Keywords

Whether in the media or in the negotiating rooms of the United Nations, people compelled to leave their homes due to extreme climate change impacts are more prominent than ever. There is now no doubt that climate change has a direct and indirect effects on when, how and where people migrate. Governments of migrants’ countries of origin, of transit and of destination are becoming increasingly aware that policy changes are urgently needed to address current challenges and to deal adequately with future ones. This chapter provides a brief overview of some key issues relevant to climate migration and discusses some of the policy options for shaping future action.

Important Aspects of “Climate Migration”

There is no internationally valid legal definition of people who migrate due to climate and environmental impacts. This has implications for the policies and obligations of states to protect people fleeing extreme climate impacts. For example, climate migrants cannot be classified as “refugees” as their situation is not recognized by the 1951 Refugee Convention. Climate migrants are generally not entitled to specific assistance under international law. Many proposals have been made to close these gaps, including the extension of the Refugee Convention. But few countries currently have an interest in changing the status quo. There are however international legal instruments applicable to climate migration, including human rights law (IOM, 2014a, b). Some states have also developed national instruments to provide protection and assistance to people migrating due to climate impacts and disasters.

In this chapter, we will use the definition of climate migrants developed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2019). This definition is broad and includes people who migrate due to direct or indirect impacts of climate change, both sudden-onset disasters and gradual environmental degradation. Migration can be within or across borders, temporary or permanent, and may take place on a continuum from ‘forced’ to ‘voluntary’.

The broad scope of this definition makes it possible to capture the diversity of mobility situations in a changing climate. From nomadic populations in the Sahel changing their traditional migration patterns to adapt to the effects of climate change to islanders in the Pacific fleeing the advancing sea, climate migration takes many different forms around the world.

The Effects of Climate Change on Migration Is Manifold

Climate migration is usually multi-causal, as the decision to migrate is often influenced by a combination of different factors. Social, economic or security aspects often overlap and cannot always be sharply separated from purely climate change-related drivers. Various environmental and climate factors can influence the decision or need to migrate, from sudden disasters such as typhoons and floods to slow-onset processes such as sea-level rise or land degradation (Ionesco et al., 2017).

The connection between environmental changes and population movements is relatively easy to recognize, when sudden disasters force large numbers of people to flee immediately. In such situations, people usually migrate to safe(r) nearby locations and return once the emergency is over.

It is more difficult, by contrast, to establish clear connections between slow climate changes and migration movements (Traore Chazalnoël & Randall, 2021; IOM, 2020b). Slow environmental changes usually extend over generations; desertification or ocean acidification directly affect the livelihood of the population as crops can no longer grow or fish can no longer be caught. In such cases, people may consciously decide to move and set out in search of new livelihood opportunities—it is then often no longer possible to make a clear distinction between “economic migration” and “climate migration”. Many migrants coming to the United States from Latin America, for example (commonly called “economic migrants”) come from areas affected by drought and other climate change impacts (Puscas & Escribano, 2018).

Climate Migration to Europe—Is the Fear of It Justified?

Some studies have found a possible link between global warming and the volume of asylum applications in the European Union (Missirian & Schlenker, 2017). Others have rejected the European narrative attributing international migration primarily to “economic” reasons is inconclusive for failing to consider the importance of climate and environmental factors for migration (Bendandi, 2020). Such narratives need to be challenged because they do not reflect the current factual situation—most people who migrate because of climate change stay in their own countries. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize potential links between climate factors and migration to Europe without classifying it as a mere border security issue. Only with this recognition effective policies can be developed as alternatives to unregulated migration. Such policies include helping countries of origin to adapt to climate change, restoring damaged natural resources and combating poverty.

Understanding possible links between economic migration and the effects of climate change is important for developing policies that mitigate the adverse economic effects of climate change on populations—and for learning how such policies can affect migration. Not yet sufficiently explored, such might become very important in the future. In highly politicized contexts, in which migration is generally seen as negative, such issues would be quite sensitive.

Is Climate Migration a Threat to Security?

Climate migration is often considered under the “security” label and accordingly classified as a threat to political stability. In some contexts, climate change can indeed increase instability and fragility in vulnerable regions, such as in the Lake Chad region, where the combination of political, economic and climatic factors is leading to increased displacement. In contrast, recent studies show that climate migration does not necessarily lead to security problems—even while climate change should definitely be understood as a threat to human security, regardless of whether it triggers migration or not (Baillat & Traore Chazalnoël, 2022).

Numbers and Life Paths of Climate Migrants

Although knowledge on climate migration has grown exponentially in recent years (Université de Neuchatel, 2018), we still lack long-term longitudinal data that capture the extended time periods of slow environmental change, as well as harmonized data sets and disaggregated data. But even if we do not yet have a complete picture to date, it is obvious that action is needed to minimize and manage the effects of climate change on migration patterns.

The exact number of climate migrants is unknown. The lack of a coordinated database and a universal definition makes it difficult to determine the number of people migrating within or across borders due to climate change; different countries and organizations use different criteria and arrive at different figures (Flavell et al., 2020). The annual report of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), for example, contains information on displacement caused by natural disasters at the country level. According to this report 33.6 million of new displacements due to disasters were registered in 2022 (IDMC, 2023). These figures only refer to people who were displaced within their own country and by a sudden disaster. Less data exists on cross-border migration and migration forced or motivated by slow environmental change.

These gaps are significant, but the people compelled to leave their homes each year due to environmental pressures certainly number to millions. We also know that some regions of the world, such as island states in the Pacific, are disproportionately affected by such migration (IOM & UN-OHRLLS, 2019). The number of migrants from such places may be small in absolute terms, but these migrant flows naturally have a greater impact on small countries than large ones, which are often better placed economically and in terms of infrastructure. So long as people can stay in their own country, they usually choose this option and migrate within their country. Some countries, such as the Kingdom of Morocco, act as a source, transit and destination country for climate migrants at the same time, which is why they need political and legal frameworks to take all these dimensions into account. Finally, it should be mentioned that there are population movements related to climate change in all parts of the world, even in wealthy Western countries.

Forecasts on Future Mobility

It is predicted that, absent appropriate policy measures, climate change impacts will force millions of people to flee. The World Bank estimates that by 2050 gradual environmental changes may force 216 million people to migrate within their own country (Clement et al., 2021). Accurate projections require data on how many people live in regions that may suffer severe climate change impacts. A 2017 report estimates that if global temperatures were rise by “only” 1.5 °C, 30–60 million people might live in areas where temperatures in the hottest month will exceed the limits of human endurance (IOM, 2017a). In addition to the island states already mentioned, coastal regions will be especially hard hit because they are heavily populated—and the seas will rise inexorably (McMichael et al., 2020).

These figures paint a picture of a world in which climate-induced migration has the potential to affect not only the daily lives of countless individuals, but also the socio-economic stability of entire states. The portrayal of an apocalyptic future may create a sense of urgency among decision-makers, but it also encourages the creation of narratives that seek to devalue the threat as scaremongering. This makes it even more important to carefully examine what all the numbers really mean. Not all people living in vulnerable areas will be willing and able to migrate in search of a safer home and better living conditions. Projected migration flows will become reality only if no or insufficient policy measures are taken to reduce the climate-related causes of migration.

In the coming decades, governments around the world will need to show that they can look ahead to identify early on where greater migratory pressure might build. Only with such foresight can timely action be taken and the worst outcomes be averted.

Policy Measures for the Future

Information deficits and insufficient legal frameworks can impede the timely development of appropriate measures. But they are no excuse for doing nothing. The data situation is good enough to develop and implement policy responses at global, regional and national levels. The goal of policy action must be to strengthen the resilience of mobile populations and their associated people (Traore Chazalnoël & Ionesco, 2022).

Climate Migration in the Global Political Debate

During the last two decades, the member states of the United Nations have increasingly recognized the problem of climate migration as one of the greatest challenges of our time. Several phases can be distinguished.

The first phase was one of “absence” of the issue on the global stage, with little interest and limited understanding of the causalities. Around 2005, climate migration was recognized as a cross-cutting issue and discussed as part of the agenda on the social impacts of climate change. A second phase of “awareness raising” began thanks to the efforts of countries at risk from climate change and other affected stakeholders. In a third phase (“mainstreaming”), wording on migration was included in texts negotiated at the annual Conferences of the Parties (COP) in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The 2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) includes passages on the protection of migrants’ rights and mandated the establishment of an interdisciplinary task force on displacement. In parallel, the first major projects were launched, such as MECLEP (Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy) (IOM, 2017b) and Where the Rain Falls (Warner & Afifi, 2013).

After 2015, a fourth phase of “unification” began, focusing on improving policy coherence and building partnerships between stakeholders, emerging interest groups and donors. During this period, states negotiated and adopted policy statements that recognized the linkages between mobility and environmental issues, such as the 2018 UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) (UNGA, 2018), the recommendations of the UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement (Traore Chazalnoël & Ionesco, 2018a) and migration-related resolutions under the ‘Desertification Convention’ (the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, UNCCD) (IOM & UNCCD, 2019) and the Sendai Agenda for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) (IOM, 2018). State-led initiatives such as the Nansen Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons and the Climate Vulnerable Forum also addressed mobility issues in the context of climate and environmental change.

Today we are at a turning point where we must ask ourselves the key question: How can governments translate the progress made in global and regional policy discussions into a new phase of “action” that involves comprehensive policy changes and programmatic action on the ground? This is not an easy question to answer, but states can build on existing instruments that have emerged from strengthened global intergovernmental cooperation.

Strengthening Global Cooperation and Shared Responsibility

Over the past 5 years, countries in the global North and South have demonstrated their political will to discuss climate migration and to develop global guidance for encouraging countries to develop policies that address climate migration at the national level (Traore Chazalnoël & Ionesco, 2018b). This growing political interest has been reflected in the development of global principles adopted by United Nations Member States. The aforementioned 2018 milestones, the ‘UN Global Compact for Migration’ (GCM) and the recommendations of the Task Force on Displacement (UNFCCC, 2019) outline principles and measures that states can develop and implement to counteract the impact of climate change on migration (Traore Chazalnoël & Ionesco, 2018c). These include, in particular, minimizing relevant climate and environmental drivers of migration and facilitating migration, for example through visa options for those affected by climate impacts.

These political advances are important, but they have their limits, because not all “agreements” are binding and their implementation depends on the good will of states. Moreover, the “Global Compact for Migration” only refers to international migration, while most climate migration takes place within countries. Nevertheless, these “declarations” have an important symbolic value and can serve as a starting point for action by governments dealing with the issue. Indeed, we are already seeing some countries (e.g. Peru, 2019a, b; Government of Vanuatu, 2018) making concerted efforts to better align their national policy frameworks with global principles. In parallel to global discussions, regional policy dialogues—on both climate change and migration—are exploring how to develop solutions that will help states manage migration in a changing climate and support the affected population groups (Dal Pra et al., 2021; IGAD, 2020).

Looking ahead to the next decade, we have a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities, as well as a solid global policy foundation and more expertise to take action and achieve tangible results. Global policy discussions can drive engagement at the national level, especially in the countries most affected by climate impacts. Vulnerable states must be supported in developing their own frameworks and programs; at the community level, everything possible must be done to reduce vulnerability and build resilience.

Migration as an Adaptation Strategy to Climate Impacts

In the current debate on climate migration, there is intense discussion about the extent to which migration can be assessed as an adequate adaptation strategy to climate change. In and of itself, migration is not a negative phenomenon—throughout history, people have migrated due to environmental changes and have built prosperous lives and made significant contributions to their new homelands. Yet, when migration occurs out of necessity and/or through irregular channels, serious tragedies can occur, as evidenced by the high numbers of missing persons and deaths (IOM, n.d.). And those who stay behind often suffer, especially children whose parents have emigrated; they are often left to their own devices and have to bear burdens that disrupt or derail their further education (Traore Chazalnoël et al., 2021).

In some contexts, however, migration can also help people, for example through better educational opportunities or more secure and better-paying jobs. Remittances back to the areas of origin increase local resilience to the adverse effects of climate change. It is important that such migrations take place in a safe and orderly manner, as this is the only way that positive effects can outweigh negative ones. Ensuring this raises numerous questions in various policy areas, including above all how to deal with the drivers of migration.

Addressing the Climate-Related Drivers of Migration

Most people would rather stay in their countries of origin to live a decent and good life there. Therefore, supporting climate mitigation and adaptation measures is crucial, especially in countries and regions that have significant outflows. Wealthy countries can play a crucial role by making investments in the most vulnerable countries. Appropriate investments reduce the negative impact of climate change on livelihoods, create alternative, sustainable employment opportunities and reduce potential reasons for leaving. Such investments also contribute to climate justice, as the countries hit hard by climate change are often the least responsible for its causes.

At present, however, migration aspects are still not sufficiently integrated into the instruments for financing climate protection and adaptation measures. Even though some measures explicitly refer to the effects of migration, migration aspects are rarely taken into account when allocating funds, such as those of the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Migration-related funds should also increasingly finance programs in areas that are especially vulnerable to climate impacts. Recently, the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund, established to support the implementation of the Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, decided to fund joint climate migration projects (UNMN, n.d.). Other migration funds, such as the IOM Development Fund, are financing pilot programs for climate migration in vulnerable areas. It will be interesting to see whether such programs prove successful; at present it is too early to make a final assessment. The political will of donor countries to finance climate migration projects is in any case discernible, so it is all the more important that this remains the case.

Facilitating Migration

There will be regions that will be so severely affected by climate change that the population there will probably be unable to stay or return. Pacific island states might disappear completely if sea levels continue to rise. In these cases, the only option is to comprehensively facilitate or enable migration from the affected areas.

The “UN Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” identifies some ways in which states can facilitate regular international migration in a changing climate, including the development of special visas. There are already countries that grant and have granted visas on humanitarian grounds, such as Brazil, which offered visas to Haitian migrants after the 2010 earthquake (The Nansen Initiative, 2015a, b).

It is still possible for countries to expand the scope of existing migration management measures to help people in vulnerable areas to migrate legally and safely from endangered areas. For example, many countries already have bilateral education, training or labor agreements with partner countries, such as the Australian Seasonal Workers Program or the Pacific Labor Scheme (Dempster et al., 2021b). These programs might be expanded to offer alternate opportunities for those most impacted by climate change.

Interested countries can also manage climate migration by taking measures to facilitate legal residence for migrants already living in their country. This can be done by issuing residence permits, stopping or reducing deportations and repatriations, and implementing comprehensive regularization programs.

Being Mindful of the Burden of Immobility

Those most impacted by climate change often lack the financial and social means to migrate. These populations are considered “trapped”. Policy making should take into account of their inability to migrate.

Another dimension of migration management concerns the return and reintegration of migrants. While return is sometimes possible, it often takes place in areas and countries where climate impacts are more likely to increase. Therefore, voluntary return and reintegration policies and programs should examine the extent to which structures to be established there can ensure that returnees have sustainable employment opportunities and can live there long-term (IOM, 2020a, b, c).

At the regional level, some countries have joined free movement agreements, which were examined in a recent study (Dal Pra et al., 2021). To take these policy instruments to the next level, more activity on the political side and increased investment would be needed.

Management of Domestic Migration

In many countries, there are internal migrations related to climate change impacts, migrations from rural regions to large urban centers for example (Baillat et al., 2020). Sometimes migrants can thus improve their living conditions, but it is doubtful whether this will still hold in the future, when climate change will increase migratory pressure. Some countries are therefore trying to incorporate the dimensions of climate migration into urban planning, such as Bangladesh with its initiative to attract internal migrants to secondary cities, which are more climate resilient and migrant-friendly than large cities (Huq et al., 2018).

Another important policy measure is managed resettlement. Such projects are already taking place in over 60 countries worldwide (Bower & Weerasinghe, 2021). Countries such as Fiji are preparing to cope with a growing number of planned resettlements, and other countries may have to follow suit if climate impacts worsen. However, planned resettlement should only be considered as a last resort. The relocation of entire communities is extremely costly, and some, such as Isle of Jean Charles in coastal Louisiana, have been underway for several years.

Strengthening Legal Protections

Even if the status of “climate migrant” or “climate refugee” does not exist, governments could take measures to provide protection and support specifically to migrants affected by climate change. Existing models could inspire the development of targeted protection measures. For example, the United States may grant temporary protected status to nationals of certain countries if conditions in those country temporarily prevent them from returning safely (The Nansen Initiative, 2015a, b). Those eligible for this status may not be deported from the US and are allowed to take up employment. France recently refrained from returning a migrant from Bangladesh to his country of origin because he would have been exposed to extreme pollution there that would have negatively affected his health (Dempster et al., 2021a, b). This type of measure could be extended to people exposed to extreme climatic conditions.

Looking ahead, countries may increasingly need to deal with international legal principles in managing climate migration. In January 2020, the UN Human Rights Committee adopted a decision recognizing that states should refrain from sending people back to areas where the impacts of climate change make it impossible to live in dignity—the principle of non-refoulement (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2020; IOM, 2020c). This decision might pave the way for national legislative changes in coming decades.

Managing Climate Migration in Wealthy Countries

In recent years, countries such as the United States (The White House, 2021; United States-White House Executive Order, 2021) have commissioned reports examining possible measures to address the negative impacts of climate change on migration. Even though climate-induced migration mostly takes place intranationally, as mentioned several times before, the multi-causal nature of climate change means that climatic factors could at least partially influence migration flows to wealthier countries. A recent report makes recommendations on specific measures that high-income countries could consider in this context. These include, for example, extending temporary protection measures to climate migrants, allowing them to work, study and access basic services (e.g. health insurance) (Dempster et al., 2021a); extending labor migration to nationals of climate-vulnerable countries (this would also help reduce skills shortages in receiving countries); and establishing a visa lottery targeting people from climate-vulnerable countries.

Strengthen Monitoring and Evaluation of Existing Policies and Programs

There are some policies and programs that specifically target climate migration, some of which have been analysed (CLIMB, n.d.). However, the status of implementation and long-term impacts of these policies are rarely assessed. Considering that climate migration is a relatively new policy issue, it will be crucial in the next decade to allocate resources to conduct comprehensive evaluations and determine which policy and program options work well. States could use international review processes, such as the quadrennial International Migration Review Forum, which reviews the implementation of the GCM, and the annual Climate Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to take stock of progress made and to build political will for future action.

Harnessing the Positive Dimensions of Climate Migration

Climate migration stories are not all negative. It is widely acknowledged that migrants play an important role in destination areas, especially by helping to fill labor gaps or redressing demographic imbalances. Migrants also play an important role in their regions of origin, as they contribute with their remittances to reducing poverty in recipient households and to building resilience.

It would be important to create incentives to make it attractive for migrants to invest in building resilience to climate impacts in their areas of origin. Financial resources can be used to make houses and infrastructure climate-proof; in Senegal, the granting of loans has been made possible (Bendandi & Pauw, 2016) and Mexico also has a program that supports investment by migrants (Villegas Rivera, 2014). A study conducted in Tajikistan, for example, highlights that remittances from migrants are increasingly being used in business start-ups and community-based agriculture, helping to create a more climate-resilient future (Babagaliyeva et al., 2017). A recent report found that aspects of environmental sustainability can provide a common ground for bringing people together across borders and counteracting negative migration narratives (Traore Chazalnoël & Barwise, 2021).

Conclusion: Do People Really Have Nothing Left?

Current knowledge and understanding of the link between climate and migration highlight serious political, social, security and economic challenges. Many people live in areas that are so vulnerable to climate change that they have little hope or prospects. But this can also be seen as a moment of opportunity. Political discussions have shown that states are increasingly interested in addressing the problems. Time is of the essence, and it is crucial that states vigorously develop and implement the policy, legal and programmatic instruments to translate global commitments into concrete action.

There are no tailor-made and one-dimensional solutions that would allow states to quickly “solve” existing and future problems. Policy choices will (have to) vary across different parts of the world. In some cases, facilitating migration can help empower people and reduce their exposure to climate risks while benefiting destination countries. In other cases, migration could become a burdensome experience.

More than ever, states need to consider a two-pronged approach. Countries in the Global North should favor policy options that provide financial, technical and political support for adaptation measures in areas most affected by climate change. However, it is also necessary to discuss the development of regular migration pathways that provide immediate and long-term options for people most affected by climate change. Some countries refuse in principle to discuss how migration policies can help cope with climate change. However, it is important to note that facilitating climate migration does not necessarily lead to more migration to wealthy countries and regions. Rather, the discussion should be about finding ways to better manage current migration flows while implementing measures that support climate adaptation and sustainable development in vulnerable areas. This is the only way of ensuring that people also have the option of not migrating thanks to suitable conditions allowing them to live a dignified life in their homeland.