Germany Under Climate Stress

Abstract

Climate change introduces significant sociopolitical challenges, potentially deepening societal divisions or promoting social cohesion. Lower-income households, the less educated, and parts of the lower middle class bear the brunt of rising costs resulting from climate policies. In contrast, wealthier households, despite contributing more to CO2 emissions, experience fewer financial implications and have a better capacity to adapt. The new German government takes steps to compensate lower-income households through measures like covering the EEG levy with taxes and additional climate payments, yet the effectiveness of these actions remains in question. Achieving climate goals requires rigorous control of complex processes related to dismantling, renovation, and construction. Collaboration between the state and private enterprises is emphasized to establish a socially ecological market economy. Adapting individual behavior for climate protection poses challenges, as restrictive policies have been met with resistance. Many parties now prioritize technological advancements and positive incentives to encourage climate-friendly practices. In conclusion, climate policy has the potential to either deepen societal divisions or strengthen social cohesion. This underscores the importance of broad inclusivity, new participation models, and reforms within existing forums.

We thank Jannik Zindel for support.

In these long months and years of the pandemic, the population is asked, implored, and reminded again and again to please stick together, to show solidarity, to have trust, to take responsibility. Cohesion, solidarity, trust, and responsibility are all concepts that move away from the “I” toward a “we” that places people in the context of others. They are relational concepts. One can neither hold together nor be in solidarity with oneself. Goodbye to singletons, individualists, distinctiveness—what counts now is the big picture.

Aligning one’s own actions with the common good probably does not come naturally. This is shown by a vaccination rate of only 74% at the end of 2021 and the consequent fierce struggle over compulsory vaccination. But the effort is not entirely hopeless, as shown by vaccination rates of over 90% in Bremen and Hamburg, where politics has convinced, educated, promoted, and created structures and cultures that connect one’s own actions more easily and more naturally with the conduct of others.

As we have known for a long time, Corona is a local, national, and global tour de force, posing a challenge to all. It requires interdisciplinary and international research to explore the SARS virus, to develop vaccines, to understand the social effects and side effects of the Corona measures. It requires cross-sectoral politics that takes advice—from science, business, and civil society. It requires a robust and participatory economy. And it preeminently requires a civil society that displays mutual understanding, builds trust, and follows rules.

Yet, compared to climate change, the virus is nothing. Corona can be contained and probably soon be cured with pharmaceuticals. In a few months, or years at most, the virus will be endemic, with herd immunity and a return to our old way of life. Climate change, by contrast, cannot be vaccinated away and will not be stopped in the foreseeable future. Despite, or precisely because of this difference, the virus is a challenging test case for the much larger tasks of tomorrow.

Climate Change as a Political Challenge

At present, climate change continues to advance, threatening the very basis of life for us all. A technological solution that would allow us to continue living as we do now is not in sight. But technologies that help us on the road to climate neutrality do exist, and more such technologies must be developed. We urgently need them. Equally urgent is state coordination that invites participation and co-ownership, fosters civil society solidarity, and lays the foundation for universal conduct change. At present, many domains feature high social selectivity: certain groups cause greater emissions than others, are less affected by climate change, and financially contribute less to measures against it. Climate change thus affects lower-income households much more severely than the better-off. Measures taken against climate change further exacerbate these differences. This can be clearly seen in the domains of work, mobility, housing, food, and health, which we will examine. In these and many other domains, climate change raises fundamental questions of socio-economic distribution.

All climate policies should therefore be examined for possible adverse distributive effects, which should be corrected through redistributive or compensatory governmental or societal measures. Quite apart from egalitarian principles being fundamental to our democracy, a huge challenge such as climate change cannot be met against resistance by large segments of the population.

Conflicts on the way to a climate-neutral world are not only about distribution but also about aspects of mutual recognition. Only when diverse situations and lifestyles are respected and accepted as fundamental for a joint way forward can the discourse about an effective climate policy succeed under liberal democratic conditions. It is therefore important persistently to question the fundamental orientation of our value system and behavior patterns. Is our conduct oriented toward our own well-being or that of the whole population? Are we considering only our own lifespan or also the lives of future generations? Are we in Europe acknowledging the situation and anxieties of people in the global South, whom climate change often deprives of their livelihoods and forces to migrate? Are we prepared to meet them on an equal footing, to integrate them or to compensate them? These questions add a socio-cultural dimension that mainly concerns matters of recognition.

Issues of socioeconomic distribution and socio-cultural recognition are easier to approach and to resolve the less divided and fractured a society is and the more deeply its members accept social solidarity and care about the common good. Without social cohesion, the climate goals cannot be achieved; it is the starting and end point of successful climate politics.

This chapter begins with reflections on the relationship between social cohesion and climate change. We then discuss, as outlined, socio-cultural recognition and socio-economic distribution as a dual challenge to climate policy. An assessment of the current climate-political projects and their open questions concludes.

Social Cohesion and Climate Change

In the discourses on social fragmentation, segmentation, and polarization, the topic of social cohesion has regained importance since at least the 1990s. Social cohesion is based on respect and trust. These in turn can solidify when there is a minimum of cohesion among people. Georg Simmel describes trust as “a hypothesis about future conduct firm enough to base practical action upon it.” Such hypotheses can only arise when people have knowledge about one another and share values and norms that are subject of frequent reassurance and joint development. This requires shared spaces and social encounters, an overlapping of social circles (Simmel). Rainer Forst (2020) organizes all these aspects into an appropriate system. He speaks of five dimensions of social cohesion. First, social cohesion is politically constituted, the result of social and political processes. Second, it concerns individual and collective attitudes and patterns of conduct. Third, it is about relationships of mutuality, which are mutually binding and socially reciprocal. Fourth, these attitudes and conduct patterns must be secured through a structural institutionalization as a precondition for establishing and maintaining enduring, reliable, and resilient social coexistence. Fifth, the foundations and rules of these institutional structures must be regularly adjusted through an open social discourse and political decisions based on it.

What does all this mean for climate change? First of all, it should be noted that the majority of the population takes climate change seriously and is willing to contribute to combating it. People understand that this will require profound social change. In a recent survey, 72% of respondents shared this view (El-Menouar & Unzicker, 2021). There is awareness of the problem and readiness to change conduct. Politics can build on this.

But doing so is not easy, the headwinds are strong. Many people have high expectations and demands on democratic and state institutions but are also skeptical about the capacity of politics for action especially in response to major and usually global challenges. Politics is, as it were, disenchanted (Forst, 2020). People’s high expectations, perceived state overload, and lengthy democratic-procedural processes of balancing competing interests can easily lead to a loss of trust, which would contribute to further disillusionment with liberal narratives of progress (Reckwitz, 2020). The future would then no longer be shapeable and thus lose its optimistic connotations. On the contrary, one would expect a problematic development of our society, a dystopia, discouraging citizen engagement.

Equally adverse to a successful climate politics is the increasing longing by many for a nostalgically charged normality. Many critics of environmental and climate policies are strongly anchored in right-wing populist and anti-science milieus and attitudes. The more they fear being disadvantaged by climate policies, the more susceptible people are to (right-wing) populist views (Humpert et al., 2021). Civil protest might turn into civil disobedience. The result would be an increase in polarized conflicts and further disintegration processes.

These attitudes can only be countered by resolutely keeping an eye on social cohesion, strengthening it, and not endangering it. This requires, first of all, a strong politics that, in communication with science, business, and civil society, defines and communicates climate goals and policies. Special care must be taken to ensure that socio-economic distribution and socio-cultural recognition do not fall by the wayside. If a society is socially divided, jointly upheld norms and values erode, polarization takes hold and subverts trust. But if climate politics resolutely ends the social selectivity of current climate policies, relieves the poor, and places more burdens on higher-income groups, then the transformation can succeed with those contributing more to climate change bearing higher costs.

Attention to socio-cultural recognition exemplifies a deeper approach that is not about allocating financial burdens but about patterns of conduct that are mindful of social cohesion across time and space. The recognition that certain effects of personal and collective behavior will manifest themselves only in the future leads to sustainable conduct informed by contracts and trust across generation. This approach must also be an international one: our conduct has monumental effects for the global South. Climate migration is one of them. What follows delves into this in more detail, showing where socio-cultural conflicts over recognition and socio-economic conflicts over distribution exist, and how climate politics might address them.

Climate Change and Socio-cultural Conflicts Over Recognition

Climate change requires conduct changes whose material effects some population groups can cope with better than others. Social frictions can arise when today’s climate policy decisions adversely affect future quality of life or when climate impacts trigger major refugee and migration flows. We call these socio-cultural conflict situations.

Generational Conflict

Climate change has been gathering pace for decades and is raging unabated, even if initially its effects were not immediately visible and tangible for all. The success of climate policy decisions is likewise not immediately apparent. Measures to protect the environment will in specific domains take effect with delay. Individual costs and benefits can be far apart. Costs, such as consumption foregone, are incurred in the present, the resulting benefits are enjoyed only in the future—perhaps even by future generations. To accept such costly conduct, people require some assurance of effectiveness and correctness, as conduct motivated by abstract altruism is exceedingly rare. Such assurance of correctness must ultimately come through political decisions and their persuasive communication.

The effects of decades of climate-damaging personal and commercial activities are by now evident, especially among the younger generations. For example, people born in 2020 face seven times greater exposure to weather extremes than those born in 1960 (Ryan et al., 2021).¹ Accordingly, many in the younger generation demand enhanced representation in the political system as well as heightened intergenerational solidarity. At present, older people enjoy greater representation in the social, economic, and political system and are better able than the young to articulate their interests broadly and audibly and to prevail politically. Due to a lack of opportunities for participation, younger generations, by contrast, are increasingly governed by others.

The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) is aware of this imbalance. In its judgement of 24 March 2021, it largely accepts a constitutional complaint against the Federal Government’s Climate Protection Act of 2019. The Court found that the Climate Protection Act requires too modest emission reductions from the present generation and thereby fails to specify, for the post-2030 period, a freedom-preserving transition to climate neutrality. By shifting the burden onto future generations, the Climate Protection Act endangers the constitutionally protected freedom of young and future generations and is therefore inconsistent with the fundamental rights that safeguard freedom across time. The BVerfG thus concludes that the federal government has disregarded the interests of young and future generations.

In this context, one should highlight the founding of Fridays For Future (FFF), whose aim is compliance with the 1.5-degree target of the Paris Climate Agreement. Protest movements and civil society associations for environmental and climate protection have existed for a long time, but only this self-organization resulted in a broad protest mobilization, which is supported and sustained by previously established movements. On this basis, FFF rose to become a high-profile mouthpiece for the previously latent interests and needs of parts of the younger generations. Here FFF was helped also by its peaceful protest culture in contrast to other protest movements, such as Extinction Rebellion, whose more reckless actions of civil disobedience exacerbate polarization (BMFSFJ, 2020). FFF is supported by various subsidiary movements from all parts of society (e.g., Scientists for Future) that were founded in its wake.

The reach of the movement is overestimated in media reporting. Only a minority of the young generation takes part in the protests (BMU/UBA, 2020). Moreover, FFF displays high social selectivity: participants are mostly left-wing (78%), have or pursue high educational qualifications (92%²) and hail from the middle class (70%) (Institut für Protest- und Bewegungsforschung, 2019). Large parts of the younger generation with other socio-demographic backgrounds are underrepresented. The analysis of the 2021 federal election results shows that most eligible voters across all age groups have not aligned themselves with the climate and nature conservation interests of the younger generation. It also reveals an intergenerational (young vs. old) as well as an intragenerational conflict structure, with the latter showing that, even within the younger age cohorts, the commitment to climate and nature conservation interests varies (cf. Fig. 1).

Fig. 1

What role did the climate and nature conservation interests of young generations play in the 2021 federal election decisions in different age groups? (NABU, 2021)

The reasons for this surprisingly low commitment to the climate goals are probably some of the characteristics of the FFF movement. Though distinguished by a strong affinity with science, it is often accused of not being open enough to the plurality of perspectives and the fallibility of science, of excluding contrary opinions and thereby promoting the moralization and polarization of public discourse.

In conclusion, climate conflicts have an intergenerational and an intragenerational conflict dimension. Due to advancing climate change and a heretofore inadequate climate politics, it is to be expected that these conflicts will further intensify on the side of the FFF movement and its opponents.

Conflict Over Migration

In 2019, extreme weather events alone displaced 23.9 million people from their homes (BMZ, n.d.). In addition, creeping effects of climate change, such as coastal erosion and changing rainy seasons, have increasingly adverse effects on food production, economic activities, and lifestyles, and thereby on the food security of many people. Heavily dependent on agriculture, poorer population groups in the global South are most affected.

The topic of migration and climate change has attracted increasing attention since the 1990s.³ Since then, two basic positions have stood in opposition. On one side there is the “alarmist” position, which assumes that climate change alone drives migration decisions. On the other side there is the “skeptical” counter-position which assumes that there are many reasons for migration and formulates a multi-causal model (Schraven, 2019). In academia, a “skeptical” position predominates due to the 2011 “Foresight Report on Migration and Global Environmental Change.” The media and the political discourse, by contrast, are “alarmist,” (Tangermann & Kreienbrink, 2019) drawing renewed public attention to the migration debate.

In view of the polarized social attitudes resulting from the so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015, the migration issue is once again fertile ground for right-wing populist arguments. This is interesting in connection with the fact that in 2015 it was precisely the initial media disregard and one-sidedly positive reporting that led to an alienation of population groups who saw their fears unrepresented. Trust in the media eroded, echo chambers formed in social networks, frustration and hatred arose (Haller, 2017), leading ultimately to social movements such as Pegida. The mixing of legitimate concerns and xenophobic positions helped the AfD and created an irreconcilable debating climate which continues into the present.

The propagated threat scenario of a new, now climate-induced “refugee crisis” is further damaging social cohesion. The fear of (felt) social decline and of social devaluation and marginalization processes leads to intensified struggles for recognition. Groups that already feel marginalized may experience these fears more strongly.

In conclusion, that what stirs up fears and thus increases the dynamics of social polarization and disintegration is not so much the real threat situation as the climate change-related migration debate orchestrated by media and politics (see also chapter “Escape from Heat, Drought, and Extreme Weather”).

Climate Change and Socio-economic Conflicts Over Distribution

Climate change affects us all, worldwide. But some people harm the climate more than others, and measures to combat climate change also affect people differentially. Low-income households contribute less to climate change, for example, but are disproportionately affected by climate policies. A few figures suffice to show this. Between 1990 and 2015, the richest 10% of the German population caused about 26% of total emissions in Germany, nearly as much as the entire poorer half. Over time, this imbalance has increased worldwide; in 2015, the emissions of the top 10% were higher than those of the poorer 50% of the population (Oxfam, 2020). In addition, those who contribute the least to climate change are hit especially hard by the effects of climate change and climate policies.

Figure 2 shows selected policy domains that have a high relevance for distribution policy and, due to their high emission shares and steep reduction paths, are crucial for the green transformation. The emission trajectory in the transport sector is especially discouraging.

Fig. 2

Climate ledger showing the policy domains with their emission shares and reduction targets for 2019. Especially sobering are the data from the transport sector where CO₂ emissions increased between 1990 and 2019. It is to be feared that the now legally fixed reduction targets for 2020 to 2030 will give rise to substantial distributional conflicts (UBA, 2021a; BMU, 2021)

There is consensus now in the political discourse that social hardships must be avoided in the transition to a climate-neutral society. But the coalition agreement of the new federal government is still quite vague about the real effects on low-income households of worsening climate change and contemplated climate policies.

Gainful Employment

Gainful employment stands for the satisfaction of material and social needs. It is crucial for individual personality formation and shapes the distribution of social recognition and social participation. It thereby shapes the relationship network between individual and society and functions as a central mechanism for social (dis)integration.

The world of work in the twenty-first century is still strongly shaped by the historically grown, emission-intensive economic structures of the industrial age. Climate protection was thus initially regarded exclusively as a “job destroyer,” especially in the heavily industrial-fossil sectors of the economy. Ecology and economy were seen as incompatible. Today, people have jettisoned this black-and-white thinking. This is due to forecasts always being difficult. Changes in labor demand can be attributed not only to climate protection, but also to automation processes and the outmigration of energy-intensive industries. This is why prognoses diverge. According to calculations by Prognos AG, unemployment is not expected to rise until 2050 (Hoch et al., 2019). There is even talk of an increase in employment: “The results show that climate protection is associated with positive economic effects overall. The ex-post analysis clearly shows that the provision of climate protection technologies and services generates substantial employment” (ibid., p. 42).

Be that as it may, aggregate effects conceal quite diverse sectoral and activity-specific developments. In certain sectors, especially in the automotive industry, jobs will continue to be lost due to climate protection measures. According to a study by the Fraunhofer Institute, such job losses till 2030 will however be much smaller than heretofore assumed (Herrmann et al., 2020). In addition to the job losses, there will also be a restructuring of jobs. Here, too, the automotive industry can be cited as an example. The switch from combustion engines to electric motors makes early retraining and qualification of employees important. In the medium term, measures against climate change can also stimulate economic growth. New technologies emerge, are deployed, and create new jobs. Good examples are job growth in the wind and solar energy sectors as well as in the construction industry.

Mobility

Spatial mobility is the second-largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions in Germany. Between 2000 and 2018, distance traveled by air grew 64.9%, by rail 30.1%, and by car 7.5% (Fig. 3). Despite slower growth, individual car transport is the most important means of mobility in absolute terms. Traffic volume, number of cars, and distances travelled, have continued to increase. The car is an integral part of the material needs of life, of social participation, and of social interaction. But not everyone can afford a car: only 77% of all households even own one (UBA, 2021b). Cars increase environmental pollution. The more frequently cars are used, the greater the environmental impact; and the farther the number of cars increases, the more of the gains from technological emission reductions are erased. Both trends have been steeply rising in the last 18 years. Environmentally damaging air transport has also seen a sharp increase, while rail travel, though increasing, is lagging far behind private motorized transport (Fig. 3). Transport is the sole sector that did not achieve any emission reductions between 1990 and 2019 (Fig. 2). The ecological transformation dubbed “transport turnaround” has failed thus far.

Fig. 3

Key figures in the transport sector (ibid.)

Various instruments are used to reduce traffic volume and to replace high-emission private transport, among them the CO2 tax which increases the gasoline price and thus has a highly selective social effect.

Lower-income households are disproportionately burdened by this levy (Held et al., 2021). Income poverty becomes “mobility poverty.” Lower-income households, if they own a car at all, are “forced (…) to spend more money on transport costs than they can really afford” (Daubitz, 2016, p. 440). They have limited opportunities to reallocate expenses, by spending less in vital areas such as housing and food. The subsidy strategy meant to replace “combustion engines” with e-cars is not a viable option for them, nor for almost three quarters of the population (72%), despite the subsidy (acatech, 2021).⁴ Local public transport is therefore extremely important for these households, but not up to the task.

The federal government is aware of the social imbalance. To cushion the social impact, it was decided to increase the commuting allowance and to introduce a mobility subsidy, both valid till the end of 2026 and for commutes of 21 km or more. The mobility subsidy⁵ is intended as cost compensation for people on low incomes. As a result, however, higher-income households are again the beneficiaries, as they are barely affected by the price increases and benefit disproportionately from the new instruments. Despite the mobility flat rate, the largest net burden still falls on the 40% with the lowest incomes (Held et al., 2021).

Housing

Housing is a human right, included in the Declaration of Human Rights. A home offers space to live and is the basis for our social coexistence. When a suitable accommodation is lacking, many other human rights are threatened, such as the rights to health and life or the right to participation. Although the German Basic Law (constitution) does not explicitly recognize a right to housing, no one questions that housing is an existential good that should be provided to all.

The housing issue is one of the most pressing problems of our time. The gap between owning and renting is widening, especially between those who can afford expensive housing and those who depend on an affordable rent. This is because households at risk of poverty spend almost 60% of their disposable income on housing, while the rest of the population on average spend less than 25%. The housing situation is getting worse, especially in the cities, in part because of people moving in from rural areas (urbanization). At the same time, the stock of subsidized housing is declining, rental costs in conurbations are rising and in inner-city neighborhoods wealthy households are displacing those with lower incomes (gentrification). Social dislocations reach into the middle class (Fig. 4). Social cohesion is threatened.

Fig. 4

Key figures on housing (Destatis, 2020, 2021; Statista, 2021)

The building sector’s decreasing harm to the climate cannot hide the fact that this sector still accounts for almost one sixth of German greenhouse gas emissions, which must be reduced by almost half by 2030 (Fig. 2). Two policies directly pursue this goal: CO2 pricing in the building sector and energy-saving renovation. A third measure concerns the construction industry which, due to its use of raw materials, is responsible for substantial CO2 emissions. Emission reductions in the housing sector can succeed only if housing construction is not continuously impeded by new building regulations and shortages of building materials.

Since January 2021, the CO2 price applies also to the building sector. This triggers additional costs for private households due to the increased cost of electricity, heating oil, and natural gas. The price increases for electricity are accompanied by an expansion of renewable energies. The green power surcharge (EEG) and its impact on the electricity markets have led to large excess costs for private households. The CO2 levy primarily affects low-income households and those in the lower middle class, as the levy forces them to spend a higher proportion of their total budget on covering their basic needs. Moreover, the costs are imposed entirely on tenants; landlords can fully pass on the costs of the CO2 levy. The CO2 price also disproportionately affects low-income tenants because they often live in poorly insulated buildings in which energy costs tend to be much higher than in renovated houses. To bring relief, it was decided to use the revenue from the CO2 levy to increase the housing allowance, which will primarily benefit lower-income households.

The second pillar of climate politics is based on the massive expansion of energy-focused renovation. The originally intended effect: to stimulate energy-focused renovations through a price on CO2, is not achievable with the current design. Why should landlords invest in energy-efficient renovation when the resulting cost savings go exclusively to their tenants? The crucial instrument for energy-efficient renovation of existing buildings is therefore the modernization levy pursuant to §559 of the German Civil Law (BGB), which can lead to an increase in the basic rent, even though the levy has been limited to 8% since 2019 (previously 11%) by the Rent Adjustment Act. For landlords, modernization is especially worthwhile in conurbations with a substantial housing shortage, as rents can there be raised more easily. Climate policy thus leads to rent increases and to processes of displacement and social segregation. In the entire policy domain of housing, climate policies increase social inequality, which shows the urgent need for policy revisions.

An important field is therefore the construction of subsidized housing units that are both ecologically sound and affordable to rent. Since the number of subsidized housing units has been cut by nearly one-half since the turn of the century, substantial efforts will be necessary.

Food

Food and food security are a human right which, though not explicitly laid down in the German Constitution, is implied by the welfare state. Agriculture is therefore the basis of our coexistence and social reproduction.

Agriculture has become much more efficient in recent decades. Today, one farmer feeds twice as many people as in 1990. This efficiency gain is due to massive consolidation in agriculture accompanied by reduction in employment. Since the mid-1990s, the number of farms has halved. In terms of total area farmed, organic farming is still insignificant (Fig. 5).

Fig. 5

Key figures on food/agriculture (DBV, 2020; Forum Moderne Landwirtschaft, 2021)

Germany produces more meat and milk than its own population consumes but is otherwise dependent on imports. Foodstuffs such as fruits and vegetables are sourced mainly from abroad (DBV, 2020). In the agricultural producer countries of Asia and Africa, global warming of perhaps 3 degrees and more is leading to disastrous conditions, with floods, storms, and droughts becoming the norm. Due to this development, the price of wheat might rise 55% by 2050, that of rice by 37%, and that of corn/maize by 11%. Large and volatile price fluctuations are also expected (Cameron, 2015). Higher consumer prices would make staple foods from abroad unaffordable to lower-income households and would also burden middle-class household budgets. Conversion to organic agriculture might further increase dependence on imports (cf. Fig. 5). Increasing demands on sustainably produced foodstuffs might result in international competitive disadvantages and even in outsourcing effects.

In Germany, climate policy is primarily concerned with the ecological restructuring of agricultural production, which is especially affected by the effects of climate change: extreme weather events and permanent climatic changes can lead to crop failures or declining yields (as well as to losses in livestock production)—though these losses will be less dramatic than in the global South. Individual farms might suffer enormous income losses, which would necessitate investments in precautionary and adaptive measures. Such investments would be especially difficult to afford for small, financially weaker farms. Already today, more than one sixth of farmers (17%) consider ecological readjustment unaffordable, and almost one third (29.5%) fear a negative financial cost-benefit balance. However, a large majority of farms (80%) are willing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions with appropriate cost compensation (Stumpenhorst, 2020).

Consumers today are more conscious of their diet than in earlier times, even if only 37% buy organic food frequently or exclusively. Almost two-thirds (64%) find it too expensive (Forum Moderne Landwirtschaft, 2021). By causing crop failures and rising world market prices for foodstuffs, climate change will drive up retail food prices, burdening all income groups but especially low-income households whose food expenditures account for a larger share of their overall budget. This development, too, might provide fertile soil for polarization and disintegration processes.

Health

Health is much more than physical integrity. Over time, proper nutrition and exercise have become integral parts of social interaction. Health is also more than the health of individual persons. The pandemic has clearly shown how much our economic and social life depends on the health of the whole population.

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges for health. Nonetheless, the health effects of climate change are not yet much discussed in our country. Large parts of the medical profession, associations, and scientific societies do not even participate in the debate (Lehmkuhl, 2019). It was only recently, in 2017, that the “German Alliance for Climate Change and Health” (KLUG) was founded. This is surprising because low-income households have long been especially affected by environmentally harmful conditions: “people with a low social status and socially disadvantaged urban neighborhoods tend to be affected more frequently by often multiple environmental burdens relevant to health, such as noise and/or air pollutants and a lack of green spaces” (BMAS, 2021, p. 342).

As a result of climate change, temperatures are rising, there are more “hot days.” With especially high exposure to urban climate effects, urban populations suffer most from this. With much of the ground sealed or covered with buildings, heat builds up and maximum temperatures rise. “Heat stress” in indoor areas will continue to increase, resulting in a higher mortality rate. Germany already ranks third in heat-related deaths; in 2018, 22,000 people over 65 died from heat-related causes (The Lancet, 2020). The increasing frequency of extreme weather events such as storms, heavy rainfall, floods, avalanches, or landslides has a direct impact on people’s health, causing diseases and injuries, stress, mental disorders, anxiety, and depression. These climate-related health risks especially affect children and older, weakened, or health-impaired people. Socio-economic status is another risk factor. Especially people of “lower social status, who are less educated, who live in neighborhoods that have a high proportion of low-income population, who are unmarried, or who have lost their spouse” (Eis et al., 2010) are at heightened risk of mortality.

If one links the various dimensions of social inequality, it becomes apparent that people with low incomes are more affected by climate change than others. They are more vulnerable to its impacts, and their low income also reduces their ability to preemptively adapt to climate change and other difficulties. People face a dilemma: if they do not adapt to the new conditions, their health will suffer. If they try to protect themselves, they bump up against their financial limits due to increased rents, among other things. Protection against climate change once again becomes a social issue.

Conclusion

Climate change poses major socio-political challenges for political, economic, and social actors. Climate policy can further divide society, but it can also strengthen social cohesion by bringing social groups closer together. In view of the unequal social impact, there is much to suggest that the pessimistic scenario, a deepening division, is the more likely prospect. This must be prevented by political decisions and their engaged communication.

Entailing rising costs in the areas of work, mobility, housing, food, and health, climate policy measures have a drastic impact on the lives of lower-income and less-educated households and on parts of the lower middle class. Higher-income households contribute more than others to CO2 emissions while being financially less affected by them. They are better able to cope with the effects of climate change because they are less affected, more frequently take precautions, and are more likely to make use of alternative options. Climate change will thus further widen the gap between rich and poor in key areas of society.

The new federal government has endorsed compensating lower-income households through tax-financed covering of the EEG levy, for example, or through additional climate payments (Die Bundesregierung, 2021). Subsidized housing is to be expanded as well with an additional one billion euros in federal funds for 2022. The evidence suggests, however, that this will not be enough to adequately compensate for the expected increase in burdens.

If the climate goals are still to be met, rapid and strong control and framing of the complex and simultaneous processes of dismantling, renovating, and constructing is required. Here, too, the new German government is setting new accents in climate policy. The state as framework provider and the economy as innovation and technology driver are to cooperate more closely:

We want more innovation, more competitiveness, more efficiency, good jobs, and climate-neutral prosperity. For this, we need a decade of investment in the future and more speed. Our goal is a social-ecological market economy. (ibid., p. 25)

Climate protection policy also attempts to change individual conduct. Politically, this falls under diverse headings. Due to the restrictive, prohibition-oriented measures (bans on New Year’s Eve fireworks or diesel engines, etc.), climate protection has a reputation for being the antagonist of freedom. Veggieday is a good example of this. To avoid the political consequences of restrictive policies, more and more parties are relying on technological progress and positive incentives, including the Green Party: “The use of modern technologies enables climate neutrality. It is the task of politics, therefore, to activate people’s ingenuity toward developing suitable technologies and deploying them intelligently” (Die Grünen, 2021, p. 22).

Which innovations should be introduced is controversial as some prioritize the market while others prefer the state to take a leading role. The preference for market-based and technological solutions is strongest in the Liberal Party (FDP), which wants climate protection to be run primarily by companies and citizens. Opposed to this is the view that a consistent climate policy cannot be implemented without (radical) intervention in the private and economic spheres. The federal government is trying to establish an intermediate path.

Climate policy can strengthen societal coherence if a joint effort in solidarity were to succeed, and an overburdening of weaker groups could be avoided. This would require broad inclusion of all, new patterns of participation, as well as procedures and reforms of the existing forums.

Climate policy must then face the dual socio-political challenge and offer proactive answers to socio-economic and socio-cultural challenges. These answers will pose a major challenge to the state, to markets, and to society’s own initiatives, but will ultimately co-determine the success or failure of climate policy.