Abstract
This article illustrates the critical importance of research into the socio-cultural reality of Bamiyan (Afghanistan) for the cooperation projects aimed at preserving cultural heritage. The case study shows that exploring and ultimately deconstructing the categories of ethnicity and gender has helped overcome the impasse created by tensions and competition among different social and interest groups. As for the ethnic issue, a way out of this impasse might be found in putting ethnic self-definitions aside and searching for a reasonable compromise apropos the underlying economic interests. In regard to gender—a particularly sensitive issue in Islamic countries—the article questions the standardized way that urban planning addresses public spaces. It illustrates first that in the local context private dwellings de facto function as public spaces, especially for the female segment of the population, and therefore should be arranged more generously. Moreover, the article draws attention to the fact that the Islamic pilgrimage shrines (ziaratgah) play a crucial role for women, as the almost only public space (except the market) that they can attend without male company. It is, therefore of paramount importance to improve their quality as public spaces even if they are not included in the list of World Heritage assets.
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1 Premise
In-depth knowledge of the local socio-cultural context is crucially important in ensuring that cooperative activities achieve their desired outcome in the field of cultural heritage protection. This knowledge can help pinpoint solutions for safeguarding the heritage in a context of more general regional promotion and development goals. It can help mediate between international agencies’ “universal” understanding of heritage and the local population’s point of view, implicit in its social and cultural practices. What is more, it can help better understand differences existing in the local community with the aim of preventing dissatisfaction or even conflicts potentially arising as a result of the protective measures taken.
Appropriate consideration of the local socio-cultural context becomes particularly pressing when the heritage in need of protection is situated in an area like the Bamiyan Valley. Bamiyan is, on the one hand, characterized by the presence of historical structures, traditional dynamics, and ways of life and, on the other hand, subject to growing urban pressure, with increasing demand for modernization and development. A whole host of actors and different interest groups are at play, each carrying out its own actions and strategies aimed at taking advantage of the situation, while other segments of the local population remain voiceless.
In cases like this, measures to safeguard cultural heritage will be more effective if they are careful to take the long-term use of resources into consideration, combine interventions in favor of cultural heritage, development of the territory, and improvement of the local population’s living conditions, and find a balance between the various social and economic interests at play.
We will use two examples to support these statements and show how, in the case of Bamiyan, socio-geographical analysis of the local context has helped to drive regional planning and/or heritage protection choices. The examples focus respectively on the role played locally by ethnicity and by gender.
2 Ethnicity
To correctly address the ethnic question in Bamiyan, we first need to understand the area’s historical background and then to consider the issues surrounding its recent demographic growth.
2.1 Historical Background
Historically the Hazara population of Shi’a creed was the majority ethnic group inhabiting the valleyFootnote 1 until the so-called “Hazara war” broke out in 1893/94, waged by King Abdur Rahman Khan,Footnote 2 during which over half of the Hazara population was wiped out, while the survivors were sold as slaves.Footnote 3 At the same time, a new Tajik population settled on the fertile valley floor and became the majority. From that point on, the ethnic question can basically be described as a tug of war between the two groups. During the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), Bamiyan again became the center of a quasi-state with a strong Hazara and Shi’a identity which was only overthrown in 1997 by the Taliban conquest (see Harpviken (1996), Grevemeyer (1988), Emadi (1997), Ibrahimi (2006)). Since 2001 and the overthrow of the Taliban, Hazara families from other parts of the province, from other provinces, and from abroad (above all refugees returning from Iran) have been drawing into the area. Finally, the return of the Taliban (August 2021) put an end, so to speak, to the direct competition between the Hazara and Tajik as a result of the emerging dominance of a third group, the Pashtu.
However, it should be stressed that words like Tajik and Hazara (but also Pashtu, etc.) are largely artificial umbrella terms that were coined and politically instrumentalized during the last few decades of civil war. They have, in some way, simplified the extremely varied ethnic mosaic that comprises Afghanistan, dividing it into three or four mega-groups which appear to exist in an ongoing state of tension among one another. In this process of roundup, the so-called “Tajiks” came to represent the Persian-speaking Sunni population, the Hazara the Persian-speaking Shi’a population, and the Pashtuns the Pashtu-speaking Sunni population. Furthermore, there are other groups who speak Turkic languages (Uzbeks, Turkmen, Qizilbash, etc.) both Sunni and Shi’a (Centlivres 1991; Schetter 2002; Barfield 2005; Dubow 2009; Siddique 2012). Some blame for the transferral of political and economic conflicts into artificial ethnic terms falls on the Afghan post-Bonn Constitution of 2004 which obliged all citizens to ascribe themselves to one ethnic group (Sahar 2014).
Consequently, the categories of ethnicity (as well as of gender) cannot be addressed in “substantialist” terms. This assumption is by now commonplace. Less self-evident, however, is the endeavor to re-translate supposedly ethnic (or for that matter gender) oppositions according to different interests and sometimes diverging daily practices. But, as we will see, only this “deconstruction” renders these oppositions manageable.
2.2 Demographic Growth and Segregation Patterns
As for demographic growth, between 1979 and 2017, Bamiyan’s population rose from 7,355 to 51,856 inh. (LaGes 2018, p. 72), an increase of 600%. The biggest increase in population occurred after 2010.
This population explosion meant that Bamiyan quite suddenly boasted the fastest rate of urban growth in Afghanistan, posing new problems not only in terms of a sizeable increase in demand for housing and services (aspects typically factored into a strategic master plan), but also in terms of the balance between the different ethnic groups.
The number of the incoming Hazara population after 2001 has inverted the proportions of the two ethnic groups. While, in 1971, the proportion was 60% Tajik and 30% Hazara (Rasuli 1971, p. 29) and, in 2013, the Hazara grew to 83% and the Tajik group progressively decreased to 11% (LaGes 2018), pp. 72–76).
An exemplary case of this inversion is the village of Zargaran, where the Tajik accounted for 15% of settled households up to 2010 but only 3% after 2010 (Table 1).
The population distribution in the area is strongly segregated ethnically. By the end of the 1970s, using religious faith categories of belonging, Robert Canfield (Canfield 1973, 1986) described a segregated settlement structure, where the valley floor was occupied by Sunnis (corresponding to the Tajik ethnic group), the plateau by Imami (Shi’ites), and the eastern portion of the plateau by Ismaelites (Shi’ites) (Fig. 1).
The more recent arrivals not only confirm but also reinforce these divisions. For example, in Zargaran, one of the areas with the most rapid demographic growth (22% of its inhabitants have settled since 2019), the first area of expansion (until 2000) displayed a certain balance between ethnic groups. Today, however, the area is very much segregated (Fig. 2).
The Tajik population makes up just 7% of the total and is concentrated in the southwestern quarter of Zargaran, bordering the village of Dawoodi which is entirely Tajik.Footnote 4
2.3 Ethnicity and Cultural Heritage Protection
Against a historical background of repeated marginalization and persecution of the Hazara in Afghanistan, the reversal in the dominance of the two groups in the city of Bamiyan risks possible retaliation among the Hazara, and a priori resistance towards Hazara local government policies by the Tajik,Footnote 5 with serious political consequences, also regarding the central issue of cultural heritage protection.
A significant example can be found in the different reactions to the regional administration’s decision to turn to UNESCO’s guidance concerning what to do about the built-up areas on the valley floor, in front of the Western Buddha niche. This decision, aimed at protecting the cultural landscape, saw the Hazara population in favor, while the Tajik population, clearly opposed, supported among other things the reconstruction of the old bazaar in those very areas.
However, it was not so much a sensitivity towards protecting the heritage—although UNESCO’s efforts certainly strengthened this feeling among the local community—that granted political feasibility to restrictive actions on the agricultural valley floor.
In the interplay between readiness to protect the landscape and economic interests, the ethnic dimension played a complex and misleading role,Footnote 6 making it harder to strike a balance between the different interest groups.
This became fully evident by combining and comparing the data collected in two direct surveys carried out while preparing the Bamiyan Strategic Masterplan (BSMP). The first survey consisted of a comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of the activities and of the 1,474 operators present in the new bazaar; the second survey consisted in mapping the agricultural lots in the buffer zones with informations about the owners (Fig. 3).Footnote 7
The surveys revealed an overwhelming presence of Hazara shops and workers in the rapidly expanding new bazaar, while the vast majority of the plots of land in the buffer zone belonged to Tajik families (Table 2).
As a consequence, the Hazara population favoured the actions implemented for the protection of the cultural landscape. The Hazara, whose economy is rooted in trading and in crafts (Monsutti 2004) and is dependent upon the new bazaar, would benefit greatly from the development of tourism, fuelled by the valley’s inclusion on the world heritage list. On the contrary, the farmers living on the valley floor close to the UNESCO sites and the protected areas, mainly belonging to the Tajik, strongly opposed the same actions. For them, the restrictions, intended to protect the cultural landscape, were instead seen as an obstacle to economic activity and to improvements in living conditions.
In this context, it was inevitable that the cultural landscape debate would evolve into a politico-ethnical issue. The difficulties deriving from the different positions on the topic of protecting the heritage were thus charged with tension, owing to the interference of ethnic factors but not caused by them.
The only way out of this endless process of clashing demands and mutual resentment would involve pushing the ethnic dimension aside once again. Documentation of the facts behind a great deal of the resistance against protecting the cultural landscape, while refraining from placing too much attention on ethnicity, might allow for a consideration of practical reasons or underlying interests, and to mediate between them (Adlparvar and Tadroz 2016). This has led to reflection not only on the dangerous side effects of an excessively restrictive protection policy but also on the “political” dimension of an apparently neutral, universal interest like the preservation of heritage and cultural landscape.Footnote 8
3 Gender
The second example that we would like to give in order to stress the importance of preliminary socio-geographic research, concerns the necessity of a gender perspective, especially for cooperation projects in Islamic countries.Footnote 9
Knowledge about mobility patterns, free-time activities, and the symbolic meanings given to places by the local population can function as a starting point for understanding the socio-cultural practices of the local community, especially in regard to the female population, often voiceless, and for consistently addressing the cooperation measures.Footnote 10
3.1 A Limited Mobility
According to the data collected through a Household survey in 2017, about 64,600 trips are made on an average weekday in the city of Bamiyan (LaGes 2018, p. 138) and the number of people commuting daily is 92% of the total. However, the distribution of trips varies significantly by gender and age (Fig. 4). This distribution first of all reflects the demographic structure of the city, 63.6% of whose population is under 25 years old and only 5% which is over 60 years old (LaGes 2018: p. 72): indeed, the most active age group is that between 15 and 20 years old and 67% of the trips involve people between the ages of 10 and 25. On the contrary, only 14% of the trips involve people over 40 years old.
However, the figure clearly indicates that differences in mobility behaviors are also gendered. Only 32% of the total daily trips are made by females, compared to 68% of trips which are made by men. In addition, the age distribution of women’s mobility is even more strongly concentrated among the very young population, with most trips made between the ages of 10 and 15, and a sharp decline after the age of 20. This decline is such that 86% of women’s trips are made under the age of 25, before the end of school-going age.
Moreover, in a context where more than 90% of travel is due to school attendance (58%) or work (38%), the distribution of female travel between school and work is 78% and 19%, respectively, while for males the percentages are 48 and 48% (Fig. 5).
3.2 Social Practices and Public Space
This data highlights how domestic barriers confine the fundamental sphere of movement among the adult female population, whose interaction with the rest of the urban context is already extremely limited.
The same considerations apply when looking at activities carried out during leisure time or for socialization purposes.
The social life of the community is predominantly structured around interaction with networks of relatives and friends, while the home acts as both an active and passive destination when it comes to visits to/from relatives and friends, the preferred free-time activity of the majority (more than 2/3) of those interviewed (Fig. 6).
As such, it is significant that as many as 20% of the interviewees indicated their place of residence among their three favorite places, and that typically residential areas, villages such as Zargaran, Mullah Gholam, Sayed Abad or Haidar Abad, appear among the most frequently cited places (Fig. 7).Footnote 11
However, even from this point of view, substantial gender differences emerge. The home stands as the preferred space for over 60% of the women in their free time, while the percentage is significantly lower for the male population, where interviewees also mention outdoor or sports activities (Fig. 8).
Therefore, it is worth considering on the one hand the social function (broadly speaking) played by homely spaces as tendentially public spacesFootnote 12; on the other hand, it is worth deepening what might be the appropriate conceptualization of open spaces which qualify as public spaces in the local urban context, as well as the dimensions and the material assets which would be appropriate.
Help with this might again be sought from the results of socio-geographic research, especially from the data concerning perceptions and symbolic meanings bestowed on different places by the local population.
Interestingly, shrines emerge as important destinations for free-time activities among members of the female population, not only for religious reasons but also above all as public spaces, typically accessible on foot and without the need for male accompaniment.
Therefore, alongside the famous Mir Hashem shrine (Ziaratgah), also mentioned by the male interviewees, albeit to a lesser extent, the spectrum of favorite places quoted by the interviewees also includes numerous smaller shrines (such as Mir Said Ali Jakhsuz or the Khwaja Sabz Push shrine of fertility), which are used as places of worship and, at the same time, as neighborhood meeting places by the female population (Fig. 9).
The role of gender as a discriminating factor in the organization of moments of socialization and public social life is reflected in the comparison between genders when other factors of differentiation are the same (age, income). This can be seen, for example, when isolating the under-25 s with a high income.
An analysis of the services that people lack confirms this reading (Fig. 10).
Services which the inhabitants would like to see strengthened function as a significant indicator both of the shortcomings of the context under examination and their model of reference (actual or ideal). According to the sample interviewed, libraries and playgrounds, followed by parks, sports facilities, and tea houses, are among the amenities that people lack the most in their neighborhood, and that they feel would significantly improve their quality of life.
As already observed in other urban contexts in the country (LaGes 2013), interest in libraries not only reflects the great prestige traditionally ascribed to literature and “knowledge” in general in Afghan culture but also reflects an appreciation for protected public spaces, which the female population can attend by themselves.
As expected, opinions regarding facilities that are lacking vary according to gender. Among women, there is a higher percentage who complain of a lack of playgrounds. Nevertheless, in this case, the gender differences are not noteworthy. Quite a weak tendency can be deduced on the part of females in outlining their specific needs, also in comparison with what can be seen in other Afghan towns and cities.Footnote 13 This is another reason for deepening our understanding of the needs of this segment of the population while preparing urban intervention.
Awareness of the role played by the home as a space of socialization (as well as of women’s work in the case of 10% of families in Zargaran) helps drive urban planning choices. Alongside this, for the specific needs of women, it is advisable from a strategic point of view to recognize and promote the role of libraries and shrines both as public spaces and as places of local cultural heritage.
Therefore, interventions to protect and promote shrines and the surrounding areas, perhaps backed by international donors, would be an important gesture and would help narrow the gap frequently found—and criticized in international literature—between what the international bodies consider cultural heritage and the cultural heritage that is part and parcel of local customs.
4 Conclusions
A precise socio-cultural analysis, both before and during the implementation of cooperation projects in the field of urban planning and management, as well as of cultural heritage protection, has proved crucial for securing quality results. The case of Bamiyan demonstrates that—even when it comes to an especially sensitive issue like ethnicity—it is still possible to find appropriate solutions for the protection of cultural heritage and to relieve social tensions. As for the gender question, the case of Bamiyan confirms that special attention to the socio-cultural context is particularly useful for urban planning in Islamic countries, going beyond abstract approaches and developing autonomous concepts and schemes that fit into the local way of life.
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Abdur Rahman Khan sparked intense interest among the British public (Mahomed Khan 1900). In the same year, a tear-inducing literary account of the Hazara War was published (Hamilton 1900). This novel interestingly combines sympathy for the nationalistic enterprise of the Afghan king with sentimentality towards its Hazara victims.
- 3.
Slavery was only abolished in 1919 by King Amanullah Khan (Poladi 1989).
- 4.
This implies a tricky decision concerning the village perimeter to be adopted by the team of Florence University as part of the ongoing Zargaran regeneration project: either following an urban planning logic, which would place the village boundary at the end of the built-up area, or according to an ethnic-belonging criterion, which would place the Tajik group in the village of Dawoodi, to the west.
- 5.
Especially when we consider that the political management of Bamiyan province from 2002 to 2021 was strongly influenced by the Shi’a and Hazara party Hezb-e Wahdat Islami (Party of Islamic Unity). The varying degree of pro-Hazara orientation among the Bamiyan provincial governors after 2001 has been well-described in Adlparvar (2014). For the politico-ethnic self-definition of the Hazara, see Chiovenda (2016).
- 6.
For a description of these vicissitudes see Adlparvar (2014, pp. 104 and 145ff).
- 7.
The following data was requested: name of the village, name and ethnic group of the owner, width of the parcel in jerib.
- 8.
Within the framework of heritage studies, a recent volume reflects upon heritage managment as a means of “reconcilition” (Ringbeck 2022, pp. 439–444).
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
References to the heritage protected by UNESCO are limited to the Buddhas and Shar-e Zohak, mentioned by 448 and 169 interviewees, respectively. The low symbolic value of Bamiyan’s UNESCO properties for the local population is also discussed in Wyndham (2015, p. 392).
- 12.
Considering the extension of the local family networks.
- 13.
The female population more clearly separates both needs typically linked to the maternal role (greater interest in playgrounds) and preferences connected to the modern evolution of lifestyles, albeit in the context of a local society that tends to organize itself in a homo-social way: therefore, there is even greater interest in sports facilities than among the male component, but only if strictly organized according to a principle of gender segregation (LaGes 2013: p. 64).
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Loda, M., Hinz, M. (2024). Framing Planning and Conservation Activities in the Local Socio-Cultural Context: Ethnicity and Gender in Bamiyan. In: Loda, M., Abenante, P. (eds) Cultural Heritage and Development in Fragile Contexts. Research for Development. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54816-1_8
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