Keywords

1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the relationship between the common and individual good in Politica Methodice Digesta, Atque Exemplis Sacris et Profanis Illustrata (1614),Footnote 1 which is a book written by the German Calvinist jurist, rector, and civil servant Johannes Althusius (1563–1638). Althusius is hailed as one of the leading reformed political thinkers of the early modern period, and a vigorous defendant of the local autonomies of the old plural order of guilds, estates, and cities against the rising sovereignty of the territorial state, advocated by Jean Bodin (1530–1596) and later by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). Being on the wrong side of history, so to speak, made Althusius’ work controversial – while Politica was widely read in its time, it was also despised by many. Famous contemporary critics of Althusius include, among others, Henning Arnisaeus (1570–1636).Footnote 2 In this chapter, we will find grounds to think of Althusius as a defendant of the plurality of communities, but I suspect that the reasons for possible antipathy will be different now than 400 years ago. For it is not his views on the rights of the associated people and the possibility of deposing, even executing, a ruler appointed by God that now sends shivers down the spine but his views on the extent of political control that is needed to lead people to their individual and common good.

The basic relation between the common and individual good in Althusius’ theory is laid out in section two, followed by a short discussion concerning the terms ‘the common good’ and ‘individual good’ in the context of Politica. The basic proposition is that the common and individual good are intimately connected in Althusius’ theory. Section 10.2.1 deals with the plurality of communities. It will be shown that despite the multitude of communities, there emerges no serious challenge to the unity of the common and individual good. Instead, different communities and their members form a harmonious society in which different parts are in reciprocal relationships with each other. Section 10.2.2 in turn pays attention to the normative conditions of social life. Harmonious and reciprocal social life and the parallel alignment of the individual and common good do not happen automatically but require the observation of various norms. Section three moves on to analyze, case by case (Sects. 10.3.1 and 10.3.4), selected conflict situations in a society envisaged by Althusius. These involve, in some way or another, a conflict between the common and individual good of a member, part, or individual subject of a commonwealth. In the concluding section four, the various findings from section three will be summarized and discussed to specify what the alignment of the common and individual good in fact requires.

2 Harmony Between the Individual and Common Good

The relationship between the common and individual good seems quite straightforward. According to Althusius, human beings are by their corrupted nature incapable of satisfying their various needs in solitude.Footnote 3 In order to live well, and indeed to live at all, they need the help of others.Footnote 4 Thus, a community (consociatio) is established to engage in mutual communication (communicatio), or sharing, to provide for the needs of all.Footnote 5 Instead of sharing ideas, communicatio mainly involves sharing things (res), works (operae), and right (jus), but also charity (charitas), benevolence (benevolentia), help (auxilium), and advice (consilium), for instance.Footnote 6 In mutual life, each contributes according to his or her calling from God, that is, according to his or her natural abilities and learned skills.Footnote 7 As a result of various works and contributions, each receives what they were initially lacking as individuals.Footnote 8 The outcome of this development is an active, reciprocal life between the members of a community.Footnote 9 As Althusius himself writes:

Thus the needs of body and soul, and the seeds of virtue implanted in our souls, drew dispersed men together into one place. These causes have built villages, established cities, founded academic institutions, and united by civil unity and society a diversity of farmers, craftsmen, laborers, builders, soldiers, merchants, learned and unlearned men and so many members of the same body. Consequently, while some persons provided for others, and some received from others what they themselves lacked, all came together into a certain public body that we call the commonwealth, and by mutual aid devoted themselves to the general good and welfare of this body.Footnote 10

According to this statement, social life seems to emerge simply to provide for the needs of individuals. Reflecting the vein of thought that the editors of this volume identify as “ancient”, Althusius holds that the good of a human being, his or her aim, is sought and obtained in social life.Footnote 11 This is supported by the comparison between the aim of human beings, which is “holy, just, comfortable, and happy symbiosis, a life lacking nothing either necessary or useful”,Footnote 12 and the aim of politics, which is “the enjoyment of comfortable, useful, and happy life, and of common welfare […]. The end is also the conservation of human society, which aims at having a life in which it is possible to worship God quietly and without error.”Footnote 13 Both definitions include similar terms and involve secular and religious elements. Indeed, for Althusius, the aim of social life – or “symbiotic life” in his terminology – is to provide the needs of both the body and the soul, which refer to material needs and security on the one hand, and to education and religion on the other hand.Footnote 14 While education covers the training of reason and skills, it also covers knowledge of God, morals, and true religion, which are essential since social life is not established solely for well-being in this earthly life but also in order to live a life that is pleasing to God in the hope of salvation and eternal life.Footnote 15 Yet, the discussion about the “general good and welfare of this body” in the quote aboveFootnote 16 as well as the discussion about the “conservation of human society” as an aim of politics suggest that, in addition to the needs of the body and soul, there is also concern for the continued existence of the established community and society.Footnote 17

As the account above shows, ‘the common good’ – or the common or public utility (utilitas), benefit (commodum), and welfare (salus), of which Althusius himself generally writes about – is a multi-dimensional notion.Footnote 18 It includes at least two discernible aspects: (1) teleological, referring to the aim or purpose of social life/community/society, which were just shown to connect directly to the aim of human beings; and (2) concrete, referring to the communicatio, that is, the sharing of things, works, and rights. These relate to each other in the way that communicatio provides the means to the common aim(s). This straightforward relation is complicated first by the fact that the community takes an instrumental role in the pursuit of the aim of human beings as the framework for communicatio: it is a means to an end (or ends). However, when the ‘common good’ is extended to include the ‘good of the community’, the aim is not simply to satisfy the needs of the body and soul of individuals but also to preserve the community, as noted. Hence, the community is also an end in itself. Consequently, the common good involves multiple aims, which communicatio can be made to serve. Another complication arises from the fact that Althusius discusses various kinds of communities, and consequently, his model of society includes a multitude of communities with more or less separate aims, sharing, and existence. It follows that the network of means and ends is expanded further. Both of these complications in determining the common good are discussed in what follows since they give reason to doubt the smooth consolidation of the individual and common good.

Now if ‘the common good’ is a complicated notion, ‘individual good’ and ‘self-interest’ are outright problematic in Althusius’ theory. The individuality or singularity of the good of an individual does not, in fact, truly exists in Althusius’ theory because the good for an individual is ultimately to achieve the general aim of human beings – rather than some specific individual aim – which in turn is common to all human beings and hence, in a sense, the common good. This aim is the mentioned “holy, just, comfortable, and happy symbiosis, a life lacking nothing either necessary or useful”. There is of course something of the individuality present even in Althusius’ theory since not every human being is the same and they clearly have different strengths and skills to utilize and roles to play in society. In a word, they have their own vocatio.Footnote 19 The point is rather that while the differences between human beings are in this sense recognized – and play a major part in the origin of social life and in the operation of communities and the broader society – social life is built with an eye for what is shared: the common aim and the means to achieve it. Consequently, the success of a community, and social life in general, is measured in relation to the attainment of the shared aim and not by the achievement of the possible individual aims of individual human beings, which play only a supporting role. Indeed, Althusius’ society is not a liberal society of individuals seeking self-interest in the manner of John Locke (1632–1704).Footnote 20 For example, the vocatio of a human being is not really his or her free choice but planned by God and regulated by the ruler.Footnote 21 What is made to matter for individuals is whether or not they achieve the general aim of all human beings, and not whether they are free to pursue their particular interests. Regardless of this entanglement of the individual and common good, the sense in which I will track the individual good and self-interest here is through the utility, benefit, and welfare of an individual human being(s), or some member(s), or part(s) of a community or broader society. What is sought after is the possibility of demarcation and conflict between the good for individuals (and members or parts) and the good for a community (or the whole).

2.1 The Plurality of Communities and the Reciprocity Between Them

One of the defining features of Althusius’ understanding of society is that it involves a plurality of communities. He discusses different types of consociationes, starting from private communities, including the family and guild (collegium), and proceeding to public communities, such as cities, provinces, and commonwealths. The sequence of treatment reflects Althusius’ conviction that society develops starting from the family – as the seedbed of rest – and culminates in the commonwealth.Footnote 22 This opens an interesting prospect that there might be many common goods rather than just one, if the ‘common good’ is understood as the ‘good of the community’. However, this is not quite what happens.

It is true that we can discern different aims or purposes between communities as well as differences in their scope and quality of communicatio. Private communities are established by individual human beings through a special covenant (pactum) to share among themselves something special (quid peculiare) according to their circumstances and way of life, that is, according to what is useful and necessary for private symbiotic life.Footnote 23 Private communities are divided into natural (conjugal, kinship, and household relationships) and voluntary (various collegia) consociationes.Footnote 24 The conjugal relationship is established to produce offspring and to avoid fornication, while the other natural relationships extend mutual care among relatives and housemates.Footnote 25 The purpose and communicatio of a collegium are determined by its members, wherefore there is a whole range of different collegia for different purposes.Footnote 26 Usually, they are established by the heads of households of the same trade and occupation for their mutual benefit.Footnote 27 In particular, the collegia of magistrates serve, however, the benefit of the broader society since magistrates in general are not allowed to advance their own private benefit, but they use public jurisdiction (jus potestatis) to give rules for the other collegia.Footnote 28

Nonetheless, the given plurality of aims and the division of society into many private communities that serve the benefit of their own members does not lead to a true plurality of the good of communities nor to competition or conflict between communities. As has been pointed out in the literature, the result is instead reciprocity, or subsidiarity, between communities, where they all serve the same overall purpose of social life but do it by providing different useful and necessary things for this aim.Footnote 29 This is particularly clear in the transition from private to public communities. For example, some households – through their internal organizations of private things, work, and rights – produce agricultural goods, others produce craftworks, and yet others engage in commerce.Footnote 30 United in a city, they can share and exchange with each other the useful and necessary fruits of their labour and benefit from the public goods and works of the community – individually as well as collectively.Footnote 31 They do so under the shared law and right of the community, the guidance and direction of the magistrate, and the protection provided by the city guards, walls, and other measures of defence.Footnote 32

The peculiar fact that there are several types of public communities rather than just one does not lead to conflict either. Again, we can discern some traces of a division of labour among the first level of public communities which do not only cover cities in a narrow sense of urban community, but also smaller rural communities such as villages and towns, for example.Footnote 33 The inhabitants of the latter carry out agricultural activities, whereas the inhabitants of urban communities engage in manual labour (functiones mechanicae) and scholarly studies (studiaFootnote 34). In the end, it is the urban community that unites the various villages under one law and thus enables the communicatio between rural and urban populationsFootnote 35 These urban communities in turn vary in size and status, reflecting a more or less extensive sphere of communicatio.Footnote 36

A similar division of labour is not formally discernible between civitas, provincia, and respublica as they all show a rounded concern for the good of the body and soul of their people and use similar means to achieve these.Footnote 37 Furthermore, possible conflicts between levels of public communities are minimized in Althusius’ schema, in which the cities and provinces are the members of the commonwealth and, as a collective, the sovereign of the realm.Footnote 38 As the holders of supreme power, the members collegially determine the rights and laws of the commonwealth, the scope of its communicatio, and the mandate of its ruler (summus magistratus).Footnote 39 According to Thomas Hueglin (a.k.a. Hüglin), who emphasizes the importance of representation and collegial decision-making procedure in Althusius’ theory, cities and provinces retain jurisdiction in their own matters, while the level of commonwealth establishes a sort of framework of law and justice for the various sub-groups to operate in.Footnote 40 Following Hueglin and others who underscore the relative autonomy of the sub-groups and division of jurisdiction between the public communities, we can conceive that Althusius recognizes the existence of different interests among them – and, as Hueglin argues, skilfully manages those interests with his federal model for society – but even so, no difference in the ultimate aim emerges.Footnote 41

Be that as it may, the reason for associating further in higher-level consociationes seems to be to increase self-sufficiency. When explaining, at the end of Politica, the relationship between different community types and levels, as well as the natural progression of communities from the family to the city, Althusius states somewhat cryptically that “these symbiotic communities can survive without the province or commonwealth, but until they are joined in symbiotic body of province or commonwealth, they are deprived of many benefits and necessary supports of life”.Footnote 42 It seems then that communal life is possible without higher levels of public communities, but provinces and the commonwealth still bring about many useful and necessary things for social life. Hence, self-sufficiency is a continuum and ever-expanding phenomenon rather than something that is conclusively achieved on a certain level of association. Even the commonwealth is not in every respect self-sufficient because the goods (bona) of the associated body can be increased by forming confederations.Footnote 43 Their purpose is either limited to mutual defence or extended to the creation of a new body with a new sphere of shared right, on account of which inhabitants engage in commercial activities in confederated realms.Footnote 44 Beyond these few remarks on confederations, and on the usefulness of trade and merchants for cultivating goodwill between different areas and peoples, Althusius is not really dealing with international relationships like his contemporary and adversary Hugo Grotius was.Footnote 45 However, Politica includes a lengthy discussion on arms and war, and hence Althusius acknowledges that international relations can be hostile, that is, non-reciprocal.Footnote 46

2.2 The Normative Framework of Sharing

The reciprocal life between the members of a community requires the sharing of right (jus) in order to succeed. The lex consociationis et symbiosis, or jus symbioticum, as Althusius calls shared right, is essential for the other aspects of communicatio since it serves to direct and govern social life and prescribes the reason and manner of sharing between members of the community.Footnote 47 In other words, social life in general, and particularly the reciprocal character that Althusius attributes to it, does not happen just in any way but within certain normative bounds and with active directing and governance.

The laws of a particular community stipulate the way the community is to be ruled and concern the specific way and extent of communicatio in that community.Footnote 48 These “proper laws” (propriae leges) of the communities are based on natural and divine laws that are fully compatible and substantially manifested in the Decalogue.Footnote 49 The latter is relevant because it gives the guidelines for living piously towards God (the first table of the Decalogue) and justly towards fellow human beings (the second table).Footnote 50 Whereas the precepts of the first table explain the duties towards God, the precepts of the second explain the duties in human relations, that is, between superiors and inferiors and between neighbours.Footnote 51 The proper way of treating people includes respect for life, honour, and the property of one’s neighbour.Footnote 52 The precepts tell us what belongs to me, what to you, and what to God according to natural/divine justice. In a sense, they set the just and inviolable limits for sharing and governance but also positive duties to act and live in a certain way in relation to God and other people.Footnote 53

The directing and governing function of social life, which is a part of the jus symbioticum, has a general aspect that is common to all communities. It states that in every community, some people rule and others submit according to their different abilities and worth.Footnote 54 In the context of arguing for the naturalness of ruling, Althusius writes, for example, that “it is very useful for the individual who cannot provide for himself to be helped and preserved by the other; and that is said to be the better which is self-sufficient and can help others […]”.Footnote 55 Leader(s)Footnote 56 are needed because people are not capable of leading themselves, and an attempt to do so would only lead to continuous discord and the dissolution of society.Footnote 57 Besides the communicatio, there is a need for administratio that sees to the fulfilment of the former.Footnote 58 However, Althusius repeatedly stresses that the authority of the leader(s) is given only for the good (that is, welfare, utility, or benefit) of the community – for the “utility and welfare of the subjects individually and collectively”.Footnote 59

The last remarks involve three important points. First, the quoted section suggests that the good of the community can be understood in two ways: as referring either to the utility of individuals or to the utility of the collective or the whole. A concrete example can shed some light on this difference. In his discussion concerning the city (civitas), Althusius divides public goods into two categories that are based on Roman law.Footnote 60 In the first place, public goods are such that individual members or citizens can use them for their own utility insofar as their use of these goods does not hinder others from using them.Footnote 61 Althusius gives a long list of such goods, including, for example, forests, pastures, fishponds, rivers, roads, temples, schools, and various other public places and buildings.Footnote 62 The second category of public goods refers to things owned by the community (universitas), which are not for the benefit of individuals but for everyone collectively.Footnote 63 These include, for example, tax revenues, storehouses, armouries, and other common stocks, as well as pastures, and ore mines.Footnote 64 While the complete lists of both categories of public goods overlap in kind, there remains the difference that public goods are either for the direct utility of individuals or for the utility of the whole community, for its defence, for example.

The second important point relates to the role of leaders. While Althusius makes it quite clear that the magistrates should advance the good of the people and not their own, it is significant that the care for the good of the community is given to the magistrates. Within their mandate – the jurisdiction given by the members of the community – the magistrates have the responsibility and power to determine what the utility, benefit, and welfare of the subject individually and collectively require.Footnote 65 Although the decision-making is often collegial, involving the members of the community – and takes place on various levels of exercising their own jurisdiction – in practice, the leader enforces on the individuals the way of life that is compatible with the purpose of the community that the members have agreed to.Footnote 66 When we keep in mind that ultimately this purpose pertains to the good of both the body and soul, this creates a setting in which the individual is subject to his superiors when it comes to the attainment of his aim, the “holy, just, comfortable, and happy symbiosis, a life lacking nothing either necessary or useful”.

Significantly, the introduction of the magistrate has also a bearing on the relationship between the individual good and the good of the community or the whole. As Francesco Ingravalle has noted,Footnote 67 Althusius posits the care for the wellbeing of the whole (commonwealth) before the care for a member (or part of that commonwealth):

Just as a good physician tends first the whole body, draws out bad fluids from it, and then applies special remedies to the sick limb; so also the administrator of the commonwealth first tends the whole body, then its members, and employs different remedies for them.Footnote 68

When we add here that human beings in general tend to prefer private benefits (privata commoda) over public utility (publica utilitas), the role of the magistrate is further emphasized as the one who looks after the common good in the sense of the good of the whole.Footnote 69

The final point has to do with the possibility of discord and the dissolution of society. Althusius consistently underscores the importance of harmony (harmonia), concord (concordia), and agreement (consensio) between members of a community.Footnote 70 He writes that consensio prevails when members’ “heart and soul are one, willing, doing, and refusing the same for the common benefit”.Footnote 71 Since he also states that “without agreement and mutual concord there can be no community and friendship”,Footnote 72 the consensus among the members of a community is crucial for its existence and ability to advance the common benefit.Footnote 73 While leader(s) have an important function to facilitate harmonious life, the aspiration for consensus involves agreement between members.Footnote 74 Consequently, there seems to be little room for substantial disagreement between the members. Even though there is no theoretical possibility of disagreeing on the ultimate aim of politics and human beings – since only one is presented – there is clearly the possibility of disagreeing on the means to achieve this aim. This suggests that at least in practice, the alignment of the good of the members and the common good is a condition rather than a fact of mutual life in a community – the harmony and consensus between the members is not a certainty but something that needs to be actively sought after.Footnote 75

The need to live the right way is further illustrated with certain familiar maxims that Althusius endorses. We can find in his theory the Calvinist notion that working means to work for the welfare of others and for the glory of God.Footnote 76 Referring to the Apostle Paul, Althusius gives the instruction to prioritize the benefit of one’s neighbour above one’s own, even to the extent of sacrificing one’s own right for the greater benefit of another.Footnote 77 This can be seen as charity, which the Decalogue teaches and without which social life, or symbiosis, is not possible.Footnote 78 Similarly, while it was stated previously that human beings tend to prefer their own benefit above public utility, there is no question that it should be the opposite when living in a community.Footnote 79 As a consequence, it is justified to deviate from normal bounds and to sacrifice private good for the public good in emergency situations, for example, by paying extra taxes or relinquishing private property for the commonwealth.Footnote 80 With all these remarks, we can see how Althusius’ model for social life as symbiosis characterized by reciprocity is supported by – if not entirely built on – the moral requirement to act charitably and to fulfil duties towards God and fellow human beings.

The findings thus far can be summarized by noting that the individual and common good do not coincide necessarily or automatically, but only within a certain conception of social life and its conditions: there needs to be (1) an agreement and consensus between the members of the community (2) to live together (3) and share what is necessary and useful for social life, (4) according to the laws they themselves established (5) in accordance with the natural and divine law – especially in accordance with the duties of the Decalogue – (6) and under the guidance and administration of the leader of the community, (7) who acts for the good of the community, (8) which involves the good of the body and soul of the subjects (9) and requires acting for the benefit of one’s neighbour and for the glory and honour of God.

While these are all general requirements for social life, many of them are also conditions for the alignment of the individual and common good. As we will soon see, disparities between the individual and common good can be found in situations where some of the mentioned conditions are lacking or threatened, such as in disagreement, unlawfulness, immorality, and failures in leadership and the duty to do one’s part.

3 Conflicts Between the Individual and Common Good

Although the previous discussion has underscored the reciprocal and harmonious character of social life, conflict nevertheless creeps in even in Althusius’ society. This is due to the normative nature of social life. To achieve the common aim, which is the good of the members and the preservation of the community, life in communities must be lived in a certain way rather than just anyway. For this to happen, the role of the magistrate is critical since it is the magistrate’s duty to administer the life of the subjects for their good individually and as a whole. Consequently, the possible conflicts between the individual good and the common good, or the good of the community, are to be found in conflicts between a ruler and the commonwealth, or between a ruler and a member, part, or individual subject of the commonwealth.

3.1 Tyrant Against the Common Good

Perhaps the most obvious place to find conflicts in Althusius’ design for society is his (in)famous discussion on tyranny.Footnote 81 In Althusius’ words, “tyranny is opposed to right and just administration”,Footnote 82 and the tyrant is one who “obstinately, violating the faith and sanctity of oath, begins to tear down and dissolve the bonds and foundations of associated body of the commonwealth”.Footnote 83 The idea is roughly that the tyrannical ruler is overstepping or abusing his mandate to govern, which has been bestowed upon him by the members, and this in turn threatens the very existence of the commonwealth. For Althusius, it is essential that the ruler is bound by the laws of the commonwealth and by the collective will of its members.Footnote 84 Towards the end of his discussion on tyranny, Althusius writes that the welfare of the commonwealth is the highest law.Footnote 85

Althusius divides tyranny into two main categories. The first concerns the overthrow and destruction of the fundamental laws of the commonwealth. These fundamental laws refer simply to “certain treaties by which many cities and provinces unite and agree to hold and defend one and the same commonwealth by common works, advice, and help”.Footnote 86 Althusius states that it is tyrannical for a ruler to violate, change, or remove fundamental laws, especially those that concern true religion.Footnote 87 In addition, he considers it tyranny when a ruler does not remain loyal to the associated body, disregards the sanctity of oath, and destroys the orders and estates of the realm or prevents them from performing their duties.Footnote 88 These definitions make it clear that what is under attack here is the established order of society and the way of life that the members of the commonwealth have agreed to. The violations of fundamental laws are basically violations of the collective agreement of the members. This agreement does not determine the aim of human beings, which is given, but involves consent to mutual life and to communication to achieve that aim.Footnote 89

The second kind of tyranny consists of the administration of things (res) and activities (negotium) of the associated body contrary to piety and justice.Footnote 90 Althusius further divides this into general and specific, in which the latter – on which we will focus – is against some part (pars) or section (caput) of administration.Footnote 91 Some cases of specific tyranny involve actions that can be interpreted as being contrary to the good of the souls of individuals, like the attempt to deprive one or more members of the commonwealth from the true religion (Calvinism) and force idolatry on them, or the spoiling of morals either by setting up inns and brothels or by abolishing and neglecting places of virtue and piety like schools.Footnote 92 Other cases relate more to the good of the body, which is endangered by neglecting the defence against violence and injustice, and by encouraging division, rivalries and disagreements, for instance.Footnote 93 A special type of tyranny involves the elimination and hindrance of trade and hence of the necessary means for sustaining life and the community.Footnote 94 Althusius further condemns as tyranny the draining of subjects by immoderate taxes, contributions, and services.Footnote 95

While the previous examples show the neglect of, interference in, or assault on the good of individuals, there is little indication of the anticipated rift between the individual and common good. In this respect, cases concerning public goods yield more interesting results. These include situations in which the ruler misuses public goods for his private desire (libido privata), luxury, and illicit amusements, or sells villages, towns, cities, and provinces and thus separates them from the commonwealth.Footnote 96 It is also tyranny “to pull down public goods to build up the tyrant’s private property, and thereby deprive many in order to enrich just a few”.Footnote 97 In these situations, the wrongdoing is in using what was meant for the good of the people, either individually or collectively, for the individual or private good of the ruler. Consequently, the private good of the ruler is not to be equated with the common good or the good of the community – the ruler is there to serve the good of his people, not himself.Footnote 98 However, this does not mean that the good of the commonwealth would not also involve the good of the ruler in the sense that he has sufficient resources to appear splendid and magnificent, for instance.Footnote 99 Instead, there is an attempt to demarcate between the acceptable and unacceptable – as in useless or immoderate – spending of public funds (pecunia publica), which is also reflected in Althusius’ view that it is tyranny to use the realm’s things (res regni) for prohibited purposes or to wastefully use the goods of the realm (bona regni) to its public ruin.Footnote 100

The given examples draw a distinction between the person, will, and good of the ruler and those of the commonwealth or the people. Althusius’ discussion on tyranny also includes a situation that shows a division between the parts of the commonwealth. Usually, remedies for tyranny involve more or less severe measures against the tyrannical ruler that range from reproach to deposition.Footnote 101 However, Althusius holds that a part of the realm can in fact leave the remaining body (1) if the public and manifest welfare of the part recommends it, or (2) if the fundamental laws are not observed by the magistrate, or (3) if the true worship and obvious command of God clearly requires it.Footnote 102 Here we have, then, direct (1) as well as indirect (2 and 3) references to the good of the part that now stands as separate from the whole.

Nevertheless, Althusius’ discussion does not quite allow us to infer that these cases (1, 2, 3) undoubtedly represent a conflict between the good of a part and the good of the rest – or between the good of a member community and the good of the commonwealth – because there is no explicit reference to the good of the remaining body. Instead, it is quite clear that the leaving part has a just cause and that it does what is good by leaving, while on the contrary, the situation for the rest does not seem good either before or after the separation since the remaining body suffers from tyranny: in case (2), it suffers from the violation of the fundamental laws (the agreements of the members); and in case (3), it suffers from the inability to practice the one and only true religion, that is, from the inability to seek the good of the soul. The only unclarity in this respect involves the first situation (1). It is not certain whether the welfare of the remaining body is affected by the leaving of one part to seek welfare for itself. Keeping in mind, however, that welfare, utility, and benefit are served by extending communicatio, it seems unlikely that the reduction of the whole through one part leaving would be good for the rest. However, this is not entirely impossible because Althusius also holds that a medium-sized commonwealth is better than a great or small one.Footnote 103

3.2 Concern for the Unity of the Commonwealth

For the rest of the chapter, the nature of the conflicts dealt with will be different from the previous examples. From now on the ruler is right and justified in correcting his subjects because he is acting within his mandate and hence working by default for the good of his subjects individually and collectively. These conflict situations are relevant insofar as (1) doing something wrong has a connection to seeking self-interest, which the ruler seeks to curb by his mandate; and (2) they reveal something new about the actual content of the common good and its relation to the good of individuals, members, or the people in general.

Concerning the second aspect, it is revealing that Althusius devotes a whole chapter to the conservation of public concord and tranquillity, which boils down to maintaining the unity of the commonwealth against factions and seditions that can arise from numerous causes.Footnote 104 While Althusius thinks that in every dispute, faction, and sedition, there are (eventually) two parties, one of which defends the law and justice of the community against all who act unjustly, nowhere in this context does he explicitly treat the defiant party as having a just cause to pursue something truly good.Footnote 105 Instead, the point of view is that of the magistrate who works to prevent the people (populus) from degenerating into a crowd (multitude, turba).Footnote 106 In fact, here and elsewhere within the discussion on administration – and particularly on political prudence – we can discern clear influences from the notion of the ‘reason of state’, which seems to place the continued existence and order of the commonwealth as a major, if not the primary, concern of the ruler.Footnote 107 Consequently, the possibility of a conflict emerges between the actions of the ruler, who is concerned with unity, and the interests of the people (or a part of them, or an individual).

Althusius’ discussion on the causes of factions is less than flattering to humans in general since factions arise from private and public hatreds between different families or from ambition, disagreement, discord, enmities, rivalries, and bad suspicions.Footnote 108 While we could perhaps interpret ambition and rivalry as something related to pursuing one’s own advantage, it is still clear that they are negative things that disturb the peace and tranquillity of the commonwealth.Footnote 109 Yet, some of the causes for sedition include reasons that are more difficult to categorize as simply bad or unjustified. Althusius mentions, for example, scarcity and excessive or unusual taxation and oppression imposed for unnecessary expenses.Footnote 110 As these come close to one of the cases of tyranny, it gives reason to think that perhaps not all causes for sedition are necessarily condemnable. Instead, the action itself – turning against the ruler without following the proper procedure for countering tyranny – is what makes it bad.

The second interesting feature of this discussion is that Althusius – like Plato to whom he refers, among others – also considers excessive wealth (divitiae) and poverty as causes of sedition since (1) wealth leads to self-indulgence, indolence, a desire (desiderium) for new things, and unrest, and since (2) poverty also begets a desire (cupididas) for new things, as well as many crimes and disgraces.Footnote 111 I will come back to the effects of wealth and poverty below, but it should be noted that Althusius also mentions the idleness of subjects that results from too much happiness, satiety, and indulgence, as a cause for sedition.Footnote 112 Moreover, elsewhere he writes that when people are in need, they are submissive and humble towards those from whom they expect help, but as soon as they feel that they are doing well, and especially when they have an abundance of wealth, they strive for freedom and try to shake off the yoke of their superiors.Footnote 113 These remarks remarkably suggest that if and when the common good or the good of the community is understood to include the unity of the commonwealth and the stability of the government, the material welfare of the subjects, if it is excessive, is in fact not compatible with the good of the community.Footnote 114 This creates an interesting contrast with the discussion on tyranny, where a part could leave the rest if its welfare required it. While there the ruler had clearly failed to preserve the unity of the commonwealth and the (adequate) welfare of the people, here he is still trying – and possibly succeeding, when employing the various measures for subduing seditionFootnote 115 – to achieve both.

Finally, the pursuit for the good of the soul can be a cause of sedition in the sense that different opinions concerning religion can lead to schisms, sects, and secession.Footnote 116 This does not relativize religion since, according to Althusius, there is only one true religion. However, if the true religion is not the only one practiced in the commonwealth, and if the ruler cannot remove discrepancy in religion without danger to the commonwealth, he should tolerate the dissidents for the sake of public peace.Footnote 117 The good of the soul of the people has then to yield to peace and unity of the commonwealth. However, even here the question is not about completely disregarding the pursuit of the good of the soul since peace means the survival of the commonwealth and hence the Church within it.Footnote 118 This is even advantageous for the rest of the commonwealth since Althusius holds that the existence of some true believers in the commonwealth brings the favour of God for the whole realm, or at least shelters it from God’s wrath.Footnote 119

3.3 The Exclusion of Some Work from Society

As we have seen, individuals contribute to the common good – or to the good of others and to their own good – with their individual skills and strengths, according to their calling from God. This happens under the direction and guidance of the ruler and his administration since they regulate work so that professions that are important for the community are taken care of and not too many individuals are dedicated to one profession.Footnote 120 The result is a mutual life in which various useful and necessary tasks complement each other. According to Althusius, the general precondition for the usefulness and necessity of activities (negotium) is that they are directed to the welfare (salus) of the body and soul.Footnote 121 Odermatt observes that Althusius bases the ethical value of every activity on two standards: whether it glorifies and honours God and whether it is useful for the symbiosis. Consequently, in accordance with the earlier observations concerning the normative character of social life, we can note that the usefulness of an activity for an individual does not suffice for its positive evaluation.Footnote 122 Althusius’ discussion of craft activities that are bad, or are considered to be so, will serve to illustrate his evaluation of activities.Footnote 123

To begin with, Althusius states that some professions quite literally involve dirty work (sordidus), such as charcoal makers, blacksmiths, and carpenters, but this observation does not entail any kind of ethical evaluation.Footnote 124 Some work is ignoble (illiberalis) and hateful to people, like the work of custom and tax collectors, money-lenders, and money changers, but it is difficult so see how these disliked professions would be useless or unnecessary: taxes, for instance, are gathered for the necessity and utility of the commonwealth.Footnote 125 Yet, Althusius also includes in this category peddlers, counterfeiters, retailers, and others who profit from falsehoods and untruths, which suggests that – at least in some cases – there is also an ethical principle at work.Footnote 126 Moreover, some activities are vile and servile because they serve less useful or, in the opinion of men, less honourable needs.Footnote 127 These include, for example, pig dealers, gatekeepers, barbers, muleteers, millworkers, butchers, innkeepers, etc., which again do not seem to be useless or unnecessary but are presumably shunned for their low social standing. More to the point are works that serve pleasure instead of necessity (voluptuariis & minus necessariis usibus inserviunt), such as the profession of brocade weavers, gladiators, athletes, beast fighters, mime artists, show dancers, actors, comedians, jesters, etc. We can presuppose that many people enjoy the products of these works, but Althusius denounces them for their lesser usefulness for the symbiosis and due to his protestant morals, which call for the abstinence of luxuries and self-indulgence.Footnote 128 Finally, Althusius mentions that impious or altogether peculiar arts (artes impiae vel prosus curiosae), which are harmful to the moral purity of the people or useless for human life, cannot be tolerated in the commonwealth at all.Footnote 129 Unfortunately, he does not give any examples of these.Footnote 130

Setting aside the obvious multidimensionality of evaluations of the ‘badness’ of some craftworks, we can still see that the usefulness and necessity of activities are set in a continuous rather than a binary scale. Some works are simply deemed less useful and necessary than others, but this does not entail their complete unusefulness, while it is connected to their lower social valuation. Nevertheless, moral concerns and utter (social) uselessness do exclude some activities from the common life all together. This underlines the fact that not every kind of activity is compatible – and some, like the professions related to pleasure, are uncomfortably compatible – with the ideal of mutual life in which the different professions serve reciprocally the utility, benefit, and welfare of all the members, and consequently the common good.Footnote 131 Concerning the individual’s point of view, Althusius writes that if a person is suitable for more than one vocation, he should choose the best one (optima), which Odermatt takes to refer to the ethically highest one that leads to the glory of God.Footnote 132 The possibility that someone’s inclinations and abilities would be directed only to morally unacceptable activities, is not addressed.

3.4 Censorship of Immoderate Behaviour

The evaluation of the usefulness and morality of activities is further relevant for us to the extent that it includes situations that can at least broadly be conceived as conflicts between self-interest and the good of the community, but which can also be conceived as conflicts between self-interest and individual good. In this context, it is quite difficult to consider the pursuit of one’s own benefit as the pursuit of individual good because the ‘goodness’ of one’s behaviour is so intimately tied to the right way of living. As is claimed in several chapters of this volume, there is no conflict between the two genuine ‘goods’, that is, between the individual and common good. Rather, the conflict is between the bad behaviour of an individual and the requirement to act in a way that is objectively good, that is, piously toward God and justly toward neighbours, which includes being useful to the community.

In this respect, Althusius’ discussion of censorship (censura) is revealing.Footnote 133 Censorship is the investigation and reproach of those habits (mores) and luxuries (luxus) that are not hindered or punished by laws, but which however corrupt the souls of the subjects or uselessly consume their goods.Footnote 134 Censorship also corrects what is not yet worthy of punishment but, if neglected or disregarded, can become a cause of many and great evils and, if little by little omitted, can pull the Commonwealth out by the root.Footnote 135 What is relevant here is, first, that bad behaviour is taken to be detrimental for the inner state of a person, for his or her soul, and hence it is contrary to the good of the soul. Althusius’ discussion also reveals a concern for the good of the body since the useless consummation of goods (bona) is also condemned. However, bad morals are not bad only because they are bad for the person themself. There is also a certain interpersonal dimension present since censors should investigate the vices that “do not appear in court […] but nevertheless offend the eyes of pious and good citizens and merit, to make an example, a most serious reprimand […]”.Footnote 136

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that bad behaviour can be detrimental for the commonwealth if it is allowed to spread. Elsewhere, when explaining the negative effects of too-great-a population and power of the commonwealth, Althusius writes that “power leads to wealth (divitiae), wealth to pleasures (voluptates), and pleasure to all vices”, and he infers that “when the power of commonwealth is increased, its fortitude and virtue are diminished”,Footnote 137 which ultimately results in the downfall of the commonwealth.Footnote 138 Thus, there seems to be an intimate connection between the behaviour of individuals and the success of the commonwealth. Both affect each other: bad behaviour and luxury are bad for the commonwealth, and the power and wealth of the commonwealth beget vices in its citizens.

The key to understanding the badness of behaviour is immoderation, which seems to characterize many vices as well as the badness of excessive power and wealth. Althusius gives several examples of bad morals, such as wantonness, lust, drunkenness, abuse (jurgium), errors, schisms, heresies, and perjury.Footnote 139 He also mentions prohibited or limited things, such as obscene and infamous books, shameful and dishonest speeches, singing, games, dancing, and feasts.Footnote 140 While these examples make up a bit of a mixed bag including both secular and religious wrongs, Althusius also writes that the good and saintly (sanctus) morals of the commonwealth are plagued and corrupted by two evils, namely the public pleasure of luxury and immoderate licentiousness, as well as “praising the amassing of money by whatever means, as if it would be an honourable pursuit”.Footnote 141 What these evils have in common is that they pertain to having or desiring something too much. While they are seemingly secular rather than religious, they are connected to the good of the soul because “he is not dear to God, to whom wealth is dear”.Footnote 142 In any case, the lack of restraint gives a reason for censorship, which Althusius describes, citing Cicero, as a teacher of sense, of shame and moderation.Footnote 143

Wealth and money (pecunia) are particularly interesting examples because they are clearly both good and bad.Footnote 144 On the one hand, since wealth can lead to vices and “money is the nurse and mother of all luxuries and the greatest curse”,Footnote 145 wealth and money are clearly negative things. On the other hand – and in addition to the fact that material well-being is an integral part of self-sufficiency – Althusius also acknowledges that wealthy subjects are useful for the commonwealth and the magistrate. He writes that “the ruler’s most certain treasure is in the coffers of his subjects”.Footnote 146 In other words, wealthy subjects are a good thing as they can contribute to taxes to make up the public goods (res/bona publica) of the community, which are used in turn for the utility and necessity of the commonwealth.Footnote 147 For “everything is for sale for a coin, whether one desires allies or soldiers, or to destroy enemies or cities”.Footnote 148 This apparent contradiction is overcome by moderating the desire for money. Crucially, this moderation is a public matter as it is the task of censorship to “remove the too excessive pursuit for money […], limit greed, interest, gnawing usury, and filthy gain”Footnote 149 and to forbid extravagance and “determine the end and manner of spending”.Footnote 150

The lesson is that to serve both ends of the social life – the good of the soul as well as the good of the body – and to secure the commonwealth, the desire for earthly pleasures needs to be restrained.Footnote 151 This is not all, however. The task of censorship is also to encourage the pursuit of wealth if wealth is lacking. Too much wealth is not only detrimental to the commonwealth, but so also is too much poverty.Footnote 152 As Biachin and Odermatt have noted, idleness is not approved.Footnote 153 Those who can work, like wandering, healthy, and vigorous beggars, should be either made to work or banished from the community to prevent them from benefiting from the achievements of the diligent and from consuming things acquired by the labour of others.Footnote 154 Consequently, common welfare requires that the desire for earthly things needs to be carefully managed by a public authority.

4 Conclusions

There is no denying that Althusius’ political theory embodies a clear emphasis on the reciprocity of life in society. However, harmonious mutual life is by no means a certainty since conflicts do arise and need to be dealt with. Significantly, many conflicts involve some sort of clash between the common good and the good of a member, part, or individual, which ideally should align with each other. In certain cases, conflicts also emerge between what individuals desire and what is objectively good for them and/or for the commonwealth.

Closer examination reveals first that the common good or the good of the commonwealth cannot be equated with the private good of the ruler. This connects to the ideal that the power of the ruler is given only for the welfare of the subjects and not for the ruler’s own benefit. A ruler who neglects to care for, or even acts contrary to, the welfare of the commonwealth is a tyrant who can be resisted and ultimately deposed in due process. It is also possible for a part to leave the existing whole if the welfare of the part so requires. The points concerning tyranny reveal that a harmonious and reciprocal society and the alignment between the common and individual good are possible only if the power of the ruler is checked with effective measures.

When acting within his jurisdiction, however, the ruler and the broader administration have the power to guide and lead their subjects towards their good. Besides the good of the bodies and souls of his subjects, the ruler is also responsible for the concord between the subjects and the unity of the commonwealth. Thus, divisions that threatened the established order(s) are not tolerated, not even when the reason for sedition is reminiscent of a justified cause for resisting a tyrant, such as excessive burdens and scarcity. Even more strikingly, Althusius also considers excessive wealth, happiness, satiety etc. as causes for turmoil and hence harmful for the commonwealth. Besides the affliction of excessive material well-being, he also recognizes the dangers of religious strife and recommends religious toleration for the sake of peace. Consequently, the concern for the unity of the commonwealth sets limits for the pursuit of the good of both the body and the soul. This makes perfect sense when we keep in mind that the disintegration of the commonwealth would reduce the all-important communicatio and consequently hinder the pursuit of the good of the body and soul.

We have also learned that reciprocal life does not mean an all-inclusive social life. All activities are evaluated from the point of view of their usefulness to one’s fellow human beings and to the broader society, as well as from the point of view of morality and their connection to glorifying and honouring God. While different works have different values, exclusion is only due to immorality and the complete uselessness of an activity. It is relevant that this evaluation is detached from an individual’s self-interest and is instead subject to an outward judgment of worth – to the good that the activity of an individual can bring in relation to God and for fellow human beings. Clearly, Althusius’ ideal society is not a place for self-interest seeking individuals.

Finally, Althusius’ discussion on censorship reveals how far into an individual’s private life the power of the ruler and his administration is extended. To serve both the good of the body and soul of the subjects, their behaviour must be quite carefully managed by the public authority. They cannot be trusted to attain individual good on their own since they are prone to vices. Besides being detrimental for the good of the body and soul of the individual, vices also threaten the good of the community. The ambivalent role of wealth and money reveals how the pursuit of material welfare needs to be managed, but this time to serve the good of the soul rather than the unity of the commonwealth. What is sought after is enough, but not too much, emphasis on the pursuit of material welfare. In other words, both luxury and scarcity are to be avoided. Here, the functionality of a reciprocal society is again shown to rely on outward control rather than on the natural needs and attributes of the people or on the religious duty to participate, which is nevertheless ideologically important. However, this control is not arbitrary or limitless since laws, justice, and the collective will of the members bind the ruler and the administration. That said, subjugation to the right way of living and to its relatively far-reaching enforcements seems to be the price to pay for the alignment of the individual and common good in Althusius’ theory.