Rwanda

Abstract

Rwanda’s Covid-19 response was centrally coordinated, implemented through decentralized government authorities and local CSOs, guided by development partners and enforced through punitive measures. While this structure enabled efficient service delivery, equity considerations had been of lesser concern. The country’s response centered on social protection extension and economic recovery. However, it glossed over the everyday realities of the extremely poor and vulnerable. The measures put in place to curb the spread of the virus were disproportionate to the measures designed to solve its socio-economic fallouts. Democratizing pandemic responses and proper targeting of the most vulnerable to enhance greater engagement between state and citizens is therefore recommended.

Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic experience and policies in Rwanda are situated in a climate of developmental ambivalences which determined the nature of policies and their impact on different social groups. Rwanda is a small country in East Africa with a turbulent political climate since independence, culminating in the 1994 genocide. Since then, the country has been under the stable leadership of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), with Paul Kagame as president since 2000. As a result, Rwanda has been hailed as a success story in sub-Sahara Africa with persistent growth rates, stability and progress in human development, such as increased school enrolment and universal social protection (Crisafulli & Redmond, 2012; Vlaminck et al., 2014). On the other hand, some argue that Rwandans have been negatively affected by the country's chosen developmental path and that macro-economic progress has gone at the cost of civil liberties, food security and the well-being of Rwandans, especially the rural populations (Ansoms, 2020; Ansoms et al., 2017; Dawson, 2018; Verpoorten, 2014).

Rwanda has experienced high levels of economic growth (approx. 9% GDP growth in 2019), alongside improving Rwandans’ living standards (World Bank, 2020) consistently. For example, there has been a two-thirds drop in child mortality and near-universal primary school enrolment (Laterite, 2017). The impressive indicators have been attributed to homegrown policies (World Bank, 2020). For example, the World Bank and other donors supported Rwanda in 2009 to develop and implement social protection programme known as the Vision 2020 Umurenge Program (VUP), which has been expanding to benefit more than a million people, with women constituting half of the beneficiaries (Gatzinsi et al., 2019).

Rwanda’s sizeable agricultural sector contributes 29% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), constitutes 80% of the country’s foreign exchange and employs two-thirds of the total population. More than 80% of the population survives on subsistence farming. The sector accounts for 78% of Rwanda's informal sector workers (ILO, 2018). Rwanda's green revolution, initiated in 2007–2008, has not have positive effect on rural areas. With rural farmers embedded in market-oriented agriculture, food insecurity increased as they have little control over their bargaining power (Ansoms, 2020).

Industry contributes 16.2% of GDP and 9% of employment, while the services sector contributes about 47.8% of GDP (NODEA, 2020). Kigali, the capital city, doubles as the economic hub for the country, while the rest is mainly rural. The country has a large informal sector which accounts for over 94% of total employment, driven by rural–urban migration (Munu, 2019). An estimated 97.2% of Rwanda's urban employment is informal (ILO, 2018, p. 91). The high incidence of informality raises questions regarding decent work standards, including the bargaining power of Rwanda's workforce. In the context of Covid-19, where responses have severely impacted people's jobs and livelihood strategies, the issue of workers’ bargaining power is crucial because it is related to the leverage and voice workers can have in the formulation of Covid-19 responses. Furthermore, the increasing food insecurity in rural areas raises questions about the resilience of farmers in the face of Covid-19, mainly as government support has only targeted urban areas.

The chapter systematically reconstructed, documented and analysed how state and non-state actors in Rwanda take equity into account in the formulation and implementation of policy responses and interventions during the Covid-19 pandemic and how they have had an impact on material, relational, subjective and collective well-being of Rwanda’s poor and marginalised.

Methodological Approaches

The research was conducted in line with existing Covid-19 restrictions and protocols. Therefore, the research was primarily based on desk research (including a literature review and document analysis) and key stakeholder interviews conducted over skype or phone and through email questionnaires. We have also conducted face-to-face interviews with vulnerable groups to shed light on the perceptions of the poor.

We identified the vulnerable groups through triangulating existing quantitative and qualitative studies on poverty in Rwanda and insights from key stakeholder interviews. The final selection was based on the following criteria: gender, age, and location. Male and female-dominated sectors, as well as young and older, were included. We included rural areas to understand the equity dimensions of responses. We selected Kigali and Iburengerazuba (Western) provinces based on their higher Covid-19 infection rates and prolonged lockdown period. We interviewed older people in the Western Province, market women in Kigali, taxi-velo and taxi-moto drivers. Within these groups, we investigated short-term effects on people's well-being, the long-term structural impacts, and how Covid-19 has affected existing inequalities.

Theoretical Framework

There has been a rise in scholarship and policy attention on inclusive development and the importance of addressing poverty and inequality (Bourguignon, 2015; OECD, 2014; Piketty, 2014). However, the concept of equity in secular philosophy dates to ancient Greece with Plato, who pointed out the dangers of inequality for political stability (Attinc et al., 2005, p. 76). Since the 1970s, the understanding of equity has been shaped by the idea of creating equality in liberties (Rawls, 1971), opportunities (Roemer, 1998; Dworkin, 1981 cited in Attinc et al., 2005, p. 77) and capabilities (Sen, 1995 cited in Attinc et al., 2005, p. 77). In a nutshell, social equity based on Rawls, Sen, Dworkin and Roemer's theories roughly entails an equal starting point or set of opportunities or capabilities. However, creating a level playing field or equal opportunities still does not always result in more equal societies. Firstly, by taking the gaze away from the result, equality of opportunity theories has been used to justify inequality. It has been argued that inequality results from differences in individual effort or merit or lack thereof (Natasnon, 2016). Secondly, when translated into policies, focusing on equality of opportunities often implies creating “universal” essential services such as public healthcare or free primary education. Although egalitarian in theory, such programmes often overlook structural inequalities that deprive certain people of accessing essential public goods. Lastly, and this is especially relevant in the case of Rwanda, the urge to reach universal coverage might come at the cost of the fairness of the measures adopted to get there.¹

Therefore, to understand the extent to which Covid-19 response and mitigation measures have taken equity into account, it is necessary to re-centre the result in the analysis. More precisely, we focused on the impact on the well-being of the poor. The conceptualisation of well-being is drawn from McGregor and Pouw (2017). They portray well-being as a multidimensional concept consisting of material, relational, subjective and collective well-being (Fig. 11.1). It allows for the analysis of the impact of Covid-19 and related state and non-state responses on:

Fig. 11.1

(Source Developed by authors based on McGregor and Pouw [2017])

Analytical framework of Covid-19 responses and well-being

• work and income as well as access to essential services (material well-being);

• social relations, social capital and social safety nets and support networks (relational well-being);

• individual perceptions of the impact on one’s quality of life (prior to and post Covid-19) (subjective well-being);

• political empowerment (collective well-being).

The analysis is guided by intersectionality, which allows us to capture the differentiated nature of vulnerability and resilience of people in the current health crisis (Chaplin et al., 2019).

Situational Sketch of Covid-19 in Rwanda

Covid-19 was confirmed on March 14, 2020, in Rwanda with the first patient coming from India. The patient was quarantined, and contact tracing started. Kigali was placed under lockdown as a result. However, soon, other cases emerged through border transit zones and truck drivers, leading to the decision of a nationwide lockdown with restrictions on movement between regions. Kirehe and Bugesera districts, which accounted for the highest number of coronavirus infections, are transit routes for cross-border truck drivers and hosted the Covid-19 isolation centres (Byishimo, 2020). In terms of vulnerability, the Western Province of Iburengerazuba was, according to the Africa Covid-19 Community Vulnerability Index (CCVI)² vulnerable due to the high refugee populations, food insecurity, lower socioeconomic status and high elderly population (Africa CCVI, 2020). Kigali city districts of Gasabo, Kicukiro and Nyarugenge were also areas of high infection (Byishimo, 2020).

Rwanda’s Covid-19 testing rates were higher than the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and others in the region. The pandemic management used a decentralised approach through laboratories at district levels and pool-testing, which increased efficiency and testing capacity. The Rwanda Biomedical Center coordinated testing, and by mid-July, over 200,000 samples had been tested for Covid-19 (Government of Rwanda, 2020). Rwanda has been largely successful in containing the first wave of the virus, but the second wave, which began in December 2020, was more challenging to curb (Broulard, 2021) and therefore led to the imposition of more stringent measures. See Fig. 11.2 for testing information (see Fig. 11.2).

Fig. 11.2

(Source Our World in Data [2020])

Daily Covid-19 tests/1000 people

Rwanda’s Covid-19 Policy Formulation Process

Even before Covid-19 was confirmed in Rwanda, the country was on high alert. The government directed ministries in charge of local government and health to take measures to prevent the importation of the virus by dispatching health officials with fever scanners to all border posts and installing handwashing systems in Kigali bus stations (Edwards, 2020). After the first case was reported on March 14, 2020, President Kagame called for calm but also solidarity and discipline to curb the spread (WHO, 2020a, 2020b). Subsequently, the cabinet held bi-weekly meetings to review and adopt policy measures accordingly. Different ministries and local government entities then implemented the cabinet decisions according to their respective mandates.³ Local village leaders have, for instance, been activated to compile lists of vulnerable people for targeting food distribution. Communication was done through addresses by the prime minister, occasional presidential addresses or communiqués by the Ministry of Health (MoH), as well as through broadcast, print media and transmitted via WhatsApp.⁴

This approach, namely, central decision-making, disseminated and implemented through decentralised local government entities, is characteristic of Rwanda's governance style and has both strengths and weaknesses (see Table 11.1) in line with those found in existing literature (Chemouni, 2018 and Gaynor, 2014).⁵

Table 11.1 Strengths and weaknesses of a decentralised Covid-19 response in Rwanda

The government has not consulted CSOs in the formulation of the Covid-19 containment measures.⁶ Development partners such as UNDP have, on the contrary, worked closely with the government, raising questions regarding downward versus upward accountability and the embeddedness of the government’s response in local realities. The UNDP emphasised its involvement stating that,

In addition to providing technical inputs and advice in the formulation of the plans, UNDP has been working closely with the Ministry of Finance on the planning for Social-Economic Impact Assessment jointly with UNECA, the World Bank, and the IMF. UNDP and the World Bank have been designated to co-lead the COVID19 Socio-Economic Sub-Group working with the Ministry of Finance. This sub-group will co-lead on the socioeconomic impact assessment of the COVID-19 (UNDP, 2020b).

The cabinet has also worked closely with WHO and CDC officials on health-related issues. Both organisations worked with the government during the Ebola outbreak. On issues related to education, UNICEF played an informative role. On a regional level, EAC developed the East African Community Covid-19 response plan, which President Kagame signed, but close observers indicate that the regional response has been fragmented border issues dealt with through ad-hoc bilateral dialogue (EAC Secretariat, 2020; O’Reilly & Vaughan, 2020).

Trade unions and workers’ associations such as taxi-moto or taxi-velo associations were consulted on effective enforcement of Covid-19. This structure confirms studies on CSOs in Rwanda, which argue that the CSOs are tolerated only when they play a constructive (non-critical) role. In the case of COTRAF, external mediation via Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) was used to open conversations with MINALOC, trade unions and other CSOs. On another occasion, COTRAF also met with the Ministry of Public Works and Employment representatives of other trade unions and the private sector to discuss health and safety issues during the pandemic and how to decrease infection, for instance, through the payment of salaries through banks.⁷ The farmer union, SYNATRAEL, mentioned they did not raise any concerns to the government as their sector fell under essential services and was, therefore, less affected by the government's containment measures.

Despite the limited social dialogue on the pandemic management, trade unions have made their views clear through research on the impact of Covid-19 on the workforce and various communiqués directed at the government. According to trade union representatives, the government implemented the private sector fund and loans for private school teachers⁸ as a response to some concerns. However, their demands to make mitigation measures more inclusive to informal workers were left unanswered. The media has also played an essential role as leverage to influence Covid-19 policies. Despite this, containment measures restricted their movement. (HRW, 2020b). Taxi-moto associations also advocated for the lifting of the ban on their services.⁹

Rwanda’s Stringent Containment Measures and Its Economic Impact

Rwanda’s Covid-19 response has been robust and rapid (Bower et al., 2020). It was the first country to impose a nationwide lockdown on March 21, 2020, in the region. Handwashing stations and ThermoScan-checks were installed (Edwards, 2020), and hundreds of volunteers were recruited for contract tracing. The processes were digitalised. It was not clear how people without mobile phone devices were monitored since 48% of the poorest quintile in Rwanda do not own a cell phone. While technological innovations, such as robot nurses have been touted as helping with the pandemic management, the approach forecloses issues of equity. The Covid-19 Community Vulnerability Index (CCVI) (CCVI, 2020) rated Rwanda as one of the least at vulnerable countries partly due to the stringent measures imposed. According to the Oxford Covid-19 Governance tracker, Rwanda had a stringency score of 75.93 (Ghana, e.g., had a score of 44.44) (University of Oxford, 2020). The high score is mainly due to the prolonged national lockdown, restriction on mobility and closure of schools. The following are some of the government directives from the government¹⁰:

• Social distancing.

• Ban on public gatherings, places of worship, schools, weddings and sports events.

• Thirty-day suspension of all commercial flights to and from Rwanda and indefinite suspension of domestic travel between cities and districts.

• Closure of all land borders except for Rwandan residents and essential businesses.

• Ban on public transport except for buses within provinces and ban on all public transport between provinces.

• Closure of all businesses except those providing essential services such as medical care, telecommunications, security and banking services.

• Mobile money and online banking service use encouraged

• National curfew from 9 pm to 5 am and later extended from 7 pm to 5 am.

• Nationwide lockdown two weeks starting on March 21, which was extended twice until May 4.

As infections surged in June, the government adopted punitive measures to increase compliance. Fines were imposed on people who flouted protocols and stadiums were used as “education” centres for Covid-19 regulation offenders. Offenders were forced to stay overnight to serve as an example to others. Among those brought to stadiums were various journalists and bloggers covering the impact of Covid-19 measures on citizens (Asala, 2020). The police also issued lists of offenders with names and number plates to increase responsibility through social naming and shaming campaign.¹¹ Due to the economic realities of the poor, offenders were more likely to be of lower social classes. Social distancing in informal settlements and restrictions on movement constrained the poor since their livelihoods depend on moving between the city (Kigali) and their villages in rural areas. A respondent, for example, mentioned “some people walked for days, hiding from the authorities in the bush to travel back to their homes”.¹² The closures of land borders have also been devastating for many informal traders and market women. Informal traders account for the 59% exports to Rwanda’s neighbouring countries. Already between 60 and 80% of the border dwellers live below the national poverty line. While cargo vehicles were allowed to pass, small-scale, informal traders (an estimated 80% of whom are women in East Africa) who trade on foot or by motorcycle taxis were excluded (Stuart, 2020; Klopp et al., 2020). On the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, a specific crisis has unfolded as Goma relies on water brought by informal traders from Rwanda. With the closure of the borders, Goma ran dry, and the Rwandans who lived by supplying water were left to find alternative means of income (Mwasa, 2020).

The stringent containment measures and punitive enforcement have had a significant socioeconomic impact on the poor and vulnerable and the economy at large, which cannot be underestimated. Many business ventures and services in both public and private institutions have either been closed or have had their operations drastically reduced. As a result, GDP growth dropped to 3.5% in 2020 from 10.1% in 2019 which is a deviation form 6.7% projected for 2021 (Bizoza & Sibomana, 2020). Unemployment reached 22.1% in May 2020 (NISR, 2020a) and was higher among young people (Matengo, 2020). The lockdown was expected to rate from 38.67% to 44.33% (UNDP, 2020a). The RECOVR survey also captured the increase in poverty and income insecurity. The result showed that 80% of the respondents have used their savings on basic needs.

In terms food security, 50% of the respondents had to decrease their food consumption, and 25% stated they had trouble buying food due to restrictions on mobility and market closures (IPA, 2020). Many Rwandans have relied on social and family networks for financial support as a coping strategy (IPA, 2020) rather than the state. Informal sector workers who are already in precarious conditions disproportionately affected by the measures. Without adequate social security and safety nets, many households were left without an income to cover food and other basic needs. Besides informal workers, SMEs have also suffered. A study by Business Professionals Network (BPN) and the University of Rwanda (UoR) shows that at least 57.5% of SMEs operating across different industries were forced to shut down between March and April due to Covid-19 (BPN & UoR, 2020). Many reduced their capacity and employees even when the lockdown measures were relaxed.

The educational sector also experiences its fair share of the pandemic fallouts. Due to school closures, about 80% of children in primary and secondary schools were forced to learn from home (Debenedetti et al., 2020). The remote learning programme did not cover all children because of differentiated access to the resources for the programmes. Poorer households relied more on radio lessons, which limited their access to education, while wealthier households got access to different platforms such as television, WhatsApp groups set up by the respective schools and internet-based learning programmes. In addition, school closure led to an increase in teenage pregnancy, particularly among poor and vulnerable girls (Nkurunziza, 2020).

Rwanda’s Socio-Economic Impact Mitigation Measures

The economic mitigation measures were mainly targeted at formal sector employees. Similarly, measures were biased towards urban citizens and companies and were justified by the saying in rural areas: “one always has something to eat” (Table 11.2). However, in the context of the decreasing food security of Rwandan farmers (Ansoms, 2020), this assumption is questionable. A survey conducted by IPA (2020) on the impact of Covid-19 debunked the myth of rural plentitude and found that rural citizens were more likely to have trouble buying food than urban dwellers. In the same survey, only 10% of the respondents stated they had accessed the government’s food aid and utility subsidies (IPA, 2020). The figures could be lower is Kigali is taken out form the sample. Considering that 16% of the national population falls under the lowest poverty category or the extreme poor according to the Ubudehe assessment, the IPA survey estimates that approximately half of the extreme poor have received government support during Covid-19.

Table 11.2 State socio-economic impact responses and equity considerations

Responses by Non-State Actors and Development Partners

A wide range of non-state actors has rolled-out measures to mitigate Covid-19's negative impacts. These ranged from trade unions’ awareness raising campaigns to solidarity between citizens at the village level and INGOs providing cash transfers. The Rwandan government, through its decentralised authorities, oversees these initiatives. The district-level government authorities approved each programme along the lines of its Covid-19 preparedness and response plan and targeting of the poor using the village-level data centralised by LODA.

Trade Unions and workers’ associations have reached out to their members by implementing Covid-19 awareness raising campaigns, creating Covid-19 clubs in factories, lobbying companies to ensure safe workplaces and making agreements with companies fabricating sanitisers to give a lower price rate for taxi-moto drivers and paying out part of the savings to members in need. However, most union and association leaders said that their main objective was to support their members in fulfilling the government requirements. Both taxi-moto and taxi-velo associations in this regard mentioned they worked together with security guards to ensure compliance. The only support from government for this group is the fact that, they were allowed to operate.

It is difficult to access the success of programmes because of the time limit of the research. However, at first glance, most aid focuses on strengthening the health sector through in-kind contributions of equipment and PPEs as well as capacity building. Social protection programmes such as cash transfers were also implemented. Only one donor is supporting CSOs, which is the European Union. The other agencies seem to work through the government, explicitly supporting its Covid-19 preparedness and response programme. If programmes do not address existing barriers experienced by the poor in accessing essential services, the investments in healthcare infrastructure will generally not favour the poor. The inclusiveness of cash transfers will mainly rely on the transparency and efficiency of targeting. The former is the most challenging in the context of Rwanda.

Apart from the key development partners outlined already, Rwanda hosts many local and international NGOs. For example, Worldrelief works with local organisations, such as churches, while others are focused on education, yet others provide direct cash transfers to beneficiaries. GIVEDIRECTLY serves as an excellent example of the latter. By October 2020, GIVEDIRECTLY had reached 19,000 people in three districts (Gasabo, Kicukiro and Nyarygenge) in Kigali and was seeking to expand to the Western Province (Rusizi and Rubavu). Targeting was done based on the data of affected families gathered by local village leaders and compiled by LODA. From these lists, GIVEDIRECTLY targeted those households with family heads under 40 years. Local staff then conducted enrolment surveys via phone to verify eligibility, after which the cash was transferred via mobile money. Each beneficiary received two transfers of 153.21 k RWF (or $150).¹⁵

Equity Assessment

In the following short-term equity assessment, we will shed light on the impact of Covid-19 and related responses on the vulnerable groups we have identified across four dimensions of well-being, i.e. material, relational, subjective well-being and collective. Material well-being is associated with income and patterns of consumption. At the same time, relational well-being is associated with individual interactions with their kin, clients and those around them. Cognitive well-being is about mindset positivity and satisfaction with one's life. Finally, we examine how the pandemic has created windows of opportunity for political participation and mobilisation of the poor, which relates to the notion of collective well-being (Kingdon, 1984; Sen, 1984).

Short-Term Equity Assessment

Impact on Material Well-being

All the vulnerable people included in this study have been severely affected by the government's response to Covid-19. Taxi-moto drivers approximately 32, 230 drivers in 2018 according to RURA (2018)) and taxi-velo riders form a significant section of people informally employed. They have been vulnerable as many of the adopted Covid-19 containment measures such as mobility restriction ones limited their services. During the lockdown, motorcycle and bicycle-taxi drivers were only allowed to carry goods resulting in income losses for the transporters. The majority (80%) of these are youth. Some have their incomes halved. As a taxi-velo rider in Kigali said, “my living condition has changed a lot, to the extent that I do not have basic needs like food and shelter” (taxi-Velo rider, Kigali).

Out of the ten taxi-velo and taxi-moto drivers interviewed, only two reported having received some food support from the government. However, one stated he received some support from the association in terms of payment of his savings. In addition, some received support from their relations.

The market women were also affected economically in various ways. First, all non-essential businesses were closed during the lockdown leaving only those that sell foodstuff to open their shop, but even for these women, business was slow due to a decline in customers and an increase in prices, which made their profit decrease because the government fixed prices of some seventeen items. Also, on August 28, markets started operating at 50% capacity via a rotation system. This has had a severe impact on the incomes of the traders. Nevertheless, they continued to pay the same amount of taxes. Since market women generally fall outside the lowest Ubudehe category, they were not eligible for government support such as food supply.

Similarly, the elderly also lost the support they receive from relations because of economic hardship. “Before COVID-19, I had something to eat from the supporters and other donors. But now in this period of the pandemic, most people who have supported me are not working as before” (elderly man in Western Province). While poor older adults fall under the lowest Ubudehe category and are thus received cash transfers from the state, transfers have not been extended in amount or coverage despite an increase in poverty. Consequently, those just above the poverty line now fell below it. The amount for cash transfers are about 8000Frw per household, which is not enough for a dignified condition of living considering the cost of food (1 kg of sweet potatoes is 300Frw and a kilo of beans is 1000frw, e.g.).¹⁶ Furthermore, the cash transfers are given at the household level, without considering the number of members. Due to unemployment, many people returned to the rural areas. As a result, rural households had more members to feed. Development partners have also changed their service provisions due to new priorities and regulations in line with Covid-19.

Impact on Relational Well-Being

In terms of the relational well-being of poor and vulnerable people, low-income families survive through mutual support with family members helping one another. However, Covid-19 induced financial insecurity strained these support networks and consequently affected social relations. The social effects dimensions were highlighted in this statement by a taxi-moto driver in Kigali “My relationship with my friends and colleagues has been very negatively affected because I have no money to help them”.

It is customary to borrow money between colleagues, but the economic hardships have made this complicated and stressful. This issue of credit is also significant for market women, who were buying goods on credit as a normal practice. Some women defaulted their credit obligations thereby creating social conflicts. The competition over fewer clients also raised tensions among market women. The relations between clients have also been affected as the Covid-19 protocols have made all human interactions less spontaneous. Another impact is the pandemic effect on the social character of markets. For the elderly, the restrictions on mobility seemed to have affected them. Some stated that nobody came to visit them, highlighting their loneliness.

Impact on Subjective Well-Being

The pandemic has also influenced the way people felt about their lives and the future. However, only one respondent, a taxi-moto driver from Kigali, mentioned that the pandemic had positively impacted on his life:

It has made the most significant change in my life, so I must work hard, and saving must be my culture. Therefore, I would say that my life has improved; it made me think that I can do different things and save (taxi-moto driver, Kigali).

In general, people expressed extreme difficulties with the pandemic's impacts on them and their family’s future. Some blamed themselves for their misfortunes. This individualism and the belief that one is responsible for one's life resonates with the RPF political discourse of moving forward by working hard (Chemouni, 2014). This mindset helps people from getting bitter with the government measures.

Impact on Collective Well-Being

With collective well-being, we refer to the position of the specific vulnerable group within society and their political power and voice. Taxi-moto and taxi-velo drivers were met with public prejudices when the lockdown started, and their businesses were banned as many feared they would resort to theft and other illegal practices to substitute for their loss of income. Interestingly, this negative sentiment spurred public opinion to join the taxi-moto associations in pushing the government to lift the restrictions on their service provision. After a media campaign in which the associations appeared on a popular radio programme and highlighted their concerns, the government decided to lift the ban on June 1. However, the bicycle-taxi drivers were excluded from this policy change, and their livelihoods remained halted until October. To a certain extent, the government has recognised the importance of their services for urban transport and has incorporated mobile money paying systems, providing loans to them so that they can buy helmets which are now a requirement for both taxi-velo and taxi-moto drivers.

Regarding the market women, it was unclear if the associations were involved in the policy formulation processes. The government has in recent years come a long way in formalising the markets and its vendors, but this process does not seem to have increase the bargaining power of the women decisions take centrally are imposed on them.

The elderly in the study have shown no sign of collective action. Although they are aware their group was more vulnerable to the virus, there has been no collective organisation as their expectations for support were not expressed in citizen-state relations but in family-community or development partner-ties terms.

Long-Term Equity Assessment

Besides the direct impact on people's well-being, Covid-19 and the related responses will also have long-term effects on the other structural inequalities in Rwanda.

Rural Versus Urban

One of the most apparent inequalities within Rwanda is geographical which is between urban and rural communities and between Kigali and the other provinces. Poverty is three times higher in rural areas than in urban ones, and Kigali has, on average, a poverty rate which is half of those in the other provinces. Nonetheless, socioeconomic impact mitigation measures were urban-biased due to the assumption that urban people were more affected by Covid-19. This approach overlooks the (in) direct impact on poor rural people. For example, an Oxfam survey indicated significant job losses in rural areas (Oxfam 2020).

Furthermore, while the direct economic impact might be slightly lower than in Kigali, the indirect impact is very high. As mentioned above, the elderly peoples living in the villages often rely on family in the city. But, with the loss of jobs, remittances to the village decreased, pushing poor older adults and households deeper into poverty. Although people in rural areas might have been hit less, the high poverty rates imply that they are also less resilient and that the impact of a shock will be higher for them.

Furthermore, rural areas present fewer opportunities to find alternative income-generating activities. For example, the VUP public works program, which provides jobs for rural citizens in the second Ubudehe category, was halted during the lockdown. Although in some districts, advances were paid to beneficiaries of the VUP public works program, this was not the case everywhere.¹⁷ According to trade union representatives, the food distribution programme could have been complemented with agricultural productivity support such as hoes, pangas and seeds.

Another inequality with geographical characteristics is the digital divide and the implications on school children to continue learning despite school closures. Despite the efforts of development partners such as UNICEF to address this challenge, more school children in rural areas did not have access to online or television school programmes.

Gender

According to the UNDP (2020a, 2020b, p. XV): the current crisis threatens to push back the limited gains made on gender equality and exacerbate the feminisation of poverty, vulnerability to violence, and women's equal participation in the labour force. As a result, female-headed households are at a greater risk of being impacted by the adverse effects of the COVID19 crisis; in fact, they could fall into deeper poverty levels and even face extreme poverty.

Women are overly represented in the daily wage labourers and operators or SMEs, two categories which have been badly affected by Covid-19 and related policies (UNDP, 2020a, 2020b, p. XV).

Income

Income inequality will likely increase in Rwanda as many measures favour formal businesses over informal SMEs. While market women received tax exemptions, companies have benefited from tax relief. Urban bias policies would exacerbate income inequality between and within provinces. There have been no measures targeting informal workers, although they represent most of Rwanda’s workforce. Most of them were left to fend for themselves by depleting their savings or diversifying their income. A moto-taxi driver said, “even though we lived badly, we never missed a meal because I looked for another income-generating activity”.

Furthermore, due to informal housing situations and regular movements between Kigali and rural areas, day labourers have been left out of food distribution.

Effect of Covid-19 on Structures and Systems of Power

Whether the people trust or fear their government, Rwandans listen to it and have been following the order regarding masks, washing hands, and staying home (Beaubien, 2020).

Based on our findings, Covid-19 has strengthened existing power systems and reaffirmed state-citizen relations in Rwanda rather than changed them. The centralised response implemented through decentralised government institutions, punitive measures against non-compliance with regulations and control over media is known characteristics of Rwanda's governance system. The high level of compliance by citizens to Covid-19 regulations is embedded in the country's political culture, which is wary of publicly showing discontent and has been infused by the values of togetherness and joint-responsibility because of the post-genocide nation-building discourse. As a result, among respondents from vulnerable groups, there was a high responsibility to follow the restrictions.

The socio-economic policy choices made by the government in response to Covid-19 are embedded in Rwanda's neoliberal growth. A trade union representing the “doing business” model once again prevailed, with huge jobless and related increase in poverty as a result. Moreover, the rush to flatten the curve undermined human rights and civil liberties. The detainment of people for education in stadiums, for instance, was an excessive use of force. The strict control over information, research, and reporting on the impact of Covid-19, which has also had consequences on this research, raises red flags regarding freedom of speech and press.

Another system of power that has been highlighted through Covid-19 has been that between the Rwandan government and international donors. Local CSOS have not been engaged in the policy formulation processes of Covid-19 prevention measure. But they were consulted posterior to share ideas on reactivating specific sectors in a Covid-19-safe way. International donors such as UNDP have, on the other hand, played an essential role in developing the government's response throughout. Unfortunately, this reinforces existing tendencies towards upward accountability rather than accountability towards Rwandan citizens.

From a donor perspective, Rwanda can be seen as a successful case in its fight against Covid-19 as it has flattened the curve relatively quickly. However, the cost of the adopted approach to the poorest and vulnerable has been very high. The civil society and broader population have little political space to voice their concerns, and the media has indicated that while the government has been relatively open about Covid-19 data, they have been much more careful in sharing information about the socioeconomic impact of adopted measures.¹⁸ Critical, independent media trying to dig below the surface have been met with oppression. All the above fall in line with existing systems of power and how Kagame’s regime, which is defined as developmental and, for others, authoritarian, sustains power.

One positive development has been how the pandemic has spurred political activism via social media and its influence over political decision-making. An example is the crimes committed by security officers at the beginning of the lockdown in Kangondo II, an informal settlement in Kigali. On March 26, 2020, security officers raped various women and severely beat several men. Independent YouTube journalists who reported on the event were later arrested for not respecting the Covid-19 regulations. Human Rights Watch has, in response, criticised the government in this statement:

It is unacceptable for Rwanda to use authoritarian tactics to enforce public health measures to contain Covid-19's spread," Lewis Mudge (HRW director for Central Africa) said. "The media crackdown sends a deliberately chilling message at a time when scrutiny of security forces' behaviour is critical.

The government officials including the president were forced to condemn the atrocities following public outrage on social media about the police brutalities. Five police officers related to the crime.¹⁹

Conclusion and Recommendations

The Rwandan government activated its robust health management structures, building on its experience with Ebola and long-term support of development partners. The decentralised governance approach, backed by a strong state, allowed for efficient implementation of mitigation measures. The use of village leaders “who know the vulnerable people” made it possible to coordinate and implement food distribution relatively rapidly and in an orderly fashion. In addition, the government prioritised “flattening the curve” over other socio-economic considerations. The initial nationwide lockdown was eventually eased and replaced by targeted quarantine measures in “transmission hot spots”. The transport of goods, including medicines and agricultural produce, was waivered from restrictions on mobility and essential services. Research respondents largely approved of the measures and primarily complied with them. However, the socioeconomic support provided by the government was disproportionate in terms of the needs of the extremely poor and biased towards formal sector industries and workers, thereby exacerbating existing inequalities.

Food aid distributed by local government officials was insufficient compensation for the loss of income, and the targeting was un-transparent. Similarly, an economic stimulus such as loans was not accessible to SMEs in the informal sector. As a result, most poor people were left to fend for themselves and depleted their savings, while others reduced their food consumption to cope with the hardship.

The strict way in which regulations were enforced and the instrumentalisation of local CSOs as implementers and watchdogs of Covid-19 prevention measures highlighted and, at the same time, exacerbated the country's authoritarian governance style. “Unfortunately, this same governance style also allowed for a quick flattening of the curve” during the first wave, which could be used as a legitimation for restricting human rights and civil liberties in the name of efficient service delivery and development.

The following policy recommendations could be considered.

• Social protection for rural citizens should include agricultural inputs to farmers to increase food security.

• Development partners should also engage with the government to include—on equal footing—local CSOs when designing and implementing crisis responses.

• Targeting by village leaders should be more transparent. While monopolisation increases efficiency; it creates challenges to inclusiveness.

• Pandemic responses should also centre on enhancing human rights, press freedom and transparency.

• Appropriate support measures should be fashioned out for various sectors and social groups.