Conclusions: A New Era of African Agency

Abstract

A prevailing sense of insecurity pervades the world, fuelled by a surge in high-intensity conflicts and shifting geopolitical dynamics among traditional and emerging global powers over the past two decades. These changes are disrupting global trade and politics and testing the legitimacy and efficacy of existing multilateral institutions. They have also reverberated in the relationship between Europe and Africa.

Both Europe and Africa have sought to strategically reposition themselves in this dynamic global landscape. For Africa, this has been a positive shift. The continent is carving out a new role in a multipolar world, diversifying its partnerships and offering attractive growth opportunities to investors; Africa contains some of the world’s fastest-growing economies and is anticipated to be the fastest-growing world region by 2027. However, read most assessments of Africa’s prospects, notably those from Europe, and this is not the perspective that emerges.

A Long History of Asymmetry

This book offers a comprehensive examination of the complex dynamics shaping the strained relationship between Africa and Europe over centuries. It starts by delving into the emotional dimensions that underpin this relationship, emphasising the enduring legacy of colonial history on both continents.

During the colonial era, Africans, convinced of the benefits of European rule, embraced new cultures from the West, initiating a distressing historical pattern that endures. The European penetration of Africa was rooted in pursuing political and economic power through colonisation, mirroring power dynamics at home. Language was wielded as a tool to assert European superiority, perpetuating a narrative that misrepresented and downplayed the continent’s size and developmental achievements, thus creating enduring stereotypes about Africa that helped justify colonial conquest and racially based exploitation.

The book invites readers to reframe the narrative and recognise these nuanced realities: Africa’s challenging geography does not accurately represent human activity and development on the continent; economic assessments of the continent must be broadened to encompass its true resource endowments; and the continent’s burgeoning youth population should be acknowledged as a potential global reservoir of talent. Additionally, colonial legacies shaping risk evaluation on the continent need revaluation, steering clear of biases.

The argument for reconfiguring Africa-EU relations along these lines parallels the imperative for all countries to cooperate in addressing weakest-link GPGs, such as climate change mitigation. Scott Barrett’s work, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (2007), emphasises that non-excludable and non-rivalrous GPGs resonates with the interconnectedness essential for fostering cooperation between Africa and Europe. The spectrum of GPGs, from single best effort to weakest link and aggregate effort, offers a nuanced perspective, aligning with countries’ varied challenges.

The historical dimensions explored in Chap. 2 laid the groundwork for understanding the influence of aid and charity frameworks that have dominated African development discourses over the past century discussed in Chap. 3. Colonialism helped create the perception of Africa as a recipient in need of assistance rather than as an active participant in its own development, a view that, in turn, contributed to the inadequacies of aid programmes in tackling much-needed structural transformation on the continent.

The failure to account for differing national priorities, political dynamics, and contextual nuances resulted in a flawed international development system that inadvertently rewarded ‘good performers’—nations that adhered to the extensive conditionality list outlined by Bretton Woods institutions—while failing to address the unique challenges faced by individual countries. This blind spot encouraged the perpetuation of charity-based models of aid that have continued to diminish and degrade Africa, reinforcing a stigmatised image of perpetual misery and of a continent that is incapable of independently addressing its challenges.

This ethos has unfortunately persisted. For example a critical analysis of the MDGs introduced in the early 2000s reveals the absence of context-based targets to foster accountability, ownership, and results-oriented programmes. Beyond the MDGs, Chap. 3 underscores the importance of addressing historical responsibilities as well as justice and equity in compensatory finance. Frameworks around governance are also scrutinised.

A critical examination of the traditional emphasis on ‘good governance’ as the panacea for economic growth and development reveals the fundamental flaws of this approach. The critique highlights the need for a more nuanced and comprehensive approach, pushing the governance discourse beyond the rhetoric of corruption, procedural fairness, and efficient decision-making to encompass a broader and more systemic perspective that focuses on tangible development outcomes. For instance, the fight against corruption demands more sophistication than checkboxes and slogans. African leaders are cautioned against adopting superficial narratives to gain favour and recognition. Instead, they need to cultivate the analytical capacity for independent critical thinking.

It is essential for both Europeans and Africans to abandon grand scenarios and unrealistic commitments, advocating instead for pragmatic goals that can realistically be achieved within a given timeframe. The right combination of attitudes and incentives is explained in Lopes and Theisohn’s (2003) ten default principles for capacity development (see Fig. 9.1).

Fig. 9.1

Ten default principles for capacity development. (Source: Lopes & Theisohn, 2003)

Chapter 4 explores how the economic theory of comparative advantage, established in the colonial era, has also played an important role in perpetuating an unequal power dynamic between Europe and Africa. This model, often presented as neutral, sees commodities flow out of Africa while higher-value manufactured goods are imported. This reinforces misleading assumptions about African economies and fails to recognise their true complexity and nuance. The analysis demonstrates how such flaws in the interpretation of comparative advantage theory have been minimised, perpetuating a skewed architecture of relations between Europe and Africa that does not accurately reflect the dynamics of trade and collaboration between the two entities.

It is evident, for example, that terminologies like ‘preferences’ were rooted in the colonial framework, coercing African entities to serve foreign objectives at the expense of their intrinsic well-being. The adverse effects of this trade system, which disadvantaged African countries, continue to echo in contemporary economic policies. The need for active industrial policies was constantly shot down by the European ‘preferences’ for commodities, incentivised through a sophisticated web of rules and the use of aid. This played down the imperative for African countries to establish specific production capabilities for effective participation and integration into global value chains.

As a result, multilateralism is now facing legitimacy challenges and the WTO is becoming more marginalised, giving rise to neo-protectionism and trade tensions. The importance of policy-led, smart protectionism to grow economies is exemplified in Southeast Asia’s experience. Having more robust export-led industrial policies in place helped ensure that region’s rapid growth. For African countries aspiring to follow Southeast Asia’s development trajectory, robust state support and strategic industrial policy frameworks are therefore imperative.

The challenges posed by foreign investments and capital flight, which is draining Africa’s resources, also need to be addressed. Measures to curb this financial haemorrhage and repatriate stolen assets are required. The evolving global economy demands a recalibration of the comparative advantage paradigm to encompass factors like security considerations, reshoring, and sustainable production practices.

As part of this process, it is vital to assess strategic alliances wielded by European countries, such as bilateral trade agreements, that amplify their economic interests and perpetuate the status quo. The impact of the intellectual property regime on developing countries’ development trajectories similarly requires revaluation.

The Lost Development Decades of the Twentieth Century

The late 1980s marked a turning point in the EU’s strategic interest in Africa. While previously focused primarily on exploiting the continent’s economic potential, a shift occurred to include geopolitical, security, and migration concerns. However, structural imbalances persisted and Africa’s socioeconomic development needs or changing trade patterns continued to be neglected. In short, the new African-European Partnership struggled to reconcile the fundamental inequalities between the partners leading to the further marginalisation of the continent.

Chapter 5 turns its attention to the repercussions of these lost development decades of the twentieth century. The implementation of SAPs in African and later in Latin American countries starkly demonstrated the disconnect between the Bretton Woods institutions’ purported intentions and the dire realities these countries faced. While SAPs were intended to deliver free-market reforms to boost socioeconomic development, the Washington Consensus they promoted gave them an unparalleled influence that ensured external influence continued to constrain African economies. Conditions tied to aid packages formulated by international financial institutions narrowed policy autonomy, compelling countries to adhere to pre-defined economic restructuring paths.

Africa bore the brunt of the SAP’s ill-conceived approach, with GDP growth stagnating, investments plummeting, and export shares diminishing significantly.

The prevailing power imbalance within the governance structures of the Bretton Woods institutions has become equally apparent. At ideological, representational, and crisis-response levels, the interests of wealthy countries, with a large number being European, consistently outweighed those of the poorest, mostly African, countries. More recently, the differential treatment shown during the pandemic and the economic and financial repercussions of the war in Ukraine bear glaring witness to this enduring inequality, underscoring questionable practices of the current international financial architecture.

It is evident that Africa’s rich developmental diversity has collided with the imposition of standardised policy prescriptions. Regrettably, this same approach is evident in the frameworks surrounding the MDGs and the SDGs. Rather than liberating Africa from the straitjacket of SAPs by shifting the focus from prescriptive policies to goals, the unthinking translation of globally applicable goals into national frameworks, devoid of consideration for diverse socioeconomic contexts, has perpetuated the stigma of an ostensibly incapable Africa, now portrayed as unable to achieve universally endorsed goals.

The EU has played a crucial role in shaping these various development strategies. Its endorsement of conditionality through SAPs as instruments for shaping African economic policies, followed by a shift towards goal-centred policies, reflects a dynamic evolution that considered the need to bury failures and engender new interpretations that justified its interventionism. As a result, the EU’s stance inadvertently hindered the exploration of diverse economic frameworks and innovative policy solutions to address African development challenges.

The Pushback: Strengthening Africa’s Role on the Global Stage

Chapter 6, titled “The Good Samaritan lost their way,” refers metaphorically to how, over time, Europe has deviated from the benevolent and altruistic stance it consistently adopted in its post-colonial interactions with Africa. The colonial logic underpinning the Africa-EU trade formation in the post-Cotonou era, for example, reflects a paternalistic approach that was camouflaged by numerous programmes and policy decisions that promised to bring sustainable growth and economic transformation.

This paternalism is evident in the many instances where Europe has acted unilaterally. For example, in November 2023, the AU and the EU were slated for their third foreign affairs ministerial meeting in Brussels. Regrettably, just a week before the scheduled event, it was deferred. The grounds for the postponement remained elusive, possibly another indicator of the challenges confronting the partnership in an unpredictable global context. However, two previous ministerial meetings suffered similar setbacks, suggesting a pattern rather than an episode.

Africa, meanwhile, is taking steps to strengthen its position in the global negotiating arena. While the AU currently lacks a direct mandate to represent member states globally, it has invested in various formats to amplify its influence. The Common African Positions (CAPs) is one such example, where African states, under AU’s leadership, decided on a collective response to global issues including the post-2015 UN agenda, climate change, humanitarian effectiveness, migration, and UNSC reform. Recent AU initiatives include appointing representatives for political negotiations or securing a debt moratorium, access to capital for COVID-19 recovery, or joint procurement of vaccines.

In September 2023, the AU achieved a significant milestone by securing permanent membership in the G20 (hopefully soon to be renamed as the G21), underscoring Africa’s escalating strategic importance on the global stage. Following this achievement, in November of the same year, the Africa Group at the United Nations in New York achieved a remarkable feat: garnering unanimous support from 125 countries in the Global South for a resolution on tax systems. This marked one of the most notable instances of a perfect North-South divide in a UN General Assembly vote.

These noteworthy developments not only signify the continent’s steadfast rejection of marginalisation but also its resolute commitment to shaping discourse and influencing decision-making in the global economy. However, despite these successes, the continent has much work to do. Realising the full potential of G20 membership requires the AU to establish effective mechanisms for shaping and contributing to the agenda. This undertaking serves as a litmus test for the AU’s capacity to represent its member states in international fora, an arena where its mandate is inherently limited. The AU’s ability to navigate and contribute meaningfully to global discussions within the G20 will undoubtedly determine its effectiveness in advancing the collective interests of its members on the international stage.

These African efforts, facilitated by the AU and other means, underscore Africa’s readiness to be a global player despite economic, political, and security challenges. But the EU appears to perceive this unified African stance as pushback, in part because it clashes with the established EU-Africa relationship’s aid paradigm and challenges giver-recipient dynamics and the carrot-and-stick approaches.

Furthermore, the lack of an overarching strategy on the part of the AU is stopping Africa from playing a more proactive role in its external partnerships and putting African countries at a disadvantage. This can be seen in negotiations with the EU where, despite common African positions on migration, energy access, climate adaptation, and vaccine access demonstrating African assertiveness, African countries have struggled to formulate strategic priorities with the EU beyond thematic and reactive proposals.

Despite pushback against the EU’s values agenda on governance, Africa also grapples with its own governance challenges. Recent coups, constitutional manipulations, and election irregularities highlight the challenges. The AU and its member states struggle to use structures like the African Peace and Security Architecture, the African Peer Review Mechanism, and others due to factors like conflict internationalisation, insurgency spread, and a lack of continental political leadership (Handy & Djilo, 2021).

This is an opportune moment to change the status quo because the global political situation is shifting, and Europe is recalibrating its stance towards Africa as a result of a range of factors, including China’s growing role in global commerce and industry. Europe aims to ‘de-risk’ and stimulate growth in specific sectors while investing in critical fields like batteries and chips. Simultaneously, discussions on strategic autonomy and European defence and security sector development are gaining prominence.

To safeguard its interests in Africa and maintain global influence, the EU must deepen existing partnerships and seek new ones to ensure it has a significant bloc of votes in Africa. European states and the EU have said several times that they seek to move away from a donor-aid-recipient approach, reframing international cooperation as partnerships. Nevertheless, despite Africa prioritising trade and investments, in practice, offers for grant aid and financial support continue to be the central negotiating point.

In reimaging their relationship and leaving colonial logic behind, both Africa and Europe can take key lessons from their previous summits and engagements. These include the cruciality of a joint preparatory process for effective decision-making, clarifying the summit’s main purpose, defining the type of interaction, and agreeing on financial resource channels. A reform package and joint preparatory processes could enhance stakeholders’ voices, improve initiative design and impact, and foster partner equality. For the moment, such prospects have been curtailed by a dominating EU that can pick and choose its African interlocutors due to the fragmentation it actively foments in its engagements with the African continent.

A reset of traditional relations is needed to tackle the mounting challenges facing the world, not the least of which is the migration crisis. In Chap. 7, the spotlight shifts towards the intricate tapestry of migration, revealing a narrative that defies conventional European public views of Africa as a continent undergoing mass exodus. Delving into the wealth of data sets, a nuanced story unfolds, accentuating Africa’s comparatively modest role in the global migrant population, compared with other regions.

A notable revelation surfaces. While the European discourse surrounding African population growth and migration is neo-Malthusian in character, rife with narratives of scarcity, incapacity, and unemployment, the reality is that the bulk of African migrants consciously opt not to leave the continent. The European view further fails to acknowledge the enduring impact of colonisation on Africa’s socioeconomic landscape, fostering structural inequalities and perpetuating a perception of resource scarcity.

In navigating this convoluted terrain, international organisations have tough choices to make. The prevailing policy approaches and funding priorities seeking to address perceived migration challenges demand a recalibration. The media, a potent influence, is not exempt from scrutiny with migration discourse often succumbing to mass hysteria fuelled by sensationalism and populist political agendas spreading across Europe.

Aligned with Khanna’s perspective, this book contends that unrestricted human movement across borders is a cornerstone of social dynamics, offering economic advantages to nations (Khanna, 2021). However, stringent immigration policies designed to clamp down on migrants implemented in Europe in recent years and the United States during the Trump administration stand as stark contradictions to this ideal.

At the same time, at the opposite end of the scale, many EU member states are establishing individual job-matching platforms to attract non-EU nationals with scarce skills, potentially contributing to a brain drain of skilled professionals from Africa. This focus on skilled migration will almost certainly have a negative impact on Africa, as it restricts the movement of non-skilled individuals and contributes to a loss of local talent. The efficiency of labour migration systems and legal pathways vary across member states, with room for improvement in processes like visas, work permits, and skills recognition. Collaboration between interior ministries and labour market authorities will be essential to develop more effective labour migration strategies going forward.

Tackling migration challenges demands a multifaceted and holistic response that balances short-term crisis management with long-term solutions addressing the root causes of migration and acknowledging the inherent power dynamics between the EU and AU. However, right now this is not happening. Notably, the proliferation of negotiations initiative by the EU with individual African countries is at cross purposes with the AU’s expressed desire for a unified continental framework on migration. This fragmentation weakens African agency, undercutting the cohesive stance the AU aims to cultivate. By contrast, a comprehensive strategy could not only save lives and combat criminal networks but also generate employment opportunities, crucial for new labour market entrants in Africa each year.

In the intricate tapestry of migration narratives, European discussions often cast doubts on African states’ ability to govern migration effectively, and this is fuelled by media depictions of desperate journeys across the Mediterranean. But in fact, the continent has valuable solutions to share with EU member states, notably the National Coordination Mechanism on Migrations (NCMs) in the East and Horn of Africa (Okoth, 2023).

The NCMs are government-led interagency platforms that facilitate dialogue and holistic policy formulation and foster coherent and inclusive migration governance. The AU’s Migration Policy Framework provides comprehensive guidelines and mechanisms like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development National Communication Mechanisms (IGAD’s) NCMs. These mechanisms strive to integrate migration into national development through a collaborative government and societal approach, promoting efficiency, avoiding duplication, and optimising limited resources.

In contrast, EU member states often compartmentalise migration within interior ministries, formulating policies primarily from a security standpoint that perceives migration as a threat. Despite evidence showcasing migrants’ positive contributions to economic and social development, the EU emphasises externalisation over regular migration pathways. Furthermore, outsourcing migration management has proven ineffective, with the summer of 2023 witnessing a record-high influx of migrants to Italy (Okoth, 2023).

IGAD member states, particularly Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, offer a model worth emulating. Their progress in implementing NCMs provides a blueprint for EU countries to revamp their migration approach.

Chapter 8 turns its attention to the centrality of trade in the current and future Europe-Africa relationship. In the post-Cotonou era, negotiations between the EU and the ACP countries have revealed an unequal trade dynamic that, unless addressed, could undermine the future of economic collaboration between Africa and Europe.

Preferential trade, ostensibly portrayed as a concession from Africa to Europe, underscores a subtle power play. The EU’s deliberate engagement with the six ACP regions instead of treating them as a unified bloc reflects a ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy. This deliberate fragmentation has not only sown discord within Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific but also impeded progress towards deeper economic integration.

Furthermore, the negotiation tactics employed by the EU echo a mercantilist agenda, often at the expense of the developmental needs of ACP countries. The overarching focus leans towards dominating ACP markets and securing preferential access for EU producers. The profound asymmetries extend beyond economic realms, with the EU capitalising on robust institutional structures, a well-resourced bureaucracy, and skilled negotiators, thereby establishing a notable advantage over many resource-limited African counterparts.

The AfCFTA injects transformative potential into the relationship. Collective negotiation under the AfCFTA umbrella will augment Africa’s bargaining power in global trade deliberations, providing a unified voice commensurate with its collective economic influence. This takes precedence over national endeavours.

To safeguard the integrity of the AfCFTA and mitigate the risk of potential exploitation, the AU needs to adopt a strategy reminiscent of the West African EPA. Such a strategic alignment would ensure that the EU receives no preferential treatment unless reciprocal benefits are extended to all ACP states.

Moving forward it is vital that Africa preserve market access to the EU while concurrently seeking avenues for deeper engagement. This involves addressing developmental challenges and advocating for equitable treatment in trade. A focused dialogue with the EU on stringent requirements and standards, particularly for agricultural products, emerges as a strategic imperative. The existing standards and EU subsidies to its farmers pose significant impediments to African agriculture and agro-manufacturing exports.

The Future Beckons

The AU is poised at a crossroads. Right now, it has an opportunity to redefine its trade relationships. By prioritising African interests, aligning with continental goals, and steering away from ambiguous commitments, the AU can ensure that trade can become a catalyst for mutual growth and prosperity for both itself and the EU.

This also makes sense as a shield against new forms of protectionism based on climate considerations. For instance, the implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) demands careful consideration of its implications for Africa, particularly its potential negative effects on industrial exports. The transition to a lower carbon economy, while holding promise, should not unfairly burden African nations. A more inclusive global order is essential to ensure Africa actively participates in and benefits from green industrialisation opportunities. As CBAM takes effect, clear guidelines on its specific targets and potential counteracting duties will be crucial for navigating its impact on Africa’s economic landscape.

Africa’s growing global influence, exemplified by achievements like G20 membership, signals a continent ready to assert itself. Challenges persist in EU-Africa relations, but the trajectory forward involves redefining engagement. The EU’s shift to partnerships and initiatives like AfCFTA present opportunities for mutual growth.

Looking ahead, a call to action emerges: to abandon unrealistic commitments and embrace pragmatic goals. The global landscape invites a new chapter marked by cooperation, mutual respect, and shared progress. In this dynamic context, the future beckons for a fresh and equitable partnership between Africa and Europe.