Emergency Response and Crisis Communications

Abstract

This chapter addresses best practices in emergency response and crisis communication, with an emphasis on the need for procedures and policies, communications systems, networks of trained personnel, and emergency exercise execution and appraisal programs. Indian author R. S. Sundar considers the need for the operators of nuclear power plants to build trust and familiarity with local populations. He uses the challenges of public relations at the Kudankulam Power Plant (KPP) to illustrate his points. U.S. authors Daniela Cooper, Michael Hornish, and Alisa Laufer explain that the U.S. approach to nuclear emergencies stems from a common emergency response structure, the National Response Framework (NRF). They argue that a central challenge of emergency response is establishing who has the authority to request and approve appropriate assistance. They illustrate their points with discussions of the Three Mile Island and Fukushima Daiichi accidents.

4.1 An Indian Perspective

• R. S. Sundar 

The world continues to aim to produce clean energy with no carbon, and the energy sector strives to attain near zero greenhouse gas emissions. In order to combat the threat of a global warming, producing dependable, cleaner power is a global priority. As the most dependable source of carbon-free power generation providing around-the-clock energy supply without interruption, nuclear energy is an important part of the power generation landscape. It is a critical pillar in the move towards to a carbon-free future. Many developing countries are setting their focus on carbon-free nuclear power generation as part of their energy mix to ensure a dependable source of cleaner power with the highest level of reliability and safety, thus ensuring energy security. Given the urgency of the climate challenge, decision-makers should ensure that nuclear energy is included in the discussion.

The COVID-19 outbreak is likely to leave a lasting impact on the future of energy production, distribution, and usage. Reduced global power consumption due to the worldwide lockdown has been one of the short-term effects of the pandemic. However, in the long-term, the demand for electricity is unlikely to diminish and governments (and their electorates) will be no less keen to ensure that their energy systems are reliable and more resilient than ever to future disruptions. So, what is the future for nuclear power? (Fig. 4.1).

Fig. 4.1

(Source International Energy Agency)

International Energy Agency

According to the IEA, the largest low-carbon source of electricity in Europe, North America and, soon to be, Japan is nuclear power. Nuclear technology undoubtedly plays a major role in ensuring secure supplies of energy in many economies. Therefore, nuclear power should be seen as part of any country’s energy mix, along with other sources of low-carbon energy generation. While wind and solar have lower capital costs and shorter construction and commissioning lead times, they are less consistent and constant than nuclear energy generation. Nuclear can provide a steady baseload of supply to complement other renewable energy generation technologies.

Third and fourth generation technologies have taken into account decommissioning designed into the construction, commissioning, and operation of the nuclear facilities so that the decommissioning challenges we face from earlier generation technologies have been significantly mitigated.

Before the pandemic, there were challenges in finding suitable funding solutions for nuclear energy compared to the investment made in its greener alternatives. The low-carbon nature of nuclear power still goes unrecognized in most countries’ policies on clean electricity and frameworks for clean energy financing. Even in countries where there is general support for nuclear, there is a possibility that the role of nuclear power in their energy systems will be undermined.

4.1.1 Public Relations

Nuclear power’s reputation is among its biggest hurdles. In the public imagination, nuclear power presages disaster. On one side are purists who believe nuclear power is not worth the risk and that the exclusive solution to the climate crisis is renewable energy. The opposing side agrees that renewables are crucial but adds that the society needs a baseload of power to provide electricity when the sun is not shining and the wind is not blowing. Nuclear energy, being far cleaner than oil, gas, and coal, is a natural option, especially where hydroelectric capacity is limited.

Though the word “nuclear” evokes images of landscapes pulverized by atomic calamity—Hiroshima, Chernobyl, Fukushima—nuclear power plants are relatively safe. Proponents point out that nuclear power produces huge amounts of electricity while emitting low or no carbon. This separates it from fossil fuels, which are consistent but contribute heavily towards global warming as well as renewables, which are clean but weather dependent. Further, as Eric Dawson, a grassroots campaigner at Nuclear New York argued, “Any energy policy has pros and cons, and we feel, after putting a lot of scrutiny on it, that the pros outweigh the cons of nuclear energy.”¹ Many scientists and experts believe nuclear power is necessary to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. In order to prevent the dangers of climate change, it is crucial to advocate for nuclear power.

Reactor core meltdowns, while rarer than once-in-a-generation, have severe consequences. And the question of how to best store nuclear waste is contentious: The US storage site at Yucca Mountain was initiated but it abandoned the project, though Finland, France, and Canada seem to have found potential solutions.

4.1.1.1 Communications

Public relations depend on building trust and a long-term relationship with the public through platforms such as print and electronic media, which play a vital role in disseminating positive news to people. Additionally, social media has become a common communication medium amongst Indians. However, there is the issue of misinformation. Misinformation can be spread across communication mediums unintentionally or as a result of malicious intent. There are lessons to be learnt during the COVID-19 pandemic about the impact of social media and its ability to spread information—accurate and false—at a much faster rate than traditional modes of communication.

It is essential to communicate true and accurate information to the public during a crisis that will help develop a more efficient and effective response. Below are a few real-life experiences to illustrate this.

4.1.1.2 Three Phases of Communication

4.1.1.2.1 During Construction of a Nuclear Power Project (NPP)

Communication is important from the time when a nuclear power plant is being constructed in order to address the concerns of local people. Communication with journalists, educational institutions, and opinion-makers must be open and transparent in order to avoid rumours and increase trust amongst the locals. Providing employment opportunities to local and affected people also can help to establish trust in the early stages.

The critical link is the process of communication. How the plant communicates with temporary workers, for instance, illustrates this. Security or plant personnel may, at times, treat temporary workers poorly, which may exacerbate the negative connotations attached to nuclear power. Furthermore, India is a multilingual society and a language barrier may act as an irritant during interaction between the locals and security agencies. Communication in local languages is, therefore, necessary. It is also important to conduct workshops for journalists to help them appreciate nuclear power projects and share relevant safety and security information as a confidence-building measure. Interactions need to be a continuous process, rather than one time action.

4.1.1.2.2 Communication During Normal Plant Operating Conditions

It is important for senior management officials and public relations officers to interact with journalists and media personnel regularly and provide honest and technically competent responses. This is to build a long-term engagement, treating media as an important stakeholder in the area of nuclear safety and security. Creating a local narrative involving different aspects of nuclear power, the operations of the power plant, and the response mechanisms and processes in case of contingency situations, can help build a positive and responsive relationship with the public.

4.1.1.2.3 Communication During Crisis

Crisis communication is different from communication that is executed during normal operating conditions. It is important to provide as much information as possible, with immediate responses as well as subsequent clarifications, to the media and locals on the workings of the nuclear power plant and the situation at hand. This is particularly important in order to avoid misinformation. Depending on the stakeholder, communication could focus on technical aspects of the crisis as well as the mitigation measures that are being undertaken, which could be a source of assurance to the larger population.

4.1.1.2.4 Clear, Precise Communication

Along with timeliness, what is conveyed and how it is conveyed are important. When handling emergencies during the construction phase or plant operation phase, it is important to: increase people’s confidence in the plant and its operations; build trust between the organisation and the locals through appropriate communications and the broader approach; provide information on the project and share details on how the project will benefit the region, such as economic growth; provide assurances related to basic livelihood; and provide also an outline of the crisis management and mitigation plans should there be a disaster.

4.1.1.3 A Case Study: Kudankulam NPP

For the first time in a nuclear power project at Kudankulam NPP in India, there has been marketing and communication about the positive and safety aspects of nuclear power. Previously, the lack of proper information had led to fear and panic. The methods used to do so were carried out via commercials in various media outlets, handouts, interactions with educational institutions, and other outreach programmes.

4.1.1.3.1 Commercials on Media Platforms

Officials put out short videos and audio advertisements on TV channels as well as the radio to disseminate accurate information about nuclear power and also about the nuclear power plant operations to the public. Although expensive, these commercials were able to reach the right audience in a short time span. They provided clear information on the safety of the nuclear power project and addressed the concerns of the local population.

Site personnel also actively participated in TV programs to increase awareness. For example, questions raised on the transfer of heat from the reactor primary circuit to the secondary water circuit were explained verbally by the site personnel in a simplified manner. Some of these explanations were done in a public debate, as well as through videos and other means of communication. It was found that simplicity in communication helped reach a wider audience and strengthened the support base among the local population. For instance, the classic example of cooling down hot milk using water as a medium was used to explain why radioactivity will not spill over to the environment from the reactor circuit. This was a serious concern among the local community of fishermen, and providing such simple examples assuaged their fears.

4.1.1.3.2 Handouts

The public outreach team made small handouts and pamphlets to distribute directly to local people. In order to have a wider reach, the handout information was disseminated in local languages such as Tamil, Malayalam, and English. Copies were distributed at railway stations and bus terminals, and were also widely circulated during government festivals. These handouts were helpful in alleviating the fears and doubts raised by local people and protestors.

4.1.1.3.3 Interaction with Educational Institutions

Public outreach through educational institutions played a vital role. By providing detailed presentations as well as engaging in Q&A sessions with local audiences, students and academics were essential in expanding local understanding about nuclear power plant safety and design features, such as ability to withstand extreme weather conditions like cyclones, tsunamis, or earthquakes. In the case of earthquakes, for example, project and plant officials used simple examples such as the structural integrity of 1000-year temples in local areas and their ability to withstand extreme conditions as a result of stable conditions of the land in the area as well as the safety aspects of the site.

4.1.1.3.4 Outreach Programs

Arranging site visits for students, local people, and other individuals also proved useful in raising awareness, building trust, and reducing apprehensions about nuclear power. These site visits included safety presentations, plant site visits—including construction sites such as the reactor hall—as well as familiarization with safety protocols and procedures at the site. Senior management personnel also participated at times, adding creditability to the outreach programmes.

4.1.2 Crisis Communication

Nuclear power plants are generally built with highest safety standards to meet internal and external challenges. All NPPs are designed to withstand conditions beyond the general design-basis threats in order to protect plant personnel, maintenance teams, and local populations in case of an incident or accident. In order to face any event occurring at a nuclear power plant, emergency preparedness is made mandatory. It is a regulatory requirement and must be fulfilled by all nuclear power plants in India even before attaining the first chain reaction.

Exercises are designed and conducted in each of the nuclear power stations in India.² The first type of exercise is called plant emergency exercise which involves the plant management under plant personnel. This exercise is conducted every 3 months to ensure that all operating crews are well trained to face any emergency situation.

The second type of exercise is called site emergency exercise, which involves all facilities that exist within a 1.6 km radius of the nuclear power plant. This exercise is conducted annually and requires the participation of all site management personnel and the staff including contract manpower.

The third type of exercise is called off-site emergency exercise. This exercise is held once in two years to familiarize all plant personnel as well as district authorities who are in charge of the areas beyond the plant boundary.

An AERB-approved document by the district and/or state authorities must be available to conduct these exercises. The document specifies the diverse roles of the various agencies involved. The nuclear power plant assumes the lead and ensures all personnel and district authorities are clear about their responsibilities. Various training programs are conducted to emphasize these aspects. For example, off-site emergency exercises are conducted on the basis of a pre-decided scenario and involve observers from regulatory bodies and other organizations in the exercise. Further, feedback sessions are held right after the exercise to evaluate performance and identify areas for improvement. As a result, new safety, security, protection, and mitigation measures are conceptualized and implemented at sites for use in an actual emergency. Crisis communication can succeed only when personnel are well versed with the various mitigation measures to be adopted during an emergency.

Nuclear emergencies in future are unlikely to happen from any known scenarios and conditions that are understood and incorporated in the risk design. The Fukushima accident was a reminder that severe nuclear accidents beyond those postulated in the design can never be completely ruled out. Therefore, emergency planning and preparedness are crucial to prepare for unlikely events. During a nuclear emergency, intervention must be carried out in a manner that ensures that the actions taken result in more good than harm. The Fukushima accident demonstrated that responses can cause more harm than good, if not properly justified and optimised.

Nuclear and associated hazards allow a certain amount of time to respond, as the immediate impact of an accident may not be high. The actual consequence also depends on the cumulative dose of radiation over a period of time. In addition, the design of PHWRs, which are the main stay of the Indian program, has inherent strength against the propagation of an accident sequence, and has been further enhanced through features that offer additional resistance against the release of radio nuclides.

Since the characteristics of the radioactive material that can be released from a nuclear power plant are known, response actions for mitigation of consequence can be well-planned. Typical response actions include: taking potassium iodide tablets, sheltering in place, restrictions on food and water consumption, and in some cases, evacuation. Simple protective measures like taking iodine tablets in a timely fashion, wearing protective gear when outdoors and avoiding drinking water from open source are very effective. The COVID-19 response protocols have made it easier for the public to understand various protective methods, such as the use of masks and protective coveralls, and preemptive measures, such as the administration of potassium iodate tablets as a prophylactic similar to a vaccine.

4.1.2.1 Early Phase Decision-making

The response to the Fukushima accident showed that early phase decision-making is the most critical part of overall emergency management. The early phase is characterized by high levels of uncertainty particularly regarding plant conditions and measurements from field. In this phase, sudden changes are frequent and coupled with a lack of external technical support. As a result, decision-makers may under or overreact to the evolving situation (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Emergency management timeline

The core of emergency management, especially during the early phase, is decision-making that emphasizes the criteria and basis for a response. Early phase decision-making is predicated upon the ability to identify and execute a course of action promptly and adequately in order to protect the public and emergency workers. A host of actions are critical in managing the outcome of an emergency situation, including:

• Meeting to evaluate early phase decision-making during emergencies at NPPs and during the conduct of emergency exercises.

• Discussing and emphasizing the importance of managing the early phase of an emergency.

• Placing an emphasis on response actions that do more good than harm.

• Improving understanding and knowledge of plant conditions/parameters.

• Emphasizing the importance of linkages between plant conditions and the emergency response actions.

• Presenting consolidated feedback regularly from the stations, NPCIL headquarters, and BARC experts on current emergency management efforts, including emergency exercises being carried out.

• Providing emphasis on Emergency Action Level (EAL)-based decision-making during emergency exercises, which strengthens the preparedness for the early phase of an emergency.

There is also a four-point strategy that can help prepare NPPs to deal with emergency situations:

• Develop criteria for early phase decision-making in advance of an emergency (EALs, OILs, etc.);

• Determine the basis and principles for public protection during different phases of emergency (doing more good than harm);

• Establish an emergency plan with an effective and coordinated operational framework;

• Revise emergency exercise methodology as needed.

4.1.2.2 Emergency Action Levels

One of the most important aspects of emergency preparedness is to establish mechanisms for timely classification of nuclear and radiation emergencies and their declaration to the larger public. Such a mechanism provides assurance to the emergency director and justifications for the declaration. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandates that “the emergency classification system shall be established with the aim of allowing for the prompt initiation of an effective response in recognition of the uncertainty of the available information.”³

In order to address this, nuclear power units should use a deterministic approach to pre-analyse all industrial control systems (ICs) for their consequences. They should also determine the imminence of release through a PSA Level 2 study. The utility needs to identify plant-specific threshold values for instrumentation readings and status indications, which if exceeded would determine if specific ICs are met. This will help in timely identification of the emergency classification and declaration. These plant-specific instrument readings, status reports, and threshold values are a part of the Emergency Action Levels. There are three fundamentally different types of EALs:

• Symptom-based EALs, which are site-specific instrument readings or other observable or quantifiable thresholds

• Event-based EALs, which are more subjective criteria requiring the judgment of the operating staff; and

• Fission barrier-based EALs, which are developed through the analysis of the full range of postulated conditions that can result in radiological consequences, including very unlikely scenarios such as reactor core melt.

Analysis of results and understanding of the attributes and purpose of each emergency class (alert, plant, on-site, and off-site) are used to align each EAL appropriately (Fig. 4.2).

Fig. 4.2

EAL development scheme

Information from other measurements like those provided by Decision Support Systems (DSS) instruments could aid in making the decision-making process more effective. For example, a DSS directly linked with real-time data from the weather bureau can be simultaneously monitored by the headquarters-based design and operation teams. Reasonable assurance of the correct approach for precautionary or urgent protective actions comes through in such processes. A Wind Profile Radar system is being planned at Kalpakkam site as part of DSS (Fig. 4.3).

Fig. 4.3

Improved framework for taking protective actions

Protective measures to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological accident can be divided into precautionary (preventive), urgent (early), and late (recovery) measures. The initial protective actions are implemented on a precautionary basis following a set of accident sequences. The precautionary (preventive) and urgent (early) measures, which may be required to be decided as part of the initial phase of a developing emergency with possible off-site consequences, need special care. If overdone, these actions may result in more damage than benefits. The “early” phase response comprises of:

• i. “Event/response initiation,” including recognition of an emergency situation and initiation of response.

• ii. “Crisis management,” including efforts to characterize and gain control over the accident scenario and implementation of protective measures that must be taken promptly in order to be effective.

During this phase, decision-making needs to be done with little or no input from outside technical support or analysis by persons beyond the plant authorities.

Protective action to reduce radiological consequences will depend on amount, time, composition, and frequency of release. For example, for certain types of release, sheltering along with food control is enough. For another type of release, however, temporary evacuation may be required. EALs were developed such that they can differentiate between these different release situations. EALs provide a graded approach to protective action commensurate with the consequences.

4.1.3 Improved Emergency Exercise Methodology

Previous radiological emergency exercises did not adequately challenge the skills of operating and maintenance staff and did not result in appropriate use of emergency operating procedures. As a result of discussions between plant unit heads, the decision to move to desktop exercises was made. Observations from peer-review reports and meetings with regulators help evolve and implement desktop exercises at nuclear power plants (Table 4.2 and Fig. 4.4).

Table 4.2 Improvements to exercise approach

Fig. 4.4

Integrated approach for finalization of emergency exercise policy

4.1.3.1 Features of New Exercise Methodology

The exercise is designed to challenge all organizations playing a role in responding to a nuclear emergency. It spans a wide spectrum of response functions that would normally take place. The exercise evolved from the initial indications of a problem at the plant to the subsequent notification of response organizations. The accident scenario is not pre-briefed to respond, but is revealed gradually, as the accident scenario unfolds. Response organizations are asked to analyze the impact on actual environmental and metrological conditions. Emergency operations centres were then activated as the scenario demanded. The DSS are used to determine the affected area according to prevailing meteorological conditions, followed by recommendation of actions to protect the public to district authorities (Table 4.3 and Fig. 4.5).

Table 4.3 Scope for participating organizations

Fig. 4.5

Improved exercise planning process

Finally, acceptance by the Operation and Maintenance team and other supporting elements, such as the radiological protection team and the environment survey laboratory team, is also crucial.

The teams that participate in the desktop exercises understand the scope of work and importance of decision-making in the early phase. Prior exercises were based on site-field measurements data; this slowed the process. Also, online weather-based and source term-based online digital platforms were previously not available. The dynamic wind pattern data along with readings from field radiation level instruments were extremely beneficial in the decision-making process. Post-Fukushima, engineering upgrade measures, including emergency operating procedures, have been incorporated in all sites. Their appropriate use during desktop exercises proved to be crucial in handling emergencies.

Moreover, the headquarters team and regulators visit the site in advance to brief relevant personnel about the surprise element in the desktop exercise. The response of the operation team and site teams is based on the situation, which evolve as time progresses. For the NPP personnel, it is ideal to combine source term with meteorological data, predict the scenario under worst- and best-case scenarios, and adopt corrective measures in advance.

Weather patterns have been very tricky, but with more monitoring of locations within the first 16 km Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), the exact number of villages or localities likely to be impacted by a radioactive plume can be predicted more easily. Also, at times ground level release can occur due to prevailing weather situations; in those cases, the personnel within the site premises need to be protected. On sites where operating and construction sites co-exist, a large number of people have to be protected including construction teams, security and other defence personnel, in addition to the teams executing the rescue mission. With the advent of faster computers and critical modeling of individual reactors, the validation of modeling is quite reassuring.

4.1.4 Conclusions

Following good practices, especially in communication and outreach in emergency situations is critical to keeping the crisis under control. Some of the key points for consideration in this regard are to work on building trust from the initial stages of an NPP in order to buy in the support from the local population that will ensure greater support and compliance with measures during emergency situations. Localized issues need to be addressed to gain confidence. The general population needs to be taken into confidence including plant visits and explaining the beneficial and safety aspects of Nuclear Power. Inclusiveness of the local nearby population is beneficial in trust and confidence-building measure in a long way. This is to sustain trust and communication over time, and ensuring that there is clear and direct information to the people, in partnership with the District and State machinery. Ensuring spread of accurate information through social and traditional media and providing clarification at the earliest in case of misinformation are critical in the area of nuclear security. This can be done by 24 × 7 emergency response centres that remain functional and coordinate across relevant agencies.

In order to achieve long-term acceptability of nuclear power in India, some measures that may be undertaken include skilling of local populations with the prime goal of employability in NPP construction or in general fields of specialization; periodic distribution of Potassium Iodate tablets (including replacement based on shelf life) to individual residents in the Emergency Planning Zone of 16 km. At present, these prophylactics are stored in Primary Health Centers and need to be distributed by the local health authorities. This would reduce burden on state teams that would have to distribute it in a situation where the administering time is essential to prevent radioactive Iodine intake. Thyroid gets saturated with Potassium iodate and prevents absorption of radioactive iodine. Infrastructure developments in the area adjacent to NPPs like educational institutions, healthcare centers, skill centers, communication network, etc. including reliable electric power supply are consequential in managing nuclear security. Synchronized communication by nuclear power units, regulators and agencies such as the NDMA to ensure public confidence is also important. Building a robust weather monitoring system with dual sensors for identifying wind direction, velocity, local radiation monitors within the Emergency Planning Zone of 16 Km/10 miles as well integrating these with the prediction models being used presently while investing in advanced technologies like the use of drones for air sampling, air samples collection to measure radioactive particles, wind velocity can be enormously useful. The information required during any conditions can be gathered quickly and are accurate. Additionally, drones can be used to survey plant areas in conditions similar to Fukushima, where the accessibility was an issue due to debris. Establishment of reliable weather and radiation levels monitoring stations and transmission of data to Emergency control centre remotely within 32 Km radius of power plants are also required.

4.2 A U.S. Perspective

• Daniela Helfet Cooper,
• Michael Hornish &
• Alisa Laufer 

Emergencies, crises, and catastrophes riddle the world daily and yet no two events are exactly alike. While most of the elements that comprise a response remain consistent across events, the unique nature, scope, timing, and location of an event invariably ensure that some key differences exist. Whether this is a result of the material associated with a crisis, or its geostrategic location, or even something as seemingly simple as the time of day, the fact stands that there will always be something novel—some friction that forces responders to adapt. And while some may consider this fact daunting, there is room for optimism: This means that there is always something to learn and improve upon. This is especially true of radiological and nuclear emergencies, which carry uniquely complex considerations. From Fukushima to Three Mile Island to Chernobyl, each crisis has posed a unique set of challenges. This increased layer of complexity understandably causes many to pause or even shy away from the high-stakes world of emergency response. However, it is that same dynamic—and the corresponding commitment of the response community to do everything possible to proactively anticipate and mitigate this inevitable friction—that has shaped the modus operandi for emergency response as we know it.

This chapter summarizes several best practices in emergency response and crisis communications for use in radiological and nuclear emergencies. The best practices herein encapsulate many years of lessons learned from our country’s greatest successes and failures—some of which have neither radiological nor nuclear components, but directly shaped United States response doctrine for emergencies, crises, and disasters writ large. The United States nuclear security community has largely agreed upon these strategies based on its experiences, resources, capabilities, and systems of governance. But these practices are not the “best” choice for everyone—each comes with tradeoffs. For example, the United States chooses to prioritize lifesaving in response operations—even when funneling resources to lifesaving can compromise other elements of the response. The United States also takes an “incident until proven accident” approach to minimize risk, even when the resulting need to preserve potential evidence slows the decontamination process. The United States’ approach is neither the only nor the best way to address these crises. As different countries balance different threats, resources, and constraints, they naturally emerge with different priorities and strategies for responding to emergencies.

Reflecting on the United States’ experiences and priorities, this chapter begins by discussing U.S. best practices for response operations broadly, focusing on several elements that the United States has found critical to success including: (1) building a tiered response structure, (2) identifying and delegating necessary response authorities, (3) establishing predetermined standards and thresholds for action, (4) developing detection, monitoring, and modeling capabilities, (5) integrating pre- and post-event response communities, and (6) building robust exercise programs and after-action processes. We then take an in-depth look at best practices for communications, which is a key part of crisis response.

There is no better way to explain the emergence of these best practices than through real-world examples of crises that necessitated them. The chapter therefore offers two in-depth case studies that demonstrate the need for these practices: the Three Mile Island accident and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.

We close the chapter with a discussion of how emerging threats may impact the future of radiological and nuclear crisis response and provide recommendations for ways through which bilateral partnership can meet these challenges. We do so not because we know the solution, but because we know tomorrow’s challenges will require us to once again grapple with our plans and adapt our approach. Our best practices today may not be the best practices of tomorrow and indeed, there is always more we can do to increase our prospects for success.

4.2.1 Tiered Response Structure

An emergency is, by definition, “a serious, unexpected, and often dangerous situation requiring immediate action.”⁴ If immediate action is required, one must quickly identify the appropriate steps and determine whether those on the scene are equipped and empowered to handle the situation. If not, an individual on-scene must have the wherewithal and training to identify what additional support is required and determine who can provide it. These are, at their core, the key initial decision points at nearly every level of a crisis. Do I have what I need or do I need to request more support?

A fundamental element of an effective response is the implementation of a tiered response structure. A tiered response structure starts at the lowest jurisdictional level and allows local officials to request and integrate more expertise as needs are identified. A tiered response structure can be established in a number of ways—both formally and informally—depending on the nature and scope of an emergency. However, for complex crises like nuclear or radiological events, formal, detailed, and practiced tiered response structures—also referred to as response frameworks—are imperative. While this chapter focuses on nuclear and radiological events, many best practices utilized today are born out of other more typical types of crises, ranging from natural disasters to deliberate chemical attacks.

One of the most pivotal and complex crises to impact the contiguous United States occurred in 2005 when Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma rocked the U.S. Gulf Coast region in quick succession. This marked the first time in modern history that such a large swath of the country was impacted near-simultaneously, stressing the general capacity—and, specifically, the coordinating mechanisms—that were established to enable a tiered response across local, state, and federal entities. The insufficient capacity and integration across various levels during the response—among other shortfalls—led Congress to enact the Post-Katrina Management Reform Act (PKMRA). The legislation that followed PKMRA directed the Department of Homeland Security to develop and issue the National Response Framework, or NRF, that is still utilized today.

The NRF establishes how the United States responds to domestic emergencies of any scale or type and applies to emergencies where the nature and scope require a federal response to supplement the state, tribal, or local incident response. Taking an all-hazards approach, the framework defines key roles, coordinating structures, consistent nomenclature, and incident management principles that enable a coordinated response across communities, tribes, states, the federal government, private sector partners, and non-governmental organizations. It also includes several support and incident annexes that provide further guidance for certain complex disasters. Among those incident annexes is the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NRIA) which provides guidance to all levels of government for planning, response to, and recovery from nuclear and radiological emergencies.⁵ The NRF’s guidelines enable responders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to conduct a unified response wherein roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clearly defined.

An underlying tenet of the NRF is its tiered response structure, meaning that all incidents will be managed first at the lowest jurisdictional level and supported by higher-level authorities or resources only when needed. This delegation of responsibilities allows local authorities to guide the response based on their knowledge of their community’s unique needs and challenges. The principle of a tiered response structure was born out of multiple lessons learned and the United States continues to refine its supporting frameworks and authorities at every level, across nearly every field, to further reduce friction.

Since establishing the NRF in 2008, the United States has faced countless emergencies that have demonstrated a need for additional solutions to empower and more effectively support lower jurisdictional levels in a crisis. This reinforced another best practice: identifying and delegating necessary authorities to the lowest possible level.

4.2.2 Identifying and Delegating Necessary Authorities

In a crisis, people tend to look “up the chain” for approvals. This causes unnecessary delays and can temporarily paralyze a response. There are two concrete steps that all entities at all levels can take to expedite decision-making and the provision of assistance. First, these entities can proactively identify those within their organization with the authority to request and approve assistance. Second, they can delegate those authorities down to the lowest possible level. Doing so will dramatically streamline decision-making, increase access to critical resources, improve information sharing between responders and decision-makers, enable the provision of care, and reduce friction, confusion, and bureaucracy.

While this concept seems intuitive, few organizations know with certainty who is authorized to make a final decision. The more complex an incident or accident, the more likely individuals are to experience discomfort with unilaterally shouldering the burden of decision-making. This is especially true at the operational and strategic levels, but there are tactical-level examples of this challenge from real-world responses as well.

In 1995, five members of the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo released packages of sarin on five separate Tokyo subway lines. Overall, the Japanese local and national response to this unprecedented event was remarkable, but even the best real-world responses carry lessons learned—especially those involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials. In the case of the Aum Shinrikyo attack, one of the more notable lessons pertains to the capabilities of Emergency Management Technicians (EMTs) on site and the actions they were—and were not—authorized to take.

Japanese law prohibits EMTs from performing certain procedures without the express consent of a doctor. Normally, EMTs obtain approval by calling the Tokyo Metropolitan Ambulance Control Center (TMACC). However, the TMACC became overwhelmed during the incident and EMTs failed to make contact, impeding the EMTs’ ability to triage patients on-scene. Moreover, given the scale of the situation, the coordinating entity (Tokyo Metropolitan Fire Department) also became overwhelmed and requested medical assistance from nearby hospitals to assist the EMTs. St. Luke’s Hospital dispatched personnel to various stations. When they arrived, however, most casualties had already been processed or transferred to higher echelons of care, in many cases back to St. Luke’s Hospital. The reduced staff remaining at St. Luke’s was not adequate to handle the large numbers of incoming patients.

While local, provincial, state, regional, and/or national authorities and assets may not wish to waive certain restrictions during normal circumstances, a solution may be to identify circumstances wherein those restrictions are waived and authorities are delegated. The United States has learned this time and again and can still do more to anticipate friction that may arise during unprecedented events. Unfortunately, the United States, along with every other country in the world, has recently experienced aspects of this challenge first-hand during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic reinforced the need for governing entities to be able to rapidly activate and enable an agile, flexible response across jurisdictions to facilitate the flow of emergency responders, healthcare practitioners, and other relief. For example, while some states had pre-existing legislation that permitted them to recognize out-of-state licenses for healthcare workers during a declared emergency, many did not. Further, many states could not authorize volunteer health practitioners to assist due to licensure restrictions and an inability to quickly assess qualifications in the absence of reciprocity or “compact” legislation across jurisdictions. During the pandemic, more states began enacting legislation and providing waivers to address this reciprocity gap.⁶ Once enacted, such legislation empowered frontline healthcare workers to more swiftly address personnel shortages.

4.2.3 Predetermined Standards and Thresholds

A primary objective in an emergency response to a radiological incident is to prevent acute and chronic health effects, by limiting unnecessary exposure to radiological dose. A common principle used to achieve this objective is the establishment of predetermined standards and thresholds of radiological hazards, and methods used to model or estimate them, above which protective actions or intervention may be warranted or required. Through organizations like the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), widely accepted methodologies, risk thresholds, and best practices are used to establish a set of standards and procedures for radiological/nuclear emergency preparedness and response. This approach ensures that, during an emergency, debate on acceptable exposure levels will not impede organizations responsible for responding based on these standards.

This compilation of standards is commonly referred to as a protective action guide, which is designed to protect the health and safety of emergency responders and the public. Manuals that summarize protective action guides assist emergency response team leaders, public officials, and others in planning for emergency response by providing radiological protection criteria for a wide range of incidents.⁷

Protective action guides allow emergency responders to perform critical response functions while reducing exposure to radiation or risks of radiological contamination. Examples of protective actions applied to emergency responders include establishment of a cordon or exclusion zone at a specified dose rate; enforcement of limits associated with individuals’ radiological exposure (e.g., cumulative dose, dose rates, stay times); use of personal protective equipment (PPE); respiratory protection; and decontamination procedures when thresholds are reached. These types of protective actions may utilize tiered thresholds that depend on the severity of the emergency. For example, a general emergency dose limit may allow even higher limits for activities needed to protect critical infrastructure and valuable property, or to save lives.

Emergency actions designed to protect the public from unnecessary radiation exposure emergencies will likely disrupt normal living conditions. Public protective actions may include evacuation, sheltering-in-place, relocation, interdiction of food supply, and using alternative drinking water supplies. Guides help officials select applicable protective actions under emergency conditions involving relatively short-term exposures. Generally, these guides are not intended to be reflexively enforced; rather, they serve as guidelines to be considered in the broader context of incident-specific conditions and hazards. Furthermore, they do not apply to non-emergency conditions and do not delineate safe and unsafe zones. Finally, the benefits of an action should be balanced against any potential harm that may be introduced in the context of other factors or conditions.

4.2.4 Detection, Monitoring, and Modeling Capabilities for Prevention and Response

Incident prevention is a core function of emergency response organizations across all levels of government in the United States. Prevention requires careful planning and coordination between national, regional, and local assets, and ensuring that those entities have received proper training and understand how they can most effectively work together.

Preventing radiological incidents often involves enhanced security and law enforcement, augmented by technical capabilities that can detect, identify, locate, and help interdict hazardous, uncontrolled radiological material. The scale and complexity of a radiological incident response reaches beyond law enforcement to include protection of public health and safety. In this context, it is important to quickly understand the scale and the severity of the incident through a combination of data collection using radiological instrumentation, and dispersion models that predict effects in areas where actual data are unavailable. These functions occur simultaneously, while first responders work to mitigate any residual or secondary hazards that could affect public health and safety.

The detection capability needed to address both prevention of and response to radiological incidents is available in handheld, portable, or vehicle-mounted form factors. An important element of this detection capability is the identification of specific radioisotopes, which helps distinguish hazardous materials from innocuous radiation. In most cases, isotope identification is achieved through gamma-ray spectroscopy. To understand the extent of the hazard, it is also important to estimate the quantity of material dispersed, and to identify its location—on the ground, in the water, or in the air. This provides insights as to possible dose pathways and locations where radiation may exceed thresholds for protective action. Lastly, telemetry or reporting of data from the field enables remote subject matter experts to quickly analyze and assess data.

Once a radiological incident has occurred, dose projections can determine whether protective actions should be taken. However, in the immediate aftermath of an incident, reliable field data may not be readily available for accurate estimates of the source term, in which case experts make projections and estimates using modeled or historical atmospheric dispersion and transport data. A dispersion modeling capability can play a critical role in helping predict which areas may be most affected by the incident and where protective actions may be warranted. Because models are based on a set of assumptions or initial conditions such as source term, dispersion characteristics, and meteorological conditions, experts must refine and update modeled results to ensure they are consistent with actual measurements collected in the field. This iterative process is important for characterizing the scale of the incident and ensuring protective actions are considered in a timely process in the affected areas. It is also important to communicate to responders and the public that safety guidance will be updated as predictions are refined with actual measurements. This type of transparency and expectation setting is critical to maintaining trust throughout the response.

4.2.5 Integrating Pre- and Post-Event Response Communities

Despite the United States Government’s efforts to ensure an integrated inter-agency response, the communities responsible for various stages of a response do not always cooperate as well as they should. As noted previously, Hurricane Katrina revealed many areas for improvement across the local, state, and federal response—including the need for better integration between preparedness and response communities. As a result, the United States has since strived to better integrate response elements across the spectrum of a crisis to ensure that any entity involved in a response receives necessary information as soon as possible. Integrating consequence management entities into early planning has proven important to initial response actions, as there are medium- and long-term considerations that can be deliberated before initial actions are taken. For example, understanding how evacuating a community, as opposed to sheltering them, will affect traffic and can hinder the ability of response assets to reach their destination. Another example could be considering how the use of water to decontaminate infrastructure could cause issues at water treatment plants.

In intelligence and defense applications, early notification is often referred to as “indications and warnings” (I&W). Despite the term’s origin, it is often used more broadly to refer to the sharing of any information that could indicate a budding crisis, enabling emergency personnel and other supporting response assets to prepare. For example, consequence management elements—responsible for taking action to restore essential services and functions and mitigating negative impacts from disasters—are now notified as early as possible of any unusual events that may develop into crises. Doing so ensures that response assets can proactively plan and stage, mitigating delays resulting from the “tyranny of time and distance.” While these delays can be planned for and shortened, they cannot be completely avoided during the initial phase of an emergency, especially if the situation was unanticipated.

4.2.6 Robust Exercise Programs and After-Action Processes

A successful response plan rests on the preparedness of those who execute it. When disaster strikes, time is of the essence and responders must execute their responsibilities efficiently without having to refer to their plans and procedures. Responders perform optimally when they have practiced their responses ahead of time and have played their role in a realistic, simulated emergency scenario.

Exercises allow responders at all levels to gain familiarity with their respective roles and responsibilities, their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and their organization’s concepts of operations (CONOPs), which often allows them to act in a more confident, decisive, and coordinated manner during a real-world event. Exercises also provide an opportunity for responders and policymakers to validate capabilities in a controlled setting and to reflect on where they should invest additional training and resources. At the same time, through controlled and simulated scenario designs that are objective-driven, organizations can validate established plans and procedures and expose potential shortfalls therein. When scrutinizing a response plan by exercising it, we learn whether doctrine aligns with the evolving threats we face and the priorities of our government.

In addition to building confidence in response plans, exercises help create networks across agencies and various jurisdictions prior to a crisis. This allows counterparts to establish or reinforce relationships and build rapport in a relaxed environment. In doing so, exercises facilitate greater understanding of cross-agency or cross-jurisdictional roles and responsibilities, and initiate conversations about how organizations can leverage one another for reach-back and force multiplication during a crisis. These collaborations often lead to greater trust and understanding when disaster strikes. Exercises can also facilitate communications pathways, data flow, information sharing, and reporting procedures within and across agencies—all of which can increase coordination, ensure efficient use of resources, and build situational awareness during a response.

The exercise planning process involves work within individual organizations and across different agencies to ensure exercise plans touch all levels. An exercise plan should address the breadth of the emergency landscape, incorporating scenarios of varying magnitude and locations to stress the response community across different timescales and jurisdictions. To make effective use of limited time and resources, exercises can range in scope and complexity from basic proficiency drills and field training exercises (FTX), which are limited and focus on specific field-level functions or technical disciplines, to integrated full-field drills that are designed to explore most or all field-level functions in a simulated response scenario. An exercise plan may also include other types of activities, such as tabletop exercises (TTX), command post exercises (CPX) and senior leaders seminars (SLS). These events focus on higher-level decision-makers presented with scenarios and questions that elicit dialog and responses about what actions or decisions to take. They can often be accomplished with simulated or no field-level play. It is also important to have a long-term exercise plan to continue validating new capabilities or procedures, to account for new circumstances, and to mitigate personnel turnover and reorganizations that impact the distribution of roles and responsibilities. An emergency response plan loses value sitting on the shelf. Good plans are living, breathing documents that are updated with lessons learned from exercises and real-world events. This is especially true in an information age in which technology develops faster than we can adapt.

An essential element of effective exercise programs is the control and evaluation cell, from which controllers provide scenario scripts and injects, control the flow of the exercise, and enforce boundaries to keep exercise play on track. Concurrently, exercise evaluators observe the performance of responders and assets at all levels (in the field, in command-and-control centers, in reach-back centers and watch offices, and elsewhere). They capture observations on successes and areas for improvement. There are several ways to ensure these observations are recorded and shared, including through formal After-Action Review (AAR) processes and reports. AARs summarize lessons learned, enumerate best practices and areas for improvement, and provide recommendations on how to address gaps and shortfalls. Because the AAR process is often delayed relative to the exercise execution, critical information is occasionally lost or not sufficiently documented. In response, exercise controllers often hold “hotwash” meetings with key players and planners daily during the exercise. Hotwash meetings provide a forum where participants can share and capture lessons learned while they are still fresh in mind.

These hotwash and AAR processes are also critical components of real-world responses, but documenting AAR findings and lessons learned is just the first step. Good planning for future events requires making time to facilitate improvements and take corrective actions to address the shortfalls in the various components of a response framework including equipment, training, and procedures. In other words, response organizations need to fix the things that are not working properly in response to “learning” the lesson. Otherwise, a lesson has not been truly learned if it is at risk of being exposed again in a different response or exercise. An archive of best practices, lessons learned, and areas for improvement is only as good as those actions that are taken to address gaps and improve the overall response capability.

4.2.7 Crisis Communications

From the moment a radiological disaster strikes, members of the public may experience a variety of emotions including panic, fear, and alarm.⁸ On top of fear, public reactions are often fueled by uncertainty and speculation; a lack of prompt information can lead the public to unwittingly take steps that threaten their safety. However, by providing rapid and clear communications during radiation crises, governments can preempt such counterproductive steps by providing the public with the information they need to respond safely.

The public will look towards officials in their community for guidance in the immediate aftermath of an emergency. Especially in the case of a radiation emergency—a disaster for which few are prepared—the public will be eager to know which steps they can take to mitigate health risks. The United States has found that the best way to keep pace with these demands is to plan ahead. A key component of this planning includes developing pre-scripted communication plans and emergency guidance that are adaptable to the scale and nature of the emergency. U.S. experts have found that this approach allows stakeholders to build consensus and familiarity with the message prior to an emergency, saving critical time if and when the event occurs. Understanding that many people will want access to pre-scripted messages during a radiological emergency, the U.S. created a word-searchable clearinghouse of publicly available, pre-scripted radiological and nuclear emergency response messages.⁹

In addition to building consensus around the message itself, it is equally important to build consensus around primary and alternate channels for delivering the message. Because a consistent message is critical to maintaining public trust, officials should be mindful of the order in which they deliver recommendations so the public is not confused about what action they should take first. For example, offering shelter-in-place recommendations concurrently with recommendations for procuring safe food and drinking water may create confusion.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains and updates a document, “Communicating Radiation Risks,” which provides organizations with guidance on how to communicate during a radiation emergency. EPA’s “Protective Action Questions & Answers for Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies” provides pre-scripted messages approved for use in any type of radiological emergency.¹⁰ The guides are publicly available so that local, state, and federal officials can reference them at any time. By building consensus around scripts and dissemination plans ahead of time, officials can deliver clear and actionable information to the public without delay. Rapid information flow is important for multiple of reasons. Mainly, it provides communities with immediate steps they can take to minimize damage to their health and safety. Additionally, by providing rapid and accurate information, officials can build public confidence in—and compliance with—the response.¹¹

Striking an appropriate balance between speed and accuracy is perhaps the most challenging element of crisis communications, and one with which any responders would struggle. However, the importance of providing accurate and consistent information throughout the response cannot be overstated. Those who have been involved with any kind of CBRN disaster response know that at the onset of the emergency, even the experts have more questions than answers. So, one might reasonably wonder how to provide accurate information at the onset of a radiological emergency when so many unknowns remain. In thinking through this challenge ahead of time, U.S. experts have identified several universal steps that we can encourage the public to take immediately in the case of a radiological emergency. The federal pre-scripted messages include information on how to safely shelter in place, how to self-decontaminate, and where to look for further information.

Information officers should be clear with the public that such steps are recommended based on initial information about the emergency, but the recommendations could be updated as officials learn more. If and when those recommendations do change, information officers should provide the public with rationale for why this has occurred.

After the initial stages of the response, when responders are learning more about exposure levels and risks, officials must continue to provide clear, coordinated, and honest messaging. Identifying a lead authority for public information and messaging ensures that communications remain consistent across the various entities involved in the response. In the U.S., that authority will pass down new messaging and information—including clarification on what information remains unknown—to other information officers as it becomes available. Instead of providing potentially inaccurate information, all spokespeople should be honest about what information remains unconfirmed or unknown. If just one entity goes off-message to speculate on unconfirmed information, the public may grow skeptical of the validity of that source as well as others. Even worse, if speculative information is later found to be false, it can lead to a significant breakdown in trust between the public and the authorities, creating additional complications for effective response.

U.S. crisis communications experts recommend that subject matter experts and information officers’ work together to translate data and technical language on radiation risks into accessible and actionable language for the public. For example, we try not to make the public do math in a crisis. Also, maintaining unit consistency throughout the response allows for easy comparison; do not mix rem with millirem or sievert with millisievert. In addition, radiation data should be juxtaposed with information on health and safety implications, as well as next steps for those who have been exposed.

By providing accurate, clear, and consistent messaging across various responding entities, officials build trust and confidence among the public. This approach can also help authorities thwart the spread of disinformation. A splintered message is more easily scrutinized and exploited by bad actors. This challenge was evidenced by the U.S. government’s response to COVID-19, where inconsistent messaging from state and federal officials led to skepticism, creating an environment more susceptible to misinformation and disinformation.¹²

The means through which officials convey a message can also impact levels of public trust in the message itself. One way the U.S. strives to build credibility through public communications is by selecting a trusted spokesperson to deliver the message. The spokesperson should be capable of conveying empathy and respect for the public’s concerns. Validating public feelings without amplifying fears strengthens messaging in any crisis, but is especially important in a radiation emergency, where people are more likely to comply with recommendations if they feel heard.

In addition to selecting a trusted government spokesperson, U.S. experts have found it useful to cooperate with “seconders.” “Seconders” are allies from local communities and the private sector who endorse and amplify the official message. Their endorsement provides additional reassurance to those who may be initially skeptical of government messaging.

Lastly, when delivering the message, the U.S. prioritizes the underserved, including non-English speaking communities, and those that lack internet access. Reaching these communities often requires planning for effective outreach. By working with them before an emergency, we can provide more equitable and accessible communications during a response.

4.2.8 Case Studies

The best practices described above emerged as lessons learned from real-world responses to various crises. To demonstrate the challenges of incorporating all of these best practices into a response, we discuss two case studies: the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island and the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster. The U.S. response to these incidents revealed major gaps in our plans and capabilities. Both case studies illustrate the complexity of coordinating multi-sectoral responses to rapidly evolving crises. By describing shortcomings in past U.S. responses, we hope to illustrate how some of the best practices above emerged to ensure more streamlined and efficient responses.

4.2.9 Three Mile Island (1979)

Shortly after 4 pm on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, several water pumps began malfunctioning in Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island power plant (TMI-2) in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. The events that followed, initiated by equipment failures and compounded by human error, spiraled into the U.S.’s worst nuclear power crisis to date.

Investigations into the accident have concluded that the radiation was largely contained and any releases would have a negligible impact on public health. However, the stress and anxiety caused by the event—compounded by a lackluster response—led to long-lasting negative effects on mental health. Some of those feelings are to be expected in any emergency, regardless of how it is handled. However, we can mitigate stress significantly by providing transparent, clear, consistent, and actionable public information through a well-coordinated response.

The failures in the response to Three Mile Island illuminate the importance of four best practices previously highlighted in this chapter: planning and exercising, tiered response structures, predetermined thresholds for notification and action, and robust crisis communication plans.

Prior to the accident, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the plant operators, and local authorities did minimal planning for a nuclear crisis. In fact, the local communities surrounding the plant had no response plans for a radiation emergency.¹³ The plant itself maintained some plans and procedures for emergencies; however, these plans were not only found to be inadequate, but unfamiliar to the staff and therefore ineffective during the event.¹⁴

The accident presented problems that could have been easily discovered and resolved in an exercise. For example, the accident revealed that the configuration of the control room was not conducive to a successful response. Key emergency indicators were hidden in counterintuitive places—such as on the back of the control board. Further, the accident set off over 100 alarms in its early stages. With no way of suppressing the unimportant alarms, control room operators struggled to identify the important ones.¹⁵

The disordered response at TMI-2 also revealed that the various entities responding—including local authorities, federal authorities, and the utility—had not prepared to respond collaboratively. Although some of the existing federal plans prescribed a tiered response structure, due to the lack of exercising, the response did not reflect that system.

Like the working-level staff, senior officials were unfamiliar with procedures for an emergency at Three Mile Island. Unaware of their own responsibilities and authorities, local and federal officials often took delayed or duplicative actions. Further, the NRC, the utility, and local responders did not collaborate on writing, exercising, or revising their plans and thus the accident required them to test the plans’ interoperability in real-time. As the accident unfolded, it revealed gaps in the plans and in officials’ awareness of their responsibilities. For example, local hospital administrators could not identify who at the state level had the authority to recommend evacuating patients and when to resume regular admitting procedures.¹⁶ The Pennsylvania Secretary of Health viewed his role as informational—not advisory—with respect to the local hospitals. Lacking awareness of who had responsibility—and how they should hand off that responsibility—officials slowed critical steps in the response.

This lack of streamlined coordination between various levels of governance at Three Mile Island illuminates the need for a clear delineation of authorities for local, state, and federal entities. A tiered response structure, as discussed previously, can help local officials escalate incidents to higher authorities as needed. Instead of acting in a mutually reinforcing manner, those responding to the accident took some actions that were duplicative, while other critical needs were left unmet. Overall, the entities involved failed to support one another due to a lack of awareness of responsibilities and ability to support a tiered response.

The slow and jumbled Three Mile Island response also demonstrates the need to predetermine thresholds for notification and action in response plans. The Three Mile Island emergency plan did not require the plant operators to notify state or local health authorities in the event of a radiological accident.¹⁷ Had the accident caused greater radiation exposure to the public, such inaction could have been catastrophic. Early notification is critical to developing support options and resources.

Finally, one of the greatest flaws in the response to Three Mile Island was the officials’ inability to communicate clearly and effectively with the public. Officials made numerous and severe communications errors throughout the response, leading to a significant breach in trust between authorities and the public.

Different organizations gathered information from their own sources, with each organization providing its own story to the public. In the initial hours of the accident, the utility attempted to downplay its severity when speaking with the press. However, days later, the NRC began providing inaccurate information to the public.¹⁸ The NRC’s assessments, however, were based on scientific errors. For example, NRC officials concluded incorrectly that a hydrogen bubble inside the reactor vessel would soon contain enough oxygen to burn or explode.¹⁹ Despite other sources providing the NRC with calculations to counter this theory, the NRC continued to warn the public of the hydrogen bubble. Based on incorrect information, the Governor recommended evacuation for pregnant women and preschool-aged children within 5 miles of the accident.²⁰

Eventually, the NRC designated a lead for communications—Harold Denton. Coordinating between the NRC, the Governor's Office, and the White House, Denton would be the sole source of information to the public. Although this decision brought some order to the public messaging strategy, it also created an additional challenge. Once the NRC appointed Denton, it prohibited any other organizations from speaking publicly about the accident. Instead of working collaboratively with other organizations to provide them with talking points to mirror the NRC’s message, the NRC silenced its partners. The media was therefore unable to confirm information they received from the NRC with other sources—a standard practice reporters undertake to corroborate a story.²¹ This likely bred further skepticism from the media and the public.

In addition to providing inconsistent messaging, officials provided information in a way that was difficult for the public to decipher. Officials fed information to the press in technical jargon but failed to provide briefings to familiarize the press with the terms. The messaging related to radiation releases was particularly difficult for the press to understand. Given the press’s inability to comprehend information on the releases—and the implications of those releases for public health and safety—the press also struggled to present the facts in a clear and accessible manner to the public.

Many of the severe communication challenges that followed the accident at TMI-2 could have been avoided with pre-arranged communication plans. Exercising and building consensus around those plans ahead of a crisis would likely have facilitated the flow of more consistent and actionable information to the public. Although the communications failures led to undue stress and panic, they also provided valuable lessons that shaped best practices in the field for years to come.

4.2.10 Fukushima Daiichi (2011)

The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant crisis represents the most complex and wide-ranging radiological emergency response case study of our generation. Japan bore the brunt of responding to the event on its home soil, and, given that it occurred during the aftermath of the offshore earthquake and devastating tsunami, it stressed the country and its citizens in immeasurable ways. At the same time, given the extent of the event and the fact that the incident remained in a dynamic phase for several weeks, it represented a global crisis that also stressed response organizations worldwide.

The United States Government (USG) response was multi-faceted and ultimately centered around (1) assisting U.S. interests in Japan—specifically, American citizens in-country as well as U.S. military operations and personnel operating out of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) installations in Japan; and (2) partnering with the Government of Japan (GOJ) to provide assistance. Efforts by U.S. response organizations focused on many elements, including the radiological monitoring and assessment for DoD bases and public locations impacted by releases of radiological material into water and airborne pathways and the associated downrange fallout. However, there were delays in gathering information early on since many of the applicable resources had to mobilize and deploy overseas.

Furthermore, due to the extent of the releases into the environment, there were concerns that radiological material could reach the U.S. Ultimately the amount of radiation measurable in the U.S. was very small—barely above background in the worst of cases and orders of magnitude below any actionable levels. Thus, the actual stresses on the home front, such as dealing with public messaging and perceived versus actual risk, were quite different from those in Japan, where the radiation levels were much greater and warranted careful planning and coordination. As we will see, decisions related to conditions in Japan were compared and scrutinized against conditions and planning assumptions in the U.S.

Although there is a multitude of important factors and considerations that warrant review, the remainder of this section will center on the importance of and challenges for three focus areas: (1) predetermined thresholds, (2) crisis communications, and (3) the AAR process.

First, utilizing predetermined thresholds proved complex for an international response. The Fukushima response involved other governments with different standards and the application of U.S. standards for its own citizens in Japan that departed from those used on U.S. soil. The NRC decided early on to recommend evacuation of U.S. citizens within 50 miles of the Daiichi power plant, which is a significantly larger area than NRC’s established emergency protection zones that only stretch 10 miles from domestic U.S. power plants. As a result, citizens surrounding those U.S. plants were concerned and confused about an apparent double standard; more effective messaging about the difference between default assumptions and departures from them could have allayed fears and concerns.

The technical experts providing analysis for these efforts had to apply one set of standards (and units of measure) for products generated for U.S. parties and apply a different set of standards and assumptions (and units) for those generated for GOJ consumption. The double tasking taxed the experts in ways that had not been fully considered before. Special scrutiny and quality assurance measures were enforced to mitigate mistakes, but they delayed product delivery. Other, more subtle assumptions common to U.S. plans proved invalid overseas, where cultural differences (such as diet and shelter types) and technical differences on risk acceptance (e.g., how sheltering protection from radiation is accounted for) can lead to varied assumptions needed to make representative dose projections. Many of these issues remain today, where the U.S. applies one set of standards and methods and other parts of the world use a different set.

Second, many lessons were learned about the most clear and effective methods of crisis communication. Although the release of radioactive material posed virtually no risks on U.S. soil, it nevertheless presented a challenge to those organizations responsible for communicating this fact. The U.S. public paid substantial attention to the event. Organizations had to be responsive to the demand for information. For example, the EPA rapidly stood up a public-facing website shortly after the event began to provide context for data that were being collected and presented. It also made iterative improvements to the content in response to feedback and requests for information from the public and media.

The difference in Japanese and U.S. guidance, including topics such as evacuation and exclusion zones, caused confusion and concern for Japanese and U.S. citizens. Call centers in the U.S. were flooded with queries from members of the public near domestic nuclear power plants, who wondered if evacuation and exclusion zone guidance applied in Japan would in turn be applied in the U.S. An array of resources and channels, including internet, social media, public meetings, and other forums, were used in new ways to communicate frequently with responders and the public.

Finally, the AAR process played a critical role in the aftermath of the response, and the ripple effects continue to be felt more than a decade later. The response exposed numerous capability gaps and shortfalls for dealing with a long-duration, overseas, multi-hazard response for which no exercise could have hoped to simulate. There were countless lessons learned from this event—some procedural, some technical, and others focused on public messaging and communications. Some of those lessons are provided in the following paragraphs.

It was absolutely essential for the response organizations to document observations, not just for archival purposes, but more importantly to use as justification for a massive effort to enact improvements, refine plans, and take other corrective actions to ensure better USG preparedness for future events of this magnitude. For example, technological capabilities built on assumptions for a U.S. domestic response were, in some cases, not well suited for an overseas response. For example, at the time, many response plans for radiological scenarios assumed single releases, shorter durations, and more predictable source terms. The Daiichi release was significantly more complex and variable than that. Additionally, the risk of airborne contamination from the extended unstable state of the reactors precluded collecting data in some areas that existing plans highlighted as most critical. As a result, typical mission planning assumptions for aerial surveys proved invalid and resulted in survey planning modifications to account for changing conditions and crew safety considerations that had not been accounted for previously.

Other technical issues stemmed from the magnitude of the survey area, the overwhelming amount of measured data, and the massive number of collected samples (air, soil, and water). The tools needed to aggregate and analyze these sets had to be modified in the midst of the response. There were also significant procedural gaps in how to appropriately share data collected for another government to other U.S. federal, state, local, and tribal entities. As a result of tremendous effort and expertise, subject matter experts were able to adapt during the response to make the most of the situation at the time. However, the gaps and shortfalls exposed in this event laid the groundwork for a significant technology development effort that refined how equipment is configured, how measurements are conducted, how data are aggregated and assessed, and how resulting data products and assessments are interpreted and shared.

4.2.11 Future Threats and Challenges

This chapter has articulated the importance of learning and adapting based on previous successes and failures. However, we recognize that it is insufficient to simply strive to emulate past successes or seek to prevent recurrent failures in such a rapidly evolving world. Emergency response and crisis communications communities must also effectively anticipate future threats and challenges and remain agile enough to prevent, detect, deter, and respond to them. In particular, global warming and corresponding climate change, cyber incidents and accidents, and the malign use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), all pose significant future challenges for nuclear and radiological communities.

Climate change has increased the frequency and severity of extreme weather events such as hurricanes, heatwaves, wildfires, droughts, floods, and precipitation, which in turn pose threats to critical facilities. In particular, unpredictable, and severe weather patterns and accelerated sea-level rise threaten nuclear and radiological facilities in various ways. Nuclear reactors rely on water supplies as coolant, which places a majority of reactors around the world in littoral areas; in fact, many are built just meters above sea level. Rising sea levels and volatile weather patterns can lead to serious flooding and more frequent storm surges that leave reactors along coastlines especially vulnerable. Without adequate protection and backup, as happened in the Fukushima incident, these factors can impact critical plant infrastructure, including electrical systems that power the cooling mechanisms and water pumps needed to prevent overheating or meltdown.

Cyber incidents and accidents, including both malicious direct and indirect attacks, are another concern for nuclear and radiological facilities. Chapter 7 of this publication delves into this topic in much greater detail, but it is worth emphasizing here as well. Malicious, direct attacks are deliberate attempts to disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy, or otherwise compromise nuclear or radiological facilities. Although major attacks of this nature are not known to have targeted U.S. nuclear or radiological facilities, examples such as the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear program—allegedly intentionally destroying critical infrastructure—demonstrate the damage that can be inflicted. Further, a non-nuclear example of novel cyber TTP involves the 2021 Colonial Pipeline attack for ransom. In other scenarios, malicious, indirect cyber incidents, or attacks—which do not intentionally target nuclear or radiological facilities but could affect them by the spread of malware from other targets—could inflict collateral damage that negatively impacts those facilities’ operations and security.

Cyberattacks can not only instigate nuclear security incidents, but they can further complicate an ongoing response to an otherwise accidental event. During an ongoing response, adversaries can attack the devices of first responders and officials managing the incident as a second wave. This threat requires that we train more regularly to leverage secondary and tertiary methods of communication and information storage during a response.

The threat of disinformation also poses a great challenge that will increasingly complicate emergency response operations. Disinformation is false or misleading information that is communicated with intent to deceive. By proliferating disinformation after a radiological event, malicious actors can stir fear among the public, in addition to sowing distrust in government. Disinformation operations prevent widespread compliance with a government’s recommendations on protective measures, which can adversely affect public health and strain healthcare systems.

Finally, the proliferation of UAS capabilities has significantly out-paced the ability of organizations to adequately identify, track, intercept, and counter these systems in the event they are used for unauthorized activities, flown in restricted air space, or used as a weapon. This situation raises serious concerns as drone incursions are on the rise, and nuclear facilities are vulnerable, as is other critical infrastructure. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents note 24 different U.S. nuclear sites experienced at least 57 drone incursions between 2015 and 2019, and again in 2020 despite new security measures. The 2020 incident specifically involved drone “swarm” incursions over a restricted area at the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant on two consecutive nights.²² Furthermore, attacks conducted with UAS or drone systems on critical infrastructure facilities have already been undertaken, including the 2019 armed drone attack by Yemeni Houthi rebels against Saudi Arabian energy giant Aramco’s facilities.

4.2.12 Advancing the Bilateral Partnership

Recognizing the significant challenges that emergency response and crisis communications communities will continue to face worldwide, the United States and India—and in fact a wide range of partners—would benefit from enhanced cooperation in a number of areas. For example, expert exchanges to discuss local, provincial, and national response plans and frameworks can provide fresh perspectives on shared challenges related to cross-jurisdictional response coordination. This is especially true for the United States and India, both of which have federal systems of governance. Further, given the shared challenges we anticipate due to global warming and corresponding climate change, the United States would benefit from a bilateral dialogue discussing the unique threats and challenges facing the nuclear and radiological communities. In addition, bilateral tabletop exercises (TTXs) can provide a venue for open conversation to work through the scenarios most likely to impact both countries. This could be done as a series of TTXs that would enable participants to build relationships and capacity, starting with simpler scenarios and moving together towards more complex crises.

4.2.13 Conclusion

The breadth and depth of best practices in emergency response and crisis communications signify both the existence of and potential for superior response capabilities worldwide. While the best practices discussed above were born of historical lessons, the emergency response and crisis communications communities remain committed to anticipating and combatting future threats and challenges. Through these efforts, which will focus particularly on partnership, the practitioners and institutions of the response and communications communities will undoubtedly forge an even brighter, more proficient, and safer future.