America Through the Eyes of Chinese Youth During COVID-19

Abstract

The imposition of travel restrictions and social distancing protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic severely curtailed opportunities for cross-border interactions, impacting vital person-to-person domains like education, tourism, and the arts. A significant outcome of this evolving landscape has been the reshaping of perceptions within China concerning the U.S. This transformation is particularly pronounced among the younger generation of Chinese citizens, who, prior to the pandemic, enjoyed unprecedented access to international education and cross-cultural encounters. Conducted in Beijing during the pandemic, this survey specifically examines views toward America among students from the top two elite colleges in China. Three key trends are identified: a reevaluation of plans to live or work in the U.S. due to rising anti-Asian sentiment and perceived shortcomings in the American public health system, a growing disillusionment with the “American Dream,” and increased support for the Chinese government. This chapter provides a timely, updated analysis of the opinions held by China's future leaders and serves as a valuable resource for shaping diplomatic strategies both now and in the future.

In addition to the health and economic repercussions discussed elsewhere in this book, the COVID-19 pandemic also weakened cultural exchange and interpersonal connections between the U.S. and China. In this chapter, I outline the methods and results of a study that I conducted on the ground in China from February to April of 2022, during the Zero-COVID policies. It focuses on the views toward America of a select group of Chinese youth: those attending the top two elite colleges in China—Peking University and Tsinghua University. Navigating the constricted landscape of travel and visa constraints, my foray into China during this period was a distinctive rarity for Western scholars. My special affiliation with Tsinghua University, as one of under 300 international students granted entrance into China during the pandemic, unlocked access for me to embark on this research endeavor. It will remain as one of a very small number of studies conducted under Zero-COVID in China.

I reveal three key trends: a reconsideration of long-term plans to live or work abroad due to growing anti-Asian sentiment and perceived failures of the American public health system, disillusionment with the “American Dream” and its values, and bolstered support for the Chinese government. I compare these results with analysis conducted from other sources, finding that contrary to several prominent studies, this specific subset of Chinese students’ opinions is relatively measured and not singularly defined by nationalism, although their views have become increasingly negative due to the events of the pandemic.

This chapter offers a timely and updated analysis of the thoughts and sentiments harbored by China's burgeoning leaders, serving as a reservoir of knowledge that can nourish diplomatic strategies aimed at ameliorating inter-country relations. Amid a backdrop of evolving paradigms and shifting geopolitical dynamics, the depth and nuance that this research affords provide a canvas upon which strategies for fostering constructive discourse, mitigating misperceptions, and establishing platforms for meaningful collaboration can be painted. As such, this chapter stands not merely as an empirical study but as a catalyst for shaping the discourse and charting a course toward a more informed and cooperative future for both the U.S. and China.

Concepts and Research Design

The imposition of travel restrictions and social distancing protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic severely curtailed opportunities for cross-border interactions, impacting vital person-to-person domains like education, tourism, and the arts. A significant outcome of this evolving landscape has been the reshaping of perceptions within China concerning the U.S. This transformation is particularly pronounced among the younger generation of Chinese citizens, who, prior to the pandemic, enjoyed unprecedented access to international education and cross-cultural encounters.

The two most recent comprehensive studies of the views of Chinese youth toward the U.S. were conducted by the Global Times, a Chinese state-sponsored publication with a highly nationalistic slant that is considered propaganda by most Western scholars. Their 2021 survey of 1281 young Chinese found that more than 40% of respondents’ favorability toward Western countries fell over the period of 2016–2021. Specifically, 53.8% of respondents said that China’s “remarkable effort in fighting COVID-19” make them begin to see the West as an equal. Additionally, 51.9% cited “ineffective COVID-19 control [in Western countries]” as leading to the deterioration of their views of Western countries. 72.4% also considered “promoting international cooperation to combat COVID-19” as the most notable contribution that China has made to the world in the last decade (Yang et al. 2021). Even considering the source of the data and the biased wording of the questions, the picture is worrying. A more recent Global Times survey from October 2022 revealed that over 60% of respondents aged 18 to 29 view the U.S. unfavorably, while only around 35% view it positively (Tang 2022).

The Global Times’ surveys portray an alarming trend, and other sources also reflect deteriorating attitudes toward the U.S. The China Data Lab’s May 2020 survey reported that favorability ratings toward the U.S. among the general public decreased from 5.77 to 4.77 out of 10, due to the American government’s COVID-19 response and anti-China rhetoric (Guang et al. 2021). A few months later, Adam Liu and his co-authors found that 77% of Chinese people hold either “unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” views of the U.S., a 60% point jump since twelve months prior (2020).

The response of the American government to COVID-19 also impacted how the Chinese government’s effectiveness is perceived domestically. In October of 2021, Cary Wu conducted a survey of 19,816 Chinese citizens asking them what they thought of the Chinese government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Approximately 67% of respondents marked that they were satisfied with the Chinese government’s pandemic-era delivery of daily necessities and protection materials. 75% of respondents said that they were satisfied with the government’s information dissemination. However, those with higher levels of education and younger respondents were overall less satisfied.

Many scholars agree that Chinese youth are increasingly nationalistic. In a January 2022 lecture that has since garnered significant discussion and controversy both domestically and internationally, Yan Xuetong, Dean of Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Studies, cautioned that China’s Gen-Z was developing “a make-believe mindset, thinking it’s very easy for China to achieve its foreign policy goals. They think only China is just and innocent, while other countries, especially Western countries, are evil and thus have natural hatred towards Westerners” (Mai 2022). He noted that Chinese youth now look down on the U.S. and warned of the danger to a country of an entire generation that believes too highly in its own ability and power.

Nonetheless, the nationalistic tendencies of Chinese youth are still unclear. In 2017, the number of young people applying for admittance to the Chinese Communist Party hit an all-time low, and a 2018 survey of 10,000 respondents found that the younger the individual, the lower their sense of national identity (Li et al. 2021). Additionally, some literature contends that nationalism is too broad a term to describe the ongoing phenomenon among Chinese youth. A 2019 article by Jessica Chen Weiss proposes that the focus should be on public perception of policy and government performance, rather than just “nationalism” among the general public. Weiss contends that younger Chinese individuals tend to be more hawkish in their foreign policy, but not due to nationalism; rather, due to their nuanced worldview and pragmatic tendencies.

I utilized a two-pronged approach to data collection: a questionnaire and a semi-structured interview. Undertaking field research in non-democratic countries presents unique challenges in terms of political sensitivity and ensuring the accuracy and reliability of data. In non-democratic systems, individual interviews based on personal relationships and trust can provide more reliable data than mass surveys of the general public. Specifically for China, “socially embedded” surveys that are built around personal relationships are more likely to produce unbiased data. Thus, as an international student attending Tsinghua University, I was able to utilize my personal relationships and connections to gather interviewees that would be forthcoming in their opinions.

The length of each interview varied from 15 to 45 minutes, and the conversation was not strictly confined to a certain set of questions. Instead, I followed the flow of conversation while keeping in mind the research questions and engaged in two-way conversation with the interviewees rather than one-sided questioning. Additionally, I asked the questions in various sequences to eliminate question order bias and make the interview feel more organic. As is customary, all information obtained, used, studied, and analyzed was anonymized to protect the identity of the participants and minimize potential risks.

To balance the downsides of in-person interviews, I ran a digital survey in parallel. The survey was administered in Chinese and conducted through a mini-app on WeChat. The survey questions were designed to be concise and easily answerable. Potentially identifying information such as age, major, and school year was not collected. Although this hampers the construction of a comprehensive demographic model of respondents, the potential downside of having students respond less honestly was assumed to outweigh the benefit of having this data available. Respondents for the survey were recruited via word-of-mouth, interest groups, sports teams, and clubs at each university.

The focal participants of this research encompassed a select group of Chinese undergraduate and graduate students, hailing from mainland China, Hong Kong, or Macau, who were currently enrolled at two of China's preeminent academic institutions—Peking University and Tsinghua University. These universities, beyond their distinction as the nation's foremost educational bastions, hold a mantle of extraordinary significance and influence woven into the fabric of Chinese social life. Reverberating beyond their academic acclaim, Peking University and Tsinghua University command an elevated stature that permeates through political echelons and the broader social tapestry. It is imperative to underscore that these institutions are not merely acclaimed for their academic prowess; they represent repositories of historical legacy and renowned prestige that transcend conventional academic circles. Peking University and Tsinghua University's unique significance emanates from their pervasive impact on pivotal arenas of China's identity. Their rich heritage and venerable reputation have contributed to their elevated role in nurturing political leadership and galvanizing influential networks. A striking testament to their influence is observed in the composition of the Chinese Communist Party's upper echelons, where a quarter of the 19th Politburo members and 7 out of 24 of the 20th Politburo members were educated at these institutions, including President Xi Jinping himself. Thus, many of the future leaders of China are likely attending one of these two schools, and so their views provide a potential window into the future decisions of the Chinese government.

A total of 88 students answered the questionnaire, and another 22 took part in the interviews. Of the 22 original interviewees, eight agreed to take part in a Zoom conversation for a follow-up interview during February of 2023. The questions I asked were mainly based on the original interviews, but I included a few additional questions related to recent pandemic developments.

Findings and Analysis

First, students’ opinions toward the American government and people were substantially different. While they had an overall negative to neutral view of the American government, their opinions of the American people were on average positive to neutral. No students reported having a “very positive” view of the American government, while three answered that they have a “very positive” view of the American people. Likewise, eight answered that their views toward the American government were “very negative,” but none held a “very negative” view of the American people (see Fig. 7.1).

Fig. 7.1

Number of respondents with positive, negative, and neutral views of the American government and American people

The interviewed students’ views followed a similar pattern—they made distinctions between the American government and American people. With only a few exceptions, the students saw the American people in a positive light. An interviewee who had worked alongside Americans at his job described them as “really down to earth and pure in terms of natural life characteristics. I think it’s based on [geography] of the continent that created the character of American people to be very open and friendly. They don’t care about [people’s] backgrounds or anything.”

The idea that Americans are “open” was a common theme, spoken of in a positive manner. One student said he understood the practicality of “a country that can accept a lot of different cultures and people from all over the world with different backgrounds…this diversity fosters development of scientific research and economic development.” Another admired Americans’ “open” culture for its acceptance of “queer culture, feminism, these things.”

Many indicated that they believed that the government and media were misleading the American people in one way or another. One student expressed his belief that “The U.S. government is controlled by a few bad guys. They cannot represent the whole of U.S. citizens. So actually, U.S. citizens are in our minds good, but [those in] governance, those are really our enemies inside the U.S.” Another hastened to assure me that Chinese people do not dislike Americans, just the American government. He insisted that “[Americans are not the] specific target for [Chinese] hatred [towards the U.S.]. [We’re] very clear that [we’re] not talking about American normal citizens. Most Chinese are very clear that the monopolies, some rich guys that control the American economy, those are the people we hate right now.”

More than two-thirds of respondents indicated that their views of the American government had grown more negative since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, and a little more than one-third said that their views had not changed. Only one student responded that their view had changed in a positive manner (see Fig. 7.2). There were two main reasons that students gave for the changes in their views: pandemic-related racism and anti-Asian sentiment and the difference in public health responses and outcomes in the U.S. and China.

Fig. 7.2

Number of respondents that changed their views of the American government and American people since before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic

U.S. public opinion toward China has also fallen drastically since 2018, and especially since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Ipsos, around 82% of Americans held an unfavorable view of China as of March 2022, a 35% point jump from 2018 and a 16-point jump since 2020 (Silver 2022). Similar studies of Chinese public opinion, while more difficult to administer, have shown a parallel trend. The most recent large-scale study (October 2020) of Chinese public opinion showed that 77% of Chinese people hold an unfavorable view of the U.S. Moreover, while the American public’s views toward China have been decreasing steadily for over six years, only 17% of Chinese held an unfavorable view of the U.S. in October 2019, suggesting that the pandemic is a larger factor in Chinese changing views than Americans’ (Liu et al. 2020).

The students interviewed were aware of Americans’ dislike of China. “They hate China because of COVID,” one told me. “During COVID times, the hostility has increased.” While only a few of them felt strong negative feelings toward the U.S. most of them believed that the U.S. was unsafe, especially for Chinese people or people of Asian descent. Many who had previously planned on living or working abroad in the long-term had shifted their plans due to a combination of factors relating to COVID-19. Similarly, almost three-quarters of the surveyed students said that the American people’s view of China was negative (see Fig. 7.3.)

Fig. 7.3

Number of respondents that believe Americans have positive, negative, or neutral views of China

Moreover, there is a direct link between having experienced anti-Asian racism and increasing one’s support for the Chinese government. A 2020 study of Chinese students studying abroad showed that even those students who are open to Western-style democracy will become more sympathetic toward China’s authoritarian government when they are exposed to Sinophobic or racist comments. The extent to which students will increase their support of the Chinese government is directly correlated to their baseline levels of nationalism; the less nationalistic the students were at the beginning of the experiment, the more supportive of their government they became following the exposure (Fan et al. 2020).

One of my interviewees mentioned that while she personally had not experienced anti-Asian racism, she was aware of the hostility that existed against Chinese people in America, and said that many “[Chinese people] saw the hostility towards China, towards Asians, and they also saw the differences in pandemic control…When I grew up we really admired the U.S. In China, there was the [idea of] the American dream…But now things have really changed.” Another student, who had studied in the U.S, recalled a moment in his first undergraduate economics class where the professor asked him if Chinese people ate dog meat. Now, he said, “The current anti-Asian and anti-Chinese trend in the U.S. makes [Chinese people] feel that China is safer than the U.S.…[In America], we’re prejudiced against, openly or secretly. That’s why many Chinese students decide to go back to China.”

The statistics support his assertion; the number of Chinese international students in the U.S. dropped from almost 375,000 in 2019 to 290,000 in 2022 (Fromer 2022). Moreover, new applications for student visas dropped 30% from 2021 to 2022, meaning that this trend will likely continue as students who were enrolled pre-pandemic complete their degrees and return to China (Ubell 2022). Students in China looking to study abroad following the relaxation of Zero-COVID regulations are looking in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia rather than the U.S. (ICEF Monitor 2023).

Not only did the interviewed students fear racism, but they also worried about the accessibility of healthcare in the U.S. The failures of the public health system during the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated these concerns. One student said bluntly that “American people live in a very dangerous condition, every day there are so many increasing [COVID] cases, they cannot get medical care, the government doesn’t give a shit anymore.” Another agreed, saying that the U.S. “overruled health concerns with economic interests.” Indeed, when comparing the U.S.’ over 1.1 million COVID-19 deaths to China’s official count of 83,150 deaths as of February 2023 (after the relaxing of Zero-COVID regulations), China seems much safer. Even the higher end of the range proposed by the New York Times estimates 1.5 million deaths in China, which is less than one-third of U.S. deaths if controlled for by population (Glanz et al. 2023). At the time of the interviews, the U.S. had reported over a million deaths, and China only 5,200. While the numbers reported by the Chinese government are certainly an undercount, even an assumption of 10 times the official numbers show a stark difference with the U.S.

The students also saw the American government as putting economic interests ahead of the safety of their people and/or unable to utilize its vast resources to manage the COVID-19 pandemic. To these students, the American government appeared either grossly incompetent or fundamentally immoral. Many of the students cited the COVID-19 pandemic as one of the main reasons that they had become disillusioned with the American dream and so-called American values. In some cases, this inability to control the pandemic has affected not only the students’ views of America, but of democracy in general. These students viewed COVID-19 as a litmus test for various ideological systems and believed that America's system had failed on both moral and practical grounds.

One student explained that “The U.S. had the best medical system in the world, the strongest economy, the most talent in the world from all over the world. But they still failed in the fight against COVID-19. China has done a very good job fighting COVID-19. Many people [now] realize that we don’t have to learn from the U.S. because under these circumstances, the U.S. is doing so badly.” He acknowledged the issues that existed with Zero-COVID lockdowns, agreeing that “China is a dictatorship. It is an autocracy. But somewhere along the line, this system has suited its own people. It suppresses civil liberty, that’s a fact. But increasingly, people are treating this as a trade off because it performs better [than democracy].”

One woman I interviewed told me to, “Imagine I tell my parents that I’m going to marry an American man in the future. For me, I’m open to any kind of marriage in the world, to any nationality. My parents will say, okay, you can do that. But he’s American, he’s a foreigner, and America is a bad place. They have a lot of bad issues happening. If [I] have a Chinese man as an option, [my parents] prefer that.” Another said that “Before COVID, people always had this sense of ‘Oh, America is better. I want to go there. I want to live there.’ But now, after COVID, ‘China’s actually pretty good, at least it’s safe for Chinese.’”

Many of the students were honest that the pandemic affected their views not only of the U.S. but of Western-style democracy. One said, “[The pandemic] has confirmed that democracy is not for every country.” Another agreed that “The COVID pandemic gave me proof and evidence to prove my knowledge on American culture and values.” The interviewees had previously been somewhat neutral on the American government, but their views had changed after seeing how the U.S. responded to the pandemic.

One of the interviewees who had previously studied in an American college and traveled to the U.S. many times throughout his life spoke at length about his lack of surprise with how the U.S. handled the pandemic: “I could predict the current issues that we’re seeing in the United States–people who are unwilling to wear masks because they feel like that’s their own right to choose. There are two sides of the idea: individualism or groups’ values first. These two collide amid the COVID situation, and we’re seeing two ideologies being presented in their most revealing way. It’s not because of COVID that China and the U.S. decided to go head-to-head but it certainly became a playground device to play against each other, to [test] the strength of the political ideologies.”

He continued by saying, with a great deal of bitterness, that Americans do not deserve the freedoms that they are given because they take them for granted. He mentioned that even though the Chinese approach to COVID-19 was too overbearing, in the U.S, “everyone is for themselves…that’s a lazy interpretation of freedom…I hold my grudge against a lot of American people and the country’s ideology in general [because] of the imposition and entitlement [that became obvious during the pandemic].”

Many students believed that, despite starting at a disadvantage compared to the U.S., China managed to combat the pandemic more successfully. They were aware that there are downsides to the Chinese government’s methodologies, namely, the suppression of rights, and many did not like living in a Zero-COVID world. Nonetheless, they believed that China had been much more successful at controlling the pandemic than the U.S., and thus the COVID-19 pandemic increased their support for the Chinese government and their trust in its competence, and at the same time negatively impacted their view of the U.S.

In January and early February 2023, after the lifting of Zero-COVID policies, most mentions of COVID-19 on Chinese social media involved people complaining about symptoms. Increasingly, the responses have been the same as in the rest of the world: let’s move on with our lives. As of December 2022, about 40% of Americans considered the pandemic “over.” Another 45% felt the U.S. had done enough to combat COVID-19 and should now move on. Almost 70% agreed that “We’re moving towards a time when COVID-19 won’t disrupt our daily lives,” and half of Americans reported having already returned to their normal lives (Jackson et al. 2022). According to eight interviewees who participated in follow-up interviews in February 2023, sentiment among Chinese citizens is rapidly aligning with this perspective. One person noted, “With so much happening around us, people haven’t had the space to reflect on their opinions about the government or U.S.-China relations.”

Several of the students mentioned that they saw the government’s actions in lifting Zero-COVID as responding to the will of the people. One said, “Before lifting of Zero-COVID, there were so many protests…[but] the government knows it’s impossible to make people [quarantine] anymore, so the Chinese government has to listen to the people’s voices, the experts’ voices.” He argued that the government's actions demonstrated a willingness to listen to the public on some policy issues. He further contended that China's response to the pandemic suggests it operates as a form of democracy, albeit not a Western-style one.

Most did not agree. One student who was now living in a “third-party country” (not closely allied with the U.S. or China) described how her views had evolved over the pandemic. She had been studying in the U.S. when the pandemic hit, and she chose to finish her studies before returning to China in 2021. At that time, she left a world still in the throes of COVID-19 and entered a world without COVID. “I was a bit more patriotic,” she said. Indeed, in her first interview, she had spoken with hope about the possibility that “China [could] show the world that there's a different way of doing things.”

However, an incident where she was quarantined due to a “close contact” and nearly prevented from leaving China for a new job abroad convinced her never to return while Zero-COVID policies were in place. She watched from the outside as the Zero-COVID protests erupted and then restrictions were relaxed, but “Deep down, earlier in 2022 I already felt this political despair and depression that has really triggered my thinking…[the past year] made me really reflect a lot on the whole policy, whole political system, whole society, so the past year has really changed a lot the viewpoints of mine.”

She said that she was not interested in returning to China to live long-term, but that she was equally unlikely to return to the U.S. Other students had similar thoughts–even those students whose regard for the Chinese government had decreased drastically over 2022 did not see the U.S. as more attractive in comparison. One student said that “The Chinese government is not fooling anyone who’s following the current [COVID-19] situation,” but that the U.S. is “crazy about China, crazy about immigrants…there’s a disease in U.S. society.” Many expressed a desire to relocate to neutral countries like Singapore, the U.A.E., or Germany. They are disillusioned with both the American government and the Chinese system.

More specifically, the respective responses of the U.S. and Chinese governments to the pandemic have inflicted seemingly irreparable damage on U.S.-China relations. In the 2022 survey, nearly 90% of students believed the relationship was on a path toward intensified competition, decoupling, or even armed conflict (see Fig. 7.4).

Fig. 7.4

Percentage of respondents to the 2022 survey that believe that China and the U.S. are headed toward each path over the next 5–10 years

The prevailing sentiment was one of powerlessness and ambiguity regarding potential solutions to the situation. One student stressed that “Being an ordinary citizen, you can’t really change anything [when] the two governments are chess playing.” Another pointed out that “It’s easy to say that we want to be more open-minded and empathetic but it’s always easier said than done.”

A year later, the outlook had darkened even further. All but one of the follow-up interviewees believed that the U.S-China relationship was worse off than a year prior. While the pandemic has, in many ways, ended, its effects are far-reaching. U.S. government officials continue to advance the theory that COVID-19 originated in a Chinese lab, despite their own scientists expressing “low confidence” in this conclusion (Matza and Yong 2023). The Chinese government has retaliated by publicly supporting conspiracy theories that accuse the U.S. military of releasing COVID-19 in China (Ambassade de la Republique Populaire de Chine en Republique Francaise 2023). Many other similar acts have piled strain onto the relationship. The result is simple, and disappointing. As one of the interviewees put it, “There is no trust. And without trust, what can we do? Nothing will get done.”

Nonetheless, there is a glimmer of hope in how these students view U.S.-China relations. After all, their educational institutions are shaping the future leaders of Chinese society. In the 2022 survey, 87 of 88 respondents—and every interviewee—believed that the U.S. and China should cooperate on at least one policy area (see Fig. 7.5). Large majorities supported cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation, environmental protection, and cultural exchange. None believed that the relationship was cemented in antagonism for perpetuity.

Fig. 7.5

Percentage of respondents to the 2022 survey that believe that China and the U.S. should cooperate in specific areas

Discussion and Implications

It is pertinent to reiterate the foundational aims of this survey following the exploration of key findings—chiefly, to scrutinize young Chinese students’ evolving perceptions of the American government, society, U.S.-China relations, and how these views have been significantly influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic. The key trends I uncovered—such as reconsidering plans to live or work abroad due to increased anti-Asian sentiment, doubts about the American public health system, disillusionment with the “American Dream,” and increased support for the Chinese government—provide nuanced perspectives that challenge the often monolithic and nationalist views found in other research. This chapter, therefore, serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it is an empirical exploration that provides a timely and updated analysis of the thoughts and sentiments of China's future leaders; on the other, it functions as a repository of insights that could guide diplomatic strategies and policy frameworks aimed at improving relations between the U.S. and China. In the context of a world undergoing rapid geopolitical shifts and amid waning trust in traditional superpowers, the value of this research is not merely academic. Rather, it stands as a substantive contribution that has the potential to shape the discourse and guide bilateral relations toward a more cooperative and mutually beneficial future.

There are several policy lessons that can be taken from this study.

First, both American and Chinese leaders should invest more in programs that facilitate people-to-people interactions. The significant decline in visa applications from Chinese students to study in the U.S., along with the U.S. government's refusal to reinstate Fulbright Exchanges with China, both signal a concerning trend toward isolationism. Fulbright participants have historically acted as grassroots diplomats and help to inform geopolitical strategy, especially in regions where high-level relations were fraught. Exchange programs like the Fulbright not only deepen American knowledge but also serve as a counter-narrative to negative portrayals, thereby benefiting both nations.

Second, the U.S. must increase its efforts to recognize and combat racism at both societal and systemic levels. Studies have shown a more than 300% increase in incidents of anti-Asian racism since the pandemic's onset (Wong-Padoongpatt et al. 2022). According to the 2022 STAATUS Index, one in five Americans believes that Asian-Americans bear at least some responsibility for the spread of COVID-19. Racism in the U.S. harms domestic communities but it also echoes internationally, as incidents of racism provide more ammunition for narratives that portray the U.S. as a deeply flawed society. Moreover, racism erodes the “soft power” that the U.S. has traditionally wielded globally. U.S. claims about the virtues of democracy and human rights are undermined when racial minorities are subjected to discrimination and hate crimes. This undermines the U.S.’s ability to credibly critique the human rights records of other countries or promote democratic values, thereby weakening its diplomatic standing.

The COVID-19 pandemic is more than just a public health crisis; it marks a pivotal juncture that has reshaped young Chinese students’ views on governance and international relations. This has far-reaching implications, affecting not only domestic policies in both the U.S. and China but also shaping how the international community navigates an increasingly skeptical view of existing superpowers. This study underscores the urgency for both American and Chinese leaders to re-examine and reformulate their approaches to people-to-people exchanges and societal issues, particularly in combating racism. As we move into a post-pandemic world, it is imperative to heed the perspective of students like the ones I interviewed, for they offer invaluable insights into the evolving landscape of geopolitics and their collective aspirations for a more equitable and just future.