Keywords

The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), an unforeseen public health catastrophe, has resulted in 6.9 million deaths and wrought severe disruptions and repercussions across the globe (World Health Organization 2023). This pandemic has not only profoundly disrupted routine life and production within human societies but also triggered grave political, economic, and social consequences. Since its outbreak in December 2019, China and the U.S. have suffered catastrophically from the pandemic. So too has the U.S.-China relationship, which was already at a historic low point, experienced accelerated deterioration due to the pandemic.

Beyond the immediate health crisis presented by the coronavirus, a metaphorical “political virus” has permeated relations between these two nations, manifesting as mutual blame, disinformation, nationalism, racism, and xenophobia. This “political virus,” while less tangible than its biological counterpart, has proven to be equally, if not more, insidious and damaging in the long term, threatening international and bilateral cooperation precisely when it is most needed.

While tragic disasters invariably bring immeasurable suffering and challenges, they also inadvertently provide the academic community with unique opportunities to delve into the profound structures of human societies and international relations. Calamities ruthlessly lay bare deep-seated issues and vulnerabilities within international societies, nations, and their interrelationships, which are concealed under normal circumstances. Remarkably, the implications of COVID-19 extend beyond the palpable and data-evident impacts on life and the economy. COVID-19 has also influenced people’s perceptions, cognition, and emotions in unprecedented ways.

This book, COVID-19 and U.S.-China Relations presents a multi-dimensional assessment of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on U.S.-China relations. It delves into several key aspects of the relationship, including public health, trade and supply chains, people-to-people relations, public perception, the rise of nationalism and anti-Asian hate, and strategic assessments. Through an exploration of the complex impacts of COVID-19 on U.S.-China interactions, this book seeks to illuminate the myriad ways and underlying reasons the pandemic has negatively permeated this pivotal relationship. It underscores the need for objective and in-depth reflections on the pandemic and its far-reaching consequences, a crucial step toward healing and restoration in the post-COVID-19 era.

This book seeks to embark on a pioneering journey, offering what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first systematic and comprehensive exploration into the myriad impacts of COVID-19 on U.S.-China relations. While a substantial body of research and numerous publications have emerged to examine COVID-19 and its varied impacts on distinct facets of global and domestic issues, there remains a gap in exploring the nuanced and enduring impacts on the relations between the U.S. and China systematically. This volume endeavors to bridge that gap, providing the inaugural book-length treatment on this pivotal topic, seeking to unravel the complexities and far-reaching consequences of the pandemic on the diplomatic, economic, cognitive, and socio-cultural interplay between these two global powers.

The contributing authors of the book include leading scholars and rising stars from both countries, mirroring the project itself, which represents joint efforts and embodies the willingness for bilateral collaboration. As we tread into the post-COVID-19 era, this book presents itself as a timely reflection. The post-COVID-19 restoration of the U.S.-China relationship will have profound implications for both nations and the world at large. As the editor of this book, I firmly believe that if scholars from both nations fail to reflect objectively and comprehensively on this disaster and its devastating consequences, it is challenging to envision how the two countries can mend their wounds and rebuild relations and societies in the post-COVID-19 era. We—the editor and authors of this book—humbly offer it as a tangible starting point in this vitally important reflective undertaking.

Post-disaster Impacts and Damages Assessment

The relationship between the U.S. and China is often described as a marriage and its rapid deteriorations in relations as a bad divorce. The metaphor of a marriage is often used to describe the relationship between the two countries due to the complex and interdependent nature of their interactions. Indeed, for the better part of the last 40 years, the U.S. and China have engaged in close collaboration across a multitude of significant arenas, spanning the economy, education, climate change, public health, among numerous other fields. These collaborations have effectively unfolded at every echelon, from central and federal government interactions down to provincial and state level exchanges.

The rapport between the two nations was particularly strong during what many consider a golden era from 2002 to 2016. The year 2002 marked China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), while 2016 heralded a shift with the election of Donald Trump. This era fostered a term of endearment, “Chimerica” (Ferguson and Schularick 2007), symbolizing the symbiotic relationship that had developed, characterized by frequent and comprehensive interactions. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi (2022) provides the following statement about the pre-pandemic closeness of the two countries:

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, more than 300 flights shuttled between the two countries every week, and over five million travels were made across the Pacific every year. China-U.S. business ties, once negligible, expanded to U.S.$750 billion in bilateral trade and U.S.$240 billion in two-way investment. From tackling terrorism, financial crises and Ebola, to providing leadership in the signing of the JCPOA and the conclusion of the Paris Agreement on climate change, China and the United States did many great things benefiting the world through their cooperation.

A particularly salient example of this bilateral collaboration is explored in Chapter 2 of the book, “US-China Health Relations During COVID-19.” Joan Kaufman and Michael Gallo elucidate how China and the U.S. have enjoyed a lengthy and fruitful collaboration addressing numerous global health threats, a camaraderie that notably commenced with the SARS pandemic in 2003. The authors underscore how significant portions of China’s present robust public health infrastructure have been shaped and sustained through financial and direct support from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and various U.S. philanthropic organizations, including the Rockefeller Foundation, the China Medical Board, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, among others.

The robust collaboration observed during the “golden age” encountered major hurdles during the Trump presidency, particularly in the wake of the 2018 Trade War. The advent of COVID-19 further accelerated the decoupling process significantly. To a certain extent, the pandemic symbolized a “divorce” or “separation” from what was once a mutually beneficial “marriage” between the U.S. and China. Much like a tragic marriage, despite having substantial common interests and shared responsibilities, the two nations found themselves on a path toward conflict.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has ushered in a complex, multifaceted crisis, impacting nations on a scale reminiscent of war. Although the confrontations between the U.S. and China during the pandemic were not of military nature, they mirrored a war-like scenario in terms of disruption, separation, fear, resentment, and the stimulation of nationalist and anti-foreigner sentiments akin to wartime. The virus, an invisible enemy, besieged normalcy and international cooperation, erecting barriers between nations, communities, and individuals.

Separation and Decoupling

The surge in U.S.-China tensions during the pandemic, coupled with China's near-total isolation due to its “Zero COVID” policy, erected formidable barriers between the two nations. Numerous statistics from this period, including the sharp decrease in the number of visitors and visas issued between the two countries, paint a vivid picture of the situation. In Chapter 5, “Reconnecting Students and Academics in Post-Pandemic U.S.-China Relations,” Margaret Lewis draws upon statistics to highlight a significant decline in the number of Chinese students in the U.S. during the pandemic: the count fell from nearly 375,000 in 2019 to 290,000 in 2022. Furthermore, new applications for student visas decreased by 30% from 2021 to 2022. Lewis also quotes Nicholas Burns, the current U.S. Ambassador to China, who states that there were between 14,000 and 15,000 American students in China as recently as 10 years ago—a number that dwindled to approximately 350 American students in the spring of 2023.

Margaret Lewis also points out that, although some costs of these deteriorating ties can be easily quantified, others, more intangible in nature, may have even graver implications for the bilateral relationship. For instance, a limited number of American students in China today suggests that, a decade or so down the line, the field of China studies in the U.S. may be increasingly populated by individuals with less firsthand experience in China. This dearth of direct exposure to each other’s societies, cultures, and peoples might further exacerbate existing misunderstandings and mistrust between the two nations (Fig. 1.1).

Fig. 1.1
A stacked bar graph of numbers of U S visa issuance to Chinese nationals. The bars for July 2019 are the highest at approximately 125000. The proportion of U S Visa issuance to Chinese Nationals is higher. The values are the lowest for the months of July 2020, and October, January, and April of 2021.

Numbers of U.S. visa issuance to Chinese nationals, 2019–2022

The pandemic also exposed the fragility of and over-dependence on concentrated supply chains, particularly those rooted in China. As the virus wreaked havoc, disrupting manufacturing and logistics, companies and countries realized the imperative of diversifying supply sources to mitigate risks associated with over-reliance on a single country or region. The U.S. began exploring alternative supply chain networks, thereby incrementally decoupling from China's economic ecosystem. In Chapter 4, “COVID-19: Catalyzing U.S.-China Supply Chain Realignments,” Bo Zhengyuan dissects the impact of COVID-19 on the supply chain dynamics between the U.S. and China, supported by extensive statistical data, figures, and tables. The chapter zeroes in on three pivotal shifts:

  1. 1.

    The securitization of supply chains: In both countries, the pandemic period has witnessed the growing recognition of supply chains as a critical facet of national security, necessitating measures to ensure their resilience, security, and robustness against disruptions that could negatively impact a nation’s economy or public safety.

  2. 2.

    Selective decoupling and de-risking: COVID-19 has exposed vulnerabilities in global supply chains, prompting a reevaluation of supply chain strategies in both the U.S. and China. This reevaluation is characterized by actions to relocate or diversify supply sources in sensitive or critical sectors. Under this trend, we observe China's imperative to bolster self-sufficiency and the U.S.’s endeavor to diversify its supply chain away from China.

  3. 3.

    Reevaluation of China's Role in Global Supply Chains: China's COVID-19 control measures in 2022 triggered severe production disruptions globally, prompting investors and governments to reevaluate China's position as a reliable hub for global supply chains. This reevaluation could have far-reaching implications for China’s economy and foreign relations.

Indeed, in response to the pandemic, we saw both countries adopt policies that fostered economic decoupling. The anti-globalization sentiment bolstered by the pandemic facilitated momentum for economic decoupling as both nations veered toward protecting their domestic industries and reducing reliance on each other. The U.S.’s increasing restrictions on Chinese technology firms under the guise of national security, and China’s “dual circulation” strategy aiming for greater economic self-reliance, are quintessential examples of policy-driven economic decoupling. The pandemic also accelerated trends toward re-shoring and near-shoring as companies sought to bring production closer to home to avoid future disruptions.

The disruptions caused by COVID-19 in manufacturing and transportation, as well as different countries’ new policies and regulations in response to COVID-19 controls, have also prompted a reassessment of some long-term policies and practices. China's spring 2022 lockdowns under its Zero-COVID policy notably rattled the global supply chain. Although such actions may not recur, the pandemic's memory and ensuing skepticism toward China, confirmed by numerous surveys in different parts of world, have led businesses and investors to reassess its reliability as a global supply chain hub. This reevaluation, likely persisting even as disruptions abate, could catalyze a decoupling trend from China, enduringly impacting global supply chains and China's future economic trajectory.

Information Warfare and Cognitive Dissonance

Disasters have always been accompanied by debates about who is responsible and who should be blamed for the unfortunate occurrences. Confronted with tests of life and death, people become more outspoken and emotional, often leading to the emergence of various extremist thoughts and ideas.

In the early phase of the pandemic, information regarding the novel virus was severely limited. The information sphere transformed into a battleground where nations became ensnared in a narrative conflict, particularly concerning the origins of COVID-19. Chapter 3, Contested Narratives: The COVID-19 Origins Debate and Its Implications for U.S.-China Relations,” thoroughly reviews the unfolding debate between the U.S. and China regarding the origins of COVID-19. While Yanzhong Huang and Betty Best, the coauthors of the chapter, refrained from employing the term “information warfare,” a reading of their contribution reveals that the debate over COVID-19's origins between the U.S. and China encapsulates several facets indicative of informational combat.

Their chapter delineates how both nations, represented by various officials such as ministers, spokespersons, and congressional members, have exploited unverified suspicions and rumors to champion their own storylines and undermine their adversaries. As corroborated with sources in this chapter, several U.S. officials, including former President Trump, initially labeled COVID-19 as the “Chinese Virus” or “Wuhan Virus.” Conversely, Chinese officials and state media have insinuated that the virus might have originated in the U.S. before being released in Wuhan, in an attempt to deflect responsibility for the initial outbreak. A surge of disinformation and propaganda further impaired mutual perceptions, mirroring wartime propaganda in which nations compete for narrative control.

During this period of information combat, both sides employed an “Us versus Them” mentality, aiming to redirect people's anger toward the foreign enemy. In fact, each side operationalized the negative messages from the other to fuel domestic nationalism and distract people from their own governments’ dysfunctional performance. Unfortunately, it seems that both sides might have realized some of their objectives through this strategy and, paradoxically, may harbor a degree of gratitude toward one another. When President Trump referred to the coronavirus as the “Chinese virus,” it provided his counterpart in China with an optimal tool to stir and mobilize the Chinese population, arousing their anger against a foreign enemy. Although Twitter is not accessible from China, many of Donald Trump’s tweets from this period were translated into Chinese and disseminated across China. Similarly, tweets from Zhao Lijian, the spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which promulgated the conspiracy theory that the virus originated in a U.S. military lab, were widely shared across both America and China. Even though these messages were primarily intended for domestic audiences, they contributed to the hostility and significantly angered citizens in the opposing country.

Indeed, disinformation and propaganda have significantly shaped citizens’ perceptions in both countries. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a Chinese scholar informed one of the authors, “I suspect 90 percent of those in rural areas or small cities are convinced the virus originated in the United States.” Unfortunately, this observation seems quite common in China, based on speaking with numerous individuals residing in China, including university professors. The authors of Chapter 3 also cited a recent Economist/YouGov poll, which indicates that 66% of Americans, including 53% of Democrats and 85% of Republicans, believe it is “definitely or probably true” that the virus causing COVID-19 emerged from a laboratory in China. This poll reveals several notable points. First, three years after the COVID-19 outbreak, the majority of Americans subscribe to the Lab Leak theory. Second, the inclusion of party affiliations in the poll, like many similar surveys, underscores the politicization of the origins debate.

The blame game and conspiracy theories circulating about the pandemic’s origins have resulted in a cascade of consequences. These have not only substantially contributed to the downward spiral in bilateral relations but also further entrenched the distrust and suspicions harbored by the two nations. Moreover, they have jeopardized bilateral collaborations, particularly in critical sectors such as healthcare, biotechnology, and scientific research, and rendered the scientific investigation into the origins of COVID-19 challenging, if not virtually impossible.

In Chapter 8, “The Pandemic and the China-U.S. ‘Echo Chamber’ Effect,” Da Wei and Li Haixuan explore a peculiar “Echo Chamber” effect observed in U.S.-China relations during the pandemic. This phenomenon took shape as each nation predominantly reported the other's misfortunes, governmental dysfunction, and societal suffering amid the pandemic, thereby cultivating prevalent views about each other and perceived power shifts between the two countries. Notions such as the Chinese perception of “the East is Rising, the West is Declining” and the U.S. perspective of “China Peaks” became widespread, with each side foreseeing the other's fundamental decline, or even collapse, due to the extensive damage inflicted by COVID-19. Moreover, each nation now believes that the pandemic exposed intrinsic flaws in the other's political system and leadership, significantly influencing their strategic assessments and perceptions of power.

It seems to me, as the editor of the book, that this phenomenon aligns closely with the theory of cognitive dissonance. In his seminal work, “Perception and Misperception in International Politics,” Robert Jervis (1976) employed cognitive dissonance to elucidate how states, via their leaders, perceive and misperceive one another. Within this framework, the contemporary U.S.-China relationship is entwined in a prototypical “cognitive dissonance.” Following escalating tension and hostility in bilateral relations, particularly intensified by information warfare replete with disinformation and unverified “truths” about the other, individuals psychologically seek rationality for their judgments and actions toward the opposing nation. This psychological necessity propels people to “automatically” filter out incongruent information and pursue and amplify details validating their assessments and actions. Consequently, both nations unconsciously amplify each other's present challenges and disappointments, while psychologically sidestepping and disregarding each other’s developmental progress and potential. For these two superpowers, however, their reciprocal strategic assessments of each other carry immense significance and have global implications. If these assessments are influenced by disinformation and cognitive dissonance, they could result in tragic misjudgments.

Prejudice and Perception: The Rise of Nationalism and Anti-Asian Racism

Pandemic-induced fear and uncertainty fostered a worldwide rise in nationalism, aptly termed as “Pandemic nationalism.” The manifestations of anti-Asian racism in the U.S. during the pandemic paralleled the kind of racial animosities often exacerbated in wartime. Similarly, the virulent racism experienced in the wake of the virus is a stark testament to the societal schisms further deepened by the pandemic, much like the societal divides witnessed in wartime.

The pandemic precipitated a dramatic shift in public opinions within both the U.S. and China, each toward the other. Public sentiment in the U.S. toward China has soured significantly, experiencing an alarming increase in negative perspectives during the past several years. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center (2023a) aptly illustrates this trend: in 2018, less than half of the respondents (47%) expressed negative views toward China. However, by 2023, a striking 83% of respondents harbored negative opinions, marking a substantial escalation of 36% points over a mere five years (Fig. 1.2).

Fig. 1.2
A double line graph of U S opinion of China. It has values versus years 2005 to 2023. In 2005 unfavorable is at 35 and favorable is at 43. In 2023, favorable is at 14 and unfavorable is at 83.

U.S. public opinion of China, 2005–2023

The timeframe in question coincides with the global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in Wuhan, China. The pandemic not only claimed lives and disrupted economies but also sparked geopolitical blame games and heightened scrutiny toward China’s handling of the outbreak, transparency, and cooperation with the global community. This period also witnessed escalating U.S.-China trade tensions and disputes over technological and geopolitical issues, further straining the bilateral relationship. The findings from the Pew Research Center serve as a stark reminder of the impact that global crises and political discord can have on public perception, and the resultant hurdles they pose to bilateral relations and diplomatic engagements.

This phenomenon is not just in the U.S.—according to another survey by the Pew Research Center (2023b), attitudes toward China are predominantly negative in 24 countries surveyed. A median of two-thirds express an unfavorable opinion of China, while a median of just 28% offer positive ratings. In each of the North American and European countries surveyed, half or more hold somewhat or very unfavorable opinions of China, including majorities of three-quarters or more in Sweden, the U.S., Canada, the Netherlands, and Germany. Indeed, post-COVID-19, China is grappling with a serious crisis of trust and burgeoning negative opinion.

In Chapter 7, “America Through the Eyes of Chinese Youth During COVID-19,” Mallie Prytherch explores the viewpoints of students at two of China’s premier institutions, Peking University and Tsinghua University, uniquely leveraging her position as one of the very few international scholars in China during the COVID-19 pandemic to speak with Chinese students who are poised to become future leaders in business, academia, and politics. Employing a dual-method approach, Prytherch utilized a digital questionnaire, supplemented with semi-structured interviews to mitigate the limitations of the digital survey.

The research findings reveal invaluable insights into how COVID-19 has influenced the perspectives of China's future leaders toward the U.S. According to her research, over two-thirds of respondents expressed a more negative view of the American government since the onset of the pandemic. Moreover, many students, who had once contemplated pursuing extended living or working experiences in the U.S., have reevaluated their plans, attributing this shift to various factors associated with COVID-19. Additionally, a clear correlation emerges between experiencing anti-Asian racism in the U.S. and an enhanced support for the Chinese government. Not only did the pandemic affect the students’ views of the U.S., but it also negatively influenced their perceptions of democratic systems at large. This chapter further elucidates that the COVID-19 pandemic is not merely a public health crisis but a pivotal juncture that has reoriented future Chinese leaders’ viewpoints on their government, the U.S., and the wider spectrum of international relations, with potentially far-reaching implications.

This growing nationalism is evident in the U.S. as well. As Minxin Pei (2003) argued, nationalism used to be a dirty word in the U.S., and Americans used to believe that it appeared only in “backward” societies and would not find the fertile ground to grow within an advanced and mature democracy. However, what we have experienced in the last four years is fundamentally the astonishing rise of nationalism in this land, with Donald Trump as its cultivator. By leading this movement, Trump successfully transformed himself from a real estate businessman to the U.S. President. In my opinion, Trump’s nationalism, or Trumpism, is a combination of an “America First” economic nationalism, white-supremacist racism, and anti-elite and anti-immigrant populism. Nationalism blinds judgment, justifies lies and extreme actions, creates an “Us versus Them” confrontation, and draws rifts within societies.

And yet, nationalism is a double-edged sword. To a certain extent, Trump too became a hostage of his nationalist movement, which turned into the biggest factor contributing toward his failure as a President, especially in handling the COVID-19 crisis. Aware of who sent him to the White House, he has spent his term catering to the likes and preferences of American nationalists. As they are his power base, Trump has been extremely careful to never let them down. When the pandemic first arrived on American shores, these were the people who disliked wearing masks and opposed locking down their communities. Trump's reluctance to counter these sentiments precipitated the internationally observed anti-science and anti-intellectual posture of his administration throughout the pandemic.

In Chapter 2, Joan Kaufman and Michael Gallo comment on a distinct form of “vaccine nationalism” that influenced the Chinese government's decision to decline more efficacious mRNA vaccines. This stance endured even after the highly contagious Omicron variant began spreading in late 2022, following the lifting of the “zero-COVID policy,” which led to widespread deaths, especially among the elderly population. I find Kaufman and Gallo’s observations regarding “vaccine nationalism” particularly relevant in understanding China’s differential attitudes toward domestic and foreign vaccines. During the initial stages of COVID-19, China successfully developed its own vaccines, which were heralded as a source of national pride and scientific innovation in official media and were also exported to many countries promoting China’s global influence. However, under the “vaccine nationalism,” the Chinese government continued to reject the importation and implementation of mRNA vaccines in China, even when its own vaccines were found to provide less protection against the virus.

During the pandemic, we have also witnessed a unique competition in “vaccine diplomacy” between the U.S. and China. Each nation has sought to portray itself as a global leader in the battle against the pandemic, while also casting a critical eye on the other’s efforts and intentions. Both countries have donated large quantities of COVID-19 vaccines to numerous nations, a strategy largely tied to geopolitical competition for influence across various regions of the world. It seems to me that this “vaccine diplomacy” has induced a “rally round the flag” effect, typically observed in conflict or wartime, where nations and citizens unite against perceived external threats. However, this unity can also foster an “Us versus Them” mentality, further exacerbating international relations. At a critical juncture when the global community direly needed leadership, the two superpowers were primarily focused on blaming each other and competing for global influence.

While patriotic and nationalistic sentiments can forge unity and support during trying times, they may also sow seeds of xenophobia, racism, and jingoism. A poignant tragedy of our era is the escalation of anti-Asian racism and related crimes in the U.S. amid the COVID-19 pandemic. According to a report by the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism (Yam 2022), Anti-Asian hate crimes surged by 339% nationwide in 2021, with cities like New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles exceeding their previous 2020 records. Anti-Asian hate is one of the ugly by-products of COVID-19.

In Chapter 6, “COVID-19, Anti-Asian Racism, and U.S.-China Relations,” D.G. Kim employs public opinion polls and original survey data to delineate the direct linkage between COVID-19 and anti-Asian sentiment within the U.S. His research unveils a pivotal discovery: there is a striking correlation between pandemic-induced public anxiety and a rise in support for more assertive foreign policy measures against China—a correlation partly anchored in negative attitudes toward individuals of Chinese and Asian descent.

Kim’s research further unveils a noticeable increase in the discourse related to anti-Asian racism within Chinese state media, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020. Confronted with an American President who utilized the label “Chinese virus” and the stark images of vulnerable victims of anti-Asian hate crimes in America, a wide spectrum of Chinese society––from the nation’s assertive “wolf warrior diplomats” and government-operated media to countless Chinese netizens––intentionally increased attention toward anti-Asian racism in the U.S. An analysis of these narratives unearths two dominant themes: firstly, associating the spike in anti-Asian violence with racially charged U.S. foreign policy toward China, and secondly, perceiving such violence as a mirror reflecting the inherent flaws of American democracy and the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy.

Nationalism often necessitates foreign adversaries, which explains why Trump chose to label the coronavirus as the “Chinese virus.” When President Trump utilized this term in a tweet, it sparked significant outrage in China and marked a pivotal moment in U.S.-China relations. While nationalists derive satisfaction from seeing their adversaries struggle, nationalism frequently leads people to forfeit their rationality. This has been apparent in many actions and policies against China under the Trump administration, which have harmed Americans as much as they have harmed Chinese. Similarly, many behaviors exhibited by the Chinese government, such as the so-called Wolf Warrior Diplomacy, have only served to diminish China’s global soft power and exacerbate its international environment. Unfortunately, we have witnessed rationality being supplanted by emotionality, with rhetoric and symbolic politics assuming a more prominent role in bilateral relations.

For an extensive period, America’s influence in China—particularly among its educated population—was a significant concern for the Chinese Communist Party, since many Chinese admired the U.S. political system, institutions, and way of life. However, never before has America’s soft power and reputation been so damaged within China. For many Chinese, in the wake of COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. no longer represents the light on the hill.

Organization

Each chapter in the book explores specific facets of the relationship, employing case studies, empirical statistics, and qualitative analysis to assess the pandemic's impact on bilateral relations. Additionally, each chapter also provides policy recommendations to address the observed effects and to nurture future collaboration between the two nations. The book includes eight chapters and an afterword. While I have introduced some primary findings and insights from each chapter in the previous section, this section provides an overview of the book by listing each chapter's title, author, and a brief abstract, and offering additional background about the book project and its writing process.

Chapter 1, “Invisible Battlegrounds: The COVID-19 Chapter in U.S.-China Relations,” serves as the introduction to the book. Zheng Wang, the editor of the book, provides an overview of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on U.S.-China relations. This chapter presents the main findings and recommendations from each section of the book and highlights their relevance and significance to the current state of bilateral relations and global governance.

Chapter 2, “U.S.-China Health Relations During COVID-19: Insights from Past Collaborations and Future Considerations,” reviews the history of U.S.-China health cooperation since the 2003 SARS pandemic. Joan Kaufman and Michael Gallo further analyze how geopolitical tensions led to reduced staffing in CDC program offices, consequently hindering collaboration and data sharing during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In Chapter 3, “Contested Narratives: The COVID-19 Origins Debate and Its Implications for U.S.-China Relations,” Yanzhong Huang and Lucy Best unpack the conflicting narratives in both countries regarding the origins of COVID-19 and explore how these narratives have been intertwined with domestic politics on both sides, undermining trust and causing a breakdown in communication and cooperation between the two nations.

Chapter 4, “COVID-19: Catalyzing US-China Supply Chain Realignments,” examines the impact of COVID-19 on the U.S.-China supply chain, analyzing how the pandemic not only further strained the bilateral relationship but also accelerated selective decoupling. Bo Zhengyuan demonstrates how the deepening distrust between the world's two largest economies during the pandemic prompted both governments to regard each other as unsuitable partners for hosting critical supply chains.

In Chapter 5, “Reconnecting Students and Academics in Post-Pandemic US-China Relations,” Margaret Lewis navigates through the evolving People-to-People (P2P) ties between the U.S. and China amidst and following the COVID-19 pandemic. The “Zero COVID” policy adopted by China, coupled with already escalating tensions between the two nations during the pandemic, erected formidable barriers to P2P interactions, severely impacting facets such as academic exchanges and cultural interactions. The chapter also provides recommendations for rejuvenating connections and interactions between the citizens of the two countries.

The upcoming two chapters primarily utilize public opinion surveys to dissect the repercussions of COVID-19 on the mutual perceptions between Americans and Chinese. In Chapter 6, “COVID-19, Anti-Asian Racism, and U.S.-China Relations,” D.G. Kim utilizes public opinion polls and original survey data to trace the direct linkage between the COVID-19 pandemic and the escalation of anti-Asian sentiment in the U.S. The discussion further explores how this rising tide of animosity has influenced the emergence of hawkish foreign policy discourses in China, thereby shaping the racialized perceptions and interactions between the two powers.

In Chapter 7, “America Through the Eyes of Chinese Youth During COVID-19,” Mallie Prytherch unpacks the significant shift in the perception of the U.S. among Chinese youth, particularly those studying at China’s esteemed universities, Peking and Tsinghua, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Utilizing a dual-method approach, incorporating both surveys and interviews, the chapter uncovers a trifecta of trends among these students: a reevaluation of aspirations to live or work abroad, attributed to escalating anti-Asian sentiment and critiques of the U.S. public health system; growing disillusionment with the “American Dream” and its underlying values; and strengthened support for the Chinese government.

Chapter 8, “The Pandemic and the China-U.S. ‘Echo Chamber’ Effect,” explores how COVID-19 has markedly influenced both nations’ strategic assessments and perceptions of power. Da Wei and Li Haixuan dissect two prevalent viewpoints: the Chinese perception of “East Rising, West Declining” and the U.S. perspective of “China Peaks.” These oversimplified, yet compelling, narratives provide a lens through which each country perceives the other, notably shaped by disinformation and psychologically impacted assessments during the pandemic.

The book concludes with an Afterword, “The Pathways to a U.S.-China Post-COVID-19 Reconciliation,” written by the editor of the book. If COVID-19 is likened to a war-like experience, can reconciliation between the U.S. and China occur, and if so, what could facilitate this reconciliation? The Afterword explores potential avenues and strategies for reconciliation between the two nations and presents various thoughtful and actionable recommendations from the contributing authors of the book.

This book project has been significantly informed by a track two online dialogue project titled “Luce Dialogue on U.S.-China Relations During and After the Pandemic” (CPCS 2023), funded by the Henry Luce Foundation. Over the past three years during the COVID-19 period, more than 60 leading scholars from both countries have participated in a series of online dialogues over many topics of the bilateral relations. These dialogues, aimed at fostering open and frank communication between the policy communities of both countries, have promoted an in-depth understanding of various pandemic-related issues. Furthermore, the dialogues have enabled the creation of working relationships among participating scholars, enriching perspectives and understanding of each other's contexts and perceptions. They have not only facilitated a profound understanding of various issues related to the pandemic but also served as a channel of communication at a time when in-person meetings were impossible.

We hope that the dialogues and discussions contained within these pages serve as a substantive resource, nurturing a deeper understanding and fostering ongoing dialogue about U.S.-China relations in the future. I cordially invite you to explore the chapters that follow.