Abstract
This chapter examines the principle of legality as a central component of the rule of law in the internal context of the European Union (EU), with a particular focus on the perspective of the Court of Justice. It examines the historical development of the principle in the context of modern states and its place in international law. The rule of law is a fundamental concept within the EU's legal and political framework, serving as the cornerstone ensuring that all actions and decisions taken by the EU comply with the principles of legality, transparency, and respect for fundamental rights. Within this comprehensive framework, the principle of legality plays a central role, underlining the need for the exercise of public authority, both at EU and national level, to be clear, predictable, and lawful. The focus on the internal dimension of the rule of law within the EU underlines the crucial importance of ensuring that EU institutions and Member States comply with the legal norms and principles applicable to their respective areas of competence in order to fully affirm a ‘Union based on the rule of law’.
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Notes
- 1.
This article builds on the reflections previously made in Il principio di legalità nell’ordinamento comunitario, Giappichelli, 2005. On the EU domestic dimension of the rule of law see T. Konstadinides, The rule of law in the European Union. The internal dimension, Hart, 2017 and F. G. Jacobs, The sovereignty of law: the European way, CUP, 2007; D. Triantafyllou, Des compétences d’attribution au domaine de la loi, Bruylant, 1997.
- 2.
In this respect, see the observations of A. Tizzano, La Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee, Jovene, 1967, pp. 11–13, which are still relevant today. The translation is our own.
- 3.
F. Neumann, The Rule of Law. Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society, Berg, 1986, p. 182, emphasises how ‘the essentials of the Rechtsstaat are therefore as follows. The fundamental principle is the legality of administration, that is to say, the postulate that the administration of the state is bound by its own laws, and that every interference of the state must be reducible to such laws. This implies the supremacy of the law and only of the law; but of a certain type of law, namely of the general laws. From this it follows that the relation between the state and the individuals must be determined in advance by formal rational law. The interference of the state with liberty and property must be predictable and calculable; in Stahl’s words, it must be exactly defined. From this it follows that those interferences must be controllable, and indeed by independent judges’. See also J. Meierhenrich—M. Loughlin (eds.), The Cambridge companion to the rule of law, Cambridge, 2021; J. R. Silkenat—J. E. Hickey Jr.—P. D. Barenboim (eds.), The legal doctrines of the rule of law and the legal state (Rechtsstaat), Springer, 2014.
- 4.
L. Carlassare, ‘Legalità (principio di)’, Enc. giur., XVIII, Giuffrè, 1990, p. 2.
- 5.
J. Chevallier, L’Etat de droit, Paris, 1992, p. 71 underlines how this development is particularly clear in the Federal Republic of Germany, where the concept of the rule of law was explicitly enshrined in the Basic Law (Art. 28).
- 6.
H. Kelsen, Foundations of democracy, in Ethics, 1955, pp. 1–101.
- 7.
F. Levi, ‘Legittimità (diritto amministrativo)’, Enc. dir., XXIV, Giuffrè, 1974, p. 126.
- 8.
C. Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, translated and ed. by Jeffrey Seitzer with and introduction by John P. McCormick, Duke University Press, 2004, p. 4.
- 9.
A. Baldassarre, Globalizzazione e democrazia, Laterza, 2001, p. 380, fn. 1, emphasises that: ‘The ‘certainty of law’ is a principle that, formed in the late Middle Ages, has imposed itself in modern times as an essential bulwark of civilisation. It presupposes that every subject is placed in the condition of knowing in advance not only the source of the law, but also the content of the rule to be applied, so as to minimise the arbitrariness of the authorities (judges, public administration) competent to execute the law and apply it in the concrete case. Legal certainty’ is, therefore, as much a function of the security and freedom of persons as of the uniqueness and generality-abstractness of the legal rule and thus, in the latter respect, of equality between men’. The translation is our own.
- 10.
L. Carlassare, Legalità cit., pp. 2 and 9.
- 11.
See J. Chevallier, ‘La dimension symbolique du principe de légalité’, Rev. dr. pub., 1990, p. 1651.
- 12.
S.L. Paulson, Teorie giuridiche e Rule of law, in P. Comanducci, R. Guastini (a cura di), Analisi e Diritto 1992, Giappichelli, 1992, p. 251; P. Craig, ‘Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law an analytical framework’, in Public law, 1997, pp. 467–487; A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Macmillan 1915.
- 13.
See A. Baldassarre, ‘Diritti inviolabili’, Enc. giur., Giuffrè, 1989, VIIII, p. 2; see also P. Craig, S. Adam, N. Diaz Abad, L. Salazar, Rule of law in Europe. Perspectives from practioners and academics, European Judicial Training Network (EJTN), 2019, in http://ejtn6r2.episerverhosting.com/PageFiles/19061/2019-056-RoL%20Manual-170x240-WEB_FINAL.pdf
- 14.
This expression refers to a well-established distinction in international law, as discussed by W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, New York, 1964. Friedmann defines two primary spheres within international law: coexistence and cooperation. In the sphere of coexistence, which reflects the classical system of international law, the focus is on maintaining peaceful relations among states, irrespective of their economic and social systems. This traditional approach primarily deals with diplomatic interactions between states and the establishment of rules aimed at ensuring peaceful coexistence. In contrast, the sphere of cooperation in international law involves positive collaboration among states, often facilitated through international treaties and permanent international organizations. Here, the emphasis shifts from mere coexistence to active cooperation on various matters, including economic, social, and political aspects. Friedmann underscores the significance of this shift toward cooperation in contemporary international law. It represents a notable development that has implications for the fundamental principles and structure of international law. This evolution reflects the increasing interdependence of states and the growing importance of international organizations in addressing global challenges and promoting cooperation among nations.
- 15.
See P.M. Dupuy, Droit international public, Paris, 1998, pp. 15–16.
- 16.
The case of Lotus S.S., Judgment No. 9 of 7 September 1927, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, p. 18.
- 17.
See R. Jennings, ‘The Judicial Function and the Rule of Law in International Relations’, in Il diritto internazionale al tempo della sua codificazione: studi in onore di Roberto Ago, vol. 3, Giuffrè, 1987, p. 139 ff.
- 18.
See A. Nollkaemper, National Courts and the international rule of law, Oxford, 2011. M. Kanetake—A. Nollkaemper, The rule of law and the national and international levels, Hart, 2016.
- 19.
On the peculiar issues raised by the principle of legality in international criminal law see T. Dias, Beyond Imperfect Justice, Brill, 2022, pp. 35–84; K. S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law, CUP, 2010; H. Olásolo, ‘A Note on the Evolution of the Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law’, Criminal Law Forum, 2007, pp. 301–319. See the judgment of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia of 2 October 1995 in the Tadić case, (https://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm), §43 according to which in the international context, there is no clear division between legislative, executive and judicial functions. While the International Court of Justice serves as the primary judicial organ, there is no legislature in the traditional sense, and no global parliament to enact laws directly binding on international actors. Consequently, the concept of separation of powers found in national constitutions does not apply in international law. The correct interpretation in the context of international law of the expression ‘established by law’ is that its establishment must be in accordance with the rule of law. This appears to be the most sensible and most likely meaning of the term in the context of international law. For a tribunal such as this one to be established according to the rule of law, it must be established in accordance with the proper international standards; it must provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full conformity with internationally recognized human rights instruments’(§45). On the quasi-legislative power of the Security Council see S. Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’, American J. Int. Law., 2005, p. 175 ss.
- 20.
On the jus cogens and the challenge of the traditional exclusion of any form of hierarchy between international norms see among others G. Gaja, ‘Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention’, Recueil des cours, Brill, 172, 1981, III, p. 271 ff.; E. Schwelb, Some aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law Commission, in American J. Int. Law, 1967, p. 946 ff.
- 21.
See J. Morin, ‘L'Etat de droit: émergence d'un principe du droit international’, Recueil des cours, Brill, 254, 1995, p. 26; See also A. Watts, The International Rule of Law, in German Y. Int. Law, 1993, p. 15; D. Georgiev, Politics or Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in International Law, in Eur. J. Int. Law, 1993, p. 1 ff.; R. McCorquodale, ‘Defining the international rule of law: defying gravity?’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2016, pp. 277 ff.
- 22.
See the reference to the rule of law in the preamble to the Statute and in Article 3 according to which ‘Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law’. See also the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe n. 1594 (2007), Text adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 23 November 2007 and see Doc. 11343, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Jurgens). In particular see the annex II with the extracts from case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and Court of Justice of the European Communities and selected texts of the Assembly.
- 23.
See Report of the UN Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, (S/2004/616).
- 24.
The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (General Assembly resolution 217 A), states that ‘it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law’.
- 25.
See Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 September 2012 (Declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels); see also the addendum to the 2014 Report of the Secretary-General on Strengthening and coordinating United Nations rule of law activities (A/68/213/Add.1), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/.
- 26.
Judgment of 21 February 1975, Série A, No. 30, p. 30.
- 27.
Judgment of 30 May 2000, in Recueil 2000–VI.
- 28.
See G. Lautenbach, The concept of the rule of law and the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford, 2013.
- 29.
H. Hahn, ‘Constitutional Limitations in the Law of the European Organisation’, Recueil des cours, Brill, 1963, pp. 195–196 underlines that: «The term “Constitution” may not only designate the system of rules according to which a State […] is governed and which affects the distribution as well as the exercise of sovereign power in the State. As the word stands for general legal concept […] it is also an appropriate name for the international act instituting an intergovernmental entities devoted to the pursuit of specific purposes, setting up its principal organs, specifying the relationship of these organs to one another, defining the position of the international organisation vis-à-vis its member States»; R. Monaco, ‘Le caractère constitutionnel des actes institutifs d'organisations internationales’, in Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau, Pédone 1974, p. 154; T. Sato, Evolving constitutions of international organizations: a critical analysis of the interpretative framework of the constituent instruments of international organizations, Kluwer, 1996.
- 30.
On the conformity of acts of United Nations organs see for all M. Bedjaoui, ‘Du contrôle de légalité des actes du Conseil de sécurité’, Nouveaux itinéraires en droit. Hommage à François Rigaux, Bruylant, 1993, p. 69; J. Halderman, The United Nations and the Rule of law, Oceana Publications, 1966.
- 31.
As A. Giardina, ‘Principio di legalità e poteri impliciti nelle comunità europee’, in AA.VV., Studi in memoria di Enrico Guicciardi, Padova, 1975, p. 467, points out, with explicit reference to the European Communities.
- 32.
See A. Tizzano, La Corte cit., p. 13 underlines that ‘in fact, in the European Communities not only are there no longer the obstacles which we have just seen to the full recognition of the judicial function in other international organisations, but there are even situations which make the presence of a judicial body absolutely necessary […] Indeed, in a system in which political control is, at least for the time being, very limited, judicial control acquires even greater importance. On the other hand, it also appears from another point of view, in that it constitutes an important guarantee for the Member States themselves, as constituent entities of the Communities, with regard to the proper exercise of the considerable powers which they confer on these organisations. Lastly, since, as we have seen, the Community's activities take on the character of genuine governmental action on the part of individuals, the presence of the Court of Justice is also necessary in order to ensure direct judicial protection for the individuals themselves’. The translation is ours.
- 33.
On the legal basis of EU legislation see the observations of K. Lenaerts, ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community’, Common Market Law Rev., 1991, p. 25 ff.; D. Triantafyllou, Des compétences d’attribution cit.; see also the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 19 July 2012, C‑130/10, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2012:472, in particular §42 ff. and §80, where the Court, following the Council, held that ‘it is not procedures that define the legal basis of a measure but the legal basis of a measure that determines the procedures to be followed in adopting that measure.’.
- 34.
A. Palacio Vallerersundi, ‘La Commission dans son rôle de gardienne des Traités’, Rev. trim. dr. Eur., 2001, p. 901. See, for all, the judgment of 4 April 1974, Case 167/73, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:1974:35, §15, and judgment of 18 June 1998, Case 35/96, Commission v. Italy, EU:C:1998:303, §26.
- 35.
Judgment of 23 April 1986, case 294/83, Parti écologiste Les Verts v/ Parliament, §23, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166; see for all, Order of the Court of 13 July 1990.—J. J. Zwartveld and others, C-2/88, ECLI:EU:C:1990:315; Opinion of 14 December 1991, No 1/91, European Economic Area, §21, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490; Judgment of 23 March 1993, Weber/Parliament, C-314/91, §8, ECLI:EU:C:1993:109; Judgment of 25 July 2002, Union de los pequeños agricultores (UPA), case/ C-50/00, §38, ECLI:EU:C:2002:197.
- 36.
See P. Pescatore, Les droits de l’homme et l’intégration européenne, in Cahier dr. eur., 1968, pp. 641–642.
- 37.
See J.V. Louis, The Community Legal Order. 2nd ed. Brussels: European Perspective Series, European Commission, 1990, p. 55. The author quotes Walter Hallstein's speech in the European Parliament on 17 June 1965 (European Parliament, debates, 17 June 1965, p. 220) ‘No holder of public power relies as it does on the law to perform its tasks. The Community is not endowed with direct powers of coercion; it has no armed forces or police. It is endowed with a limited administrative infrastructure and must, in this respect too, rely to a large extent on the Member States. In short, it is not a state: the law it creates is its only strength’. See also C. Charrier, ‘La communauté de droit, une étape sousestimée de la construction européenne’, Rev. marché comm., 1996, p. 521.
- 38.
A. Arnull, ‘Does the Court of Justice have Inherent Jurisdiction?’, Common Market Law Rev., 1990, p. 683.
- 39.
See F. G. Jacobs, The sovereignty of law cit. and also T. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, OUP, 1988, p. 319.
- 40.
See G. Bebr, ‘Court of Justice: Judicial Protection and the Rule of law’, in D. Curtin—T. Heukels (eds), Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, II, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, p. 303.
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Alì, A. (2024). The Principle of Legality as a Pillar of the EU’s Rule of Law: Bridging the Gap between International and National Law. In: Antoniolli, L., Ruzza, C. (eds) The Rule of Law in the EU. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-55322-6_13
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