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Corruption, Taxation of Natural Resources and Sustainable Development in Africa

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Taxation and Management of Natural Resources in Africa

Abstract

African nations grapple with balancing socio-economic growth and environmental preservation amid resource extraction. Taxation is advocated for revenue and environmental control. However, corruption poses a significant hurdle among duty bearers and citizens. Using a multidimensional regression strategy, this research explores corruption’s interplay with taxation policies and their impact on African sustainable development. The findings stress anti-corruption measures’ critical role in enabling effective taxation strategies for sustainable resource management across diverse African nations. Firstly, they indicate that robust anti-corruption measures significantly shape successful taxation policies for sustainable resource management. Moreso, the study underscores a strong link between reduced corruption, enhanced taxation strategies, and improved prospects for sustainable development across Africa’s sectors. Finally, it highlights the urgent need for cohesive policies and robust enforcement mechanisms to drive sustainable development in Africa’s natural resource sector.

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Correspondence to Michael Gift Soku .

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Description of Variables

Number

Variable type

Variable name

Abbreviation

Description

References

Source

1

Dependent

Proxy for Sustainable development

SD

Sustainable development index

Badur et al. (2023), Nyantakyi et al. (2023), Quayson et al. (2023), Arora and Mishra (2019)

Sustainable development index (Retrieved from https://www.sustainabledevelopmentindex.org/)

2

Dependent and Independent

Tax

TAX

Sum of Corporate income tax and Royalty on gross turnover

Ajeigbe et al. (2023)

Taxation of mining industries (Retrieved from https://fiscalite-miniere.ferdi.fr/en/download/tax-systems)

3

Control

Corruption score

CS

Corruption score

Badur et al. (2023), Hope (2022), Rubusundram and Rasiah (2019), Kalkuhl et al. (2018)

Transparency International

4

Control

Trade openness

TOS

Sum of imports and exports of goods and services as a percentage of the country’s GDP divided by two

Badur et al. (2023), Tiba and Belaid (2021), Asongu et al. (2021)

World Development Index

5

Control

Urban population

URP

People living in urban areas as a percentage of the entire country’s population

Hove et al. (2018), Ogwu (2019)

World Development Index

6

Control

Population growth rate

PG

Population growth rate

Arora and Mishra (2019), Ogwu (2019)

World Development Index

7

Control

GDP per capita growth

GDP

Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita

Hope (2022), Halim and Rahman (2022), Ajeigbe et al. (2023), Asongu et al.(2021)

World Development Index

8

Control

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism

PSA

Perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism

Kunawotor et al. (2020), Appiah-Kubi et al. (2021)

World Development Index

9

Control

Human capital index (HCI)

HCI

Contributions of health and education to worker productivity ranges from 0 to 1

Fhima et al. (2023), Oyinlola and Adedeji (2022)

World Development Index

10

Control

Gross fixed capital formation

GFCF

Gross outlays by the private sector and its fixed domestic assets as a percentage of GDP

Tiba and Belaid (2021), Christoforidis et al. (2021)

World Development Index

11

Control

Government spending

GS

Gross national expenditure is the sum of household final consumption expenditure, general government final consumption expenditure, and gross capital formation

Cockx and Francken (2016)

World Development Index

12

Control

Unemployment

UEM

Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and unemployment differ by country

Akinyele et al. (2023), Carraro et al. (1996)

World Development Index

13

Control

Institutional quality

INS

Principal component analysis of the six institutional quality measures (control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of violence, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability)

Botlhole et al. (2012)

World Governance Index

14

Control

Human capital index (HCI)

HCI

Contributions of health and education to worker productivity ranges from 0 to 1

Fhima et al. (2023), Oyinlola and Adedej, (2022)

World Development Index

15

Control

Gross fixed capital formation

GFCF

Gross outlays by the private sector and its fixed domestic assets as a percentage of GDP

Tiba and Belaid (2021), Christoforidis et al. (2021)

World Development Index

Preliminary Diagnostic Checks

In this section, we discuss the outcome of the diagnostic test conducted and the determination of the correlation matrix prior to the test for the presence of cross-sectional dependence. For panel models, the absence of multicollinearity is relevant in obtaining reliable estimates. In Table 4, we find no evidence of multicollinearity in all the variables used for estimating the model. The variance inflation factor estimates in Appendix 2 support the absence of multicollinearity in the data. From Appendix 2 Wooldridge’s (2002) test for autocorrelation and the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity show evidence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, respectively. However, the Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test in the residuals shows no evidence of temporal and spatial dependence in the cross-sectional residuals. Nonetheless, the series exhibits strong cross-sectional dependence. In the absence of endogeneity, the Hausmann (1978) test shows that a fixed effect model is appropriate for the panel data. To account for the cross-sectional dependence in the series, we apply the Driscoll-Kraay standard error correctional model. Hoechle (2007) has argued that temporal and spatial dependence in the series and the residuals make estimates from panel regression unreliable. Also, assuming cross-sectional correlation is constant across series will lead to misspecification errors.

Appendix 2: Variance Inflation Factor

Independent variables

VIF

1/VIF

TAX

2.714

0.368

CRS

1.552

0.644

TOS

2.181

0.458

URP

2.190

0.457

PGT

1.836

0.545

GDP

2.147

0.466

PSA

1.435

0.697

HCI

1.094

0.914

GFC

2.784

0.359

Mean VIF

1.993

 
  1. The abbreviation TAX stands for sum of corporate income tax and royalty on gross turnover, CRS stands for corruption score, TOS denotes trade openness, URP stands for urban population, PGT denotes population growth, GDP stands for gross domestic product capita per growth, PSA stands for political stability and absence of violence, HCI denote human capital development, and GFC means gross fixed capital formation

Appendix 3: Cross-Sectional Dependence Test in the Series

Variable

Statistic

ID

14.509**

CRS

14.686**

TAX

−0.860

TOS

−1.360

URP

15.873**

PGT

3.764**

GDP

−0.281

PSA

−0.378

GFC

−0.378

HCI

15.872**

  1. Note ** Denotes statistical significance at 5%. The abbreviation CRS stands for Corruption score, TAX stands for the sum of corporate income tax and royalty on gross turnover, TOS denotes trade openness, URP stands for urban population, PGT denotes population growth, GDP stands for gross domestic product per capita per growth, PSA stands for political stability and absence of violence, HCI denotes human capital development, and GFC means gross fixed capital formation

Appendix 4: Diagnostic Tests

Test

Statistic

P-value

Wooldridge test for autocorrelation

1540.053

0.000

Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity

9.090

0.003

Hausman (1978)

895.210

0.000

Pesaran CD test in the residuals

−1.132

0.258

Appendix 5: Country-Level Descriptive Statistics Averaged for the Period 2011–2019

The table presents country-level descriptive statistics averaged for the period 2011–2019. To examine the impact of corruption score and natural resources taxes on sustainable development in Africa, this study uses the sustainability development indicator, corruption score index and tax on natural resources as it main dependent and independent variables respectively. Trade openness, Urban population, GDP per capita growth, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Human capital index, and Gross fixed capital formation are incorporated as controls in the study.

Panel A

 

SDI

CS

TAX

TOS

URP

Angola

0.609

18.111

23.914

36.147

63.406

Burkina Faso

0.455

35.556

11.541

29.839

27.554

Congo, Republic

0.603

19.467

23.548

57.387

65.543

Ghana

0.638

39.433

17.579

36.877

54.071

Madagascar

0.561

24.222

17.833

30.295

35.205

Mali

0.453

28.422

11.547

30.431

39.981

South Africa

0.672

39.122

33.444

27.967

64.817

Panel B

 

PGT

GDP

PSA

HCI

GFC

Angola

3.617

−1.628

−0.375

0.080

17.563

Burkina Faso

2.915

2.693

−0.827

0.083

0.000

Congo, Republic

2.526

−3.092

−0.500

0.093

38.572

Ghana

2.323

4.199

0.032

0.098

0.000

Madagascar

2.629

0.533

−0.486

0.084

16.609

Mali

3.122

1.080

−1.742

0.071

11.119

South Africa

0.809

0.316

−0.147

0.092

14.133

  1. The abbreviation SDI is Sustainable development indicator, CS denotes the corruption score, TAX is the tax on natural resources, TOS is trade openness, URP is urban population, PGT is population growth, GDP is the gross domestic product per capita, PSA is the Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, HCI is the human capital index and GFC is gross fixed capital formation (private sector)

The country-level descriptive statistics of the study variables are presented in Table 1. Among the seven sampled African countries, the average sustainable development indicator ranges between 0.453 and 0.672. Mali shows the lowest sustainable development indicator, 0.453 while South Africa shows the highest, 0.672. That implies high levels of sustainable development in South Africa as compared to Mali. The average corruption score ranges between 18.111 and 39.122. This implies that the highest corruption score is 39.122 and the lowest corruption score is 18.111. Unlike the other variables, a high value signifies a positive whereas a lower value signifies a negative. According to Transparency International, a high corruption score, 100, signifies a very clean country, a country with no corruption whereas a low corruption score signifies a highly corrupt. From the table, Angola is highly corrupt with a corruption score of 18.111 followed by Congo, Republic, 19.467. South Africa on the other hand, has the highest corruption score, hence a less corrupt country.

The average tax on natural resources range between 11.541 and 33.444. This implies that relatively low taxes are paid on natural resources among the sample African countries. From the table, the average GDP trade for the period 2011 to 2019 ranges between 27.967 and 57.387. Unlike the main independent and dependent variables, Congo, Republic recorded the highest GDP trade over the sample period. Urban population has relatively high averages as compared to the other variables. South Africa has the highest percentage of its population living in the urban areas, 64.817. Burkina Faso, on the other hand, has the least percentage of its population living in urban areas, 27.554.

The mean level of population growth ranges between 0.809 and 3.617. On average, South Africa’s population increased at the lesser rate while Angola’s population increased at a very faster rate. The average GDP per capita ranges between −3.092 and 4.199. Among the sampled African countries, Ghana has the highest annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita while Congo, Republic has the least. The average human capital index is relatively low, ranging between 0.071 and 0.093. The average contribution of health and education to the productivity of workers of the sampled countries below 0.1. Gross fixed capital formation for private sectors has an average range of 0.000 and 38.572. Among the sampled countries, Burkina Faso and Ghana has the no gross outlays from private sectors whereas Congo, Republic has the highest outlays from private sectors.

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Kuttu, S., Soku, M.G., Amidu, M., Coffie, W. (2024). Corruption, Taxation of Natural Resources and Sustainable Development in Africa. In: Amidu, M., Ali-Nakyea, A., Abor, J.Y. (eds) Taxation and Management of Natural Resources in Africa. Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58124-3_16

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