The Good Samaritans Lose Their Way

Abstract

The complex relations between the EU and Africa have their roots in history, but more recently, the tone of their interactions has been determined by a series of instruments, agreements, and initiatives that the EU and its most influential members decided to launch, often unilaterally. For example, the recent Global Gateway Initiative was announced days before an EU-AU Summit without any prior consultation or warning. This means that frequently, African negotiators have faced interlocutors without a clear strategy and have been undermined by their own fragmentation and shifting priorities along the way. The EU negotiating tactics in the last two decades of this century have taken stock of the previous two, where results did not match expectations, obliging international actors in the development space to accept a shift from prescriptive policies towards goals. African agency got a boost but stumbled, nevertheless, due to weak negotiating capacity.

A History of Asymmetry

Europe’s influence on constructing an architecture of engagements with Africa has evolved over time, with historical roots extending beyond the post-World War II era. Various factors, including the decoloniality agenda, the Cold War, and economic considerations such as trade and investment agreements, have shaped the dynamics of Africa-Europe relations. The trajectory of these relations took a significant turn in 1975 with the signing of the first Lomé Convention between the EU and the ACP group of countries, marking the formalisation of engagements between the two entities. The subsequent Cotonou EU-ACP Partnership Agreement signed in 2000 further institutionalised the relationship.

The genesis of the ACP group can be traced back to colonial days and the power dynamics that shaped the post-colonial world order. The group emerged as a collective entity representing former colonies with shared historical ties to European powers. The colonial logic behind its formation reflects a paternalistic approach, wherein European nations sought to maintain influence and strategic interests in regions that were once under their dominion.

The exclusion of Northern Africa from the ACP group is telling. Linked to European colonial powers through the Mediterranean region, Northern Africa was often perceived differently from the sub-Saharan ACP countries. The exclusion underscored a regional differentiation rooted in historical ties, geopolitical complexities, and divergent post-colonial trajectories, revealing the nuanced and often uneven dynamics that shaped the formation of the ACP group.

The overarching goals of the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements were ambitious, aiming to promote sustainable development, contribute to poverty eradication, expand international trade, and enhance production capacities by guaranteeing ACP countries preferential access to EU markets. Additionally, the agreements sought to create an environment conducive to attracting investment to foster a mutually beneficial partnership.

However, despite the noble intentions outlined in these agreements, the practical outcomes have not always aligned with the aspirations for African development. One significant challenge has arisen from the EU’s strategic negotiation stance, which often prioritises preserving its commercial and governance privileges over its African partners. One of the main principles of the Cotonou Agreement explicitly states that the fundamental principles governing partnership relations are built on equality (Eur-lex, 2021). However, the reality behind the execution of these principles is quite different. Firstly, the Cotonou Agreements and systems were based on preferential trade agreements between select countries. This approach created fragmentation within the ACP-EU partnership and divided the ACP by generating differences between the countries rather than promoting integration.

Additionally, Africa’s integration into global affairs also remained limited. While the EU has strategically deployed regional integration processes to facilitate Africa’s gradual integration into the world economy, ensuring that these instruments do not perpetuate a pattern of asymmetrical power dynamics in favour of the EU has remained a challenge.

As the new century unfolded, significant developments reshaped the international landscape. The United Nations 2000 Millennium Summit marked a pivotal moment, shifting the focus from prescriptive development policies to concrete goals. It was the beginning of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Simultaneously, there was a shift away from the centrality of structural adjustment policies. The inauguration of the Africa-EU Partnership took place during the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo the same year, setting the tone for ongoing collaborative engagement between the AU and the EU.

Anchored by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), officially adopted during the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007, the Partnership encompasses political dialogue, economic cooperation, and development initiatives. The JAES consolidated about 50 years of trade and development cooperation between Africa and the EU relations and sought to strengthen political dialogue and enhance cooperation at all levels. Prioritising governance, democracy, and conflict prevention, the joint strategy aims to bolster trade, investment, and sustainable development while fostering people-to-people contacts and cultural exchanges. With regular summits and oversight by the AU-EU commissions, this collaborative endeavour addresses shared challenges and leverage opportunities, serving as a vital platform for mutual understanding and coordinated efforts in peace, security, and socio-economic development.

Part of the 2007 vision of a renewed Africa-Europe relationship was the idea of Africa becoming fully integrated and better regarded within global and multilateral decision-making frameworks. This trend started with the UK initiative ‘Commission for Africa’ and the invitation to prominent African leaders to attend the G8 and G20 nations meetings to discuss global economic governance matters and represent the continent at those meetings. This was a request from African leaders following the creation of the African Union in 2002 as a successor to the Organization of African Unity.

In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty marked another pivotal moment in the evolution of EU-African relations. For the EU, the treaty ushered in a new era of governance and redefining its role in international affairs. It aimed to consolidate the EU’s strength by emphasising solidarity as a central element among European countries, fostering collective efforts and actions. The goal was to enable the EU to assert a dominant international position with a coordinated voice on foreign policy matters (Qobo, 2010).

However, concerns arose regarding the treaty’s impact on Africa’s position within the new EU foreign policy framework. The Lisbon Treaty formally recognised the European Council as an EU institution responsible for providing the impetus for the Union’s development and defining its general political directions and priorities. Despite having no legislative functions, the European Council played a crucial role in shaping the EU’s external actions, especially concerning ACP countries. The treaty signalled a significant evolution in how the EU managed its global relationships, attributing more competencies to the EU and involving new actors in its institutional landscape (Qobo, 2010).

These changes, in turn, necessitated more coordination between the EU High Representative (EUHR) and the intergovernmental EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Security and Defence Policy, and the European Commission’s External Action Service (EEAS) areas. Unifying all geographic desks under the EEAS ended Africa’s special treatment within the EU, requiring the continent to reassert its space in the dialogue with the EUHR.

The immediate consequences of this were that it became increasingly challenging to coordinate the eight thematic areas of cooperation under the JAES, covering peace and security, democratic governance, human rights, trade, regional integration, infrastructure, millennium development goals, energy, climate change, migration, mobility, employment, and science. This occasionally led to the establishment of conflicting programmes and hindered efforts to assess the impact of interventions and measure progress during EU-Africa ministerial meetings.

The new governance arrangements also undermined earlier discourses of joint continent-to-continent governance articulated in 2007, causing tension within the EU Commission. For example, in 2011, the EEAS unilaterally formulated geographical strategies for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel that deviated from the previous approach of waiting for African perspectives, signalling a shift in governance dynamics. The EEAS’s proactive stance unsettled some within the EU Commission, especially the ‘development’ specialists who traditionally held primacy in the Africa-EU relationship (Qobo, 2010).

Historically, the EU-Africa partnership prioritised trade, but the JAES document adopted by the Lisbon Summit (2007) was ahead of its time in many ways. In its preamble, the EU and African states/continental organisations spelt out political ambitions that announced a ‘paradigm shift’ in the partnership. A few excerpts:

“The purpose of this Joint Strategy is to take the Africa-EU relationship to a new, strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels. The partnership will be based on a Euro-African consensus on values, common interests and common strategic objectives”.

“This partnership and its further development will be guided by the fundamental principles of the unity of Africa, the interdependence between Africa and Europe, ownership and joint responsibility. … In the light of this new partnership, both sides also commit themselves to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements, policies and instruments”.

“Both sides will treat Africa as one and upgrade the Africa-EU political dialogue to enable a strong and sustainable continent-to-continent partnership, with the AU and the EU at the centre”.

The partnership will seek to “jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism … and to address global challenges and common concerns” (European Commission, 2008).

Soon after the adoption of JAES, EU member states delegated trade negotiations to the EU Commission Director General for Trade. This approach framed negotiations as free trade talks, sidelining the development aspects proposed by the ACP based on their Lomé experiences. Pressure to meet WTO artificial deadlines, as well as the eagerness of the Director General for Trade to fast forward controversial agreements, resulted in crisis negotiations and limited interim agreements.

The EU’s focus on liberalisation through EPAs raised concerns about the focus on Europe’s access to African markets rather than fostering development in partner countries. The EU’s trade policy, influenced by the Common Agricultural Policy, faced criticism for hindering developing countries’ agricultural exports and contributing to market access challenges. The intricate dynamics between trade, debt markets, and development cooperation underscored the complexities of the EU-Africa partnership, with profound implications for the continent’s socio-economic development (see Chap. 8 for more extensive coverage of this)

The End of an Era: Cotonou Agreements Expire While the World Enters a Lockdown

The Cotonou Agreements expired in 2020, ushering in a period of reflection where stakeholders had the opportunity to better understand the various actors and agendas that were guiding the AU in formulating alternative strategies to tackle the challenges that lay ahead.

This was an interesting time to be watching the evolving dynamics of the relationship between the EU and the AU. Within the AU, there were two camps. One camp comprised countries that were ready to shift towards a more equal continent-to-continent relationship that abandoned a colonial approach based on trade concessions and aid and were against a large degree of interference. The group of countries in the second camp was worried about shaking the ACP architecture and feared seeing aid reduced and partnership terms becoming unpredictable.

In March 2018, in Kigali, the AU Executive Council chose to negotiate a new continent-to-continent partnership with the EU rather than pursuing a post-Cotonou deal within the ACP group. The importance of this post-Cotonou Agreement was reiterated at the AU Summit in Nouakchott (July 2018). This Summit also recognised the need for further consultations to solidify Africa’s common position, but in areas that would not interfere with the AU priorities.

As a result, the AUC Chairperson requested a postponement of negotiations until Africa finalised its consultative process, a request that was accepted by the ACP group and the EU. However, uncertainties persisted about the unfolding processes. While Brussels-based ACP actors continued preparations, the European Commission and certain member states had expressed openness to an AU leadership role but remained committed to existing EU negotiating directives.

Amid this uncertainty, the AU faced strategic and procedural questions requiring urgent attention. Understanding the ACP group and EU responses to the AU’s preference for a continent-to-continent partnership was crucial. Additionally, identifying potential political constraints within the AU’s common position was essential. The AU had to articulate the strengths of a continent-to-continent approach, consider past obligations in formulating the negotiating position, and rally support for such a stance.

The AU’s preference for a comprehensive partnership with the EU, independent of the ACP, had raised concerns that were rooted in the desire for African countries to shape their destiny and maintain solidarity with the Caribbean and Pacific states. Caribbean states may have found negotiating a regional deal less appealing than a broader African partnership, a scenario they did not anticipate. Brexit and an EU focused on core priorities close to home had contributed to fears of further marginalisation in the Caribbean and Pacific regions.

Arguments favouring the original ACP-EU foundation over regional alternatives included continuity, stability, predictability of resources, and political leverage in multilateral fora, but these needed more evidence. The AU had already been a primary political interlocutor for the EU, and ACP’s claims of global influence were questionable. Concerns about the AU’s ability to secure aid resources post-2020 through new channels were mentioned as a potential risk.

In the initial stages of the post-Cotonou process, certain EU member states, notably Germany and France, demonstrated an inclination to transcend the ACP-EU framework. Despite this, a nuanced compromise materialised within Europe, as the EU Commission formulated a mandate endorsing an all-ACP-EU foundation, supplemented by three regional partnerships—one for Africa, one for the Caribbean, and one for the Pacific—as the preferred modality.

This approach represented an endeavour to sustain the existing order, a subtlety underscored by prior arrangements with the ACP, which included a mechanism to regulate European Development Fund (EDF) allocations. Contrarily, the new EU negotiating mandate explicitly indicated the EU’s intention to terminate the EDF, transitioning into an agreement that centralised decision-making on budgets and allocations within the EU. This shift added a layer of complexity to the negotiations, introducing a departure from established practices in fund management and allocation decisions.

The fear of the unknown and the perception of the AU as a problematic partner had contributed to the reluctance to adopt the EU negotiating mandate to cater for direct continent-to-continent talks. Preserving the ‘acquis’ of Cotonou became crucial for the EU Commission, reflecting a reluctance to listen to the AU priorities.

In 2016, the EU proposed to enhance the JAES but was hesitant to engage directly with the AU in negotiating governance and accountability rules, citing legal and normative reasons. This presented a challenge for African negotiators who had to contend with potential misinformation and warnings about potential long-term implications of the proposals under discussion. Navigating these complexities to ensure effective negotiations proved to be a minefield. Significant external resistance persisted despite the AU’s efforts to assert control over its agenda and partnerships. The end result was that there was no mechanism to jointly evaluate what the various Summits had approved, and it was difficult to organise ministerial-level meetings as envisaged in the various deliberations.

Various actors preferred adhering to the familiar Cotonou system for reasons ranging from concerns about relinquishing power and control to a general mistrust of the AU as the primary actor in this context. The AU’s endeavour to shape a new narrative encountered resistance, reflecting the ongoing struggle to establish autonomy in the face of entrenched norms and interests.

In late 2018, the need to organise further consultations to solidify the AU’s ‘Common African Position for post-Cotonou negotiations’ became imperative. The AU’s legal status, not being a direct ‘party’ to the Cotonou Agreement, challenged its involvement in the intergovernmental negotiation. However, a significant development occurred when a clear majority of African states, including North African states, formally and explicitly mandated the AU to engage in the process on behalf of the continent. This shift in political dynamics rendered previous legal arguments obsolete since this was an AU decision (Pichon, 2021).

At the time, key initiatives were recommended to enhance Africa’s interests, including:

• Developing a robust political narrative around the Common African Position underscoring the urgency of establishing a modern continent-to-continent partnership that addressed shared interests and challenges. Notably, caution was advised against accepting a long-term arrangement that could constrain Africa within a less favourable framework.

• Providing detailed assurances to African states that were hesitant to follow the AU’s path, convincing them their interests would be better served under an upgraded AU-EU political partnership post-2020.

• Conducting targeted outreach and effective communication to key stakeholders within Africa and the EU institutions/member states, highlighting the stakes in the post-Cotonou debate and the imperative to shift to a continent-to-continent negotiation between the AU and EU.

The Common African Position already contained compelling arguments for a single political cooperation framework with Europe. These arguments included the fragmented nature of current EU policy and institutional frameworks towards Africa, suboptimal effectiveness in critical areas, the necessity to prioritise Agenda 2063—the AU’s key strategy—and the lack of legitimacy in the governance structures of both the Cotonou Agreement and the ACP group.

But while these arguments were relevant individually, they lacked a cohesive and attractive political narrative. To address this issue, the preamble of the JAES was revisited, and four strategic messages aimed at reshaping the political narrative and ensuring a more robust safeguarding of African interests were formulated. Despite losing momentum since 2007, the JAES’s underlying political foundations aligned closely with the AU’s objectives for the post-Cotonou process.

The four messages included:

Message 1:

The ACP-EU framework, in isolation, needs to be improved to safeguard Africa’s interests and establish engagements with Europe beyond 2020. The African Union (AU) currently needs more involvement in the governance of the Cotonou Agreement. Moreover, the collective action of the ACP group in addressing global challenges has been historically limited. Preserving the ACP as the overarching framework is conditionally acceptable, contingent upon not compromising Africa’s autonomous capacity to defend its interests. Notably, Africa and Europe collaborate on shared interests and challenges independent of the ACP’s involvement.

Message 2:

African states stand to enhance the defence of their interests vis-à-vis Europe by collaborating through an African organisation endowed with undisputed legitimacy at the Heads of State/Government level. The proposition of a new continent-to-continent agreement between the EU and the AU is advanced to fortify Africa’s political position, facilitating negotiations on pivotal issues such as migration and trade, for example, the EPA and the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). This shift would also permit a transition towards an alternative form of political dialogue, moving beyond the confines of Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. The AU’s structures, particularly their ability to regularly mobilise at the Heads of State level, are accorded greater political credibility within European circles than the ACP structure.

Message 3:

Recognition of African institutions’ central role and legitimacy at continental and regional levels is posited as imperative for the EU. Since 2000, Africa has diligently erected an institutional architecture encompassing entities like the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Governance Architecture (AGA), and advancements towards a CFTA. This institutional progress is complemented by the development of an array of continental policy frameworks, prominently exemplified by Agenda 2063. Thus, the call is made for effectively utilising this progressively mature and legitimate institutional architecture in shaping a post-Cotonou deal, superseding reliance on the ACP format.

Message 4:

A recalibration of the funding strategy is advocated to underpin the new political partnership between the EU and AU. It entails formulating a more effective, coherent, and mutually owned funding strategy. Crucially, such a strategy should be attentive to the specific development cooperation needs of diverse African countries, ranging from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and fragile states to small islands and middle-income nations. It is underscored that the new funding strategy must respect existing arrangements within various agreements, such as those of North Africa and South Africa, with a gradual trajectory towards harmonisation. Additionally, Africa is urged to proactively manage the funding challenge by intensifying resource mobilisation efforts, countering illicit financial flows, and enhancing self-reliance in funding both the AU and the Regional Economic Communities.

It was unequivocally communicated to all African states that any potential new continental agreement would not impact their bilateral arrangements with the EU, except in areas they had already decided to have a common approach: trade, climate change, peace and security, and migration (Kappel, 2021; Kotsopoulos & Mattheis, 2018). This assurance extended to those states associated with the Cotonou Agreement. Furthermore, it was imperative to alleviate concerns regarding the potential repercussions on aid resources post-2020 without the ACP-EU framework and EDF support. Such concerns arose due to the EU mandate, which delinked allocations from the prospective negotiated agreement. These efforts sparked immense controversy and resistance by the EU Commission negotiators, who agitated all kinds of fears and used tactics to sideline the AU and key negotiators from any meaningful process.

The Proof of the Pudding Is in the Eating: The Post-Cotonou Crash

On December 3, 2020, almost ten months after the expiration of the Cotonou Agreement, negotiators representing the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) achieved a significant breakthrough by finalising a political agreement to succeed it. The new agreement was the culmination of over two years of intense discussions involving a diverse array of experts, ambassadors, and ministers under the leadership of the chief negotiators Jutta Urpilainen, EU Commissioner for International Partnerships, and Robert Dussey, Togolese Foreign Minister, on behalf of the ACP group. In the middle of the negotiations, the traditional arrangement sustaining the ACP group secretariat in Brussels, with funding provided by the EU Commission, was replaced by launching a new structure, the OACPS, which was to be funded by its member states. The subsequent marginalisation of the OACPS secretariat during the post-Cotonou negotiations has proven that the EU distancing has not worked financially or otherwise.

The new EU-OACPS Agreement represents a notable departure from its predecessor in form and substance. In terms of content, the agreement outlines six equally crucial objectives, surpassing the previous focus solely on development. Notably, it explicitly articulates the goal of establishing a political partnership for mutually beneficial outcomes, aligning with the EU’s approach in agreements with third states.

This shift in focus contrasts with prior agreements between the EU and the ACP, where the primary aim was promoting economic, social, and cultural development, with a central role in poverty eradication. Additionally, the absence of a specific financial instrument is noteworthy, as the EDF, historically dedicated to funding projects in ACP countries, has now been integrated into the EU budget. Furthermore, some other financially ring-fenced activities provided to ACP countries in areas such as peace and security have also been replaced by EU unilateral decision processes.

The expiration of the Cotonou Agreement sparked a vibrant questioning of the continued relevance of the EU-ACP partnership. The post-Cotonou era prompted discussions on whether it should be regarded as a historical artefact or if certain aspects of the existing cooperative framework warranted preservation. The diminishing interest from several EU member states, scepticism from select African nations regarding the ACP group’s effectiveness, and the rising trend of regionalisation within the ACP group’s three constituent parts had introduced uncertainties.

The adoption of cooperation strategies between the EU and Africa and between the EU and the Caribbean exacerbated these concerns. Concurrently, contentious negotiations on EPAs and the initiation of ad hoc processes on migration and mobility indicated that crucial policy areas were expanding beyond the scope of the EU-ACP partnership. The inconsistent performance of the Cotonou Agreement, particularly in terms of economic growth, rendered the continuation of the status quo impractical. Notably, negotiations became entangled with vested interest groups and manipulation, primarily aimed at circumventing the involvement of the AU, was common. This situation further complicated the preparatory processes undertaken by both sides to establish an optimal governance framework for their post-2020 relations.

Tensions among various African actors and certain European countries, as well as the EU Commission, necessitated two postponements of the expiration date for the Cotonou Agreement. When the new agreement was eventually signed, it coincided with a heightened focus on issues arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, such as access to critical equipment and medicines. Some African countries strongly perceived a lack of solidarity in terms of access to protective equipment, ventilators, and, subsequently, vaccines, which, in their view, underscored the marginal importance of the EU-OACPS Agreement.

This culmination of events resulted in a prolonged process of ratifications, and it is likely that the agreement may ultimately not be implemented despite the potential of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to advance the continent-to-continent approach to international trade negotiations (see Chap. 8 for more on this). This is akin to the challenges encountered by the EPAs in Africa.

Subsequently, South Africa’s withdrawal from the OACPS (Soko & Qobo, 2017) was a political signal highlighting the divergence in perspectives favouring Africa’s integration over maintaining a framework that competes with the AU’s responsibilities.

Against this backdrop, and after numerous attempts to organise it, the 6th Africa-Europe Summit eventually took place in Brussels in February 2022.

Africans articulated clear priorities during the Summit. First, they sought the EU’s support of pan-African projects like Agenda 2063, the AfCFTA, and the African Union Green Recovery Action Plan. Second, leaders emphasised the need to shift from a donor-recipient mindset to a true partnership in exploring investment opportunities on the continent. Third, they called for a monitoring mechanism to ensure more concrete outcomes following the Summit, highlighting the perception that prior EU commitments often remained unfulfilled.

This last point was the most challenging question during negotiations and had been repeatedly refused, but the EU eventually accepted the call for a monitoring mechanism. However, since then, the EU has selected the interlocutors for such an exercise and defined the process and framework that will make such accountability palatable to them. The AU Commission has been completely marginalised in these endeavours, while the monitoring mechanism has been effectively stolen from the AU member states.

The call for an equal partnership resonated strongly during the Summit, with EU officials emphasising their desire to be Africa’s partner of choice. The Summit’s focus on understanding each other and the concept of equal partnership was reflected in the final declaration, emphasising mutual respect, accountability, shared values, and reciprocal commitments.

As such, the 6th Africa-Europe Summit marked a shift in rhetoric, with African participants asserting themselves as equal partners, emphasising the need for a reset in relations. However, post-summit assessments reveal a disparity between EU rhetoric and policy practice on partnership equality. The divergence is attributed to the existing summit organisation, where each side presents vague ‘wish lists’ without proper prior consultations.

Other challenges arose during the Summit that highlighted the gap between rhetoric and practice. For example, the EU chose the Summit as a platform to launch its new Global Gateway initiative, positioned as a dynamic alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the AU was only informed about the Global Gateway a few weeks before its launch. This initiative was presented during the preparatory ministerial meeting responsible for the Summit’s declaration, and it was the subject of a formal exchange with the AU when the EU made its unilateral announcement. Such behaviour was reminiscent of the announcement of a plan for Africa made by EU Commission President Juncker just weeks before the previous Summit in Abidjan in November 2017 (European Commission, 2022).

The Global Gateway was eventually presented by EU Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen as a demonstration of the strength of the partnership with Africa and a testament to the seriousness with which she and her Commission approached their Africa Strategy (European Commission, 2022), but the impact of the earlier lack of communication lingered.

What are the lessons from one more Summit likely to disappoint? First, a joint preparatory process is crucial for effective decision-making. Second, clarifying the summit’s main purpose is essential, whether for information exchange, informal consultations, or reaching concrete agreements on shared projects. Third, defining the type of interaction (development assistance, joint efforts, or spillover management) is vital for successful outreach activities. Fourth, agreement on financial resources is needed, specifying when funds flow to the AU Commission or other recipients. Fifth, clarity on these issues lays the foundation for establishing progress indicators and improved monitoring, possibly by an independent body.

Despite highlighting weaknesses in the current summitry, the 6th summit underscored the need for a reset and emphasises Africa’s role as an equal partner, providing crucial insights for future improvements. Two elements could make a big difference at future summits. First, there is a need for a structural reform that will change the colonial commodity dependence model. Second, organising a joint preparatory process could enhance the voice of all stakeholders; improve initiative design, selection, and impact; and foster partner equality in the AU-EU relationship.

Without a change, EU efforts to showcase its African activities will not appeal to Africans. Research revealed that as things stand, Africans consider China and the USA, not the EU, their top partners (Afrexim Bank, 2022; Orbie, 2007; Tull, 2008). As Africa’s largest trading partner (Afrexim Bank, 2022), the EU faces an opportunity to strengthen trade relations, increase foreign direct investment, and support continental projects.

Meanwhile, in Samoa, the EU and its member states inked an agreement with the OACPS in November 2023, which represents the long-delayed final step of the post-Cotonou negotiations. However, behind the celebratory rhetoric, the stark reality is that among the 79 non-EU countries, only 44 were willing to sign the deal. The withdrawal of South Africa and the non-signature by Nigeria, both influential economies in Africa, present significant challenges. Additionally, the omission of several mid-sized economies, including Senegal and Namibia, from the list of signatories further complicates the situation.

This raises questions about the agreement’s diminished significance compared to its predecessors, notably evident in the absence of a dedicated financing stream, highlighting potential challenges in its effective implementation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023).

In addition, despite the initial signing of the agreement by 44 countries, the prospect of attaining the required two-thirds threshold for ratification remains uncertain. Even in the event of unanimous ratification, this would not be adequate for the agreement to come into force. As a result, the agreement is currently undergoing provisional application to maintain its viability, a status that has been effective since it was initialled in 2021. This prompts essential questions about its future. Two pivotal inquiries persist: first, which countries will emerge as signatories as EU country delegations in ACP countries escalate their efforts, and second, which of the 44 signatories will ultimately ratify the agreement?

Drawing comparisons with prior experiences, such as the EPAs in East and West Africa, it becomes apparent that concluding or signing an agreement does not necessarily denote unanimous agreement but rather indicates a sense of weariness. The fact that EU countries have chosen to opt out of specific clauses, particularly those pertaining to tax, transparency, debt, regular migration, and remittances—matters hard-fought for by African countries—introduces an additional layer of complexity and erodes confidence in the agreement’s efficacy.

The overarching question remains: why would African countries commit to an agreement that appears to contradict their interests, especially since they have been operating without it since the early 2000s? Furthermore, given that the EU has changed its allocation system and decides unilaterally how to pursue financing commitments, future financing could be managed through focused agreements, barring the European Investment Bank (EIB), which is required to base its funding on some kind of agreement.

Essentially, the EU seems to grapple with challenges in maintaining the support of a substantial portion of African and Caribbean nations, fuelled not only by concerns about their negotiation style but also by the perceived lack of commitment from EU member states, exemplified by the limited high-level representation during the agreement’s proceedings.

The Samoa Agreement appears destined to be consigned to the annals of history. It now stands as a testament to a bygone era, marked by grand expectations that, in hindsight, have amounted to nothing of substantial consequence.

Navigating the Impact of China’s Influence on the European Agenda

When the EU launched its first Strategy for Africa in 2005, aiming to foster coherence among a myriad of actors and diverse European policies, it was doing so in response to the strong emphasis the newly established AU put on such an approach. The strategy centred on crucial pillars, including peace and security, good governance, economic growth, and investing in people. According to Ighobor (2013), the initiative outlined the EU’s pledge to support integration endeavours for a decade, encompassing the entirety of the African continent. The approach introduced two critical changes: separating Africa from the Caribbean and the Pacific and giving corpus to a continent-wide approach as assumed by the AU.

The strategy further acknowledged regional and country-specific needs. It proposed an alignment with African countries’ national strategies, with primary objectives focusing on achieving the MDGs and promoting sustainable development, security, and good governance. Emphasising partnership grounded in international law, human rights, equality, and mutual accountability, the strategy is built upon the progress achieved by African countries themselves.

In 2009, China became Africa’s largest trading partner and a substantial investor, and its influence has been growing since then. This has stimulated the EU’s interest in Africa, highlighting the evolving dynamics of international relationships on the continent (Ighobor, 2013). China has funded over 3000 infrastructure projects since 2009, many deemed crucial, as reported by the AidData Project (Schneidman & Wiegert, 2018). The financial commitment from China to African governments and state-owned entities was more than $86 billion in commercial loans extended between 2000 and 2014, averaging about $6 billion annually (Schneidman & Wiegert, 2018).

In 2015, President Xi Jinping made a substantial pledge at the 6th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), promising $60 billion in commercial loans to the region (Marsh, 2018). If realised, this commitment would have resulted in an annual lending increase of at least $20 billion. However, the pandemic has considerably slowed down these ambitious targets.

The vigour and speed of Chinese engagements in Africa have redefined the continent’s geopolitical landscape and prompted a reassessment of Western strategies. The multifaceted nature of China’s involvement in Africa spans economic, geopolitical, and strategic dimensions, showcasing a remarkable vitality that has left Western countries both intrigued and, in some cases, apprehensive. The sheer scale of Chinese commitments, spanning infrastructure development, energy projects, and telecommunications, has fuelled robust economic growth across many African countries. This investment surge has helped address Africa’s developmental needs and positioned Chinese companies at the forefront of the continent’s growth trajectory.

Central to China’s success in Africa is its adaptability to local contexts. Unlike some Western counterparts, China is willing to engage with Africans on their terms, respecting diverse governance structures and policies. This adaptability has allowed China to navigate the intricate political landscapes of Africa more effectively, forging partnerships beyond mere economic transactions. China’s focus on long-term vision further distinguishes its approach. This contrasts with Western investors, often criticised for their short-term focus.

However, the rapid rise of China in Africa has not been without its challenges. Western nations, initially taken aback by China’s assertiveness, pointed the finger at the economic dependency and environmental impact of China’s investments, the potential adverse effects on local economies, and the spectre of unsustainable debt levels. Nevertheless, as the dynamics of China-Africa relations continued to evolve, calls for a reevaluation of Western engagement strategies became louder.

In addition, the Ukraine war has forced the EU and its member states to play a more vital geopolitical role and tested their collective resolve to ramp up all the instruments at their disposal, from diplomacy, sanctions, and military assistance to humanitarian support. Yet, in an era of increased geopolitical competition, Europe’s visibility and influence in world affairs are being challenged by China, Russia, and other regional powers. In response, the EU has sought to develop new and better types of partnerships, notably with Africa, while seeking to establish a leading role on the global stage, protecting its interests and promoting its values.

For example, a few days after she was elected President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen embarked on her first official trip, a trip to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, the headquarters of the African Union. It was symbolic and aligned with her calls for a “comprehensive strategy for Africa” (Fougières & Labastie, 2022). Africa remains at the heart of the EU’s geopolitical ambitions.

This growing interest towards Africa is also underpinned by many recent diplomatic initiatives by the EU and its member states. Germany’s Marshall Plan with Africa is encapsulated in the “Marshallplan mit Afrika: Partnerschaft für die Zukunft” document (Zeiss, 2020), emphasising an approach to revamp investments. On the other hand, the EU Commission President Juncker’s vision was outlined in his 2017 proposal titled “Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa” (European Parliament, 2020). This document delineated the framework for sustainable investment and job creation, acknowledging the importance of enhancing economic ties between the two continents.

The EU frequently prides itself on being the world’s largest donor of ODA and consequently claims to be a significant global actor in international development. Africa’s transformation presents the EU with both an opportunity and a challenge: it may either diminish Europe’s role in the global power contest further or pave the way for its geopolitical ascendancy.

Europe still holds the crown of being Africa’s primary trading partner and source of foreign investment and development aid. However, the geostrategic landscape of Africa is shifting rapidly, and Europe risks losing credibility and influence in its broader southern neighbourhood if it fails to recognise the changing nature of its relationship with the continent.

The EU has been criticised for trying to replicate China’s BRI through its Global Gateway Infrastructure Plan for Africa (Han et al., 2021). The BRI spent more than $83 billion on African infrastructure in 2022. Early in 2022, the EU focused its efforts on helping Africa develop its vaccines and has recently announced further development and investment assistance, including €150 billion through 2030 (Han et al., 2021).

The BRI and EU initiatives have played significant roles in shaping Africa’s development landscape, yet a critical examination reveals disparities in their approaches and outcomes. The BRI has made a tangible impact on Africa’s infrastructure development, fostering connectivity and economic engagement. In contrast, the EU’s initiatives emphasise governance and other forms of conditionality. They often seek to translate lofty principles into concrete results. EU agreements and aid packages face criticism for their bureaucratic complexities and a lack of direct impact on grassroots development (Ingram, 2022). Furthermore, the EU’s insistence on specific governance standards may be perceived as imposing Western values on Africa (Fig. 6.1).

Fig. 6.1

Chinese total engagement in the BRI in 2022. (https://greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-h1-2022/)

Too Many Cocks: The Proliferation of EU Initiatives for Africa

The Zambian proverb “Too many cocks crowing at the same time make the dawn take too long” can be applied to the EU’s engagement with Africa with regard to the number of new initiatives it has introduced on the continent. Between 1972 and 2020, the EU Commission or their member states introduced no less than 52 initiatives to strengthen partnerships with Africa (see Annex B). As the proverb suggests, a proliferation of initiatives, some occurring concurrently, may lead to a lack of clarity, potential competition between different initiatives, and a slower realisation of intended goals.

Despite numerous proclamations and declarations, the actual implementation of these initiatives often needs to be revised, leading to a credibility gap. While seemingly ambitious on paper, the abundance of strategies has resulted in a fragmented approach, with each initiative operating in isolation rather than contributing to a cohesive and comprehensive strategy for Africa. This inconsistency between rhetoric and action raises concerns about the EU’s commitment to its stated goals, as the multitude of initiatives risks diluting the intended impact of any.

Contemporary political relations between the EU and Africa have been intricately woven into two overarching themes: governance and development policy. In turn, the convergence of these discourses has significantly amplified the regulatory influence that the EU has exerted over African countries. This influence, manifest in various realms, underscored the EU’s pivotal role on the international stage, particularly in trade, European Security and Foreign Policy (ESFP), and military operations abroad (Stivachtis, 2012).

One of the outcomes of this influence has been that conditionality—specifically conditions attached to good governance outcomes—has become a cornerstone of EU-Africa relations. However, this has become increasingly hypocritical when juxtaposed with the EU’s internal challenges. Certain EU member states, like Poland and Hungary, for example, have exhibited persistent breaches of good governance, the rule of law, and democratic principles, as indicated in the European Commission’s Annual Report on the Rule of Law (Eur-lex, 2021).

Conditionality was introduced into the EU’s development policy under the Cotonou Agreement in response to perceived shortcomings of the Lomé system (Zimelis, 2011). The EU wanted to adopt a more assertive stance with ACP member countries by emphasising human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, and transparent governance as integral components of sustainable development. However, the vague definitions of these principles in the agreement have created ambiguity, challenges, and unintended outcomes (Zimelis, 2011). For example, in the case of Zimbabwe, political conditionality resulted in sanctions and suspensions (Del Biondo, 2009).

The EU’s approach to conditionality mirrored that of the USA, which emphasises good governance and performance indicators. The EU’s EDF served as a mechanism for policy conditionality, but challenges persisted due to the imprecise definition and application of critical principles, potentially undermining African agency. The sectoral allocation of EDF and other funds towards African countries reflects the EU’s priorities (see Fig. 6.2).

Fig. 6.2

Share of projects funded by the EU (2022). (Source: authors’ compilation)

The complex interplay of conditionality, differing interpretations of principles, and the imposition of external frameworks underscores the need for a nuanced and context-specific approach to EU-Africa relations.

Notably, the EU-AU Summit of 2020 announced new attempts at reforming the partnership. The Summit emphasised the importance of equal partnership, mutual respect, and shared values. The impact of these reforms on the dynamics of EU-Africa relations requires ongoing analysis and scrutiny to assess their effectiveness and implications for African agencies in political and developmental processes.

What is known is that the EU continues to engage the African continent with a layered set of siloed initiatives, with the countries of North Africa falling within the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the remaining having a differentiated, more intrusive treatment (Fig. 6.3).

Fig. 6.3

EU initiatives in Africa, excluding trade agreements (1972–2022). (Source: Author)