Interpreting Aristotle’s Concept of the Common Good

Abstract

Providing a definitive interpretation of many ideas in Aristotle’s moral and political works has proved to be a difficult task for his commentators, both ancient and modern. The relation between the individual human good and the communal good is a particularly complex problem, especially because of its association with complicated notions of human happiness, practical wisdom, and contemplative and political virtue. This chapter considers the question of the superiority of the common good over individual happiness in light of these accompanying ideas. The many conflicting explanations of these doctrines are the result of Aristotle’s method of providing only general principles and a broad outline of moral concepts. That there may never be a consensus on the exact meaning of many of Aristotle’s ideas may not be a weakness in his work but rather a strength, which he himself had envisaged, since he allows the practically wise person to determine the best course of action in order to attain human goodness.

1 Introduction

A definitive interpretation of many important concepts in Aristotle’s philosophy has eluded his commentators for more than two thousand years. Among the most disputed passages in the corpus are those that consider the meaning of happiness, goodness, practical wisdom, human nature and virtue. Aristotle’s treatment of moral issues has produced a number of conflicting explanations, such as the ‘dominant/inclusive theory’ of eudaimonia, the rights of the individual and the duties to the state, the defence of slavery, and the priority of the common good over individual happiness.¹

The common good, the topic of this and other chapters in the present volume, has recently generated a number of works that often provide different explanations of this idea and its relation to individual goodness. Divergent opinions on Aristotle’s notion of the common good are not merely a recent phenomenon but existed also among ancient and medieval commentators, as other contributions to this volume demonstrate. Louis Dupré acknowledges the ambiguity associated with the term ‘common good’: “the term common good has been used in so many ways that it would be difficult to find any political thinker, however individualistically oriented, who has not, in one form or another embraced it.”²

What follows here considers the question of the superiority of the common good over individual happiness in light of Aristotle’s discussions on human happiness, practical wisdom, and contemplative and political virtue. The many conflicting explanations of these doctrines are the result of Aristotle’s method of providing only general principles and a broad outline of moral concepts, such as the nature of virtue, the process of moral choice and the analysis of moral weakness. That there may never be a consensus on the exact meaning of many of Aristotle’s ideas may not be a weakness in his work but rather a strength, which he himself had envisaged, since he allows the practically wise person to determine the best course of action in order to attain human goodness.

2 A Single Universal Good

There is a number of difficulties in determining the precise meaning and significance of Aristotle’s phrase common good (koinon agathon). In his refutation of Plato’s concept of a single universal good, Aristotle concludes his critique as follows: “Clearly it <the good> will not be something common, universal and one, since it would thereby not be predicated in all categories, but only in one alone.”³ In the Ethics, Aristotle clearly rejects the existence of one separate common good.⁴ Aristotle argues that the word “good” can be said of in many ways, depending on whether it refers to substance, quality, God, or intelligence, and it is not limited to one being that is “goodness as such”.⁵ After enumerating a number of difficulties associated with the Platonic form of a common good in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle concludes “such then are the difficulties indicating that the absolute good (auto ti agathon) does not exist – and that it is of no use for political science.”⁶ Even if such a good were to exist, Aristotle clearly rejects it as the good sought in Ethics and Politics: “It is manifest, therefore, that the Absolute Good we are looking for is not the Form of good, nor yet the good as universal […].”⁷

As we shall see, Aristotle’s medieval commentators understood this passage not as a rejection of a separate good but rather as Aristotle’s conviction that such a being is not relevant to ethical enquiry. Christopher Shields observes that Thomas Aquinas understood the critique of Plato to represent a rejection of a univocal notion of a supreme good and not as a denial of the existence of a highest good, “which is the source of goodness for all other good things, a source in the sense that lesser goods qualify as good precisely because they somehow depend for their goodness upon the highest good”.⁸ This reading can be supported by Aristotle’s assertion in the Metaphysics where he seems to accept the existence of a separate good: “And that science is supreme, and superior to the subsidiary, which knows for what end each action is to be done; i.e. the good for each, and generally the supreme good in all of nature.”⁹

3 The Common Good for Human Beings

The role of the first being as a common object of human speculation, while significant, is certainly not the usual interpretation of the common good. The more usual reading of the term considers it in relation to the individual good and as the collective goal of benefitting an entire community. Its appearance in Aristotle’s works has helped to invigorate the discussions of many modern moral philosophers, who emphasize the importance of the common good in the production and maintenance of a just society.¹⁰ Mark Murphy comments on the importance of the topic and the difficulties in interpretation as follows:

The differences among natural law views on the character of the common good are not trivial: they concern such deep issues as whether the common good should be understood as an intrinsic or an instrumental good, and whether the common good should be understood in relation to the good of individuals of that community or solely in relation to the good of the community as a whole. If one aims to develop a natural law account of the political order, then, one cannot remain neutral with respect to the various natural law understandings of the common good, for these various understandings are almost certain to yield differing conclusions on the source, functions, and limits of political authority.¹¹

Almost everyone in the academic profession has experienced the disparate demands between the common good and the individual good in that a choice is needed between the requirements of teaching and administration (common good) and the desire to engage in research and writing (individual good). The dichotomy between individual and common goodness may not always appear so stark as often believed since the discoveries of an individual researcher in medicine may ultimately benefit an entire community. The difference in motivation, however, is important because one may argue, like Aristotle, that the good for the city is nobler than that of the individual.¹² He also claims, as we shall see, that the good for the individual and the state are identical, and the good life for citizens is the primary goal for all.¹³ The identity of the good for the community and the individual contributes to the difficulty in determining the primary motivation for moral and political virtue in Aristotle’s view.

The term ‘common good’ (koinon agathon) and related concepts, such as common benefit (koinon sumpheron) and common advantage (koinon lusiteloun), do not appear very often in Aristotle’s political and ethical treatises. The understanding of the common good in the political sense differs substantially from its meaning as a metaphysical concept discussed above. The common good in this sense provides a foundation for the construction and maintenance of a just society. While some are reluctant to accept such an idea because of its abuse by totalitarian regimes, some modern defenders argue that the quest for common goodness need not lead to an abrogation of the rights of individuals.¹⁴

The correct constitutions, no matter what form they take, must govern according to this common interest; otherwise they deviate from the desired end in favour of the interest of the few.¹⁵ A noteworthy feature in the Politics is the implication that the common interest, while essential to good government, differs from the common good of the state. Even if the ideas of good (agathon), advantage (sumpheron), and benefit (lusiteloun) are related, one must examine whether they are truly identical in meaning, as some commentators, like Donald Morrison, have assumed: “Aristotle’s two main expressions for ‘the common good’ are to koinon agathon and to koinēi sumpheron. Aristotle uses them interchangeably.”¹⁶ Despite this assertion, Morrison later admits in the same article that “When Aristotle uses the term ‘the common good’ […] he never presents an explicit answer” to its meaning.¹⁷ Morrison offers four possible meanings of the common good: (1) it may designate the happiness of all citizens; (2) it may mean the good condition of shared activities; (3) it may signify the happiness of all citizens as an interrelated, inseparable whole; (4) or it may designate the happiness of the city.¹⁸ Other scholars, like Mark Hoipkemier, inject a further note of caution when examining the two terms ‘common good’ and ‘common interest’. He observes that the “word choice may not be decisive, but certainly Aristotle’s reliance on ‘common advantage’ troubles any easy equation of it with the human good”.¹⁹

Aristotle clearly understands the common good in the political sense to be happiness, as he indicates a number of times.²⁰ This identification of the goal of politics as happiness does not resolve questions that arise from the concept of the common good. Aristotle seems first to indicate the identity of the common good and common benefit. Then he implies a distinction between the two terms. In the Politics, Aristotle claims that the end of politics is the greatest good. The good in the political field is justice, but Aristotle qualifies the designation of justice as the political good by declaring it to be the common benefit: “The good in the sphere of politics is justice; and justice consists in what tends to promote the common interest.”²¹ This passage, however, has convinced at least one modern scholar that justice is the common good.²² One should reiterate, however, that the qualification of justice is a common benefit, which seems to imply a difference between the common good and justice.²³

All political communities are formed and maintained for the benefit of their members, and justice is that which best promotes what is beneficial to all.²⁴ Again, there is some confusion concerning justice and the common good. Does Aristotle wish to make justice the supreme political good even though he has already claimed it to be happiness?²⁵ Eudaimonia and justice are not coextensive terms, and so justice is either an element of political goodness or a means to it. In Politics, after discussions on justice, various institutions of a common social life, and friendship, Aristotle concludes that such institutions are means to the good life or happiness.²⁶ All human institutions have a common interest in promoting the good life for all collectively and individually.²⁷ Justice certainly is an essential element of a good state, but its exact relation to the common good is never clearly resolved.

At times Aristotle seems to indicate that justice and friendship constitute the common good. After the identification of the common good with happiness, the conclusion that justice and friendship comprise happiness may be justified. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests that justice and friendship contribute to the common interest or the common advantage of the state,²⁸ but despite some modern translations of to koinēi sumpheron as the common good, Aristotle does not normally use the word agathon in reference to justice or friendship. He prefers the term ‘benefit’ or ‘advantage’ to describe justice, as he does in Rhetoric.²⁹ Again, expectations that he would define the exact nature of the common good are left unfulfilled. We may ask whether Aristotle considers justice and friendship to be the common political good or merely means to attaining it. He certainly considers the relation between the common interest of citizens and happiness for all when he says that people are brought together by to koinēi sumpheron, according to which they have a share of the good life.³⁰ His common mode of expression is to designate justice and friendship as a common advantage (koinon lusiteloun), which is certainly a good but not the supreme political good.

In Nicomachean Ethics 1.4, 1095a14–20, Aristotle again establishes the goal of politics to be the supreme good that is attainable by action. He quickly adds that almost everyone agrees that this goal is happiness, which is living well or doing well (τὸ δ᾽ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν). This definition, as Aristotle admits, is rather general and requires further refinement. He clarifies his concept of happiness further when he defines eudaimonia as follows: “The human good turns out to be an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.”³¹ Aristotle, however, is not content with his clearest expression of the human good, and he quickly adds the qualifying phrase, “and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete”.³² This addendum has led to an enduring debate as to the exact meaning of Aristotelian eudaimonia. Some consider the human good to consist in theoria and that every other human action is directed to the attainment of theoretical excellence. This “dominant” theory of happiness was accepted by most medieval commentators on Nicomachean Ethics. They were influenced by Albertus Magnus (c. 1200–1280), who argued that the lesser type of political happiness created favourable conditions for human beings to attain the higher form of contemplative happiness. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Boethius of Dacia (fl. 1270s), however, understood happiness to consist of a combination of moral and intellectual virtues, which is currently known as the “inclusive” concept of happiness. My intention here is not to resolve the question but to remark that it is perhaps wiser to highlight Aristotle’s common practice in practical philosophy to leave a topic open to interpretation.³³ Julia Annas comments that, “What Aristotle says about virtue and happiness […] is tempted […] in both of two conflicting directions. […] If we find what he says unsatisfactory, it is because we think that ethical theory, even of Aristotle’s kind, must take sides in a way that Aristotle does not.”³⁴ These comments are equally applicable to Aristotle’s political theory.

As is well known, in book ten of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines happiness as an activity in accordance with the highest virtue of the supreme human power that allows contemplation of what is divine and noble.³⁵ The solitary philosopher can contemplate truth since the contemplative is self-sufficient and independent of external demands. Here Aristotle relegates practical virtues to political and military pursuits that are inferior to intellectual activity, but he seems to retreat from an unconditional acceptance of the life of contemplation as the essence of eudaimonia since he quickly adds that this type of life is too high for a human being. One cannot live entirely according to nous, which is the divine element within the soul.³⁶ Aristotle then, in a most passionate statement, warns against heeding the advice of those who encourage mortals to be content with worldly things. One should strive to make oneself immortal and strain mightily to live according to the divine element within the soul. The life of supreme reason is the best and happiest.³⁷

Aristotle does not dismiss the life of political and moral virtue since it constitutes a secondary type of happiness, which is specifically human in contrast to the divine activity of theoria.³⁸ Aristotle seems to vacillate between two notions of happiness again when he expresses his admiration for the perfect contemplative existence of divine beings: “Divine activity, which exceeds all others in beatitude, must be contemplative; concerning human activities, therefore what is most like this must be the nature of happiness.”³⁹ He succinctly concludes that happiness must be a form of contemplation.⁴⁰ One might assume that Aristotle has ended all doubt about the meaning of happiness and that it must be the exercise of the supreme faculty of the soul. However, he does not end the discussion here, and he quickly adds that human beings need external goods to survive. He concludes the discussion on happiness in book one with a reference to Solon, who described the eudaimon as one moderately equipped with external goods but who has performed the noblest of acts and lived temperately.⁴¹ In Politics, Aristotle provides a similar definition of happiness: “The best life for individuals and for cities commonly is the life of virtue with sufficient means for partaking in virtuous activities.”⁴² In neither work does Aristotle provide any further information about the way in which one might choose between possible conflicts in the two ways of living. He has noted earlier that a career in politics might keep the politician from engaging in theoretical contemplation, but he does not offer any method to resolve possible competing demands.

Whatever Aristotle’s final determination of the meaning of human goodness may be, he closes the discussions on the topic in both Nicomachean Ethics and Politics with references to Solon’s pronouncement on its nature. In both works, Aristotle presents the three elements that contribute to a good life (external goods, intellectual and moral virtues) but refrains from any clarification of their relative value. Although he is consistent in his description of the supreme human good, he remains unclear about its exact constitution. The similar descriptions of happiness do not clarify the question of the superiority of one life over another. If there should be a conflict between the demands of civic and theoretical pursuits, he provides no method for resolution.⁴³

4 The Political Common Good

A similar discussion on the two lives of virtue within the state appears in Politics. The best constitution under which citizens may live is that which promotes happiness. But even those who agree that the good life is that which is lived in accordance with virtue ask whether this life is political and practical or rather theoretical and free from external concerns.⁴⁴ Aristotle admits that the active life is best both for the state and for individuals, but the active life and active thoughts need not be limited to what is achieved through action. Speculation and contemplation, which aim at nothing beyond themselves, are certainly worthy of the designation of practice or action (prattein).⁴⁵ Aristotle again gives no indication of the relation of the life of political virtue to that of intellectual virtue.⁴⁶ He merely offers a variation of the Solonic formula, which appeared in Nicomachean Ethics. What is sufficient for his purpose is to describe the best life for the state and for individuals as the life of virtue with sufficient means to exercise it.⁴⁷ This shorter version of his final determination in Nicomachean Ethics on the nature of happiness does little to answer the questions regarding possible conflicts within the two types of lives. There certainly are times when the demands of daily life intrude upon the solitary exercise of contemplation. If the common good is nobler for the state, how can the contemplative contribute to its attainment?

The preferred mode of identifying the common good (agathon koinon) in both Nicomachean Ethics and Politics is its definition as happiness (eudaimonia). The city, which is a community of similar people, has as its goal the best life possible, which consists of the exercise of virtue: “Since happiness is the highest <good>, it is the exercise, and a complete practice of virtue.”⁴⁸ Aristotle often repeats his assertion that the common good for the state and for individuals is identical: “It remains to discuss whether happiness of the city is the same as that of the individual, or different. The answer is clear: all are agreed that they are the same.”⁴⁹ Later in Politics, he reaches the same conclusion: “Since it appears the end for human beings is the same end (telos) individually and collectively, the standard (horos) for the best man is the same as that for the best city.”⁵⁰ Both the city and the individuals can be considered wise, courageous, and just since cities reflect the characters of their citizens. A good state looks to nurture these virtues within the entire community.⁵¹ When it is successful, it achieves its end, happiness, collectively.⁵² On the other hand, both an individual and a city may lack discipline and consequently goodness.⁵³

The designation of a city as eudaimon may seem odd to us at first reading, and likewise to identify the happiness of a state with that of individuals seems strained.⁵⁴ This identification has led to various attempts to understand Aristotle’s meaning precisely. George Duke offers three interpretations of the meaning of the collective common good: (1) an instrumental concept according to which the political common good is subordinate and instrumental to the realization of basic common goods, such as knowledge, friendship, etc.; (2) the aggregative common good that consists in the realization of some set of the individual good that results in individual flourishing; (3) the distinctive common good that produces a state of affairs that is the good of the community as a whole.⁵⁵ Each of these interpretations has its defenders, and again Aristotle does not specify any of these particular ideas. What he does assert is the superiority of the common good over the individual: “for even if the good is the same for an individual and for the city, that of the city seems to be greater and more complete […]. To secure the good for one person is worthwhile, but to secure it for a nation or cities is better and more divine.”⁵⁶ What is not clear is whether Aristotle deems the common good of the city to be qualitatively better than that of an individual or merely quantitatively better in that a greater number enjoy the good life.⁵⁷

The identification of the common good with the individual good does not imply that the good citizen and the good person are necessarily the same.⁵⁸ Aristotle certainly envisages a situation in which one lives in an unjust or corrupt state. If this is the case, then a citizen in such a city who follows unjust laws and corrupt customs can be viewed as a good citizen but a bad person. The indulgence in the practices of an evil city would prevent the citizen from attaining happiness, which consists in activities according to virtue. Only in a good political community can the good person and the good citizen be considered the same.⁵⁹ Even in such a city only the statesmen are truly good, probably because they are the ones who can fully exercise practical wisdom.⁶⁰

5 The Individual and the Common Good

The distinction between a good person and a good citizen raises the questions whether the common good of the city and the individual good may conflict and how to resolve such differences. In a corrupt society, should one choose to become a good person and abandon civic duties? Even in a good community, the needs and the desires of an individual are not necessarily in harmony with the general welfare of the community. Just as there is no explicit resolution to the possible contrary demands of the contemplative and active life in Aristotle’s Ethics, there is no discussion of competing claims of common and individual goodness in the Politics. Despite the claim that the welfare of the community is greater and more complete than that of the individual, Aristotle refrains from any discussion of competing ends, nor does he advise a good person in an evil state to break its laws. The questions concerning contemplative and active happiness in Nicomachean Ethics find parallels in the discussion of the common and individual good in Politics. In both works, Aristotle is silent about potential inconsistencies between common and individual goodness, but his modern commentators are not. Donald Morrison asks what Aristotle would say about cases in which demands of general justice and particular justice conflict. He concludes that “in certain cases general justice may demand that we harm the innocent while particular justice demand that we spare them.”⁶¹ Susan Collins makes a similar comment on the tension within moral virtue itself; that is, between its orientation towards the common good and its requirements as an independent end. She sees a recognition of this conflict in Aristotle’s discussion of justice whereby the education of the citizen with a view to the community may not be the same as that of a plain good man.⁶² She concludes that Aristotle conceded that the two ends of a morally serious person cannot be reconciled.⁶³ Even if Aristotle were to grant that there might be tensions between the individual and common good, he seems untroubled by them. Richard Robinson observes that “Aristotle’s difficulty appears to be different from any of ours. We often worry whether the State’s orders conflict with our conscience, or whether our duty to the State conflicts with our duty to our family […]. None of these questions occurs to Aristotle.”⁶⁴

Robinson would have been safer to say these questions did not trouble Aristotle, although they may have occurred to him. These problems, however, would be overcome by the person of practical wisdom who would know which course to follow. The phronimos realizes that no one virtuous activity has precedence over another. The practically wise person weighs all factors and makes the right decision. Aristotle’s inconsistencies, obscurities and seeming contradictions concerning theoretical and practical actions and the individual and common good are likely intentional since human life with its varied choices is inconsistent and contradictory. Aristotle would no more advise one course over another than would Sartre, who refrained from advising a student whose desire to fight against the invaders conflicted with his duty to care for an ailing mother. Whereas Sartre emphasizes the freedom of choice, Aristotle concentrated on the wisdom that informs the choice. The choice is not directed to an unattainable ideal of moral and political excellence, but practical wisdom is the virtue which directs choices to goods that lie within the agent’s ability.⁶⁵

Aristotle acknowledges that those who agree that the virtuous life is most desirable still may disagree about whether that life is active or contemplative. A proper resolution requires people of wisdom to decide the question. The wise have long accepted that either the contemplative or the political life is worthy of choice by those who seek goodness. Aristotle considers the question to be of great importance but does not resolve it in favour of one type of life over the other. He merely indicates that there is further disagreement about how the effects of ruling over others contribute to the disagreement about the best possible life. He concludes that those who wish to be good, either collectively or individually, must astutely aim at an exalted standard.⁶⁶ Again, modern commentators point out the complexity of motivation in Aristotle’s moral and political thought. Susan Collins points out Aristotle’s priority of individual goodness over altruism.⁶⁷ Whatever Aristotle’s own final understanding of the nature of the common good may be, Ronald Terchek and David Moore conclude that for Aristotle, “the best politics is fluid and negotiable”.⁶⁸ Despite the critical remarks of Terchek and Moore, Thomas Smith is correct in his assessment that “the common good requires […] people to pursue practical wisdom (phronesis) rather than reputation and power. […] When <phronesis is> directed to politics, it is called political wisdom.”⁶⁹ Smith’s formulation should perhaps be expressed more strongly in that the common good as well as the individual good require an exercise of practical wisdom that can attain not a perfect ideal but rather one that a person of wisdom and a just state can reasonably achieve.

The precise meaning and scope of practical wisdom has long eluded its commentators despite Aristotle’s lengthy treatment of it in book six of Nicomachean Ethics. He provides a few examples of how it functions, but none of these is specifically moral. His two examples of the exercise of phronesis refer to non-moral practical choices: (1) that light meats are healthy and (2) that stagnant water is not.⁷⁰ Aristotle seems to have deliberately avoided any examples of moral reasoning in his examples of practical wisdom, most likely preferring to allow the wise to make their own decisions. We must ask ourselves whether Aristotle, the inventor of logic with its emphasis on precision in language, would not have noticed the different definitions and descriptions of central moral and political concepts in the very same works. Almost all his commentators cite his admonition to refrain from seeking certainty and exactitude in practical science⁷¹ but then immediately attempt to provide absolute and exact interpretations of the texts. They can only fail because Aristotle rejects such responses. As the master of those who know, he realizes that the best method of teaching is to allow students ultimately to develop their own wisdom through experience and reflection. Those who remain his students must be content with general guidelines for proper action and recognize those who are the best practitioners of moral action.

6 Some Medieval Interpretations and Modern Criticisms

Medieval interpreters of Aristotle tried to remain faithful to the intention of the author, but at times they exploited the inconsistency and vagueness of certain works to construct responses that were compatible with their religious ideals. Robert Kilwardby (c. 1215–1279), in an early Latin commentary on Nicomachean Ethics, views Aristotle’s critique of Plato in a manner that becomes common in the works of later medieval authors. He does not consider Aristotle to have rejected the common good but rather the common definition of goodness.⁷² The opinion that identifies the separate good and the cause of all goodness as happiness is partially true according to Kilwardby.⁷³ A careful distinction within the notion of goodness is needed to support this conclusion since all Christians accept the goal of all humanity to be union with the first cause and the supreme good.

Concerning the human created good, however, about which Aristotle speaks, the separate good is not happiness. Here Kilwardby is careful to retain the theological notion of the separate good as the ultimate human end, but he dismisses a metaphysical discussion of its nature as irrelevant to the explication of the text of Nicomachean Ethics. Kilwardby argues that knowledge of the supreme good is needed to complete the human desire for complete intellectual knowledge. The separate good is relevant to ethics as the ultimate object of human contemplation. Like Aristotle, he compares the directive force of cognition of the good to an archer’s awareness of a target.⁷⁴ One must know the goal in any pertinent art or discipline in order to decide on a proper course of action.⁷⁵ The directive force of knowing the good orders every subsequent action in its pursuit. Another commentator of this era (the so-called pseudo-Peckham) emphasizes more emphatically the idea that the separate good is indeed relevant to ethics. For pseudo-Peckham, that which all things seek seems to be the supreme first good since it must be the good in itself and the source of all subsequent goodness. Everything that exists desires that by which it maintains and preserves its own existence. For this commentator, only the first cause can be the universal object of desire.⁷⁶ As such, it becomes an important element in moral philosophy.

Thomas Aquinas’ reading of the text of Aristotle influences his own idea of the common good as God toward which all human beings strive. Thomas argues that Aristotle only disproves Plato’s position that human happiness consists in a certain common idea of the good and that he does not reject the existence of the common good.⁷⁷ Thomas further explains Aristotle’s text by reference to Metaphysics in which Aristotle posits a certain good that is separate from the entire universe or one that is merely the order within the elements. He concludes that the separate good is thought of in both senses.⁷⁸ In Metaphysics, Aristotle does not refer to the supreme being or God as the common good, but Thomas understands the discussion here of the separate good to include the idea of the common good: “It is evident that any natural thing […] is ordered to the common good (ad bonum commune) according to its proper natural action.”⁷⁹

Thomas uses Aristotle’s analogy to the proper functioning of a household to explain further the concept of common goodness in that the master aims at the common good for all. Like Kilwardby, Thomas also employs Aristotle’s analogy in book twelve of Metaphysics to support his analysis of the notion of a separate common good. Thomas contends that Aristotle did not intend to disprove Plato’s opinion about the existence of one separate good upon which all other goods depend. According to Thomas, Aristotle made this conclusion clear in Metaphysics, where he posits a certain good that is separate from the whole universe to which the entirety of creation is ordered, as an army is directed to the good of its leader. Aristotle merely disproves Plato’s conception insofar as he concluded that this separate good is a certain idea common to all other good.⁸⁰ Despite Aristotle’s dismissal of the relevance of common goodness as unattainable and impractical,⁸¹ Thomas finds evidence in Aristotle’s moral and political works for maintaining the importance of goodness in human endeavours. According to Michael Sherwin, “Thomas Aquinas calls God the common good and end for rational creatures, but also a person’s enjoyment of God, the ultimate common good.”⁸²

Thomas’ attribution of a separate common good to Aristotle despite the latter’s expressed denial of its existence in Nicomachean Ethics does not necessarily misrepresent Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle provides no explicit statement in Nicomachean Ethics or Politics that God is the common good for all, but he does so in Eudemian Ethics:

For God is not a ruler in the sense of issuing commands, but is the end as a means to which wisdom (phronesis) commands […] Therefore, whatever mode or choosing and of acquiring good things by nature […] will best promote contemplation of God, that is the best mode, and that standard is the finest.⁸³

As is often the case, Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of Aristotle’s intention is a valid reading of difficult and disputed texts.

Albertus Magnus resolves the difficult question of the relation between the individual moral good and the common political good by distinguishing two types of good: bonum honestum and bonum utile. In his excellent study of the common good in medieval thought, Matthew Kempshall explains Albertus’s solution: “Albertus’ solution […] is to distinguish between the two meanings of melius which are produced by the two meanings of goodness – more honourable (honorabilius) and more useful (utilius). In the first sense of good, contemplative happiness is ‘better’, whereas, in the second sense, it is political happiness.”⁸⁴ Kempshall describes how Albertus goes on to explain Aristotle’s designation of political goodness as ‘more divine’ in book one of Nicomachean Ethics as that which is more similar to God in bestowing goodness on his creatures. Contemplative happiness, however, is more divine in its greater similitude to the divine act of understanding.⁸⁵

Thomas employs a similar approach in clarifying Aristotle’s doctrine of the relation between communal political goodness and the individual contemplative good. Thomas differentiates the political active end or good from the individual contemplative end by distinguishing their value (dignitas) from their usefulness (utilitas). The active life, which concerns the well-being of one’s fellow citizens, is more useful than the contemplative life. The contemplative life, however, is more worthy (dignior) because dignitas indicates one’s good for one’s own sake, unlike utility, which indicates one’s good propter aliud (for the sake of others). Only in the second sense can the active life be considered more beneficial that the individual contemplative life.⁸⁶

Aristotle’s identification of moral and practical goodness with the judgments of wise and good people (in EN 1130a30–35) allows for the variety and flexibility of interpreting ideal practice. Practical wisdom must always account for principles that vary since ethics and politics do not produce scientific necessity.⁸⁷ This approach in Aristotle’s works permits a variety of interpretations, and his commentators often view his ideas in light of their own conclusions. Thomas Aquinas, for example, when considering the question of the possibility of the soul’s beatitude after death in commentary on Nicomachean Ethics, claims that Aristotle never denied the possibility but rather refrained from determining the problem because it transcends every rational process.⁸⁸ Aristotle’s practice of determining questions with reservations and qualifications is even more pronounced in his works on practical philosophy and continues to cause different interpretations among his expositors.

Aristotle’s method has allowed modern scholars to question the efforts of medieval authors to determine Aristotle’s responses to problems about human goodness, happiness, the contemplative and active lives, and the nature of common and individual goodness. One example of modern criticism of medieval authors concerns their understanding of the common good. Mark Hoipkemier writes that “Medieval Aristotelians could build intricate, analogical theories of common good that pointed to virtue, cosmic order and God, precisely because of the polyvalence of ‘good’ in ‘common good’.”⁸⁹ Not without some justification, David Hollenbach considers Thomas Aquinas to be in “full agreement with this stringently theological understanding of the common good. For Thomas, the full common good is God’s own self.”⁹⁰ Despite their departure from a strict interpretation of Aristotle’s words, the medieval authors remain, however, well within the spirit of Aristotle’s practical thought, and the answers they provide reflect the method of moral experimentation advocated in his philosophy. That their answers differ in many aspects is hardly surprising as they reason from general principles based not on absolute universal ideals but on the conclusions from individual experiences. Aristotle would acknowledge their efforts as consistent with his recognition of the complexities and difficulties on the nature of goodness, whether it be for individuals or the community.

Not every doctrine in the works of Aristotle is open to multiple interpretations, but for certain important concepts in practical philosophy, such as the relation between individual and common goodness, the role of moral and theoretical virtue in the production of human happiness, and the precise nature of practical wisdom, there are sufficient grounds for different interpretations of Aristotle’s meaning and intent. The work of commentators from antiquity to the present, including those discussed in this volume, demonstrate the continued relevance of Aristotle’s contribution to practical philosophy despite the different conclusions. That there may never be a consensus on the exact meaning of many of his ideas may not be a weakness in his work but rather a strength that he himself had envisaged.