Abstract
This chapter argues that the extended mind approach to cognition can be distinguished from its alternatives, such as embedded cognition and distributed cognition, not only in terms of metaphysics, but also in terms of epistemology. In other words, it cannot be understood in terms of a mere verbal redefinition of cognitive processing. This is because the extended mind approach differs in its theoretical virtues compared to competing approaches to cognition. The extended mind approach is thus evaluated in terms of its theoretical virtues, both essential to empirical adequacy and those that are ideal desiderata for scientific theories. While the extended mind approach may have similar internal consistency and empirical adequacy compared to other approaches, it may be more problematic in terms of its generality and simplicity as well as unificatory properties due to the cognitive bloat and the motley crew objections.
Juraj Hvorecký: Work on this chapter was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR), project n. 20–14445S (‘Dual Models of Phenomenal Consciousness’) realized at the Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
In this chapter, we use the terms “extended mind” and “extended cognition” interchangeably.
References
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. 2010. Defending the bounds of cognition. In The extended mind (pp. 67–80). MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0004
Allen-Hermanson, S. 2013. Superdupersizing the mind: Extended cognition and the persistence of cognitive bloat. Philosophical Studies, 164 (3): 791–806. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9914-7
Barker, M. J. 2010. From cognition’s location to the epistemology of its nature. Cognitive Systems Research, 11(4), 357–366. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.05.001
Bernecker, S. 2014. How to Understand the Extended Mind. Philosophical Issues, 24 (1): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12023
Carroll, J. B. 1993. Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor-analytic studies. Cambridge University Press.
Casper, M.-O. 2023. A Methodological Problem of Choice for 4E Research. In M.-O. Casper & G. F. Artese (Eds.), Situated Cognition Research: Methodological Foundations (pp. 17–43). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39744-8_2
Clark, A. 2016. Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind. Oxford University Press.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. J. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis, 58 (1): 7–19.
Craver, C. F. 2009. Mechanisms and natural kinds. Philosophical Psychology, 22 (5): 575–594. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080903238930
Douglas, H. E. 2013. The Value of Cognitive Values. Philosophy of Science, 80 (5): 796–806. https://doi.org/10.1086/673716
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., Ellsworth, P., Goldstein, A. P., & Krasner, L. 2013. Emotion in the Human Face: Guidelines for Research and an Integration of Findings. Elsevier Science.
Fernandez-Dols, J. M., & Ruiz-Belda, M.-A. 1997. Spontaneous facial behavior during intense emotional episodes: Artistic truth and optical truth. In J. A. Russell & J. M. Fernández-Dols (Eds.), The Psychology of Facial Expression (1st ed., pp. 255–274). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511659911.013
Fridlund, A. J. 1991. Sociality of solitary smiling: Potentiation by an implicit audience. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60 (2): 229–240. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.60.2.229
Keas, M. N. 2018. Systematizing the theoretical virtues. Synthese, 195 (6): 2761–2793. At: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1355-6
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Kiverstein, J. D. 2019. Extended consciousness and predictive processing: A third wave view. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Kraut, R. E., & Johnston, R. E. 1979. Social and emotional messages of smiling: An ethological approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37 (9): 1539–1553. At: https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.37.9.1539
Krueger, J. 2014. Emotions and the social niche. In C. von Scheve & M. Salmela (Eds.), Collective Emotions (pp. 156–172). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0011
Krueger, J., & Szanto, T. 2016. Extended emotions. Philosophy Compass, 11 (12): 863–878. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12390
Kuhn, T. S. 1977. The essential tension: Selected studies in scientific tradition and change. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Lakatos, I. 1970. Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), 1965. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London.. Vol. 4 (pp. 91–195). Cambridge University Press.
Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, J., & Feldman, M. W. 2000. Niche construction, biological evolution, and cultural change. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23 (1): 131–146. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00002417
Laudan, L. 1977. Progress and Its Problem: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. University of California Press.
Litwin, P., & Miłkowski, M. 2020. Unification by Fiat: Arrested Development of Predictive Processing. Cognitive Science, 44 (7): e12867. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12867
Menary, R. 2007. Cognitive integration: Mind and cognition unbounded. Palgrave Macmillan.
Menary, R. 2015. Mathematical Cognition: A Case of Enculturation. Open MIND. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570818
Miłkowski, M. 2018. From Computer Metaphor to Computational Modeling: The Evolution of Computationalism. Minds and Machines, 28 (3): 515–541. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-018-9468-3
Miłkowski, M., Clowes, R. W., Rucińska, Z., Przegalińska, A., Zawidzki, T., Gies, A., Krueger, J., McGann, M., Afeltowicz, Ł., Wachowski, W. M., Stjernberg, F., Loughlin, V., & Hohol, M. 2018. From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent Revolution. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2393.
Müller, V. C. 2018. The Extended Mind Thesis Is about Demarcation and Use of Words. Reti, Saperi, Linguaggi, 2/2018. https://doi.org/10.12832/92304
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. 1972. Human Problem Solving. Prentice-Hall.
Okasha, S. 2011. Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow. Mind, 120 (477): 83–115. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzr010
Rowlands, M. 2009. Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive. Philosophical Psychology, 22 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080802703620
Rupert, R. D. 2009. Cognitive systems and the extended mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, L. A. 2011. Embodied Cognition. New York: Routledge.
Simon, H. A. 1981. Cognitive science: The newest science of the artificial. Cognitive Science, 4 (1): 33–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0364-0213(81)80003-1
Simon, H. A. 1996. The sciences of the artificial. MIT Press.
Sprevak, M. 2010. Inference to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 41 (4): 353–362. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.10.010
Sutton, J. 2010. Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process. In R. Menary (Ed.), The Extended Mind (pp. 189–225). MIT Press.
Thagard, P. R. 1978. The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice. The Journal of Philosophy, 75 (2): 76. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025686
Vélez, N., Christian, B., Hardy, M., Thompson, B. D., & Griffiths, T. L. 2023. How do Humans Overcome Individual Computational Limitations by Working Together? Cognitive Science, 47 (1): e13232. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13232
Vickers, P. 2013. Understanding inconsistent science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walsh, K. S., McGovern, D. P., Clark, A., & O’Connell, R. G. 2020. Evaluating the neurophysiological evidence for predictive processing as a model of perception. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1464 (1): 242–268. https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.14321
Wołoszyn, K., & Hohol, M. 2017. Commentary: The poverty of embodied cognition. Frontiers in Psychology, 8. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00845
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Joel Krueger for comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2024 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Miłkowski, M., Hvorecký, J. (2024). Theoretical Virtues of Cognitive Extension. In: Alexandre e Castro, P. (eds) Challenges of the Technological Mind. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-55333-2_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-55333-2_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-55332-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-55333-2
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)