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From Plaintext-Extractability to IND-CCA Security

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Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13742))

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Abstract

We say a public-key encryption is plaintext-extractable in the random oracle model if there exists an algorithm that given access to the input/output of all queries to the random oracles can simulate the decryption oracle. We argue that the plaintext-extractability is enough to show the indistinguishably under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) of OAEP+ transform (Shoup, Crypto 2001) when the underlying trapdoor permutation is one-way.

We extend the result to the quantum random oracle model (QROM) and show that OAEP+ is IND-CCA secure in QROM if the underlying trapdoor permutation is quantum one-way.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Recently, the classical plaintext-awareness notions PA0, PA1 and PA2 are adopted to the post-quantum setting, however, in the standard model [10].

  2. 2.

    Outputting the smallest (r, m) is a convention to have a correct definition of the projector. Since a random oracle is quantum collision-resistance [17], only with a negligible probability there will be more than one pair satisfying the relation (2).

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Acknowledgment

We would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and suggestions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Luxembourg, Esch-Sur-Alzette, Luxembourg

    Ehsan Ebrahimi

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  1. Ehsan Ebrahimi
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Correspondence to Ehsan Ebrahimi .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Inria and École Polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, Palaiseau, France

    Benjamin Smith

  2. Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada

    Huapeng Wu

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Ebrahimi, E. (2024). From Plaintext-Extractability to IND-CCA Security. In: Smith, B., Wu, H. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13742. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58411-4_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58411-4_19

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