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The Place of No Place

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Crises and Conversions

Abstract

Among Traditionalists, the Iranian Revolution kindled optimism that a rebellion against the modern world could indeed materialize. In the literature produced by converts, this victory was credited to the potentialities of Shiʿism, perceived as a religion that blended contemplation and action. The revolution was seen as the embodiment of Evola’s utopian ideals, and therefore, the aspects of this utopia were attributed to the nation that hosted the revolution—Iran. Iran’s image became synonymous with the Traditionalist utopia, where a king-warrior ruled over a highly hierarchical society guided by essentialist ethical norms. In the publications of converts, Iran and Khomeini are glorified and described with extraordinary characteristics, often relying on racial and romantic narratives inherited from figures like Evola, Filippani-Ronconi, and Corbin. The Iran depicted by converts is unlike the one represented by Iranian immigrants in Italy or the one that had been engaged in a struggle for modernizing its socio-economic and political structures since the early twentieth century.

The converts’ portrayal of Iran omits the voices of reformists and leftists. Protests by Iranian women, workers, and the middle class advocating for civil and social equality are dismissed as being orchestrated by the United States and financed by the International Monetary Fund. Converts do not translate or acknowledge the existence of non-conservative Iranian intellectuals. Immigrants from Iran (and immigrants in general) who come to Italy in search of improved material and economic conditions are not considered representatives of Islam and Iran by converts. Instead, converts promote the narratives crafted by Iranian political representatives in Rome, which portray Iran’s political system and leadership as traditional and spiritual. Khomeini held a central role in the literature produced by converts and is equated with the Infallible Imams. Consequently, converts become advocates for Iran’s hardline positions in Italy. This specific relationship between converts and Iran led to various conflicts with Iranians residing in Italy. During moments of civil unrest in Iran, converts often support the Iranian state’s efforts to save face, either by denying the existence of the unrest or by attributing it to a conspiracy by the United States.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In his apology of Evola, De Turris (1997) narrated that Heinrich Himmler (d.1945) considered Evola a “reactionary Roman”, a utopist, and a dreamer whose ideas were not compatible with the social reality. De Turris reported this episode to decouple Evola from fascism and defend him against Ferraresi’s accusations in the Threats to Democracy in which Evola has been presented as an ideologue of fascism.

  2. 2.

    Shariʿati was an Iranian sociologist of religions and presumably an introducer of Franz Fanon in Iran. Although he is commonly regarded as an ideologue of the Iranian revolution, his socialist tendencies were not embraced by the traditionalist figures who eventually constituted Iran’s conservative front.

  3. 3.

    Taleqani served as an Iranian theologian, Muslim reformer, proponent of democracy, and a prominent Shi’a Islamic scholar and intellectual. A key figure in the establishment of the Freedom Movement of Iran. He embodied the inclination of numerous Shiʿa clerics to fuse Shiʿa principles with Marxist ideals, a strategy aimed at engaging with leftist movements for the support of the youth, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s.

  4. 4.

    Al-Ahmad was a novelist and sociologist. He was inspired by the ideas of Marx and Franz Fanon.

  5. 5.

    Behrangi was a novelist whose works revealed his leftist ideas, ultimately establishing him as a revered figure for the Organization of Iranian People’s Fedai Guerrillas.

  6. 6.

    Bazargan was Iran’s first post-revolutionary prime minister, serving as the democratic and liberal figurehead of the revolution. However, he found himself in conflict with conservative clerics, including Khomeini himself.

  7. 7.

    Sahabi was an Iranian prominent liberal nationalist politician.

  8. 8.

    Musadeq was Iran’s prime minister from 1951 to 1953. He is considered a hero of nationalism because he nationalized Iran’s oil industry limiting the access of Britain to Iran’s oil resources.

  9. 9.

    Ahmadinejad served as Iran’s president from 2005 to 2013. He was renowned for his religious conservatism and his antagonistic stance toward Israel, the UK, and the USA.

  10. 10.

    Mousavi is a reformist Iranian politician who, in 2009, ran as a candidate in the presidential election, symbolizing his campaign with the color green. Following the widely contested election, a protest movement emerged, lasting until 2010 and known as the Green Movement.

  11. 11.

    Interview with Ruhollah Arcadi originally published in Persian on 25 December 2017 on Istibsar (https://fa.estebsar.ir/). This website, similar to Rah Yafte, is dedicated to interviews with Europeans who convert to Shiʿism (accessed 24 December 2022).

  12. 12.

    Lit., “ignorance” is a word used by Muslims for pre-Islamic period, when other religions governed the world.

  13. 13.

    Muslims’ circumambulating around Kaaba as rites of the pilgrimage.

  14. 14.

    “Tenete alta la bandiera. E’ sempre bene vedere che qualcuno ce l’ha fatta e qualcun altro ce la farà”.

  15. 15.

    Interview with Giovanni Yahya Sorbello conducted by Cascino (n.d.).

  16. 16.

    The anti-capitalist, anti-globalization, and anti-Enlightenment causes have made Italian converts comparable to their Spanish counterparts (Rogozen-Soltar, 2012).

  17. 17.

    Such references are not limited to the Shiʿa repository of symbols. In the aftermath of WWII, the attitude of ascetism, courage, assertiveness, strength, impassibility, self-sacrifice, the battle against everything that constitute enjoyment and pleasure, glorified in Eastern traditions, such as Samurai Bushido and the Hindu martial arts became sources of inspiration for neo-fascism (Ferraresi, 1996).

  18. 18.

    On 4 June 2016, during a conference organized by DDS, Mutti discussed the letter that Ayatollah Khomeini had sent to Gorbachev in 1979. During this conference, Mutti expressed his admiration for the militant portrayal of Jesus Christ as presented by Ayatollah Khomeini. According to Mutti, this depiction of Jesus differed from the sweet and insipid image often emphasized by sentimental and weeping Christianity (Mutti, 2016).

  19. 19.

    It refers to a battle that occurred near Karbala in 680 between the forces of the third Shi’a Imam, Husain Ibn Ali, and the Umayyad Caliph, Yazid Ibn Mu’awiya. In this battle, Imam Husain and his 72 companions were massacred and killed by the Umayyads. This defeat marked a turning point in Shi’a history. Some scholars believe that after this defeat, pro-Alid groups abandoned any hope of seizing political power and instead focused on scholarship and devotional activities.

  20. 20.

    Moezzi in his Le Sciisme doctrinal et le fact politique (Doctrinal Shi’ism and the Political Factor) affirmed that Khomeinism was more affine to the doctrines of Muslim Brotherhood than to the traditional Imamism.

  21. 21.

    In the Buddhist tradition, Sati is a concept of the Buddhist tradition and is usually translated in English as mindfulness or awareness of reality.

  22. 22.

    On 6 June 2020, the DDS held an online conference for the commemoration of Ayatollah Khomeini’s demise. In this conference, Aiello compared “Imam” Khomeini to Evola because both encouraged their followers to action (Dimore della Sapienza, 2020).

  23. 23.

    Following the Karbala Tragedy in 680 when the third Shiʿa Imam along with his 72 companions were massacred by Umayyad Khalifah, subsequent Shiʿa Imams adopted a quietist attitude. According to their narratives, as reported in early Shi’a collections of Hadith, such as Al-Kafi, any involvement of Shiʿas in politics prior to the return of the Hidden Imam was prohibited. Ayatollah Khomeini’s victory in 1979 was the result of a centuries-old sequence of developments within the Shiʿa clerical institution, which led to the progressive empowerment of the Shiʿa clergy. This gradual empowerment allowed the clergy to take on the prerogatives of the Infallible Imams and engage in practices that were originally prohibited during the period of the Occultation of the twelfth Imam such as the establishment of the state. For a comprehensive exploration of these doctrinal developments, refer to Amir-Moezzi (2012).

  24. 24.

    On the difference between fiqh and morality see Rasekh (2023).

  25. 25.

    In 2003, Iran allocated almost 215,620 billion Iranian riyals (about 2.3 billion dollars) for the dissemination of Shi’ism and the support of missionaries throughout the world. This budget was increased seven-fold in 2004 (Sindawi, 2011).

  26. 26.

    The episode has been reported also by Caragiuli (2013, p. 197).

  27. 27.

    COREIS is the acronym for La Comunità Religiosa Islamica Italiana (The Italian Religious Community). Founded in 1993 by Italian convert to Sunnism, Shaykh Abd al-Wahid Pallavicini, who drew inspiration from Guénon, COREIS is known for its Sufi tendencies. You can visit their website: https://www.coreis.it/ (accessed on November 17, 2023).

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Correspondence to Minoo Mirshahvalad .

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Mirshahvalad, M. (2024). The Place of No Place. In: Crises and Conversions. Palgrave Studies in New Religions and Alternative Spiritualities. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-55877-1_8

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