Abstract
I offer a Marxist reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein and juxtapose his famous dictum that philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’ with the idea of transformative action. I seek to align the later philosophy of Wittgenstein with Karl Marx’s eleventh thesis on Ludwig Feuerbach. I advance an unorthodox view interpreting Wittgenstein as an advocate for social and political reform. Wittgenstein’s philosophy encourages us to imagine alternative horizons and contemplate concrete possibilities for changing the world. The debate operates within the philosophy of education and draws inspiration from related inquiries in political thought and, more specifically, from Marxist connections with Wittgenstein.
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Notes
- 1.
Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein’s works are abbreviated (BB = The Blue and Brown Books, BT = The ‘Big Typescript’ (TS 213), CV = Culture and Value, PG = Philosophical Grammar, PI = Philosophical Investigations, RFM = Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Z = Zettel), with section (§) or page number, and with the full citation and initials given in the References.
- 2.
Part of this unorthodoxy involves a repositioning of the concept of criticality by altering its focus to bring about social and political change.
- 3.
This chapter was originally published in Philosophy and Social Criticism, and I would like to thank the editors for allowing me to incorporate my article in this book. See Deegan, Marc James. (2023) ‘A Marxist Reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein: Making the Case for Social and Political Change’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 1–21, Ahead-of-Print. First published online 3 May 2023 by Sage Publications Ltd. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/01914537231170907. It is reproduced here under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
- 4.
Kitching (2002: 1–3), Pleasants (2002: 160–161), and Vinten (2013: 10–11 and 22). For a recent collection of essays that bring out affinities between Wittgenstein and Marx see Sulpizio et al. 2021. The essays demonstrate different ways to address Wittgenstein and Marx(ism) from multiple perspectives starting from the critical attitude adopted by both thinkers.
- 5.
These ideas are mirrored in Section 89 of The Big Typescript TS 213 where the case is made for philosophy providing us with an Übersicht of language, a perspicuous representation of the grammatical landscape which consists in ‘seeing connections’ and which itself is ‘lacking in perspicuity’ (BT 171–177). However, philosophy, Wittgenstein says at page 177, cannot interfere with our actual use of language, only describe it. Nor can it erect a foundation. ‘It leaves everything as it is’ including mathematics. Philosophy ‘puts everything before us’ and there is nothing to explain or deduce. Indeed, on his analysis, anything that does not ‘lie open to view is of no interest to us’.
- 6.
Our philosophical, conceptual, investigations cannot uncover new facts about the world but, by removing our prejudices and erroneous notions and clarifying our thoughts, we will treat the world and our concepts differently (Hacker 1972: 125). In this respect, then, philosophy is not leaving everything as it is. In mathematics, we distinguish between our calculations and proofs and the prose we use to describe them. And when we cleanse this prose of conceptual confusion, our methods of proof may not change but our attitude towards them will (Glock 1996: 236). ‘The concept of calculation as an experiment tends to strike us as the only realistic one,’ Wittgenstein remarks, while everything else, our other methods of inquiry, appear to us as ‘moonshine’ (RFM II, §76). A calculation is not an experiment, in other words. Here we are pointing to different ways in which we use our words.
- 7.
In the Philosophical Grammar Wittgenstein says that philosophers cannot use words in a ‘sublimated or abstract sense’ and construct a second-order account of language and meaning; we ‘must still speak the language of every day’ no matter how coarse and material it may appear (PG 121). He also assures us that ‘we cannot achieve any greater generality in philosophy than in what we say in life and in science. Here too (as in mathematics) we leave everything as it is.’.
- 8.
Wittgenstein shares Friedrich Nietzsche’s concern that turning philosophy into a science would mean throwing in the towel (Nietzsche 1979: §55). We should cease being preoccupied with the ‘method of science’, Wittgenstein says, and should not naïvely ‘ask and answer questions in the way science does’ (BB 18).
- 9.
- 10.
See Medina (2013: Chapter 6).
- 11.
Crary 2000: 118. The misinterpretations are due to readings of Wittgenstein that advocate a use-theory of meaning which prohibits external criticism of our forms of life, that prevents us from bringing critical concepts to bear on our forms of social existence, moral and political—all of which Crary casts into the net of ‘inviolability interpretations’ (Id. 119–121). She rightly points out that when Wittgenstein says the ‘meaning of a word is its use in the language’ he is quite specific that though this applies in a ‘large class of cases’, use does not determine or fix meaning in all cases (PI §43). Crary’s discussion of the champions and critics of alleged Wittgenstein’s conservatism include J.C. Nyíri, Ernest Gellner, Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish (Id. 121–130).
- 12.
Wittgenstein is far from suggesting that we slavishly adhere to the status quo (Langille 1992: 237–238). On the contrary, we are always able to ask questions, to challenge what counts as legitimate. Wittgenstein ‘is not saying that we must dutifully submit ourselves to the established order,’ Andrew Lugg says, ‘but only that we start out from practices already in place’ (Lugg 1985: 468). We must have a starting point for critique, we must take something for granted, but this does not mean, Lugg continues, that Wittgenstein is excluding the possibility of asking questions about justification.
- 13.
Pitkin makes the valid point that while Wittgenstein is not a political theorist and does not devise a plan for social change, if we are to accept his challenge, and make the self-knowledge he is offering our own, then we are summoned ‘back to reality, to ourselves, to action, to our responsibilities’ (Pitkin 1972: 339). Knowledge for Wittgenstein, she continues, demands an ‘acknowledgement that it is not neutral with respect to action’ and, hence, we are left to devise our own courses of action. She suggests that a Wittgensteinian approach means we listen to the views of other people, other cultures, and see their perspectives. Pitkin adds that if we are to change our institutions, we do this in our actions, in our lives and not in isolation (Id. 340).
- 14.
Andrew Lugg maintains that Wittgenstein’s silence about how we can change our social and cultural practices for the better does not make him a conservative thinker. Similarly, he aligns Wittgenstein with Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach contending that what is required by both thinkers is ‘not more explanation, but rather a change in our practices so that the problems they give rise to no longer occur’ and that the ‘answers we require must be forged in practice; they cannot be generated by philosophers out of their own meagre experience’ (Lugg 1985: 472).
- 15.
Cressida Heyes, in her Introduction, discusses Wittgenstein’s attitude to politics and rightly emphasises his greater concern for the ethical integrity of the individual (Heyes 2003: 1–3). She highlights conservative and relativist views commonly associated with Wittgenstein’s later thought (Id. 3–6). She concludes: ‘I still think Wittgenstein would have been horrified by the idea of his work being incorporated into political projects. Too bad for him: his ideas have long since escaped his governance (if they were ever in his thrall); they have grown up, moved out, and created families of their own. Nonetheless, even if there aren’t more or less authentic ways of being a Wittgensteinian, there are, I would argue, better and worse ways. I hope that the essays collected in this book exemplify the better ways, and thus that they will indeed inspire the reader to thoughts of their own’ (Id. 13).
- 16.
Janik’s response to those sceptics who find Wittgenstein’s aphorism that philosophy leaves everything as it is to be a ‘hopelessly unacceptable endorsement of the status quo’ is to remind them how Wittgenstein’s approach only entails that theorising fails in its ‘task of understanding the world when it also directs itself to changing it’ (Janik 2003: 104). Wittgenstein, he says, believes that no one has an answer to how we change the world for the better. Further, it is hardly surprising, Janik continues, that Wittgenstein’s remarks about rule-following and the role of philosophy and, in particular, that philosophy can only describe practices and not alter them, are ‘construed as politically conservative as well as capriciously perverse’, but this is to read them in isolation from Wittgenstein’s central point that ‘to acquire a concept is to follow a rule’ (Id. 112).
- 17.
Tully’s discussion draws attention to conventions of political thought that seek to establish one or other form of critical reflection as foundational and he critiques the justificational or validational form put forth by Jürgen Habermas and the interpretational or hermeneutical form presented by Charles Taylor. Since ‘any practice of critical reflection is itself already founded in the popular sovereignty of our multiplicity of humdrum ways of acting with words’, Tully concludes, we should reject any single form of critical reflection as a foundation (Tully 2003: 41). Indeed, ‘submission to one regime of critical reflection, as the self-certifying guarantor of our freedom, would itself mark the end of our free and critical life’ (ibid.).
- 18.
McManus discredits the test of meaningfulness as it is often expressed in the social sciences. He shows shortfalls in Peter Winch’s approach or at least suggests that Winch leaves his work on Wittgenstein ‘unfinished’ (McManus 2003: 64–66). McManus concludes that Wittgenstein’s philosophy ‘can be understood as an effort to show why we lose nothing when we recognize the incoherence of [a] confused test of meaningfulness’ (Id. 65–66).
- 19.
‘What is your aim in philosophy?,’ Wittgenstein writes, ‘To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle’ (PI §309). Wittgenstein is intent on teaching us the importance of thinking for one’s self.
- 20.
Carver argues that Wittgenstein was ‘very interested in changing the world for ordinary people by stripping away a good deal of over-complex interpretation, especially of the philosophical (and pseudo-philosophical) kind’ (Carver 2002: 105). Wittgenstein and Marx unseated metaphysical foundations and appealed to facts about ordinary people and their daily activities—how they use language and engage in social practices. Carver concludes: ‘If “the people” are to be trusted in ruling themselves, there is then little warrant for claiming that they are only licensed to do this in relation to some “philosophical” framework propounded by the “voice from nowhere”,—an authorial—and authority-presumption that Marx and Wittgenstein seem (in this reader’s/writer’s eyes) to have wanted to subvert’ (Id. 108).
- 21.
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is, De Iaco continues, ‘focused on the goal of changing the look of philosophers by converting towards everyday language use despite the metaphysical uses as well’ (De Iaco 2021: 26). She takes the view that Wittgenstein does not conceive of the possibility of social transformation through language; and that a Wittgensteinian change in the way we look at our philosophical problems does not have practical-social consequences and for this reason the ‘correction of the language that he made cannot be called a reform’ (Id. 27).
- 22.
‘What we do,’ Wittgenstein writes, ‘is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ (PI §116).
- 23.
Ferruccio Rossi-Landi provides an early criticism of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the extent that it lacks a theory of history and society (Rossi-Landi 2002). Marco Gigante retorts that this lack could be explained away as a consequence of Rossi-Landi’s diagnosis as distinct from something Wittgenstein should have dealt with (Gigante 2021: 48, footnote 7).
- 24.
Nancy Fraser’s provides a critique of Jürgen Habermas’ social theory in relation to the struggles and wishes of contemporary women. She examines what is critical and what is not in his theory. ‘Habermas says virtually nothing about gender in The Theory of Communicative Action,’ she notes, and yet she is willing to read that work from the ‘standpoint of an absence’, extrapolate from things he does say to things he does not and ‘reconstruct how various matters of concern to feminists would appear from his perspective had those matters been thematized’ (Fraser 1989: 114).
- 25.
Marx is in interested in advancing workers’ rights and clearly wants theorists to engage in transformative action as his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach indicates (Marx and Engels 2010: 5). Wittgenstein wants to remove linguistic confusions that hamper traditional ways of philosophical thinking and to nurture critical modes of inquiry while, at the same time, expressing a personal preference for framing conceptual and aesthetic questions (CV 79).
- 26.
The later Wittgenstein is, for instance, opposed to scientism and to constructing theories based on the scientific model. His critique of empiricism and the hegemony of science pervades much of his work (Vinten 2013: 13–14). Human beings, Wittgenstein retorts, have to ‘awaken to wonder’, as do peoples, and science is a way of sending them back to sleep (CV 5).
- 27.
Vinten sees merit in Marxists reading Wittgenstein’s work ‘to better understand the nature of traditional philosophical problems’ and to ‘produce better Marxist/emancipatory philosophy’ (Vinten 2013: 11, footnote 6). Also he concludes that ‘there is no particular reason why Wittgensteinians should not become involved in workers’ struggles with the aim of creating a classless society’ (Id. 22)—or, as I would put it, working together to create a freer and more inclusive, democratic society.
- 28.
Both Wittgenstein and Marx follow up on Ludwig Feuerbach’s insights by underscoring change in practice, aspect-seeing; and that what needs altering is not a belief or a doctrine but an attitude and a way of life (Read 2002: 260). Both thinkers adopt an unorthodox view of philosophy by replacing philosophical argument with a therapeutic orientation that re-grounds ‘us in the concretion of our actual lives and with (actually, practically) laying to rest the metaphysics that distorts those lives’ (Id. 271). Finally, Marx, like Wittgenstein, demands that we should not reify language but descend to our everyday lives, to our worlds as we ordinarily live and speak (Id. 273).
- 29.
Here Read is portraying Marx at ‘his non-scientific best’, wanting to change things not through explanation but ‘through description interlinked with action’ (Read 2002: 274).
- 30.
‘There is not a philosophical method,’ Wittgenstein writes, ‘though there are indeed methods, like different therapies’ (PI §133).
- 31.
‘In this way,’ Gigante says, we can find in Wittgenstein and Marx’s ‘philosophical investigations the idea that the transformation of the individual’s existential conditions involves a philosophical reflection on language to the extent that the latter permits them to recognize the processes of the ideological bewitchment of society’ (Gigante 2021: 50).
- 32.
A philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas, but someone who stands outside, indeed distances him or herself from, the human communities and who can see them for what they are (Kenny 1984: 55–56). Frank Ramsay is thus a ‘bourgeois thinker’ interested only in ‘clearing up the affairs of some particular community’ (CV 17), accepting what his mathematical peers ordain as truth or knowledge (Cf. Kenny 1984: 55–56; and Monk 1991: 246–247). As Marco Brusotti puts it, a ‘genuinely philosophical reflection aims at showing that this state is not the only possible one’; and that a bourgeois thinker does not look beyond the horizon of his or her own society (Brusotti 2021: 185 and 188). Wittgenstein wants us to maintain our critical distance and be able to critique our systems of knowledge and truth as well as our own internal frameworks, beliefs, values and biases. The tenets of established authority are, in this sense, and to borrow from Friedrich Nietzsche, always open to question ‘under the police of mistrust’ (Nietzsche 2001: §344).
- 33.
Uschanov rightly contends that philosophers can voice their political views, run for office and fight social evils but a philosophy of politics will not turn their political statements into philosophical ones (Uschanov 2002: 39).
- 34.
PI §109.
- 35.
PI §144.
- 36.
CV 17.
- 37.
PI §66.
- 38.
Pleasants argues that: ‘a more promising way of doing social criticism would be to provoke people into reflecting on what they do and know in the course of their everyday social life. This process might be stimulated by “reminding” them (and ourselves), through “perspicuous description”, of some of the consequences and implications of their (our) actions and how these relate to their (our) basic intuitive sense of decency and justice. This, I submit, will not be achieved through promulgation of purportedly explanatory or revelatory theory, but only by coaxing and cajoling people into seeing what they actually do, or contribute to doing, to their fellow creatures and natural environment, and then questioning the moral adequacy of this way of life’ (Pleasants 2002: 167).
- 39.
To resolve philosophical problems then entails resolving the real causes in the world (Göcmen and Kilinc 2021: 53). In this sense, Wittgenstein and Marx are suggesting changing the world. This may, Göcmen and Kilinc continue, ‘also bring about conclusive solutions to our language and philosophical problems’.
- 40.
Ray Monk argues that ‘political questions’ are, for Wittgenstein, ‘secondary to questions of personal integrity’: being true to one’s self is the paramount duty (Monk, 1991, 18). This is why, when questioned about improving the world, Wittgenstein retorts, ‘Just improve yourself; that is the only thing you can do to better the world’ (Id. 17–18 and 213). Monk writes: ‘Wittgenstein’s remark about philosophy—that it “leaves everything as it is”—is often quoted. But it is less often realized that, in seeking to change nothing but the way we look at things, Wittgenstein was attempting to change everything. His pessimism about the effectiveness of his work is related to his conviction that the way we look at things is determined, not by our philosophical beliefs, but by our culture, by the way we are brought up’ (Id. 533).
- 41.
Linguistic analysis and social critical theory should not be considered as separate domains whereby politics belong only to the latter. And even though Wittgenstein’s conception of semantics is not dialectical in Theodor Adorno’s sense, Soulez continues, it can still be read as critical in a social sense (Soulez 2021: 176).
- 42.
- 43.
Brusotti says that comparing an institution with alternative possibilities calls its alleged necessity into question and that ‘thinking of alternative activities, of remote ages and cultures, is simply a tool that enables “contemplation” to find out the nature of a familiar institution, e.g. to understand “what sort of thing, what sort of activity science is”’ (Brusotti 2021: 187).
- 44.
Medina (2013: Chapter 6).
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Deegan, M.J. (2024). Wittgenstein as an Advocate for Social and Political Change. In: Reflections on Criticality in Educational Philosophy. Palgrave Studies in Educational Philosophy and Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57330-9_6
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