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Overcoming the Antagonism Between Efficiency and Distributive Justice

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Law and Economics of Justice (ILEC 2023)

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 17))

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Abstract

Efficiency is a key objective of the Law & Economics movement that potentially is in an antagonistic relation to the more socially oriented distributive justice. But a closer look at the manifold roles of law and the legitimacy functions shows that measures exist for tempering the antagonism. In particular, justice failures must be avoided or overcome. Possible remedies are the standardisation of distributive justice principles through international guidelines and special regulatory “innovations” (such as the “regulatory impact analysis” and the “regulatory lookback”). The newest developments go in the direction of tensions mitigation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Williamson (1985), passim.

  2. 2.

    For further details see Fletcher (1996), pp. 158 et seq.

  3. 3.

    Dworkin (1980), p. 204.

  4. 4.

    Mathis (2019), p. 237.

  5. 5.

    Aristotle (1985), Ch. V/6, 1130b–1131a.

  6. 6.

    Bentham (1789), passim.

  7. 7.

    Mill (1863), pp. 8 et seqq.

  8. 8.

    For a general overview see Miller (2002), pp. 17 et seqq.

  9. 9.

    Rawls (1999a), p. 14.

  10. 10.

    Rawls (1999b), pp. 266 et seq.

  11. 11.

    See also Miller (2002), pp. 143 et seqq.

  12. 12.

    Rawls (2001), pp. 34 et seq.

  13. 13.

    Mathis (2019), p. 230.

  14. 14.

    Mathis (2019), p. 237.

  15. 15.

    See also Mathis (2019), p. 242.

  16. 16.

    For example see Mathis (2019), p. 243.

  17. 17.

    Okun (1975), pp. 91 et seqq.

  18. 18.

    For further details see Weber (2023), p. 376.

  19. 19.

    Sen (1996), p. 395.

  20. 20.

    See hereinafter ch. 2.3.

  21. 21.

    Singer (2018), p. 106.

  22. 22.

    For a general overview see Weber RH (2017), pp. 253 et seqq.

  23. 23.

    See for example Black (2001), pp. 103 et seqq.

  24. 24.

    Weber RH (2021), p. 13.

  25. 25.

    Weber RH (2021), p. 14.

  26. 26.

    Singer (2018), p. 102.

  27. 27.

    Weber RH (2021), pp. 14 et seq.

  28. 28.

    Weber RH (2009), p. 109.

  29. 29.

    Weber M (1976), pp. 122 et seqq.

  30. 30.

    Clark (2005), pp. 18 et seq.

  31. 31.

    Weber RH (2009), p. 110.

  32. 32.

    Luhmann (1975), pp. 9 et seqq.

  33. 33.

    Habermas (1992), p. 161; see also Weber RH (2009), p. 111.

  34. 34.

    Singer (2018), p. 107 and p. 112.

  35. 35.

    Unger (1983), p. 607.

  36. 36.

    Singer (2018), p. 108.

  37. 37.

    Singer (2018), p. 112.

  38. 38.

    Heath (2004), p. 73.

  39. 39.

    Singer (2018), p. 112.

  40. 40.

    Singer (2018), p. 112; a detailed analysis of inequality elements is given by Stigler (2015), pp. 57 et seqq.

  41. 41.

    Singer (2018), p. 113.

  42. 42.

    See Li et al. (2022), passim.

  43. 43.

    Singer (2018), p. 103 and p. 112.

  44. 44.

    Piketty (2014) passim; see also Miller (2002), pp. 145, 146 and 149.

  45. 45.

    See also Stiglitz (2012), pp. 122 et seqq.; for a critical assessment of the Stiglitz approach being more based on experience than on econometric data see Girgis (2013), pp. 3 et seqq.

  46. 46.

    See Mahlmann (2023), p. 310.

  47. 47.

    Club of Rome (1972), pp. 45 et seqq.

  48. 48.

    Schlosberg (2007), ch. 5 and 6.

  49. 49.

    See Stiglitz (2015), pp. 57 et seqq.

  50. 50.

    See above Ch. 2.3.3.

  51. 51.

    Stiglitz (2015), passim.

  52. 52.

    Weber RH (2021), p. 9.

  53. 53.

    Senn (2011), p. 173.

  54. 54.

    Weber RH (2021), p. 9.

  55. 55.

    To the particularities of the network infrastructure see Weber RH (2021), pp. 11 et seq.

  56. 56.

    https://www.undp.org/sustainable-development-goals?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&utm_campaign=CENTRAL&c_src=CENTRAL&c_src2=GSR&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIqcj08qu_-wIVqIKDBx1djAZSEAAYASAAEgI33fD_BwE.

  57. 57.

    https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/.

  58. 58.

    http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-for-Responsible-Business-Conduct.pdf.

  59. 59.

    For a detailed analysis see Kaufmann (2018), pp. 29 et seqq.

  60. 60.

    For Switzerland see https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/wirtschaftslage---wirtschaftspolitik/wirtschaftspolitik/regulierung/regulierungsfolgenabschaetzung.html.

  61. 61.

    Mathis (2019), p. 250; Zwahlen (2010), p. 35.

  62. 62.

    Weber RH (2023), pp. 378 et seqq. with further references.

  63. 63.

    See Coates IV (2015), p. 882.

  64. 64.

    Sunstein (2014), passim.

  65. 65.

    Cochrane (2014), p. 102.

  66. 66.

    Weber RH (2023), pp. 380 et seq. with further references.

  67. 67.

    Weber RH (2023), p. 381.

  68. 68.

    Mathis & Shannon (2009) and Mathis (2019).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

    Rolf H. Weber

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  1. Rolf H. Weber
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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland

    Klaus Mathis

  2. School of Law, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA

    Avishalom Tor

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Weber, R.H. (2024). Overcoming the Antagonism Between Efficiency and Distributive Justice. In: Mathis, K., Tor, A. (eds) Law and Economics of Justice. ILEC 2023. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 17. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-56822-0_2

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