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1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the interactions between individual and common utility within Hugo Grotius’s theory of the state. According to his masterpiece De Iure Belli ac Pacis, human beings are by nature sociable and in need of a community. However, it is for the sake of personal utility that they create or join a state. Thereby, individuals consent to grant the state rights that may take precedence over their own whenever necessary for the community’s essential needs.Footnote 1 As I hope to show, this process proves to be particularly interesting for the reflection on the relation between the individual and common good as it both places the individual’s interest at the very foundation of the state and allows for restrictions to it for the sake of common utility. This is enabled by Grotius’s juridical conception of the state as a voluntary association, which largely relies on the notions of contract and society, which is notably inspired by the Roman law concept of societas. This association is equipped with rights of its own to fulfil the main functions attributed to it by its members (protection from violence and injury). What the state needs to perform these functions then determines the concessions that subjects must make for the common good. Ultimately, natural law also constitutes an essential component of these common good requirements: associative obligations rest upon the natural obligation of promise keeping, which constitutes a condition for the flourishing of any society. Seen from his broader perspective, the value of the Grotian state reaches beyond the personal utility that gives rise to them, due to their significant contribution to a harmonious life in community, in keeping with our sociable and rational nature.

Some terminological remarks are in order at the outset. In general, Grotius speaks of a common utilitas even though he also refers to the notion of bonum commune without explicitly differentiating between the two.Footnote 2 We often find contrasts between individual and common utility (or good), and private and public utility (or good), even though Grotius likes to bring out their intertwinement. When it comes to the weighting of the two, the concept of subjective rights also intervenes – a concept that Grotius is widely considered to have placed a distinctive emphasis upon, thus encouraging a focus on the individual in early modern political theories.Footnote 3

This chapter concentrates on De Iure Belli ac Pacis, which had a massive influence after its first publication in 1625 and contains a wealth of material on our topic. As a complement, we will also look into Grotius’s early work De Iure Praedae (although it was not published entirely until 1868, aside from its famous chapter De Mare Liberum, which came out in 1609).Footnote 4 Other works will be mentioned when necessary. Given the interest of the volume in the evolution of the notions of the individual and common good over time, I will also refer to the many ancient sources adduced by Grotius – often quite loosely – to consolidate his arguments in order to trace inflowing legacies. My analysis starts with Grotius’s theory of the state in De Iure Praedae (Sect. 11.2) before presenting his theory of the state in De Iure Belli ac Pacis, with an emphasis on individual utility as the original drive for the state’s institution (Sect. 11.3) and the structure of the interactions between individual and common utility within the state (Sect. 11.4). After that, I take a closer look at De Iure Belli ac Pacis’s passages on the right to resist (Sect. 11.5) and the right to leave one’s state (Sect. 11.6), where Grotius makes numerous assertions on the imbrications of individual and common utility. Throughout the analysis, I will also highlight his recurrent endeavours to demonstrate the congruence of the individual and common good against appearances to the contrary.

2 De Iure Praedae

According to De Iure Praedae, humans are free by nature, and states arise from their consent.Footnote 5 At first, political communities were created to contain the numerous individuals of “corrupt nature”,Footnote 6 who posed a threat to human society: those who attacked and stole from others or failed to observe the fundamental prescriptions of natural law.Footnote 7 The increase of human population also favoured the institution of states as did the need for a division of labour and, quite crucially, for impartial authorities to settle disputes. For these specific purposes, the future members of a state gathered to institute “a smaller” society (minor societas) than the larger, natural society of humankind that “links all men as a whole”.Footnote 8 This seems to echo the Ciceronian notion of the society of humankind, which comprises several “degrees of fellowship among men”: according to Cicero too, the bonds of the state would be much “narrower” than those of the “vast fellowship of the human race”, although the former do not attenuate the latter.Footnote 9 In a Grotian state, the entanglement of individual goods engenders a productive climate of mutual concern:

For it is a fact (as Pliny so graphically points out) that when universal goods (bonis omnium) are separately distributed, each man’s ills (mala) pertain to him individually, whereas, when those goods are brought together and intermingled, individual ills cease to be the concern of any one person and the goods of all pertain to all (singulorum mala ad neminem, ad omnes omnium bona pertinent).Footnote 10

In this vein, a state proceeds from “a general agreement for the sake of the common good (boni communis)” and forms a “considerable group sufficing for self-protection through mutual aid, and for equal acquisition of the necessities of life”.Footnote 11

So far, the common good appears to consist of the securing of goods that all individuals seek for themselves and that largely relate to basic practical needs, but Grotius goes on to expose more demanding requirements for the state’s members. These requirements rest upon the state’s founding agreement and its aim for the bonum commune. Importantly, this common good goes beyond the good of the individual members and targets the good of the whole (unius) – although this also comprises “one’s own” good.Footnote 12 Therefore, citizens should not only avoid harming their fellow citizens, but they should also “protect” them, “both as a whole (universos) and as individuals (singulos)”.Footnote 13 Likewise, instead of solely abstaining from theft, they should also “contribute individually both that which is necessary to other individuals (singulis) and that which is necessary to the whole (universis)”.Footnote 14 This thus encompasses more than the first natural laws enunciated in De Iure Praedae, which were valid before the institution of states but which were restricted to the prohibition of injury, theft and promise breaking as well as to the permissibility of punishment.Footnote 15 At this point, Grotius had also claimed that self-love and the related inclination to self-interest are natural and God-willed features of all human beings,Footnote 16 and yet while nature allows the prioritization of one’s own good over others’, life within a state may sometimes impose the weighting of the good of individuals (bono singulorum) against “the good of all” (bono omnium).Footnote 17 Grotius then hastens to add that the good of all actually “includes the good of individuals as well”.Footnote 18 This lack of opposition between the two is fundamental to him, but it is also possibly contentious, which may well explain his numerous metaphors and references to Ancient sources to corroborate it. In sum, “the cargo cannot be saved unless the ship is preserved”.Footnote 19

The next question at stake is how far the private good (bonum privatum) is subjected to the public good (publico). One particularly illuminating quotation is a speech by Pericles in which he pleads for the interrelatedness of the individual and common good in spite of their seeming conflicts. According to Pericles, a state that thrives “as a whole” would be more useful (prodesse) to its citizens than a state in which private utility (privatis utilitatibus) would “flourish” while the whole “is falling into ruin”:

For even he whose personal fortunes are well invested, must nevertheless perish if his country is destroyed; while on the other hand, if some individual within a prosperous state is not particularly fortunate, he is still far more likely to be preserved unharmed through the latter.Footnote 20

Similarly, “betraying the public interest” is no means to “protect” one’s own, whereas a harmonious state can guarantee “private property” (a warning encountered in Livy).Footnote 21 These passages highlight the mutual dependency of individual and collective interests and bring out an incentive for citizens to act accordingly.

As for citizens’ obligation to abide by the state’s decisions, it is grounded upon their own consent to the state.Footnote 22 A state’s law (lex) constitutes “the will of all” as a result from its founding agreement.Footnote 23 And whoever has (expressly or tacitly) declared their will to set up or join a state has to stick to this resolve. In virtue of the rule of faith (regula fidei), “[w]hat each individual has indicated to be his will, that is law with respect to him”.Footnote 24 This is also reflected in the “old saying” volenti non fit injuria (“no injury is committed against a person who is willing”).Footnote 25 In an analogy between the will of the individual and that of the whole, “[w]hatever the commonwealth has indicated to be its will, that is law (ius) in regard to the whole body of citizens”.Footnote 26

3 De Iure Belli ac Pacis’ Utility-Based Conception of the State

Although De Iure Belli ac Pacis does not give as detailed an account of the emergence of states as De Iure Praedae, it retains its main elements, such as their voluntary origin and the tension between subordination and natural liberty. Liberty is now defined as a rightful power over oneself (potestas in se), including the “Right which a Man has to his own”.Footnote 27 Like in De Iure Praedae, the principal causes for the institution of states are the indispensability of impartial courts as well as the prevention of violence and injustice.Footnote 28 A noteworthy difference is that De Iure Praedae integrates the question of the relations between the individual and common good directly in its theory of the state, whereas De Iure Belli ac Pacis discusses it across different passages. Furthermore, De Iure Belli ac Pacis places a stronger emphasis on the moral significance of sociability (which becomes the “source” of natural law) than does De Iure Praedae.Footnote 29 De Iure Belli ac Pacis also aims to construct a comprehensive theory of the laws of war, while De Iure Praedae notably serves the defence of the Dutch East India Company’s seizure of a Portuguese ship overseas.Footnote 30

The Prolegomena of De Iure Belli ac Pacis reiterate that the source of a state’s authority lies in its subjects’ consent:

Again, since the fulfilling of Covenants belongs to the Law of Nature, (for it was necessary there should be some Means of obliging Men among themselves, and we cannot conceive any other more conformable to Nature) from this very Foundation Civil Laws were derived. For those who had incorporated themselves into any Society (coetui), or subjected themselves to any one Man, or Number of Men, had either expressly, or from the Nature of the Thing must be understood to have tacitly promised, that they would submit to whatever either the greater part of the Society, or those on whom the Sovereign Power had been conferred, had ordained.Footnote 31

This suggests two scenarios: that of an association and that of subjection.Footnote 32 In the case of an association, citizens agree to form a political society and thereby promise to obey the community’s majority (that may then decide to establish authorities over the community). Note that Grotius holds that the rule of majority is an evident and natural principle for any society, as it would make no sense for a “greater Number” to be “governed by a less”.Footnote 33 Alternatively, in the case of subjection, citizens submit directly to a sovereign (“one Man, or Number of Men”) and promise him obedience. Later in De Iure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius lists many possible contractual arrangements among rulers and citizens, which include various divisions of power between them and range from partial to absolute submission to the sovereign.Footnote 34

Right after this point, Grotius affirms a distinction between natural and civil law, which is of significant importance for our matter. The normative force of natural law is first and foremost grounded in our rational and sociable nature and not in its utility for us – even though Grotius is keen to emphasise the benefits of its observance.Footnote 35 Importantly, this sociability does not necessarily call for the establishment of political societies, which is not a prescription of natural law. By contrast, states clearly proceed from utility:

[…] for the Mother of Natural Law is human Nature itself, which, though even the Necessity of our Circumstances should not require it, would of itself create in us a mutual Desire of Society […]. Whereas of the Civil Law Profit (utilitatis) was the Occasion (occasionem); for that entering into Society, or that Subjection which we spoke of, began first for the Sake of some Advantage (utilitatem). And besides, those who prescribe Laws to others, usually have, or ought to have, Regard to some Profit (utilitatem) therein.Footnote 36

The utility expected from the state should provide an incentive to follow its laws for the sake of our long-term interests and that of our descendants, even when this appears to be detrimental to our most immediate goals:

For as he that violates the Laws of his Country for the Sake of some present Advantage to himself (utilitatis praesentis causa), thereby saps the Foundation of his own perpetual Interest (perpetuae utilitates), and at the same Time that of his Posterity […].Footnote 37

Later, Grotius defines the state as a “compleat Body (coetus perfectus) of free Persons (liberorum hominum), associated together (causa sociatus) to enjoy peaceably their Rights (iuris fruendi), and for their common Benefit (communis utilitatis)”.Footnote 38 This confirms Grotius’s emphasis on utility, and also makes the preservation of rights an essential purpose of the state. Interestingly for our inquiry, this conception of the state dispenses with explicit mentions of other common goods to be pursued, such as happiness or virtue, or of the common obligations of obedience to God.Footnote 39 Rather, it concentrates on the concurrence of individual subjects’ intentions, needs and expectations as a basis for their consent and the obligations that flow from it.

The reference to utility stands in accordance with Grotius’s contractual conception of the state.Footnote 40 In Grotius’s own words, it lies in “the Nature of a Contract” to aim for the utilitas of the parties involved and to engender among them “a nearer Society” (proprior societas) than that of all human beings.Footnote 41 This is similar to his Ciceronian view of the state as a narrower society than the broad one of humankind in De Iure Praedae, and it also highlights the close connection between contract and societas in this context. While the original Roman law concept of societas refers to an association created for a definite purpose (typically a commercial oneFootnote 42), Grotius understands societas more broadly as “any form of human association that expresses shared interests and effective co-ordination”.Footnote 43 The affinity with Cicero remains, and he tends to conceive of societas as a “relationship between individuals sharing a common project or a common way of life”.Footnote 44 For Grotius, we would be “in Want of many Things necessary for living commodiously”Footnote 45 without human societies. Utility is the primary purpose of societies, so that “every one should quietly enjoy his own, with the Help, and by the united Force of the whole Community”.Footnote 46 Thus, while our natural inclinations to sociability and utility are two distinct things, they are by no means diametrically opposed.

As we will see below, the utility derived by citizens from the state acts as an important measure to find a balance between the individual and common good. This being said, utility is not the only way Grotius conceives of the relationships among members of the state. To account for the continuity of a political society despite changes to its members’ identities over time, he alludes to the notion of a constitutive spirit, or disposition (spiritum unum, hexis),Footnote 47 which he gleaned from Plutarch, Seneca and Aristotle among others. This spirit consists of “a full and compleat Association (consociatio plena & perfecta) for a political Life (vitae civilis)”, combining its members into “an artificial body”, with its sovereign acting as a cohesive force (cohaeret).Footnote 48 As for the relation between sovereign and community, Grotius deploys a visual metaphor according to which the community is akin to a body and its rulers to its eye.Footnote 49 As Knud Haakonssen has argued, the message here is that “sovereignty is not a power that rulers have over subjects, but one that they exercise on behalf of the corporate body”.Footnote 50 De Iure Belli ac Pacis allows considerable latitude as to the way this power may be organised, as “there are several Ways of Living, some better than others, and every one may choose which he pleases of all those Sorts”.Footnote 51 The extent of the sovereign’s right is ultimately determined “by the Extent of the Will of those who conferred it upon him”.Footnote 52

4 On the Balance Between the Individual and Common Good in De Iure Belli ac Pacis

I now turn to the way the interactions between the individual and common good, or utility, operate in De Iure Belli ac Pacis. By characterising the state as an association, Grotius establishes its authority upon firmer ground than a fluctuating conjunction of individual interests. The following statement is quite revealing in this respect:

The Union of many Heads of Families into one People or State, gives such a Body of Men the greatest Power over its Members (ius corpori in partes), because this is the most perfect of all Societies (perfectissima societas): Nor is there any outward Act done by any Person, which does not either by itself, or by some Circumstances or other, refer to this Society.Footnote 53

When subjects establish or join a political community, they agree to transfer to it rights that will subsequently come to prevail over their individual rights.Footnote 54 As a result, the community acquires an “eminent and superior” right over its members and their goods to achieve the common good (boni communis).Footnote 55 As we will see in the examples below, this juridical structure provides the framework in which the balance of the individual and common good is articulated when confrontations of rights arise. If the community’s rights reach beyond its members’, this is a direct consequence of their own initial consent, which means that everyone’s will is taken into account at this foundational stage. Later on, however, this may occasionally come at the cost of individual interests even though subjects initially entered into this arrangement on self-interested terms. Grotius’s task is hence to show that there is no discrepancy here.

A first and quite classical illustration of the problem relates to private property and taxes. For Grotius, the community may rightfully dispose of its members’ property when this is useful for the whole: A sovereign has “a greater Right (dominion)” to his subjects’ possessions than they do, if this is required by the common good (ad bonum commune).Footnote 56 Taxes comprise “that eminent Dominion (dominion) which a State has over its Subjects, and their Goods, for the public Use (ad usum publicum)”.Footnote 57 Furthermore, a sovereign is entitled to requisite a subject’s property for the sake of public utility. However, some compensation should be given, provided sufficient common resources are available.Footnote 58 Indeed, just as it would run against justice to simply take from someone “without a sufficient Reason”, a sovereign would violate citizens’ rights if he dispensed with his obligation “to make Restitution, and to repair the Damage”.Footnote 59 Subjects’ property rights are thus not completely absorbed by the community’s. Nevertheless, Grotius concludes that these rights must be under the sovereign’s “Dominion” when this is necessitated by the utilitas publica.Footnote 60

In what follows, I turn to Grotius’s passages on subjects’ rights to resist and leave the state in De Iure Belli ac Pacis, which abound with reflections on the respective weight of the individual and common good. In these tense contexts, he is keen to recall the long-term interests of individuals in enjoying the justice and safety provided by the state. However, the key standard becomes what Grotius considers the state to need in order to perform the functions for which its subjects instituted it in the first place. In this vein, he often resorts to a means-to-an-end argument: If individuals grant authority to the state and attribute it certain tasks, then by derivation, they also grant it the right to the means necessary to this end.Footnote 61

5 On the Right of Resistance

De Iure Belli ac Pacis’s chapter on resistance asks whether individual subjects may rightfully engage in warlike conduct against their rulers. Due to its many subtleties, Grotius’s position has later been interpreted both as a condemnation and as a justification of resistance.Footnote 62 This being said, in spite of a general suspicion towards resistance, Grotius was a fervent supporter of the Dutch revolt against Habsburg rule.Footnote 63 One of the essential ideas of this chapter is that the extent of a people’s right to disobey, oppose or even rebel against its sovereign depends upon the terms of a state’s founding contract. Indeed, some contracts bind rulers to the observance of certain laws or stipulate a certain division of power between rulers and the ruled and foresee sanctions by the people (which may even go up to the death penalty, as in Sparta’s example).Footnote 64 However, in the absence of specific contractual dispositions, Grotius holds resistance to be prohibited, at least in principle. The main argument becomes that if resistance were licit, a state could not serve its primary purpose, namely the maintenance of peace and order:

Indeed all Men have naturally a Right to secure themselves from Injuries by Resistance (ius resistendi), as we said before. But civil Society (civili civitate) being instituted for the Preservation of Peace (tranquillitatem), there immediately arises a superior Right (ius maius) in the State over us and ours, so far as is necessary for that End (ad finem illud necessarium). Therefore the State has a Power to prohibit the unlimited Use of that Right (ius resistendi) towards every other Person, for maintaining public Peace and good Order (publicae pacis & ordinis causa), which doubtless it does, since otherwise it cannot obtain the End proposed; for if that promiscuous Right of Resistance should be allowed, there would be no longer a State, but a Multitude without Union […].Footnote 65

Thus, the natural right of self-defence must be subject to conditions that preserve public tranquillity, in line with the state’s mission: “[a]uthority could not be maintained, if it were lawful to resist”.Footnote 66 As he turns to the Scriptures for confirmation, Grotius comments freely on St Paul’s injunction not to resist the powers that be,Footnote 67 which proves particularly instructive for our concern. In Grotius’s reading, St Paul not only appeals to divine commands but also to utility. The “general End” of St Paul’s injunction is public tranquillity, which comprises each individual’s tranquility.Footnote 68 On this basis, Grotius points to intimate links between the interests of individuals, communities and rulers. Tranquillitas publica qualifies as a good (bonum) that subjects “receive from the sovereign Powers”, thus giving them good reason not to endanger it (as “no Body ever wished ill to himself (sibi male)”).Footnote 69 Conversely, the sovereign would do well to strive for peace as his own felicity (felicitas) “depends” upon his subjects’.Footnote 70 The “rare” case of a sovereign who acts against public tranquillity would not make a sufficient case for the permissibility of resistance.Footnote 71 This is because a law should only take into account “that which generally happens” and cannot accommodate each particular circumstance: rather, “it is enough, if it be beneficial in general, and to the greater Part”.Footnote 72 Note that this is a distinct argument from the ones we have encountered so far as it targets the large number of interests to be served by the state: Given that laws must be able to cover very diverse situations equally, they can only be expected to get most cases right.

Then comes a series of citations that confirm the close ties between individual and state utility as well as the importance of subjects’ awareness of these, like in De Iure Praedae. One novelty is the reference to Plato’s Laws, according to which “the Bond of States, is the Care of the public Good (quod commune est)”, as opposed to concerns restricted to one’s own individual good (quod singulorum).Footnote 73 Moreover, as Iamblichus puts it, private and public utility cannot be taken to diverge, the former being “included“ in the latter: “for as in the natural Body, so in the political, the Preservation of the Parts depends on that of the Whole”.Footnote 74

After this general plea against resistance, Grotius nonetheless admits certain exceptions. An important one is the individual right to resist one’s authorities in the “extreme necessity” of an imminent death threat.Footnote 75 For Grotius, it seems unlikely that the founders of a state initially agreed not to defend their lives at all:

But this Law [of non-resistance] seems to depend upon the Intention of those who first entered into civil Society (a voluntate eorum, qui se primum in societatem civilem consociant), from whom the Power of Sovereigns is originally derived. Suppose then they had been asked, Whether they pretended to impose on all Citizens the hard Necessity of dying, rather than to take up Arms in any Case, to defend themselves against the higher Powers; I do not know, whether they would have answered in the affirmative. [...] they would have declared that one ought not to bear with every Thing, unless the Resistance would infallibly occasion great Disturbance in the State, or prove the Destruction of many Innocents. For what Charity (caritas) recommends in such a Case to be done, may, I doubt not, be prescribed by a human Law.Footnote 76

As we have seen, the protection from violence is one of the purposes that subjects assign to the state as they submit to it. It is therefore aberrant to suppose that subjects have relinquished their natural right to self-defence in favour of the community. In this case, the most essential utility that grounds individuals’ subjection to the state (i.e., the protection of their life) resurges as a limit to their loyalty. Nevertheless, Grotius’s mention of the peril of a “great disturbance in the state” as a potential restriction to this instance of the right to resist still evokes a regard for the common good. Yet this is now considered from the perspective of what the state’s founders “would have declared”. This brings us back to the commitments that gave rise to the state and suggests that these are strong enough to preclude self-defence when the state’s survival is at stake. In such cases, it seems that the obligation no longer proceeds from the individual utility from which the state originates, but rather from the moral significance of the subjects’ voluntary commitment as they join it.

Subsequent to this point, Grotius mentions two other exceptions to the general prohibition of resistance: when a ruler renounces or alienates sovereignty without the population’s consent, or when he behaves as its “Enemy” (which comes down to a renunciation of sovereignty).Footnote 77 Lastly, when it comes to the legitimacy of resistance against an usurper, the decision would not belong to individuals; the whole community, as an association, should deliberate and act as one.Footnote 78

6 On the Right to Leave One’s State

Grotius’s discussion of subjects’ right to exit their state “without obtaining Leave” is located in his chapter on the acquisition of rights over persons. It addresses what natural law requires if states do not come up with specific regulations (such as the Muscovites’ prohibition to leave).Footnote 79 In his view, states cannot easily allow the departure of large groups, because the exodus of large groups would present a risk for the survival of the states and hence be at odds with the very purpose of the state:

That we ought not to go out in Troops or large Companies, is sufficiently evident from the End and Design of Civil Society (civilis societas), which could not subsist if such a Permission were granted; and in Things of a moral Nature, what is necessary to obtain the End (ex necessitate finis) has the Force of a Law.Footnote 80

However, the question of individuals’ exit is markedly different: “it is one Thing to draw Water out of a River, and another to divert the Course of a Part of that River”.Footnote 81 Here, Grotius appeals to the individual’s natural liberty to settle in the state of their choice. He refers to the Digest as well as to Cicero’s Pro Balbo, according to which the possibility “of Not staying in any State against his own Inclinations” would lie at the very “Foundation of Liberty”.Footnote 82 This accords with Grotius’s views on the consensual foundations of political communities. However, in the example of the right to leave, the value of this foundational liberty only seems to subsist within the confines of public interest. Grotius makes an analogy to a disposition of Roman law that relates to the “Dissolutions of private Societies (privatis societatibus)”: a “natural Rule of Equity” would prohibit a society’s members from leaving “if the Interest of the Society requires he should stay in it (si societatis intersit)”.Footnote 83 Thus, according to the Digest, “[a] Regard is commonly had to the Interest of the Society, and not merely to the particular Interest of any of its Members (non id quod privatim interest unius ex sociis servari solet, sed quod societati expedit)”.Footnote 84

There are two scenarios in which it would be against the interest (intererit) of the state to simply allow its subjects to leave without compensation: “great public debt” and the imminent resolve to go to war. In such situations the sovereign counts on the help of their subjects.Footnote 85 In the case of debt, subjects should pay their share before leaving. In the case of war, they must find someone to replace them on the front. Grotius thus leaves open the possibility of departure, but only if one is able to contribute by other means before leaving. Otherwise, the state’s interest comes first. The case of war reminds us of the subjects’ presumed commitment not to resist the state’s lethal force in the risk of a “great Disturbance in the State” (Sect. 11.5). Here as well, the obligation for the community’s members to risk their very lives on the battlefield seems to be derived from their initial consent rather than from the long-term utility they may expect from the state. Taken together, these two points bring out an aspect of Grotius’s theory that was less salient in his utility-based definition of the state: the associative bonds at the root of the state have a high, intrinsic moral value, and the obligations attached to these hold even in cases of considerable financial loss or danger. I will come back to this point in the conclusion.

Finally, Grotius concludes that the right to leave should be granted in the absence of such major obstacles: “it is to be presumed that Nations leave to every one the Liberty of quitting the State, because from this Privilege they themselves may reap no less an Advantage (commodi) by the Number of Strangers they receive in their Turn”.Footnote 86 This reaffirms the value of individual liberty, but still attaches it to the state’s interest in being able to welcome foreigners in its jurisdiction. As Annabel Brett points out, this view is related to Grotius’s general endeavour to encourage legal provisions that are favourable to free trade.Footnote 87

7 Concluding Remarks

If we summarize Grotius’s positions for purely analytical purposes, two conceptions of the common good emerge. When it comes to the definition of the state as an association for the common good, we are dealing with a sum of individual goods that are pursued by all subjects alike (a peaceful environment and the respect of one’s rights). This evokes a merely aggregative conception of the common good. However, the state’s structure then brings us closer to what Murphy calls a “distinctive” common good, namely “the good of the community as a whole”.Footnote 88 This is reflected in his view of the state as an association endowed with rights superior to those of its members, which guarantees its ability to defend subjects’ interests over time, and hence a motivation to maintain it.Footnote 89 In general, the community’s claims over its members spring from the tasks its members entrusted to it when they joined it with a view to further their own utility. For Grotius, the constraints of compliance with the state’s commands do not actually conflict with subjects’ individual goods, as these are best preserved by the state itself. However, his appeal to numerous eloquent writers to strengthen this point exemplifies his awareness that this may be far from obvious at times. It is not coincidental that the longest discussions in De Iure Belli ac Pacis revolve around what the common good demands in crucial matters as the rights to resist and to leave the state. Grotius sides with the community when its long-term subsistence is under pressure, except when the subject’s life is at imminent risk. Such life-and-death situations make it difficult for him to argue that subjects should contribute to the community’s effort for the sake of their own interest in the long run. In Grotius’s theory, the source of the obligation to obey the state authority resides in the subjects’ commitment when joining the state. This does not only exemplify Grotius’s deference towards subjects’ consent but also a very demanding conception of the obligations that arises from it, which highlights another important component of his theory for our concern: the considerable moral weight of consensual obligations and of associative ties of the state as a societas. Grotius hopes that these moral ties provide a sufficient basis for the requirements of the common good when individual utility is no longer in sight. Hence, states may need to rely on something more than individual utility in its most immediate sense to subsist, even though this does not evidently flow from Grotius’s definition of them.

This last point gives us occasion to consider these findings from a broader perspective and situate them within Grotius’s theory of natural law. The obligatory force of natural law is not predicated on utility, but on a higher principle, namely our natural sociability. Human beings are not only inclined to pursue their own interests, but they are also born with a rational desire to live in community with their fellows, the well-known appetitus societatis that would also hold if “the Necessity of our Circumstances should not require it”.Footnote 90 The fundamental precepts of natural law comprise what is indispensable for the subsistence of any society: the prohibition of stealing, the obligation to give back to others what belongs to them, to keep one’s promises and to compensate for offences done to others, as well as the permissibility of appropriate punishment.Footnote 91 Promissory fidelity is a natural law of particular importance for our study, as it provides the grounds for subjects' obligation to obey the state once they consent to enter into it:

And the Mother of Civil Law is that very Obligation which arises from Consent, which deriving its Force from the Law of Nature, Nature may be called as it were, the Great Grandmother of this Law also.Footnote 92

This obligation proves critical to furnish a robust foundation to the state.Footnote 93 It is in virtue of subjects’ founding promise of obedience that they must obey the state’s laws and authority and remain loyal to the community even when in danger. While Grotius does not dwell on the political aspect of promise keeping as much as Hobbes later will, he insists on many occasions that promises create strong obligations and that promissory fidelity is essential to the thriving of human societies.Footnote 94 This brings me to my conclusion. On the Grotian model, even though people establish states for the sake of their own utility, they thereby incur obligations that have a much broader moral scope than their personal utility. Indeed, the force of consensual obligations is anchored in a natural law that aims for no less than the survival and flourishing of human society as a whole in conformity to human nature and divine will. In relation to this, even though Grotius does not make the institution of the state a requirement of the natural law (in spite of his mention that “Equity and natural Reason, advise us to submit” to courtsFootnote 95), his conception of states suggests that they are a convenient way to promote a harmonious life in community as facilitators of peace and justice. In this sense, we may consider the moral value of Grotian states to encompass more than their expected individual utility. Unlike Hobbes after him, Grotius does not warn us that no sophisticated or meaningful human activity would be possible without the safety provided by the state.Footnote 96 Neither does he go as far as his admirer Pufendorf’s claim that God and His natural law ordained the institution of states as “Instruments and Means of improving and inforcing the Law of Nature”, which ultimately aims for the preservation of the whole of humankind.Footnote 97 Moral improvement is not the explicit purpose of Grotian states. However, they certainly provide conditions that encourage the fulfilment of our sociable nature, which is the source of natural law. In this respect, there is a noteworthy parallel between Grotius’s theory of natural law (which is not rooted in individual utility but is no less conducive to it) and his account of the state, whose main purpose is to convey individual utility while enabling a more sociable life in its noblest sense. This illustrates, once again, Grotius’s persistent effort to demonstrate the convergence of the individual and common good.