the problems with targeting government assistance. To some extent, it is consistent with the categorization on lines of perceived poverty, recorded poverty, and poverty as assessed by the Ministry of Social Affairs.⁴⁶

The results of the simulations proposed by UNDP must be presented in a context where survey data were not available at this level of disaggregation. The rate of monetary poverty worsened during the two months of lockdown following the spread of the pandemic, primarily because of falling consumer spending and rising prices for basic foodstuffs. In fact, according to UNDP simulations, 457,500 individuals fell below the poverty line. Moreover, the monetary poverty rate reached 19.2%⁴⁷ as opposed to 15.2% before the Covid-19 crisis. This can be explained by the decline in consumer spending by household groups and the increase in the price of basic foodstuffs. The categories most affected by Covid-19 were unemployed and inactive workers, who have experienced a more considerable fall in their income than other household categories. As far as the last two of these categories are concerned, although inactive people do not receive any direct income, they receive assistance from their families and relatives. Inactive people and the unemployed were among those most affected by the health crisis. This is because, in addition to rising prices, they suffered from the effect of the fall in the incomes of their relatives. In addition, the economic recession caused by the coronavirus has affected multidimensional poverty. Indeed, the multidimensional poverty index⁴⁸ exceeded 15.6%, compared with 13.2%, due to the difficulties encountered by poor households in terms of food and health expenses (Box 13.1).

Box 13.1: Principal findings relating to the impact of the pandemic on poverty according to UNDP.

• Multidimensional poverty rose from 13.2% to 15.6%

• Food expenditure rose from 14.4% to 21.3%

• Healthcare spending rose from 44.5% to 49.1%

• The proportion of the poor increased in the category of agricultural workers (45.1% as opposed to a 38.3% before the health crisis), in the category of non-agricultural workers (27.3% as opposed to 21.8% before the health crisis), in the category of farmers (26.8% as opposed to 21.4% before the health crisis), in the category of the unemployed (41.7% as opposed to 35.6% before the health crisis) and in the category of other inactive persons (24.5% as opposed to 19.5% before the health crisis)

• According to the multidimensional approach, the poorest Tunisian households were poorer after the crisis. Indeed, the poverty rate rose in the category of agricultural workers (23.4% as opposed to 20.7% before the health crisis), in the category of non-agricultural workers (15.7% as opposed to 13.1% before the health crisis), in the category of farmers (19.6% as opposed to 16.8% before the health crisis), in the category of the unemployed (24.3% as opposed to 21.5% before the health crisis) and in the category of other inactive persons (24% as opposed to 17.7% before the health crisis)

Source UNDP (2020)

The Impact of the Lockdown on Access to Basic Services

The total lockdown in response to the pandemic included the closure of all schools and academic institutions. The options for online education in the public sector were limited due to the shortages of connection options, equipment, and distance learning materials.

More specifically, most pupils and students were not able to maintain educational continuity, and after the lockdown, only 39% of school children were able to participate in a learning activity.⁴⁹ These activities consisted of completing homework (48%), following educational programmes (40%) and using digital platforms (37%). In addition, only 26% of households were able to contact a teacher. This proportion was 53% for the richest quintile and 11% for the poorest quintile. It should be noted, however, that the authorities, with assistance from civil society, produced educational television programmes to safeguard the continuity of distance learning for a large population of pupils, particularly in rural areas with less internet connection. However, the impact of those programmes remains uncertain.

Education is, therefore, not exempt from the stark reality of greater inequality because of the crisis. Indeed, the proportion of students who have had contact with teachers is five times higher in richer households than in poorer ones. Furthermore, children whose parents come from modest families or who have poorly educated parents would face more difficulties when they return to school. The main reasons for the educational shortfall are the lack of remote options (33%), a lack of interest (22.5%), lack of communications with teachers (18%), and lack of equipment and educational materials at home (11% of households).⁵⁰

The poor performance of remote education can be explained, in part, by the lack of digital resources and equipment in the education system, which is even more serious in the era of digital transformation, but also by the modest digital resources produced as a matter of urgency in combination with the lack and inadequacy of teacher training and the poor mastery of digital tools. Moreover, it is important to note that two-thirds of respondents in the four rounds of the household living standards survey believed that the health measures taken in schools were inadequate to protect students and teachers and that priority should be given to improving infrastructure and equipment in schools.

The considerations set out here about the educational options available in Tunisia should also be seen in conjunction with the circumstances of children, which the pandemic has severely impacted. In addition, it has also been noted⁵¹ that there was an increase in insomnia, violence, and depression among children in 34%, 33% and 18% of households respectively. More specifically, impaired concentration was seen in one-third of the children. Housing conditions may also influence their psychological condition. According to the 2014 national census, 27.6% of dwellings consist of fewer than two rooms, and about 54% of dwellings in non-municipal areas are “dar/houch arbi” (traditional houses). These living conditions can be particularly affected by the family context: according to the Ministry for Women, the Family, Children and Seniors, violence against women has increased seven times during the lockdown. Calls to dedicated numbers increased drastically during the lockdown (multiplied by 7).⁵² In other words, the problems associated with delivering education are catalysed by the living conditions of children and the family circle in the context of uncertainty associated with the pandemic.

The short-term consequences referred to here should be viewed in the context of the situation prior to the pandemic. Indeed, this “missed year” for young Tunisians will exacerbate cumulative under-achievement at whatever level of education.

In summary, education is unquestionably one of the sectors most affected by the crisis, mainly because of the disruption of educational continuity, and the repercussions are irremediable, particularly for the most vulnerable. The inequalities in educational infrastructure access should be of a concern to government going forward.

Impact on Access to the Health Services

Access to medical assistance has gradually improved after the difficulties during the total lockdown. Household access to medical care after the lockdown has returned to almost the same level as before the spread of the pandemic, according to the I.N.S. survey conducted during June. Indeed, 5.3% of the households surveyed could access health services during the total lockdown, and 25.5% reported being able to access health services during the progressive relaxation of restrictions. However, of the poorest 20% of households, only 7% had access to medical assistance during the total lockdown, and 18.8% had access during the targeted lockdown (Fig. 13.7).

Fig. 13.7

Spread of households access to medical care by quintile (Source I.N.S. 4th round of the household living standards survey)

Turning to the quality of health services, 30.4% of the households surveyed reported dissatisfaction with the quality of care obtained. In addition, 44.3% of the poorest 20% of households reported being dissatisfied. The main reasons are the financial charges involved (22% overall and 20.4% of the 20% of poorest households) and the distance from health facilities (10.9% overall and 21.8% of the 20% of poorest households).

Moreover, the pandemic has had a negative impact on the public health sector⁵³ in the light of the following listed in the Box 13.2:

Box 13.2: Pandemic Impact on Health Sector

• The fall in the level of activity of the public health structures and, consequently, the decline in their revenue

• The worsening health status of patients with chronic diseases

• An urgent need for additional beds in the intensive care units (the available number of beds with oxygen facilities is 450 and the number of intensive care beds is just 240)⁵⁴

• The depletion of stocks of medicines and shortages of medical equipment⁵⁵. Particularly for people from the lower categories

• The poor management of medical staff and medical specialists. In addition, the reduction and restriction of medical assistance during the lockdown have had an impact on health services

• The increasing need for medical organizations to protect themselves against the pandemic⁵⁶

• The delay in the establishment of some twenty hospital units

In addition, the cost of the PCR test represents a significant proportion of the household budget in the context of private clinics, given that most of them were not able to find 210 dinars in emergencies.

Moreover, the crisis has shown that the lack of means of transport and the minimum service requirements for medical assistance, both public and private, have negatively affected the quality of health services, particularly during the total lockdown. While the government's proactive strategy to contain the spread of the virus did succeed in limiting the number of deaths and infections during the first wave, the acuity of the sector's shortcomings and problems, and the lack of a coherent crisis management plan involving all stakeholders after the period of the progressive relaxation of the lockdown, was strongly felt. The worsening of the health situation and the exponential increase in the number of cases, both infections and mortalities, bear witness to this.

Conclusion

Tunisia was particularly successful in managing the first wave of the pandemic from a health perspective due to the early and strong response. However, this response had a very high economic cost and a disproportionate social impact that the State was able to mitigate in part only. Indeed, the economic difficulties of the previous decade left the Tunisian State with no room to manoeuvre in response to major crises. In addition, the presence of a large informal sector and the delay in the implementation of the unique identifier did not make the task any easier for the government, which had to respond exceptionally quickly.

In addition to the cost of jobs and income, the education of working- and middle-class children have been the big loser: public education, unlike private education, has not made any provisions for remote schooling.

After the lockdown phase, Tunisia went through a partial recovery during the summer and early autumn due to the lifting of restrictions. However, the second wave had a more dramatic health impact because of the need to work with socioeconomic constraints. The State no longer had the resources to compensate households or businesses. The most vulnerable therefore had to pay the price for this crisis.

The pandemic has once again highlighted malfunctions in monitoring, continuity, and quality of services, especially for those who need them most. It has deepened inequalities and revealed the presence of a two-speed Tunisia. This pandemic is, therefore, not only a reflection of stark structural and social needs but also a window of opportunity to precipitate structural reforms. The ordeal of the pandemic has also highlighted the resilience of the Tunisian social fabric, particularly the capacity for adaptation of civil society and the public.

One of the few positive aspects of this exceptional Covid-19 crisis is that it has helped accelerate certain structural reforms, particularly the digitalization of the administration of the economy. In addition, the completion of the Amen Social programme and of the unique identifier, the minimization of inclusion and exclusion errors in the allocation of assistance, and the strengthening of financial inclusion are now seen as absolute priorities.

The success of these reforms will depend on the ability of leaders to forge consensus and compromise by organizing a dialogue about reforms that can remedy structural difficulties along the lines of the dialogue that anchored the democratic transition.

In line with the findings, the Tunisian government needs to mainstream social inclusion in the fight against the pandemic as it did for the first wave. Given the low availability of financial resources, it should envisage all the possibilities of mobilizing more resources locally, including coordinating better between the different stakeholders. It should also present a clear plan to international donors to guarantee more external support and simplify any cumbersome procedures impeding the funds from reaching the final beneficiaries. In the longer run, the country needs to extend social protection to a larger share of the population by inciting informal workers and enterprises to become formal.