Introduction

Abstract

“I want to go home,” a highly successful documentary series started broadcasting on various Bosnian TV channels in May 2016. The documentary program (Kenović, 2016) features the stories of artists, entrepreneurs, scientists, academics, and other professionals who have built their careers abroad and have now returned “home” to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Scenes of harmonious family life filled with homemade food and drink, breathtaking images of natural landscapes, and the nostalgic sounds of sevdah music are interwoven with the returnees telling their life stories. In the interviews, the participants acknowledge the benefits of greater career opportunities, economic advantages, democratic freedoms, and political stability of living in the West. However, almost every interviewee emphasized how they feel more content as citizens in their country of origin; how they belong there and how they are socially and spiritually more fulfilled in their home environment. The returnees often invoked well-known phrases such as “There’s no place like home,” “Home is where the heart is,” “Home sweet home” or a Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian saying that goes something like “Travel the world, but keep coming back home.” Such expressions seem to have universal appeal, often found dutifully embroidered on handcrafted ornaments stitching together an amalgamation of warmth and comfort. Yet, their direct application to a context of forced migration and displacement, where some returnees were victims of violence, mass expulsions, ethnic cleansing campaigns, and other forms of persecution, while others have endured considerable sacrifices to make their return a reality, seems to be highly questionable. The documentary series also appears to be in line with international community efforts towards diaspora engagement. Countless “diaspora business forums,” networking events and roundtables are being organized by various levels of government to attract investment from members of the BiH diaspora. Faced with a dwindling tax base, because of high unemployment and emigration rates, the BiH authorities are trying to lure the desperately needed investment for job creation. The returnees’ warm and “homely” responses were accepted and not questioned or problematized by the filmmakers, leading me to believe that the popular TV program was made to promote return and not present a more nuanced understanding of it. Unabated by the often overly sentimentalized, and at times saccharine portrayals of warm homecomings, and with my researcher curiosity piqued, I set out to investigate the phenomenon with scholarly rigor and present my findings in this book.

“I want to go home,¹” a highly successful documentary series started broadcasting on various Bosnian TV channels in May 2016. The documentary program (Kenović, 2016) features the stories of artists, entrepreneurs, scientists, academics, and other professionals who have built their careers abroad and have now returned “home” to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Scenes of harmonious family life filled with homemade food and drink, breathtaking images of natural landscapes, and the nostalgic sounds of sevdah music are interwoven with the returnees telling their life stories. In the interviews, the participants acknowledge the benefits of greater career opportunities, economic advantages, democratic freedoms, and political stability of living in the West. However, almost every interviewee emphasized how they feel more content as citizens in their country of origin; how they belong there and how they are socially and spiritually more fulfilled in their home environment. The returnees often invoked well-known phrases such as “There’s no place like home,” “Home is where the heart is,” “Home sweet home,” or a Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian saying that goes something like “Travel the world, but keep coming back home.²” Such expressions seem to have universal appeal, often found dutifully embroidered on handcrafted ornaments stitching together an amalgamation of warmth and comfort. Yet, their direct application to a context of forced migration and displacement, where some returnees were victims of violence, mass expulsions, ethnic cleansing campaigns, and other forms of persecution, while others have endured considerable sacrifices to make their return a reality, seems to be highly questionable. The documentary series also appears to be in line with international community efforts³ towards diaspora engagement. Countless “diaspora business forums,” networking events and roundtables are being organized by various levels of government to attract investment from members of the BiH diaspora. Faced with a dwindling tax base, because of high unemployment and emigration rates, the BiH authorities are trying to lure the desperately needed investment for job creation.⁴ The returnees’ warm and “homely” responses were accepted and not questioned or problematized by the filmmakers, leading me to believe that the popular TV program was made to promote return and not present a more nuanced understanding of it. Unabated by the often overly sentimentalized, and at times saccharine portrayals of warm homecomings, and with my researcher curiosity piqued, I set out to investigate the phenomenon with scholarly rigor and present my findings in this book.

I begin my exploration with a somewhat puzzling situation of voluntary return to a country with one of the largest diasporas relative to the native-born population in the world. Collyer (2013) ranks Bosnia and Herzegovina to be the third country in the world with the highest emigrant population relative to the total population, meaning that 40.4% of its citizens live as emigrants abroad. According to more recent, UNDP and BiH Ministry of Security, estimates between 2 and 2,2 million citizens originating from BiH (UNDP, 2014; BiH Ministry of Security, 2023), or more than one half of the prewar population, currently lives and works abroad. The newer estimates place Bosnia and Herzegovina at the top of the list of net emigration countries (relative to the total population) in Europe. Forced migration during the 1990s wars in the former Yugoslavia, together with overall failures in policies of sustainable refugee return, are mostly responsible for the widely spread BiH diaspora. However, the population movements of the tragic 1990s are not the only culprit. Even after close to three decades of peace and a “failed success” (Bieber, 2015), people of all ethnic backgrounds are leaving this small European country in droves to find employment and opportunity elsewhere. It is difficult to obtain official numbers of people leaving, because there is no legal obligation to de-register residence in BiH. EU sources are indicative. Eurostat data for 2013–2021 register 295,090 first time residence permits issued to BiH citizens in EU countries, with an observed trend of consistent increases from year to year. A politically dysfunctional state structure embedded in a Constitution which was set up to end a war and not to build the foundations for a lasting and prosperous peace; a society deeply divided along ethno-religious fault lines, years of lagging economic growth with high unemployment rates, as well as widespread corruption and nepotism have been some of the main contributing factors to the startling numbers of BiH citizens leaving the country.

Within the general trend of alarming emigration rates, a small number of people are deciding to do exactly the opposite. They are leaving the relatively secure lives they managed to establish for themselves abroad to return and settle in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many of them have been forced to leave their homes during the 1992–95 war, and some are descendants of prewar labor migrants. They have lived in various countries and acquired citizenship of the host state. Now, they have returned to make a life for themselves in the country of their original citizenship. What puzzles is the obvious contradiction. Why would people with apparent alternatives for livelihood be coming back to a country from which so many seem to be desperately running away? What motivation drives their ostensibly “irrational” move from stable Western democracies such as Sweden, Norway, the United States, or Switzerland to a country still recovering from the aftermath of a devastating war? When they return to Bosnia and Herzegovina, what happens to them there? How well do they re-integrate? Is this type of return sustainable and successful? Beyond the romanticized visions presented in a popular television program and international aid efforts channeled towards promoting diaspora return, the puzzle remains. The situation of the returning diaspora is at the core of my study: a country with the highest number of emigrants relative to total population size in Europe is also receiving a small number of voluntary returnees.

This chapter sets the foundation for unlocking this puzzle. I begin by formalizing the research questions driving my investigation. Next, I examine Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “post-conflict society” and unpack what this label means. I outline a brief historical overview of the 1992–95 war, and analyze Bosnia’s constitutional setup established by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The chapter next examines the different types of postwar return migration, including forced return and assisted repatriation, the UNHCR’s efforts at promoting minority return, and the subsequent acceptance of majority return as being the only reality. I trace the evolution of Bosnia’s two-tiered citizenship regime, and discuss the importance of bilateral agreements on dual citizenship with neighboring states. The constitutional institutionalization of ethnic belonging through the “constituent peoples” category is considered in relation to elevating collective, while curtailing individual rights. In parallel, the consistent failures to implementing the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)⁵ Sejdić-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina verdict is problematized. The final two sections of the chapter explain the research methodology, and present the book’s structure.

1.1 Research Questions

The research purpose of this book is both to explain the reasons behind the decision to return to and remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to explore the concepts of emotional citizenship, home, and belonging in relation to voluntary return. To fulfill this purpose, I aim to answer the following research questions:

• 1. Why did the diaspora members choose to return and remain in the home state? What are the main drivers behind their decision(s)? How do they reintegrate?

• 2. What understanding do return migrants have of the ‘emotional dimension’ of BiH citizenship? Which specific emotions do they associate with citizenship?

• 3. What do ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ mean to the returnees? What do they associate these concepts with? Which specific emotions do they convey?

The conceptual framework in Chap. 2 surveys the relevant literature for each theoretical item found within the research questions, which guide all other research tasks. Discussing the return decision and the subsequent reintegration process in Chap. 3 sets the background for an exploration of the second research question on the emotional dimension of citizenship and the set of specific emotions constituting it, presented in Chap. 4. Notions of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ are investigated in Chap. 5. Collectively, results presented in these empirical chapters build the foundation for a lower-level abstraction conceptual model, linking voluntary return migration, citizenship, home, belonging, and a specific set of emotions.

1.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-conflict Society

The war as a “never-ending process” lies at the heart of the continued categorization of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “post-conflict” society. But, is this label justified and what does it mean? On one hand, it is disappointing to keep referring to BiH as a post-conflict society, close to three decades after the signing of a peace agreement that has brought an end to direct warfare. Children born when the Dayton Peace Agreement was put into place are now developing professional careers, starting families and raising their own offspring. These late 20-year-olds have no direct experience of the 1992–95 war, but their lives have been marked by the “post-conflict” label. As a way of comparison, it would have been absurd to refer to BiH as post-conflict in 1975, three decades after the Second World War. Generations entering adulthood around that time certainly did not consider themselves to be living in “post-conflict” times. So, why is the context so different now? The answer lies in the nature of the 1992–95 war and the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended it. Creating ethnically homogenized territories through military means was an objective of warfare. The Dayton Peace Agreement stopped direct conflict and established close to 30 years of peace, but it de facto legalized wartime territorial conquest.

On March 1, 1992, following a referendum and with the support of approximately 64% of its citizens, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence from a collapsing Yugoslavia. The SDS (Srpska demokratska stranka–Serb democratic party), called for Serbs in BiH to boycott the referendum. It is impossible to determine exactly how many Bosnian Serbs actually voted in the referendum and how they voted, as ethnicity was not recorded in voting data. According to the 1991 census, Bosnian Serbs comprised close to 31% of the BiH population and the referendum was largely boycotted in Serb-majority municipalities. These municipalities neither accepted the legitimacy of the BiH government nor the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. With the support of the Yugoslav National Army and Serbia, the Bosnian Serb leadership started an insurgency, making substantial territorial gains and occupying up to 60% of the country. Serb territorial advancement was accompanied by a systematic campaign of “ethnically cleansing” all non-Serb elements, including people, cultural, historical, and religious heritage. The ethnically cleansed territory was firstly named “Srpska Republika Bosne i Hercegovine” (Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and instituted as “Republika Srpska” later on. Mass atrocities committed by Serb forces included the setting up of concentration camps, such as Omarska, Trnopolje, and Keraterm, mass rape, and expulsions of non-Serbs, crimes against humanity, and the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica.⁶ Two years into the war, the Bosnian Croats, supported by Croatia, replicated the Serb example; rejected the central BiH government and set up their own territory within the BiH state, firstly called “Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna” (Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosna) and later known in its abbreviated form as “Herceg-Bosna.” Similar atrocities were carried out on Herceg-Bosna territory, including the setting up of the Dretelj and Heliodrom concentration camps where non-Croat BiH citizens were detained, tortured, and killed.⁷ Originally, the military arm of the central BiH government was a multi-ethnic army (ARBiH-Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine) established to defend BiH sovereignty on its entire, internationally recognized territory. Although not directly comparable with mono-ethnic Serb or Croat forces,⁸ as the war progressed, the ARBiH also strayed from its original multi-ethnic ideal.⁹

For a visual representation of changes in ethnic structure and how the war created ethnically homogenous territories, compare the municipality level census data from the prewar 1991 census to the 2013 census, the last census conducted in postwar BiH.¹⁰ The color (red for Serbs, green for Bosniaks, and blue for Croats) of each municipality is determined by the majority ethnic group. Darker colors show higher majorities, while lighter shades represent lower numerical majorities of a particular ethnicity (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2).

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted for three and a half years and resulted in a thorough and complete devastation of the country, its economy and people, its infrastructure and the fabric of society. According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) over 100,000 people were killed and two million people, which was more than 50% of the B&H prewar population, were forcefully expelled from their homes. The armed conflict ended with the signing of the General Framework Agreement (Office of the High Representative, n.d.), commonly referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), initially agreed upon at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 and officially confirmed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (Fig. 1.3).

Figs. 1.1 and 1.2

BiH census-ethnic composition. (Source: www.statistika.ba. This website compiles and visually displays information for BiH censuses conducted in 1991 and 2013. Original data for these censuses are available from the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and can be found at: https://popis.gov.ba)

Figs. 1.1 and 1.2

(continued)

Fig. 1.3

BiH Administrative Map. (Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina)

Fig. 1.4

Qualitative research cycle. (Adapted from Hennink et al., 2010)

In Annex IV, the Dayton Peace Agreement delivers the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and establishes an ethnically based power-sharing state structure comprising two separate entities and a district. These are the Bosniak-Croat controlled Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), the Serb dominated Republika Srpska (RS) and Brčko district as a self-governing unit under jurisdiction of the sovereign BiH. The territorial breakdown agreed upon in Dayton is 51% for the FBiH and 49% for the RS. The Dayton Constitution envisions four vertical levels of authority in the FBiH: Federation, 10 cantons, cities, and 79 municipalities and two authority levels for the RS: 61 municipalities and Republika Srpska. Both the FBiH and the RS, as well as each canton in the FBiH have their own constitution, presidency, government, parliament, and judiciary. As Bieber (2006) sums it up, power-sharing in BiH operates on three levels: entities, cantons, and the state. When analyzing the definition of consociational power-sharing put forward by Arend Lijphart, Bieber (2006) points to four characteristics of a power-sharing system: grand coalitions, mutual veto rights, proportionality, and segmental autonomy (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 25–44). For example, when looking at the formation of grand coalitions, both the RS and the FBiH require them to include members from all three ethnic groups or constituent peoples. Eight Bosniak, five Croat and three Serb ministers are required in the FBiH, while each one of these ministers needs to have two deputies from the other two ethnic groups. By the same token, there need to be five Bosniak and three Croat ministers in the RS. Power-sharing at the state level is based on entity representation, so that one third of the ministers need to come from the RS and two-thirds from the FBiH (Bieber, 2006). Overall, the entire constitutional structure is overwhelmingly characterized by the ethnicity element: Serb, Croat, and Bosniak, while the highly decentralized state structure of the Dayton Constitution grants the two entities unprecedented levels of autonomy.

The DPA successfully brought an end to the tragedies of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it did not create the foundation for functional governance and prosperity in peacetime. For a country of 3.5 million people, the BiH Constitution envisages fourteen parliaments (state, two entities–FBiH and RS, ten cantons and Brčko district) with fourteen governments and close to two hundred government ministries. While the consociational model of power-sharing (Lijphart, 1977) assumes that ethnic elites will cooperate so that conflicts are managed, the BiH case attests to a reversed outcome of bitter rivalry and deepening divisions, partly aided by the constant involvement of international community representatives. Merdžanović (2015) makes a compelling case for understanding the post-war BiH political system as “imposed consociational democracy” in which the promised benefits of power-sharing, including preventing the “tyranny of majority,” are reversed because of constant foreign intervention creating perverse incentives for ethnic elites. Thus, the reality of the BiH consociational democracy with the added element of a semi-protectorate status results in ethnic elites moving away from accommodation as predicted by Lijphart (1977) and towards further acrimony and extremism (Merdžanović, 2015). Analysts and commentators (see Keil & Perry, 2015) agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina is paralyzed and stuck, unable to find its way out of an ethnonationalist stranglehold. Perhaps their collective view is best summarized here: “None of us would deny that the obscenely ineffective (my emphasis) Dayton set-up of the country is a serious obstacle for any overall improvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Jansen, 2014, p. 88). Twenty-nine years after its signing, the country still struggles with the “straightjacket” (Bieber, 2015) imposed by the Dayton Constitution.

The DPA instituted the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) as responsible for monitoring the peace plan’s implementation and effectively set up the BiH state as an international semi-protectorate. Officially, the High Representative is working with the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in consult with the international community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions,¹¹” In reality, however, the OHR was and still is just one part of the overall international presence in BiH. Thus, BiH’s effective status as an international semi-protectorate was sealed by three compounding factors: an institutionally weak, decentralized and fragmented state structure, the official position of the OHR, and an overwhelming presence of “international community” representatives. As is pointed out by Helms (2013), the “international community” cannot be conceived of as a monolithic entity, but it instead comprises diverse and often competing interests and policy-agendas. However, Western representatives consistently reassert their stated goals of building BiH into a democratic state with full respect for human rights and a functioning market economy, with prospects for future NATO and EU membership.

In economic terms, ever since wartime hostilities ended, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been undergoing a three-fold transition. BiH’s transformation from socialist self-management of the former Yugoslavia to the neoliberal prescriptions of the Washington consensus is comparable to other similar post-socialist countries, particularly those of Central and East Europe. In addition, unlike other post-socialist economies, BiH is making its transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy and from “donor-dependency¹²” (Papić, 2001) to a sustainable economy. Directly after signing the DPA, 80% of BiH’s GDP per capita was lost because of wartime devastation (Pugh, 2002). Also, most of prewar GDP was generated by some twelve large, self-managed enterprises in heavy industry, whose operations were impossible to restart after the war both because of physical assets destruction and direct conditionality imposed by the OHR to break up these large conglomerates and privatize them (Stojanov, 2001). Some scholars, such as Donais (2005) argue that the continuing economic stagnation in BiH can be explained by the failure of neoliberal economic prescriptions, including a criminalized privatization process, and the criminal networks (Andreas, 2004; Festić & Rausche, 2004) of the three main ethnic political parties with their extensive systems of political patronage.

A brief macroeconomic snapshot of the BiH economy is characterized by consistently high unemployment rates, a currency board-induced, constrained monetary environment and a disproportionately high percentage of GDP funneled to public sector spending. The incredibly complicated, dysfunctional, and inefficient public administration created by the Dayton Peace Agreement straddles, burdens and suffocates an economy of only USD 7585 per capita GDP (World Bank, 2023). According to the IMF, the size of the BiH public sector ranks it at the top of countries in the region, with most of its public sector funds spent on current items, such as wages and social transfers to its members. Years of postwar economic stagnation and widespread corruption have led to the overall unemployment rate reaching 29% in 2012, and a more than double youth (15–24 years) unemployment rate of 63,1% (ILO, 2013). The overall unemployment rate has since dropped to 14,9% (World Bank, 2021), while the youth unemployment rate is approximately 39% and still among the highest in the region (World Bank, 2020c). However, the drop in the unemployment rates is not due to job creation, but because of emigration and the decrease in the working-age population. In other words, unemployment rates have decreased not because of people finding jobs in the country, but because they have left to find opportunities abroad. While the currency board arrangement of the Central Bank of BiH fixing the national currency Konvertibilna Marka (KM) to the Euro in an approximately 1:2 ratio is certainly not without its demerits and critics (for example, see Silajdžić, 2005), overall, it has provided much needed price stability and increased confidence in the BiH financial sector.

From a microeconomic perspective, BiH remains to be one of the least business friendly climates, characterized by a cumbersome bureaucracy enabling rampant corruption, tax evasion and a general lack of transparency in business practices. According to the World Bank “Doing Business” reports (World Bank, 2017, 2020a, b), Bosnia and Herzegovina is consistently ranked at the bottom of European lists of favorable business climates and amongst the lowest performing business environments in the world. For example, due to multiple layers of government bureaucracy and long waiting periods, it takes slightly longer than 65 days to start a business in BiH, ranking the country 175th in a list of 190 countries surveyed worldwide. The burden of bureaucratic procedures in the conduct of business operations also gives rise to systemic corruption, which, according to Divjak and Pugh (2008), is a direct product of the Dayton Peace Agreement and its constitutional arrangement. In assessing the BiH corruption context, Divjak and Pugh (2008) are careful to define political corruption as a narrow field of “the abuse of public position for personal or financial gain” (p. 373) distinguishing it from a broad understanding of business corruption “at which accumulators and investors of capital in the core locations of global capitalism have been observed to excel” (p. 373). As Divjak and Pugh (2008) argue, corruption is a direct product of the DPA Constitution and an “absence of a liberal social contract” (p. 374). Governing BiH through a combination of ethnically based power sharing and an international protectorate has created a power vacuum whereby local communities are weakened as international administration shirk responsibility in a supposed state-building effort. Instead of creating a social contract between citizen and state, the depoliticized space of a semi-protectorate is colored by clientelism and ethno-nationalist loyalties, leading scholars to report on BiH as “one of the most corrupt and criminalized spaces in Europe” (Hozić, 2006, p. 818).

The DPA has stopped the 1992–95 war, but, it has de facto legalized wartime territorial conquest. In turn, vindicating the “might makes right” principle has kept Bosnia in a perpetual “post-conflict” society or “frozen conflict” state. In the 7 years of research and writing of this book, the phrase “war by other means” has referred to various phenomena. These ranged from religious intolerance (Rose, 2015), linguistic discrimination in education (Jelin-Dizdar, 2007), to hate speech in public discourse (Žuna, 2018). Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the rapid change in regional geopolitics, the “war by other means” in Bosnia has moved ahead at an accelerating pace, toward further dismantling the DPA and threats of warfare. Some of the most worrying recent developments include the National Assembly of Republika Srpska voting to annul rulings of the BiH Constitutional Court (Dimitrić, 2023) and Milorad Dodik, the RS President, issuing a decree that permits the RS to ignore any decisions made by the OHR (RFE/RL Balkan Service, 2023). The BiH Constitutional Court and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) are the two pillars of the Dayton Peace Agreement, so undermining these two institutions is a direct threat to sustained peace in Bosnia. The background of the current crisis is a battle for BiH state property, which Milorad Dodik insists on resolving through an “inter-entity agreement.” Regulating BiH state property through such an agreement would effectively lead to further dismantling of the BiH state. This outcome would serve the Croat nationalist agenda as it would aid their effort to push through with further election reform in the Federation of BiH with the ultimate goal of “carving out a Croat quasi-entity” (Bassuener et al., 2023, p. ii). The deliberation on whether BiH could be called a “post-conflict” society is still useful, because it is absurd that Bosnia has had close to three decades of peace and has still kept the “post-conflict” label. However, given the persistent “war through other means” and the dizzying array of recent political events, just keeping the” post” in “post-conflict,” and not moving to direct conflict and renewed violence, could also be consider a success, or better said, another instance of “failed success” (Bieber, 2015).

1.3 The BiH Diaspora and Post-war Return Migration

Bosnia and Herzegovina has had a long history of emigration going back to the nineteenth century (Oruč et al., 2019), temporary labor migration during the 1960s and 1970s with the war causing the largest wave of forced migration from the country in the 1990s. Even two decades after the war, BiH continues to be a net emigration country with the trend of emigration changing to encompass both unskilled and highly skilled labor, causing both a demographic problem and a significant “brain drain” problem. According to BiH authorities, during the 1948–1991, an estimated 729,424 people from Bosnia and Herzegovina have emigrated to countries of Western Europe, Canada, the U.S. and Australia, mainly as labor migrants. Germany was a preferred destination for Yugoslav labor migrants, close to half a million of them (Gastarbeiter), with tens of thousands originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Valenta & Ramet, 2011). Most of the labor migrants from the prewar period have since changed their temporary residence statuses and permanently settled in the various host countries. Undoubtedly, the years 1992–1995 have seen the largest outflows of population from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Valenta and Ramet (2011) divide the war caused exodus into two waves: the beginning of the war in 1992 and the period following the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995. Table 1.1 presents a summary of the numbers of refugees and their destination countries.

Table 1.1 Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992–1995

Emigration from Bosnia and Herzegovina continued after the war with family reunification and persistent labor migration. Eurostat data for 2013–2021 indicate 295,090 first time residence permits issued to BiH citizens in EU countries, with an observed trend of consistent increases from year to year. Particularly worrisome are the numbers of young, working-age people leaving the country. According to World Bank (2020c), 30% of those who left in 2018 were aged 18–35. Construction workers, drivers, mechanics, and technicians of various branches are leaving and creating labor shortages of these professions in Bosnia. Young people are leaving as soon as they graduate from university, but experienced professionals, especially medical staff, are also leaving (World Bank, 2020c). The continued emigration process is further aided by treaties on employment established between BiH and Slovenia, as well as BiH and Germany. These treaties significantly facilitate the employment of particular professionals, such as medical doctors and staff, engineers and technicians, computer programmers and IT personnel (IOM, 2022). The World Bank (2020c) projects that by 2050, due to a combination of increasing emigration, and a declining birth rate, the total population of BiH will shrink by approximately 20%, from 3.5 million to about 2.7 million. According to that estimate, it is expected that by 2050, 30% of the population will be of retirement age.

It is difficult to provide exact numbers of emigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, because currently, state statistics only keep track of people whose place of birth was in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus not accounting for the second and third generation. Valenta and Ramet (2011) also point to the discrepancies in how BiH emigrants are registered in the receiving countries as a source of inadequate data. Some host countries exclude naturalized migrants from their statistics, others record immigrants based on their citizenship, while some keep track of immigrants’ origins based on their place of birth. According to BiH authorities (BiH Ministry of Security, 2023), the total number of BiH emigrants, including the second and third generations, is between 2 and 2,2 million people (Table 1.2).

Table 1.2 Global distribution of the BiH diaspora–Top 20 host states

When considering postwar return migration to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (2005) assert, it is important to emphasize the “contradiction in the DPA between the partition of Bosnia into de facto mono-ethnic spaces and the peace plan’s guarantee that the displaced could return to their prewar homes” (p. 582). On the one hand, the two entities have been formed because of ethnic cleansing and genocide and the peace treaty itself more or less legalized the status quo established by war, while the peace agreement seemingly provided for the tenuous possibility of reversing the effects of war. The right of return is provided in Annex 7, Chapter 1, Article 1 of the Dayton Peace Agreement: “All refugees and displaced persons have the right to freely return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.” The glaring contradiction inherent in the Dayton Peace Agreement was additional compounded by the fact that the security of return of minorities was entrusted to the same authorities responsible for their expulsions in wartime (Alvarez, 2015). Despite the obvious contradictions, the return of refugees and displaced persons to their prewar homes was viewed by the international community as essential to the viability of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multiethnic state (Stefansson, 2006).

Key to rebuilding BiH’s prewar multiethnic composition was the concept of “minority returns,”—the return of displaced persons and refugees to areas where they would now be in a numerical minority, according to their ethnicity. However, the actual dynamic of return was such that favored “majority return” from abroad, most intensely during the first two years after the war (Pašić, 2015). The initial intensity of return in the first couple of years after armed conflict ended was also aided by Germany’s policy on forced repatriation. Germany, according to Black (2002), had no choice but to force the return of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of the disproportionate burden of hosting refugees (see Table 1.1). The refugees that came back during this initial period of involuntary return, confronted the reality of “monoethnic areas of control as entities and cantons” (Bieber, 2006, p. 31). Due to a stagnant economy and generally resentful attitudes expressed towards returnees by the stayees, return was difficult for all refugees and displaced persons, however, minority returnees had the additional challenge of direct discrimination and physical attacks. In addition, although the DPA formally enshrined the “right to return” in its Annex 7, minority return was actively discouraged and prevented by nationalist leaders in order to preserve ethnic homogenization of territories (for more, see Lippman, 2019).

According to figures provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the main organization in charge of refugee return, the refugee return process could be divided into three phases. The first phase involved the return of over 500,000 people to their places of origin during the first five postwar years (1996–2000). During this time, it was recognized that most of the returnees were majority returnees and, in response, international efforts were gathered around the specific policies and funding support for minority return. Close to 470,000 people were repatriated as part of the second phase of return, with their property restituted and restored under the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP). In places where minority returnees were left to themselves, life became increasingly difficult (Mayne, 2015; Eastmond, 2006; Tuathail & O’Loughlin, 2009, Dahlman & Ó Tuathail 2005). They had to face a combination of ethnically based violence, intimidation, and discrimination, as well as economic hardship. As a result, many could not stay. The third and final phase of return more or less accepted the de facto realities of ethnic divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, many of the most vulnerable displaced persons were assisted in their current places of displacement, with the implicit understanding that they could never actually return to their prewar homes (Mayne, 2015).

Although the Dayton Peace Agreement in its Annex 7 provided the legal and institutional framework for postwar return of refugees and displaced persons, its actual implementation did not have long-term success. The low numbers of people who returned, compared to the initial projections of the UNHCR, are a very clear indicator of failed policies (Black, 2002). Some of the displaced chose not to return because of traumas incurred during the war and a prolonged sense of insecurity, while others because of financial limitations and lack of job opportunities in BiH (Pašić, 2015). Many of the minority returnees simply returned to restore their property, sell it and move back, either to their residence abroad or the area of the country where they are part of an ethnic majority. Tuathail and O’Loughlin (2009) cite the pessimistic conclusions of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights which state that “BiH is today divided into almost ethnically pure territories, while consequences of war migrations have only deepened through long standing obstructions and administrative barriers of authorities at all levels” (p. 1049). The failure of return policies to reverse ethnic cleansing and allow the displaced to settle back to their prewar homes can also be illustrated by the protracted internal displacement of around 8500 people, housed in some 100 collective centers throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, even two decades after the war (Meyerhoefer, 2015).

To understand the failures to implement the Annex 7 provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement, it is important to compare and contrast minority/majority return with sustainable return. As Eastmond (2006) points out, the success of return was to a great extent determined by economic opportunities, even with majority return. In other words, even if the returnee faces no direct obstacles for social integration due to his/her ethnicity, still the economic reality of nearly every other person of working age being unemployed looms large. According to UNHCR estimates, 93% of property lost in the war was restituted by May 2005. However, the number of formally registered returnees is much higher than the number of actual physical returns (Eastmond, 2006). Therefore, people merely returning to reclaim or reconstruct their property, whether they belong to ethnic majorities or minorities, cannot be considered as sustainable. Sustainable return implies the possibility of returnees to generate an income; provide a livelihood for their families and “build communities in conditions of geographic or social marginalization” (Dahlman & Ó Tuathail 2005, p. 582). Despite success in property restitution, sustainable return in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whether majority or minority return, remains to be an overall failure. Eastmond (2006) aims to shed further light on the minority/majority vs. sustainable return, by emphasizing the need for a “(re)conceptualization of return” (p. 144), in which scholars would develop alternative understandings of return that would not be necessarily “permanent and place-bound” (p. 144).

1.4 Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Present-day BiH citizenship is largely a product of historical development, marked by Bosnia belonging to various empires and the more recent Bosnian republican citizenship regime within the former Yugoslavia. Sarajlić (2010a) presents a thorough historical overview of BiH citizenship from Ottoman times to Dayton (also see Sarajlić, 2010b, 2012), with two main stages in development identified as particularly relevant for a better understanding of the current Dayton citizenship regime. First, as Bosnia and Herzegovina was consistently incorporated into larger empires and states, such as the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the citizenship of BiH was also situated within a wider context which effectively prevented an independent development of a citizenship regime. Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1463 to 1878, Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1878 to 1918 and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1943. Second, although some of the first elements of an independent BiH citizenship began developing during the reign of Austria-Hungary, it was within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first republican citizenship regime was established. As Shaw and Štiks (2012) astutely observe, post-Yugoslav states offer a unique opportunity for the study of citizenship from at least three different perspectives: post-socialist, post-partition, and post-conflict.

From a citizenship perspective, it could be argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most complicated one of the post-Yugoslav states, as it is the only one that does not have a core ethnic group. Thus, most relevant to a current study of BiH citizenship regarding its SFRY legacy is the simultaneous presence of federal and republican citizenships within the SFRY. As the SFRY functioned as a federation of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), an individual citizen of the SFRY was at the same time a citizen of one of its constituent republics. Yugoslav federalism combined with a lack of an overriding nation, led to a “multilevel and bifurcated” (Medvedović, 1998 as cited in Sarajlić, 2012) SFRY citizenship. This feature of the SFRY citizenship regime is to find a clear echo later on in the Dayton “two-tiered” model of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Dayton Constitution of BiH establishes a two-tiered citizenship model with a state and entity level, whereby each citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a citizen of either Republika Srpska or the Federation of BiH. The BiH citizenship regime is presented in Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the Constitution and further regulated in the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-C-S: Zakon o državljanstvu Bosne i Hercegovine, 2016). According to the legal framework, the “entity citizenship” of a BiH citizen is determined by the pre-war place of residence, unless the citizen’s current place of residence is the other entity. Citizens of the Brčko District, an area not under direct jurisdiction of either entity, choose which entity (RS or FB&H) citizenship they prefer (Štiks, 2011). Džankić (2015) argues that the two-tiered model of B&H citizenship is derived from BiH being composed as an asymmetrical federation in which the territorial autonomy of the two entities is supplemented by a consociation power-sharing of the three ethnic groups (Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs) or “constituent peoples” as they are referred to in the Constitution.

As the BiH Constitution is part of the Dayton Peace Agreement, it is the result of a negotiated compromise reached to end a devastating war. However, this compromise was not attained through internal political bargaining, but as Džankić (2015) rightly points out, imposed from outside and, besides Bosnia and Herzegovina, also ratified by Croatia and Serbia. Consequently, as Sarajlić (2012) asserts, neither the BiH Constitution nor the ensuing citizenship regime was created to grant full-scale civil rights and liberal stipulations of membership. Guzina (2007) views the BiH Constitution as incorporating two opposing forces. On one hand, within the constitution, emphasis is placed on integrating elements such as democratization, market reform, and human rights, while exclusionary definitions of “national community” (p. 228) serve as disintegrating factors. Central to the debate on the BiH Constitution is the notion of “constituent peoples,” which can have an exclusionary and disintegrating impact on BiH citizenship.

The symbolic dimension of BiH citizenship, expressed through such elements as the flag, coat of arms, and the national anthem, has gone through several changes. Kolsto (2006) presents a thorough historical overview of developments related to the BiH flag and coat of arms, while the evolution of the BiH national anthem is covered in detail by Džankić (2016). The 1992 flag and coat of arms with the fleur de lis upon white background motif was chosen by the BiH leadership because it had historical roots in the Bosnian Kotromanić dynasty from pre-Ottoman times. Stefan Kotromanić, declared himself King of the Serbs, Bosnia and the Coastland in 1376, later augmenting his title with the “King of Dalmatia and Croatia.” Therefore, a symbolic association with the Kotromanićs was supposed to appeal equally to all three ethnic groups (Kolsto, 2006). However, this intent was not materialized. Instead, during the 1992–1995 war, both Croats and Serbs engaged in conflict under their own ethnic symbols. The Serbs used a Serbian red, white and blue flag with a cross and four Cyrillic S letters, spelling the acronym “Samo sloga Srbe spašava – Only unity saves the Serbs,” while the Croats resorted to the Croatian checkerboard flag. The originally proposed fleur de lis flag, which was intended to have supraethnic characteristics was thus ethnicized as only the Bosniak identified with it. Instead of becoming a symbol of a unified state identity, it also became symbolic of division (Kolsto, 2006).

After the DPA was signed, it became necessary to abandon the fleur de lis flag as the official BiH flag and choose another one with which all three ethnic groups could identify. In 1997, the BiH state parliament began working on selecting a new flag, however, after consistently failing to agree mainly because of Serb opposition, the Peace Implementation Council held in Bonn, Germany authorized the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, to manage a compromise and impose a state flag for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The intent was similar to the original fleur de lis motif—find a symbol that would be unifying for all three ethnic groups, but this time turning to the future instead of the past. The adopted design for the flag and coat of arms was a futuristic, highly stylized image of a yellow triangle, representing the geographic shape of the country, rimmed by stars representing the European Union (Kolsto, 2006). Although this flag was and still is meant as unifying for the country, its artificiality bothered even Sarajevo-based intellectuals led by the philosopher Muhamed Filipović, who deemed the flag “the final way to kill the nation” (Kolsto, 2006; Filipović, 2008). The current BiH state flag can be seen widely displayed only in Bosniak-dominated parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Croat and Serb ethnic flags continue to be used in other areas (see Bougarel et al., 2007; Jansen, 2015 or Palmberger, 2016).

The BiH national anthem underwent a similar set of changes, all designed to act in a unifying, nation-building direction. Džankić (2016) presents a brief historical overview of the evolution of the BiH national anthem and developments that led to the present situation where this anthem is one of four national anthems, together with those of Spain, San Marino and Kosovo, with only a melodic sequence and without an accompanying text. As the wartime BiH national anthem Jedna si jedina (You are the one and only) was criticized for excluding the Serbs and Croats, analogously to the flag, in 1999, the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp imposed a national anthem that was supposed to be unifying. Since then, numerous attempts were made to reach political consensus on lyrics to the national anthem. Although each proposal included references to a shared future, deliberately excluding any ethnic elements, until now, attempts at finding common ground for lyrics of the anthem have been consistently failing. As Džankić (2016) concludes “failure to adopt the lyrics of the national anthem is reflective of the ethnic divisions that have fractured the citizenship of this country, both as an identity of the state and as a community of membership” (p. 10). Džankić (2016) cites the results of the Ipsos (2011) survey, which illustrates this conclusion, whereby only 5% of Serbs, 35% of Croats and 68% of Bosniaks favor the national anthem.

To further complicate citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina is dual citizenship with the neighboring states of Croatia and Serbia. As stipulated by the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH citizens can become dual citizens of those states with which B&H has signed bilateral agreements on dual citizenship. At the time of writing, these agreements have been signed with Croatia, Serbia, and Sweden. Most of the Serbs in BiH are also citizens of Serbia, while most of the BiH Croats are simultaneously citizens of Croatia. This is not only an issue in terms of citizenship as legal status but also one of identity, national belonging, and membership. The issue of “national home” is thorny for various countries of East and Central Europe, as there are numerous examples of core ethnic groups residing in neighboring countries, such as the Hungarians in Romania or the Russians in Belarus. Similarly, many, if not most, Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina consider Croatia to be their “national home”, with the BiH Serbs affiliating the meaning of “national home” with Serbia (Štiks, 2011). However, differently from other examples of cross border national affiliation in other European countries, both Serbs and Croats are also “constituent peoples” of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1.5 “Constituent Peoples”: Ethnic Belonging Institutionalized in the DPA Constitution

The BiH citizenship regime derived from the Dayton Peace Agreement prioritizes the notion of “constituent peoples”, i.e. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs over all other minority groups such as Jews, Roma or BiH citizens who do not wish to align with either of the three constituent peoples. Territoriality and power-sharing through consociation, the two organizing principles inherent in the DPA, act as elements of stability and of exclusion. The intention of the power-sharing consociation is stability, while its unintended consequence is exclusion of all those who do not fit into the narrowly defined constituent peoples. Štiks (2011) vividly illustrates this situation by looking at how the three members of the B&H Presidency are elected. The Serb representative is elected from the Republika Srpska, while the Croat and Bosniak representatives come from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This means that a Bosniak citizen living in the RS could not vote for a Bosniak representative. Similarly, a Serb citizen living in the FBiH could not vote for a Serb representative. Guzina (2007) accurately summarizes this problem to a minority-majority discourse, whereby full citizenship rights are granted only to the citizen, fortunate enough to belong to the majority group living within the territory of any given entity. In addition, although the BiH Constitution recognizes a category of “Others” which lies outside of the constituent peoples, it also stipulates that the “others” are not eligible to be elected to the state Presidency or other ethnically defined positions of authority.

Obvious discrimination within the B&H Constitution leads to the well-documented Sejdić-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina case at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Dervo Sejdić, a Roma citizen of BiH and Jakob Finci, ethnically Jewish, filed a complaint with the ECtHR regarding the discriminatory nature of the BiH Constitution, which makes them ineligible for a post at the BiH Presidency or the House of Peoples simply because they are not affiliated with any of the BiH constituent peoples. The ECtHR’s verdict recognized the discrimination ingrained in the BiH Constitution both as it relates to non-constituent peoples and to members of constituent people who reside in an entity in which they are not part of the majority ethnic group. The court judged that the Dayton constitutional setup of Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to be changed in order to grant equal political rights to all citizens of the state, independent of their ethnic origin or their entity citizenship. Once again, it is important to reiterate that the DPA Constitution was instituted to end a horrendous war with military, political, and economic pressure from the international community. Any changes to the Constitution would need a similar amount of political will within the country, in addition to support from the international community. Consequently, the Sejdić-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina case ruling had “virtually no effects” (Džankić, 2015, p. 527). The paralysis in the distribution of political rights caused by the notion of “constituent peoples” enshrined in the Constitution continues.

Elevating collective rights of the three ethnic groups, the constituent peoples, in B&H comes at a severe cost of curtailing the individual rights of citizens. What becomes apparent is that the BiH constitution strongly favors a communitarian consociation, championing collective, ethnic belonging over a liberal, individual-based understanding of rights. According to many observers, this dynamic serves to push Bosnia and Herzegovina into a “quicksand of discriminatory, illiberal political and social practices” (Mujkić, 2007, p. 112). The BiH Constitution does not allow an individual citizen to be non-affiliated with any ethnic group, meaning that the “liberal right to exit” is missing. (Guzina, 2007) In other words, a person can be either a Serb, or a Croat, or a Bosniak, or a member of the “Others” group, with entity citizenship determined by residence, which often coincides with the ethnic group since Serbs overwhelmingly live in the RS and Bosniaks and Croats live in the FBiH. But she or he cannot just be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The absolute dominance of the “ethnic principle” in organizing any and every sphere of life in BiH has led some analysts to conclude that living in Bosnia and Herzegovina implies that “Here we do not live as human beings, but as Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks” (Miodrag Živanović as cited in Mujkić, 2007, p. 118).

In multiple verdicts, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)¹³ has called for changes to the BiH constitution to reform BiH’s ethnic-based election model in favor of a model with equality of all citizens. In fact, these changes should, according to the ECtHR, move towards abolishing the “constituent peoples” category as it stands contrary to fundamental values of the European Union.¹⁴ For example, Paragraph 43 of the ECtHR ruling in Zornić vs. Bosnia Herzegovina (Application 3681/06):

43. In Sejdić and Finci the Court observed that when the impugned constitutional provisions were put in place a very fragile ceasefire was in effect on the ground and that the provisions were designed to end a brutal conflict marked by genocide and “ethnic cleansing” (see ibid., § 45). The nature of the conflict was such that the approval of the “constituent peoples” was necessary to ensure peace (ibid.). However, now, more than eighteen years after the end of the tragic conflict, there could no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the contested constitutional provisions. The Court expects that democratic arrangements will be made without further delay. In view of the need to ensure effective political democracy, the Court considers that the time has come for a political system which will provide every citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the right to stand for elections to the Presidency and the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination based on ethnic affiliation and without granting special rights for constituent people to the exclusion of minorities or citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the Zornić case, the ECtHR asks not only for equality of all BiH citizens but also the elimination of the “constituent people” as an outdated concept rooted in the ceasefire signed to stop warfare. Most recently, the ECtHR has affirmed the same position in the case of Kovačević vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Sejdić-Finci, Zornić, Pilav, Pudarić, and Šlaku cases treat passive voting rights, the rights to be elected, while the Kovačević case addresses active voting rights. However, the ECtHR rulings in all six cases express the same position towards the BiH Constitution. According to the ECtHR, the BiH constitution needs to change to eliminate discrimination inherent in a combination of territorial and ethnic constraints. In addition, the ECtHR ruling in the Kovačević case is landmark, as it effectively calls for the creation of one electoral unit on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Twenty-nine years have passed since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which gave Bosnia Herzegovina its Constitution and the current citizenship regime. Given the unduly complex, inefficient, illiberal and discriminatory features of this constitution, a legitimate question to ask would be whether there is a possibility for constitutional reform? Would it be possible to use the peacetime to instigate constitutional change that would make Bosnia and Herzegovina a more functional state and its citizenship regime more democratic, liberal and inclusive? It is difficult to speculate, since, on the one hand, the Dayton Peace Agreement is there to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragile peace and however challenging state-building efforts, yet it does not provide the institutional setup for a truly prosperous society. According to some scholars (Džankić, 2015; Mujkić, 2007), it is the problem of collective rights enshrined in the BiH Constitution together with ethnic oligarchies who derive all their power from such constitutional arrangements that lie as the greatest obstacle to any substantial constitutional reform and a consequent change in the BiH citizenship regime.

1.6 Research Methodology

The research methodology of my study is firmly situated within the interpretivist scientific paradigm, according to which social reality cannot simply be observed; it needs to be understood and interpreted. Ontologically, the interpretivist paradigm is both constructed and relativist, in the sense that the constructed realities vary among people, groups, and cultures. In epistemological terms, the paradigm is non-dualist and non-objective, as I, as the researcher, and my object of study are not independent from each other, but rather interdependent. Methodologically, my study follows the guidelines of interpretivism, according to which interaction between scholar and object of study is empathetic, and qualitative research methods are used (Corbetta, 2003). Thus, the knowledge produced inductively ‘emerges’ from the reality studied (Creswell, 2007). However, if one rigorously adheres to induction as the guiding principle for qualitative research, the issue that appears is whether a theoretically-rooted research question should guide inquiry or should the research participants, themselves, define the research problem? A debate exists whether data collection and its subsequent analysis should be inductively conducted or should there be a conceptual framework, summarized within a research question (set of research questions), to drive the research process?

The debate on the role of deductive reasoning within the interpretivist paradigm had some opponents advocating for “ethnomethodological indifference” where all previous knowledge of social reality needs to be ignored. Some authors, such as Bogdan and Biklen (2007), argue against a predetermined research design and instead allow for a research design “in which the questions to be asked and the data to be collected emerge in the process of doing research” (p. 79). Also. early versions of grounded theory, as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) were strictly against the hypothetico-deductive view and proposed a completely inductive, “tabula rasa” approach to data collection, analysis and theory development (Kelle, 2005). On the other hand, many authors (Tesch, 1990; Bazeley, 2013; Hennink et al., 2010) advocate for a mixture of deduction and induction in qualitative research.

My study relies on mixing deductive reasoning within an overall inductive structure and it includes three interlinking cycles: research design, data collection and data analysis, summarized in Fig. 1.4.

The following sections of the chapter provide detailed explanations of each cycle of the research process, with particular attention paid to ethical considerations throughout the research project.

1.6.1 Research Design

The deductive conceptual framework produced in the research design cycle incorporates the existing literature and theory and provides the basis for a set of expectations, representing the etic or external perspective. The etic perspective is summarized within a conceptual framework and a resulting set of research questions. In other words, I defined the theoretical problem and formulated the research questions based on a literature review summarized in the Conceptual Framework (Chap. 2). The theoretically-rooted research questions drove all further inquiry, including the choice of fieldwork approach and the design of the interview guide. As my project progressed, inductive and deductive reasoning interacted actively. For example, although the interview guide was created in reference to the conceptual framework, as the interviews progressed, I kept making inductive inferences (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Hennink et al., 2010) allowing for deeper investigation into the most pertinent issues. So, each subsequent interview was informed by the content of the previous one and my field notes.

1.6.2 Data Collection

Completing the tasks in the research design cycle set the foundation for the creation of a research instrument, i.e. the interview guide, which was initially deductively derived and modified throughout data collection by inductive inferences. Data were primarily collected through in-depth interviews and participants were recruited according to the set criteria. To generate richness of data and to invite study participants to tell their own stories, interview questions were phrased as open questions, each followed by topic probes as suggested by Bogdan and Biklen (2007). The goal of the topic probes was to provide substance to the more abstract concepts such as emotions and citizenship, belonging and home. In addition to conducting the interviews, I kept writing field notes and a reflective journal, both of which were used for verification in later stages of the project.

The principle of theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) guided the number of participants to be recruited. Strauss and Corbin (1998) provide a formal definition of theoretical saturation to be “the point in category development at which no new properties, dimensions or relationships emerge during analysis” (p. 143). Thus, whenever data are collected through theoretical sampling, this means that the researcher will “go to places, people or events that will maximize opportunities to discover variation among concepts and to densify categories in terms of their properties and dimension” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 201). Although the principle of “theoretical saturation” is useful on a conceptual level, practical guidelines on how many participants need to be included in the sample are not entirely clear and the most frequent advice is “it depends” (Baker & Edwards, 2012, p. 43). Guest et al. (2006), also show how sample sizes in qualitative research are highly variable with theoretical saturation reached at much smaller sample sizes than initially projected. A notable exception from the general lack of methodological guidelines on adequate sample size for qualitative research is Creswell (2007), who advises conducting 20–40 in-depth interviews in the case of a typical grounded theory study. My study heeded both the principle of theoretical saturation and a generic “rule of thumb” set by Creswell (2007), so a sample size of 35 participants was finally set.

To collect data, thirty five in-depth interviews were conducted during summer and fall of 2017 in cities and towns throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. During my fieldwork, I was based in Sarajevo and made trips to the various places where the study participants live and work. From Sarajevo, I travelled to Prijedor, Banja Luka, Kozarac, Sanski Most, Velika Kladuša, Trebinje, Ljubuški, Mostar, Nevesinje, Derventa, Gračanica, Maglaj, Počitelj, Jajce and Srebrenica. Most of the interviews were held either at the participant’s home or office. Sometimes, due to complicating family circumstances, such as a small child, some interviews were held in a neighboring café. Each interview was set up by e-mailing the Recruitment Letter and a followup telephone call, both of which allowed for the formation of an initial positive rapport. Trust between myself and each individual study participant was further strengthened once I explained the ethical dimensions of the project and the purpose of the Informed Consent Form. Prior to the beginning of the interview, I explained the interview structure, which comprised collecting demographic information involving short questions and answers, followed by the in-depth, second part of the interview, lasting approximately one hour to ninety minutes.

In addition to in-depth interviews, data were collected by keeping a log of field notes and a reflective journal. As suggested by Bogdan and Biklen (2007), I used field notes to provide accurate descriptions of “people, objects, places, events, activities and conversations” (p. 118) which were part of the fieldwork experience. Whenever possible, the field notes were accompanied by a visual record of the interview setting. To increase rigor of the qualitative study and reveal any potential biases, I also kept a daily reflective journal, in which I tried as much as possible “to reflect on analysis, method and ethical dilemmas of the study” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007, p. 122), but ended up mostly writing about my own feelings related to data collection, reactions, assumptions and expectations. Being so close to the research subject certainly is helpful because it provides greater insight, access and ultimately potential for scholarly contribution, but it also invites several unwanted byproducts such as the possibilities for bias or lack of analytical rigor. Although the field notes and reflective journal were not used as formal data sources during the analytical cycle of the project, both data sources contributed to the analysis by giving an objective context to the interview (the descriptive field note) and a subjective one (the reflective field note–reflective journal entry), thus helping to resolve the aforementioned potential problems resulting from my proximity and familiarity with the case. For example, here is my field note from Jajce, where I interviewed Marija.

Field note 33

September 13, 2017

After saying goodbye to Ema in Derventa, I boarded a bus to Banja Luka. When I asked the driver to let me off at the Tabaco Factory, pronouncing as it is pronounced in Sarajevo (Fabrika duhana), he pretended not to understand what I was talking about. He ‘understood’ me once I used a more Serb-sounding pronunciation of Fabrika duvana. I stayed the night in Banja Luka in a Youth Hostel called ‘Havana,’ located on the First Krajina Corpus Avenue.

Today I am in Jajce, where there are all town celebrations of September 13, the “Day of Jajce’s Liberation.” I saw officers dressed in uniforms of the HVO (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane-Croatian Defense Council), but also official HV uniforms (Hrvatska vojska-Croatian Army). The celebrations are accompanied by Marko Perković–Thompson songs, such as the infamous ‘Čavoglave.’ The waiter at the restaurant where I had lunch told me that the Bosniak side is organizing similar festivities to mark their own liberation of Jajce. Even with all the celebrations and festivities going on, the taxi driver informed me that people, people of all ethnic groups, were leaving Jajce en masse. Entire families are emigrating because they cannot provide for their basic needs in Jajce. These people are searching for their happiness somewhere far, far away from here. I also saw many different flags, some affirming and others contesting BiH sovereignty and its territorial integrity.

Jajce, September 13, 2017—“Flags on Sale”

(As the liberation festivities were ongoing, an entrepreneurial vendor made sure that a wide range of political sensitivities were well-represented in his offer. From left to right: BiH flag used during wartime, former Yugoslav flag, current flag of the Republic of Croatia, current flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the wartime flag of “Herceg Bosna.”)

Jajce, September 13, 2017—“Contesting Sovereignty”—the BiH Flag (lower) and the “Herceg Bosna” Flag (higher)

The study participants are members of the BiH diaspora/transmigrants, who have lived abroad for a period of time ranging from five to 30+ years and who have voluntarily returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is meant by “voluntary return” is that the element of actual free choice is present in the decision to come back to the home country. The returnees in my study were not under any pressure to make this decision either from the host or home country. They could have easily continued to live and work in the host country from a legal, political, social, economic or even cultural perspective, as most of them are dual citizens, active voters in the host country, educated abroad, socially and culturally well-integrated with a developed career and economic wellbeing created in the host country. In addition, their return was not in any way compelled by home country factors, such as aging parents and the need for their care. Their return was entirely self-organized, so their decision to return was not in any way incentivized either from the host or home country. For example, they were not part of any assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) or talent attraction programs. Each one of these markers was carefully considered when evaluating whether they, in fact, voluntarily decided to return or whether extraneous circumstance or some type of outside force made this decision for them. Recruiting study participants based on voluntariness of return is key because it allows for providing a meaningful answer to the question of motivation and to producing sound explanations of their decision.

Research for this study was conducted to allow for maximal variation along the broad demographic categories: citizenship status, host country, ethnicity and current residence in BiH. To provide for greatest diversity according to citizenship status, 34 participants are BiH citizens and one participant is in the process of getting BH citizenship; 14 participants are single citizenship holders, 19 participants have dual citizenship, while two participants have triple citizenship. According to the host country: Germany–8, US–7, Switzerland–4, Turkey–3, Australia–2, Italy–2, Norway–2, Multiple (Croatia and Montenegro; Serbia and Argentina)–2, Argentina–1, Austria–1, Holland–1, Serbia–1, Slovenia–1. Looking at the ethnic composition of the sample: 15 participants are Bosniak, two are Croat, five are Serb and 13 participants declared themselves to belong to the Others/BiH citizens category. In relation to the participant’s current residence in B&H, Sarajevo (FBH)–12, East Sarajevo (RS)–1, Prijedor (RS)–4, Banja Luka (RS)–1, Sanski Most (FBH)–1, Kozarac (RS)–2, Velika Kladuša (FBH)–1, Trebinje (RS)–2, Ljubuški (FBH) -1, Počitelj (FBH) -1, Mostar (FBH)–1, Nevesinje (RS) -1, Derventa (RS) -2, Gračanica (FBH)–1, Maglaj (FBH) -1, Jajce (FBH) -1, Srebrenica (RS) -2. The choice of residence is relevant both for analyzing minority vs. majority return and rural vs. urban return. Also, the current residence criteria allowed for examining variation within the same ethnicity, including regional variation and intra-ethnic conflict.¹⁵ For example, enlightening insights could be reached by comparing perspectives of a Croat from Bosnia with a Croat from Herzegovina or a Bosniak from Sanski Most with a Bosniak from Velika Kladuša.

Other relevant demographic criteria driving the selection of study participants were age, gender, religion, level of religiosity, majority vs. minority return, educational level, marital status, and income level. All the study participants are of working age, between 30 and 55 years. This criteria is important for a deeper examination of the motivation for return. The decision to return involved a considerable amount of financial risk for each study participant, because they are neither still in school nor have they attained retirement abroad. Variation in the time spent abroad included those who have only been abroad for 5 years, all the way to 30+ years. Also, their time of return varied from one to 21 years. 24 of the participants are men and nine are women. Variation in marital and family status is also present in the sample, with 23 participants being married with children, four divorced either with or without children, and eight participants who are single. Looking at citizenship from the perspective of either majority or minority return is highly relevant for this project, so 14 participants are minority returnees, while 21 are majority returnees. While 22 interviewees are Muslim, four Orthodox Christian, two Catholic, one Buddhist and five agnostic, all levels of religiosity are present in the sample within each religious tradition, particularly for the three major denominations (Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism). The sample includes participants who have completed only 4 years of elementary schooling, to two participants who have earned Ph.D. titles. Diverse professions are present, ranging from a yoga instructor, bed-and-breakfast owner, IT manager, painters, advertising executive, politician, educational specialist, farmer, manager, academic to ex-football player and current restaurant owner. Most participants are self-employed, either as small business owners or freelancers.

An initial list of potential interviewees was based on the list of participants in the Al Jazeera Balkans “I want to go home” (Hoću Kući) documentary (13 interviewees), a list of “successful examples” of returnees jointly prepared by the UNDP and the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees–Diaspora Division (5 interviewees) and examples of returnees associated with the Sarajevo-based RESTART business enterprise (3 interviewees) and Naša Perspektiva, an NGO devoted to diaspora—home country cooperation (3 interviewees). I also contacted TUMED (Türkiye Mezunları Dernegi), a Turkish Alumni Association, to get access to two participants who returned from Turkey to BiH. Besides the aforementioned formal diaspora networks, I collected news stories broadcast on BiH TV stations and published in local newspapers and magazines, featuring the life stories of returnees. Six participants were recruited by following stories broadcast/published by Radio Television of Republika Srpska, Derventa TV, N1-a CNN affiliate, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Two interviewees were recruited by “snowballing” from one interview to the next. Finally, I interviewed one returnee, who is also a personal acquaintance. Approximately 42 people were contacted and 35 accepted to take part in the study.

Research design was completed almost entirely deductively, and it represents the etic perspective. As in-depth interviews were progressing, inductive inferences started gaining importance. Insights drawn from the collected data and not from existing theory began to dominate the research process. As one interview was completed, key findings from that interview were used to modify the questions on the interview guide to be then used in the following interview. In the data analysis cycle, an inductive conceptual framework emerged after the collected data were coded, described, compared, and categorized. The final goal of the inductive conceptual framework is to contribute to existing theory by representing the emic or internal perspective, the perspective originating directly from the study participants.

1.6.3 Data Analysis

The dictionary defines ‘analysis’ as “a detailed examination of anything complex in order to understand its nature or determine its essential features” (Analysis, n.d.) and according to Tesch (1990), “no methodologist could say it better” (p. 113). The generic definition of analysis gives us a clue as to the two most general elements of the analytic cycle: “detailed examination,” which can be seen as “identification of themes” when translated to the language of qualitative data analysis (QDA) and “determination of essential features” or “understanding” viewed as “construction of propositional statements” or hypotheses that place the themes in relationship with each other (Tesch, 1990, p. 113). Defining qualitative data analysis as two intertwining processes of data organization (identifying themes) and data interpretations (discovering relationships between themes) is also characteristic of several other scholars, such as Boyatzis (1998) and Miles et al. (2014). Prior to proceeding with steps of data analysis, including coding, memoing and the associated tasks of description, comparison, conceptualization and explanation, two stages of data preparation were conducted: transcribing and anonymizing the data sources.

Since the in-depth interviews are the main source of data for this study, particular care was given to the accuracy and technical precision of the transcribing and anonymization processes. A trusted transcriber was hired and trained according to guidelines set by Bogdan & Biklen (2007) and Atkinson (2004), as well as elaborated on regarding validity and reliability by Perakyla (2004). The transcriber is a native speaker of Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian and could register each colloquialism, half-mumbling or difficult to understand construction. Transcriptions were conducted parallel to data collection to insure maximum efficiency and to allow me to anonymize, code, and pursue subsequent steps of data analysis almost as soon as the field work had been completed. In explaining the Ethics of Descriptive Reporting, Bazeley (2013) asserts that in studies where anonymity and confidentiality have been promised to participants it might not be enough to simply substitute pseudonyms for the actual names and adjust participant ages, since the participant could remain identifiable in cases of small and distinct groups under investigation. Thus, my anonymization process involved using pseudonyms instead of the study participants’ actual names, as well as changing the names of particular locations, workplaces, or any other specific information that could uncover the actual identity of the study participants. After completion of data analysis and selection of quotes to be used in the empirical chapters, I translated the selected quotes from B-C-S to English. I also included footnotes explaining any lexical or semantic particularities found to be relevant for accurate presentation of data analysis results.

Following how qualitative data analysis was defined previously, coding can be thought of as the first step in analysis: organizing and managing the data by reducing and segmenting it to meaningful coding units, labeling these units with codes and categorizing them into a coding scheme. Besides viewing coding as segmenting and reducing the data, Coffey and Atkinson (1996) stress that coding cannot act as a replacement for analysis. However, seen more broadly, coding can be understood as both data organization and data interpretation. Strauss (1987) defines coding as “the general term for conceptualizing data; thus, coding includes raising questions and giving provisional answers (hypotheses) about categories and about their relations. A code is the term for any product of this analysis (whether category or a relation among two or more categories)” (pp. 20–21). Strauss (1987) goes beyond the perspective on coding as the first step in analysis to include further measures so that coding also encompasses data interpretation. My data analysis firstly employed line-by-line coding. Secondly, I used constant comparison to group similar codes into progressively more abstract units: categories and concepts. Tesch (1990) warns that concepts can only rarely be directly observed in the data and, thus, the creation of a firm structure, a codebook, that fits the data well is a slow and iterative process. My coding scheme evolved slowly over a period of close to nine months of data analysis. Following instructions on rules of formulating a good code found in Boyatzis (1998), a full list of codes–a codebook, with each code given a label and a clear definition emerged.

Parallel to coding the dataset, I developed a habit of systematic and regular writing of analytic memos with the basic idea being similar to keeping a reflective journal during data collection. With the use of both the reflective journal and analytic memos, I got the chance to reflect on data collection and analysis by recording my evolving understanding of the researched issues. Various methodology scholars (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Saldana, 2009; Yin, 2011) emphasize the importance of keeping a clear and transparent audit trail of qualitative data analysis. Yin (2011) advises preserving any and all ideas regarding data analysis as memos, even when they initially appear to be “half-baked” (p. 186). By doing this, I got to decide which analytical observations to include in the final analysis and which ones to exclude, based on a wide range of collected memos. Saldana (2009) presents a list of issues which the researcher needs to address in memo writing, such as reflections on: code choices and their operational definitions, emergent patterns, categories, themes and concepts, potential connections between codes, themes, categories and concepts, as well as emergent or related existing theory. Throughout the research process, memos progressively became more and more abstract, from the initial ones that are most descriptive to “metamemos” (p. 39) writing in later stages, which were more theoretical.

Strauss and Corbin (1998) accentuate the importance of memos throughout data analysis and present detailed guidelines on how to write them. I used my memos to “talk to myself about the data” (Clarke, 2005 as cited in Saldana, 2009, p. 32) and in that sense my memos were quite free-flowing in form. I paid particular attention to how visual representation of relationships between concepts, such as mini-frameworks and diagrams, are used. Dey (1993) sums up the point of using diagrams in memos: “Diagrammatic displays are not just a way of decorating our conclusions, they also provide a way of reaching them” (p. 192 as cited in Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 140–141). In other words, coming up with a clear visual representation of relationships between concepts made it possible for me to establish those relationships in the first place. Finally, the ultimate objective of writing memos is integration by keeping an audit trail of the complete analytic cycle (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), including description, comparisons, and explanation.

Analytic memos were a crucial component of my research project, followed by thick descriptions, constant comparison and a movement towards higher and higher levels of abstraction as patterns and associations in the data were recognized. Analytic memos were used to define concepts, such as defining “Emotional citizenship” as the intersection of the “1st (BiH) citizenship” and specific emotions or “Pragmatic citizenship” as the intersection of the “2nd (foreign) citizenship” and emotional indifference. These definitions came as a result of extensive memo writing throughout data analysis, finally resulting in a visual display (Fig. 6.1). Another example is building the conceptual model, as a series of steps in pattern identification with its visual display presented in the Chap. 6 (Fig. 6.2). Throughout data analysis I wrote thick descriptions (Bazeley, 2013) to be used later in building a “theorized storyline” (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007) in the empirical chapters of the study and I certainly tried my best to avoid the trap of simply listing “themes and quotes” (Bazeley, 2009) with no attempt of linking these themes into a more comprehensive model. When analyzing data qualitatively, I employed constant comparison as one of the essential components in cyclical reiterations of four interconnected tasks: developing codes, describing and comparing these codes, conceptualizing and categorizing the data, and finally developing inductive explanations. The main reason for using constant comparison is that it enables deeper exploration of the data when associations and patterns are noticed within the dataset. Finally, an “analytical hierarchy” emerged–“the process through which qualitative ‘findings’ are built from the original raw data” (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 217).

In order to suggest explanations that are a good fit to the data, I conducted a series of tasks including finding and studying patterns in the data; developing initial explanatory “hunches”; going back and forth between the initial explanation and the data to check for closeness of fit; trying out rival explanations; and finally producing a conceptual model. Explaining a phenomenon involves discovering why certain observed behavior occurs when existing theory fails to provide adequate answers. In that sense, “explanations eliminate puzzles and provide intellectual satisfaction” (Blaikie, 2010, p. 71). Ritchie and Lewis (2003) provide both a comprehensive understanding of explanatory research and practical advice on how to conduct it. Study participants often provided their own explanations for phenomena. Sometimes, I reported these explanations and at other times, I inferred my own explanations from their responses. When trying to explain patterns occurring in the data, I followed assumptions of common sense, but also checked them against the entire data set to make sure that the data support them. I also used the advice of Ritchie and Lewis (2003) on developing initial “hunches” or beginnings of explanations by comparison with other studies from existing literature and the guidance of Bazeley (2009) with a variety of practical steps and strategies for suggesting explanations for phenomena. As suggested by Bazeley and Jackson (2013), all data (interview transcripts, field notes, reflective journal, and analytical memos written during data analysis) for the entire study were stored in one NVIVO project with all demographic information about the interviewees attached so that matrix queries could be performed to identify patterns in the data. Seeking patterns based on co-occurrence of codes within coding units remained as the main tool to identify associations, put forward propositions, and formulate explanations. Matrix query results, together with the analytic memos, form the main structure around which a “theorized storyline” (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007) is built in Chaps. 3, 4 and 5 and the Conceptual Model presented in Chap. 6.

1.6.4 Ethical Considerations

In addition to the Belmont Report’s (DHEW, 1978) three core principles of respect of persons, beneficence, and justice, my research project observes the ethical guidelines of informed consent, self-determination, minimization of harm, anonymity, and confidentiality (Hennink et al., 2010) in all three phases of the research cycle. This was particularly pronounced during data collection and data analysis. The interviewees are members of a very small and distinct group in a relatively small society. Some of them have also given interviews to the general press and have made other public appearances. Therefore, they could be recognizable if adequate measures to protect their identities were not taken. In answering the interview guide questions, the returnees generously revealed their most sensitive experiences, attitudes, and emotions. As a result, they have provided me with an incredibly rich dataset from which substantial conclusions could be drawn. However, their candid and elaborate responses were given under conditions of anonymity and confidentiality, therefore, upholding these ethical principles was of utmost importance throughout my project.

Although a researcher’s closeness and familiarity with the case are beneficial and offer potential for valuable insights, they also come with their own set of limitations that need to be overcome, so that the research project adheres to high standards of verification. Throughout data analysis and subsequent writing, I used triangulation, researcher reflexivity, peer review and confirmation with study participants to verify that the study was conducted in a rigorous and credible manner. The data collected for analysis comes from in-depth interviews, field notes, and a reflective journal. The collected data were triangulated between these various sources. I am a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina myself with life experience that parallels the experiences of my study participants, so it is only natural that I approach the study, as any scholar working within the interpretivist paradigm, with my set of underlying biases and prejudices. However, being aware of one’s own subjectivity is the first step towards limiting its potential influence on data analysis and interpretation of the study’s results.

Throughout the research project, I took active measures at overcoming limitations inherent in being in such proximity to the case. As was mentioned previously, during data collection, I kept a systematic record of my own reflections on fieldwork as a daily reflective journal. Besides employing tactics encouraging self-reflection, throughout data collection, data analysis and writing, I worked closely with three peer reviewers as part of a writing group. These three colleagues are qualitative researchers and they assisted me in improving the study’s rigor and credibility by identifying possible biases and removing their influence on data analysis. Finally, in order to validate my explanations, the final product of analysis was compared and contrasted with the raw data, as well as presented to the study participants to gain their reactions. A coherent explanation that is grounded in data should be recognizable to the study participants, perhaps not in each one of its details, but certainly in its general operating principles (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). To satisfy this requirement of verification, I contacted a small group of the study participants and presented to them the results of my analysis. To a large extent, they agreed with my proposed explanations.

1.7 Book Structure

This book sets out to answer the research questions listed in Sect. 1.1. Chapter 2 defines the theoretical problem and reviews the scholarly literature to develop the conceptual framework, while Chaps. 3, 4, 5, and 6 present the empirical results of my study. Chapter 2 explores the concepts of return migration, diaspora/transnationalism, ‘political’ emotions, citizenship, emotional/affective/intimate citizenship, belonging, and home; establishes theoretical connections between them and identifies research gaps. Chapter 3 looks at factors motivating “decided return” (Cassarino, 2008), the subsequent reintegration process, and the sustainability of this type of return migration. Chapter 4 uses citizenship, seen as a “prism through which to address the political” (Nyers, 2007, p. 3), and identifies a set of specific and distinct emotions that constitute the emotional dimension of BiH citizenship, as experienced by returning diaspora members. Since previous researchers (Ho, 2009; Jackson, 2016) have theorized emotional citizenship as home and belonging, Chap. 5 explores how the returnees construct the notions of home and belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Chap. 6, I tackle the main theoretical problem by proposing a conceptual model connecting voluntary return migration, citizenship–emotional and pragmatic, home and belonging; and identifying feeling safe and secure as central to the existence of such connections. Chapter 7 concludes by discussing the empirical results and placing them in conversation with relevant scholarly literature(s). Finally, I offer some insights of wider applicability that could be gained by an in-depth look at Bosnia and Herzegovina as the case country.