Keywords

In September 2023, political leaders, NGO representatives, journalists, religious authorities and other opinion leaders from over twenty countries gathered in Budapest for a biennial Demographic Summit. Hosted by the Hungarian government since 2015, the summit provides a forum for likeminded public figures committed to ‘family values’ and concerned about the demographic prospects of Western societies. Over the years, it has served as a platform for prominent illiberal politicians from across Europe, Northern America, Australia and beyond, including Serbian and Bulgarian Presidents Aleksandar Vučić and Rumen Radev, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, former Czech and Slovenian Prime Ministers Andrej Babiš and Janez Janša, former US Vice-President Mike Pence, and former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, among many others (Antoni et al., 2021, November 24). While different iterations of the summit have approached demographic issues from different vantage points, ranging from security to sustainability, they have all been underpinned by a commitment to ultra-conservative values and by a conviction that such values are under attack by ‘liberal global elites’ whose support for immigration, gender equality, and LGBTQ+ rights is seen as a threat to the conservative values of family, nation, and Western civilization. These fears often tap into conspiracy theories about ‘population replacement’ or ‘demographic jihad’, which became increasingly common among far-right circles in recent years and suggest that the white and Christian populations of Europe are being purposefully ‘replaced’ by non-whites and Muslims (Bracke & Hernandez Aguilar, 2020). During each of the summits, Hungary skilfully used the opportunity to promote its family-friendly policies, introduced in 2010 to combat the country’s declining birth rate, presenting them as a ‘reference point’ for the international implementation of similar conservative policies (Budapest Demographic Summit, 2021).

In his 2023 opening speech, Prime Minister Orbán called for a ‘change in the political course’ in Europe, arguing that ‘family-friendly, conservative powers’ should take over in as many European countries as possible’ (Euronews, 2023, September 14). Italian Prime Minister Meloni echoed his arguments, emphasizing that ‘a great battle is needed to defend families, God, and all things that build our civilization’. In a manner characteristic of illiberal rhetoric across the European continent, Meloni argued that immigration ‘is not the solution to the continent’s demographic crisis’, and instead pledged to boost Italy’s birth rates through family-friendly policies modelled on Hungarian legislation (Pascale, 2023, September 15; Reuters, 2023, September 14). The previous summit, held in 2021, charted a similar ideological terrain, with participants railing against ‘massive and uncontrolled immigration’, as well as against environmentalist concerns over population growth, arguing that, as the former Czech Prime Minister Babiš put it, ‘the only truly sustainable solution to Europe’s extinction is to increase the birth rate of the indigenous population’ (Reuters, 2021, September 23). Each of the guests used the event to address specific concerns that resonated with their own domestic debates. Orbán attacked the ‘gender lobby’, while Babiš took the opportunity to criticize the EU for supposedly allowing ‘illegal immigration’. Vučić presented demography as ‘a question of survival’ for Serbia and complained about the continuing appeal of ‘liberal political Marxism’ in his country, while Pence criticized ‘liberal global elites’ for thinking that the traditional family is an outdated concept (Antoni et al., 2021, November 24).

The summit encapsulates the malleable ideological nature of illiberalism, which can take a variety of forms depending on which of the ‘liberal scripts’ or ‘metanarratives’ (Laruelle, 2022, pp. 312–313) it seeks to challenge. As argued in Chap. 2, all manifestations of illiberalism share a hostility to liberalism, and pursue a vision of society that is governed by majority rule and underpinned by ethno-nationalist ideas and traditional cultural hierarchies. Yet, this shared vision allows for significant variation across different socio-political contexts. Due to this, illiberalism is best seen as a composite ‘repertoire’ of ideological narratives, values, attitudes, and governance practices that target a wide range of political, economic, and cultural issues—from immigration, LGBTQ+ rights and abortion to economic (neo)liberalism and the geopolitical dominance of ‘the West’. As the interventions of political leaders present at the Budapest Demographic Summit illustrate, this repertoire can be adopted selectively to suit diverse national political environments and priorities, while nonetheless providing a basis for transnational alliances among likeminded politicians and public figures globally. The varieties of illiberalism found in different countries can therefore foreground different polarizing issues, and the selection of these issues can also change over time. Despite this diversity, the shared opposition to liberalism provides grounds for transnational ties and cross-border learning, with illiberal leaders often mimicking each other’s rhetoric and copying policy and regulatory solutions.

In this chapter, we focus on two polarizing issues—immigration and LGBTQ+ rightsFootnote 1—that are central to understanding the mainstreaming of illiberalism in Eastern Europe and globally. Additionally, this focus helps us illustrate the malleable nature of illiberal rhetoric and the extent to which it varies across countries and changes over time. The rise of immigration and LGBTQ+ rights as key polarizing issues was a complex process that involved many actors and was facilitated by several structural factors and long-term developments that exceed the scope of this research. We focus instead on the mainstreaming of hostile rhetoric and attitudes, the key actors involved in it—primarily illiberal politicians, but also church leaders and other opinion leaders—and the extent to which it was either fostered or hindered by the media. We start by providing an overview of public attitudes on the two issues in late 2019 and early 2020, and then trace the key moments at which immigration and LGBTQ+ rights became central to political campaigning and public debate in each of the four countries since the early 2000s. In the second part of the chapter, we zoom in on the role that the media played in the mainstreaming process, paying particular attention to public service media and digital news channels. Building on arguments about the stages of the illiberal public sphere presented in Chap. 2, we seek to establish whether and how their respective roles differ depending on how advanced the illiberal public sphere is in a particular country, at a given point in time.

5.1 Mainstreaming Hostility to Immigration and LGBTQ+ Rights in Eastern Europe

Existing global comparisons rank Eastern European countries among the lowest in the world on migrant acceptance (e.g. Esipova et al., 2020, September 23) and show them to be rather intolerant of homosexuality (Poushter & Kent, 2020, p. 7). It may be tempting to see this as another confirmation of weaker democratic culture in the region, or as evidence of legacies of authoritarianism rooted in the region’s communist past. Yet, such an interpretation glosses over the fact that hostility to immigration and opposition to LGBTQ+ rights have intensified only in recent years. Across Eastern Europe, immigration was virtually a non-issue in political terms until well into the twenty-first century. Even though many countries have long had large immigrant communities and ethnic minorities, most of them came from other Eastern European countries and rarely became a matter of political contestation (cf. Wondreys, 2021). Many countries in the region also have a reasonably long history of accommodating sexual diversity, having decriminalized homosexuality at the same time or even earlier than many Western European countries—Poland in 1932, Czech Republic in 1961 and Hungary in 1962 (Mignot, 2022). Even though the lack of consolidated democratic culture and remnants of the authoritarian past may have facilitated the recent rise in homophobia and anti-immigrant racism, these developments have largely been encouraged by illiberal politicians who stoked up fears of immigration and same-sex rights as part of their political campaigns.

In the rest of this section, we provide an overview of key moments at which immigration and LGBTQ+ rights became central to political campaigning and public debate in each of the four countries we examine. However, it is first useful to provide a general overview of public attitudes to immigration and LGBTQ+ in the four countries. To do so, we draw on our population survey, conducted in late 2019 and early 2020, in which we asked respondents about their perceptions of immigration, their support for same-sex marriage and adoption, as well as their attitudes towards immigrant, gay and lesbian people as neighbours.Footnote 2 Our data reveals considerable cross-country variation in levels of negative attitudes to these issues (Fig. 5.1). Although immigration is perceived as a threat by well over half of all respondents in all four countries, percentages range from just over half of the population (54.4%) in Poland, to well over two-thirds (72.8%) in the Czech Republic. Levels of opposition to LGBTQ+ rights vary even more, with 30% and 35.1% of the sample opposed to same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption in the Czech Republic, compared with 74.9% and 82.5% in Serbia.

Fig. 5.1
A scatterplot depicts the proportion of negative attitudes to social and political issues in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Serbia. The negative attitude to same-sex adoption, same-sex marriage, immigrants as neighbors, and gays or lesbians as neighbors is the highest in Serbia, and immigration is the highest in the Czech Republic.

Prevalence of negative attitudes to immigration and same-sex relationships

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The countries’ profiles also show that the different dimensions of illiberalism can move independently from one another—that is, high levels of opposition to immigration do not necessarily go hand in hand with high levels of prejudice against same-sex relationships. The attitudinal profile of the Czech Republic is particularly remarkable in this respect. The country ranks highest on negative attitudes towards immigration, with 72.8% of respondents seeing immigration as a threat and 57.7% being uncomfortable with having immigrants as neighbours. Conversely, it ranks as the most liberal when it comes to attitudes towards same-sex relationships and rights, with 30% of respondents disagreeing with same-sex marriage and 35.1% with same-sex adoption, and 14% being uncomfortable with having gay and lesbian neighbours. In Hungary, levels of hostility to immigration are also on average higher than levels of hostility to same-sex rights and neighbours, although attitudes on the two issues are not as far apart as in the Czech Republic, with rejection of same-sex marriage (45.7%), same-sex adoption (48.5%) and immigrants as neighbours (44.1%) all ranking rather close.

In Poland and Serbia, it is even more difficult to establish which of the two sets of issues is met with greater public hostility. In Poland, same-sex rights appear more controversial than immigration on average, but this is largely a result of particularly negative attitudes to same-sex adoption, which is opposed by well over two-thirds (69.4%) of the respondents, while levels of opposition to same-sex marriage (50.7%) are similar to levels of negative attitudes to immigration (54.4%). Attitudes to neighbours add further complexity to this picture, revealing that Polish respondents are more uncomfortable with immigrants as neighbours (36.5%) than with gay and lesbian people as neighbours (27.6%). In Serbia, a similarly complex picture emerges, although attitudes to both issues are considerably more negative than in Poland. At first sight, same-sex relationships are met with greater hostility. While immigration is seen as a threat by 70.4% of respondents, an even greater proportion is opposed to same-sex marriage (74.9%) and same-sex adoption (82.5%). However, just as Polish respondents, Serbians respondents are considerably less comfortable with immigrants as neighbours (60.2%) than they are with gay and lesbian people as neighbours (46.7%).

In the paragraphs that follow we trace some of the key socio-political shifts that have given rise to such attitudes, focusing on key moments when immigration and LGBTQ+ rights became central issues in political rhetoric in each of the countries. Where available, we also note existing research on shifts in public opinion and the role of the media, a subject that we examine more systematically later in the chapter.

5.1.1 The 2015 Refugee Crisis as a Turning Point

The 2015 refugee crisis was a turning point in public attitudes towards immigration across Eastern Europe. In 2015, the leaders of the Visegrád Group—Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia—rejected the proposal to implement a ‘quota system’ to distribute asylum seekers from war-torn Syria more equally among EU members. The jihadist attacks in Brussels and Paris in 2015 and 2016 provided further arsenal for anti-immigrant fearmongering, offering a pretext for linking immigration with the Islamic threat. In all four Visegrád countries, elite opposition to EU immigration quotas and Islamophobic reactions to terrorist attacks played a central role in political communication, helping to consolidate the popularity of right-wing political leaders or even facilitating their rise to power. This was paralleled by notable shifts in public opinion. In Poland, almost three quarters (72%) of the population agreed that the country should accept refugees from war-torn countries in May 2015, yet this proportion dropped to just one third (33%) by April 2016 (Hargrave et al., 2023, p. 18). In the Czech Republic, less than one-fifth (19%) of respondents believed immigration to be a threat in 2006, compared with almost two-thirds (65%) in 2015 (Wondreys, 2021, p. 728).

As with many other aspects of the illiberal turn, Hungary made the first move and provided a template for others to follow. In January 2015, immediately after the terrorist attack on the office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, Orbán gave an interview to the Hungarian public broadcaster in which he put forward the key arguments that would continue to dominate the debate on immigration for years to come. He called for a ‘more open and honest’ discussion about immigration, arguing that economic immigration ‘brings trouble and danger to the European man’ and blaming terrorist attacks squarely on Muslim immigrants. He went on to promise that his government ‘[would] never allow Hungary to become a target country for immigrants’, because Hungarians ‘do not want to see significantly sized minorities with different cultural characteristics and backgrounds among [them]’ (quoted in Melegh, 2016, p. 88). The launch of a National Consultation on ‘illegal immigration and terrorism’ between April and July 2015, accompanied by a nation-wide billboard campaign and ample promotion of anti-immigrant opinions through public service media, further contributed to the framing of immigration as a cultural and security threat (Kiss, 2016, pp. 48–49). As with several other consultations of this kind organized by Orbán’s government, suggestive questions were included, designed to mobilize the right-wing electorate and elicit public support for problematic legislative measures (Bocskor, 2018, p. 552). Apart from framing immigration as a major threat against which ‘Hungary should defend itself’ and warning citizens about bogus asylum seekers (Kiss, 2016, p. 46), the consultation also drew a sharp contrast between the Hungarian government and the EU, with the latter accused of being too lenient and even partly responsible for terrorist attacks (Bocskor, 2018).

The consultation and associated campaign attracted significant criticism both domestically and internationally. The European Parliament released a joint motion that highlighted its misleading and biased content, and a Hungarian organization launched a satirical counter-campaign using billboards (Kiss, 2016, pp. 50–51). However, as shown by the analysis of domestic coverage at the time, these criticisms had limited capacity to counteract the negative framing of immigration popularized by the government, as even critical outlets fell into the trap of focusing on the ‘war of billboards’ while unwittingly reproducing negative representations of immigrants through visual and other means (Kiss, 2016, pp. 62–66). Ultimately, even though only 13% of Hungarians responded to the consultation (Bocskor, 2018, p. 564), the government used the result as evidence of overwhelming public support for more stringent measures, implementing stricter legislation against irregular border crossings and constructing a barbed-wire border fence along the border with Serbia.

In contrast to Hungary, where the anti-immigration campaign served to consolidate the positions of illiberal political actors who were already in power and offered a pretext for further illiberal measures, the intensification of anti-immigration rhetoric in Poland played an important role in bringing about the illiberal takeover. Although largely missing from public debate prior to this point, immigration became a key topic in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in October 2015, when the country’s main illiberal player, the Law and Justice party, skilfully deployed various political communication channels to promote anti-immigrant views (Krzyzanowski, 2018). Having observed the Hungarian campaign and sensed the galvanizing potential of anti-immigrant rhetoric during the joint rejection of EU proposals for mandatory immigration quotas at the Visegrád summit in Prague in early September, the Law and Justice party leaders made anti-immigrant rhetoric central to their campaign strategy. The Party Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński set the tone in a speech delivered on September 16, 2015, in which he linked immigration to terrorism, citing vague and untrue examples of ‘Sharia law’ being introduced in parts of Sweden, Italy, France and Germany, and suggesting that something similar might happen to Poland (Krzyzanowska & Krzyzanowski, 2018, p. 615). Echoing Orbán’s rhetoric, he then went on to draw a distinction between economic migrants, who were supposedly a drain on public resources and a threat to the local population, and genuine refugees ‘who are really fleeing the war’ and therefore deserve to be helped (cited in Krzyzanowski, 2018, p. 87). Kaczyński also blamed Germany for attracting economic migrants, and approvingly referred to Orbán’s arguments about economic migrants being ‘Germany’s problem’, confirming once again the extent to which anti-immigrant rhetoric in Poland was inspired by the Hungarian campaign earlier that year.

In the weeks that followed, Kaczyński and other Law and Justice politicians repeatedly voiced concerns about immigration, often blaming the current government for caving into EU demands and exposing Poland to unprecedented threats. In a widely circulated YouTube video, Antoni Macierewicz, then deputy chairman of Law and Justice, reiterated warnings about the immigrant threat and used outlandish claims, arguing that Poland is in danger of being ‘flooded’ by immigrants ‘who openly say they will be combating Polish civilization and culture and also the European security’ (cited in Krzyzanowski, 2018, p. 88). The Polish Catholic Church contributed to fearmongering as well, with many of its media channels and leading figures playing into Islamophobic rhetoric by emphasizing the centrality of Catholicism to Polish national identity (Kratofil & Motak, 2018). This rhetoric drew from a deep-seated belief in Poland as the bulwark of Christianity and presented immigration as a threat to Polish identity and culture (Kratofil & Motak, 2018). Monthly public opinion polls conducted at the time showed that this campaign went hand in hand with a shift in public attitudes. Hostility to immigration increased particularly sharply between October and December 2015, a period that coincided with Poland’s parliamentary election campaign and the November terrorist attacks in Paris (Hargrave et al., 2023, p. 18). However, it is important to add that Poland saw a marked softening of public attitudes soon after the refugee crisis (Esipova et al., 2020, September 23), as opposed to Hungary and the Czech Republic where anti-immigrant prejudice remained high (cf. Globsec, 2020). These developments also explain the patterns found in our own data, which likewise reveal Poland to be the most open to immigration among the four countries.

In the Czech Republic, too, the refugee crisis of 2015 served as a catalyst for elite-led fearmongering which brought immigration to the top of the public agenda (Wondreys, 2021, p. 736). The Czech President at the time, Miloš Zeman, was the key propagator of anti-immigrant rhetoric, expressing increasingly xenophobic and Islamophobic views. Like Orbán and Kaczyński, he linked immigration with Islamic terrorism and claimed that by accepting immigrants Europe was helping the expansion of the influence of the Islamic State. He warned of irreconcilable cultural differences that would make it ‘practically impossible’ for Muslims to integrate and argued that refugees are in fact economic migrants who are merely ‘posing’ as refugees (Gigitashvili & Sidło, 2019, January 07, pp. 2–3). In an effort to mobilize public opinion, Zeman also lent support to far-right activists and movements. In November 2015, he attended an anti-Islam rally organized in Prague, during which he suggested that Muslim culture is not compatible with European values, and expressed doubts over the true motivations of Syrian refugees coming to Europe, publicly wondering why ‘these men [were] not fighting for the freedom of their country against the Islamic State’ (Zeman 2015, as cited in Euractiv, 2015, November 18).

As immigration became a more salient issue, other Czech political actors also opportunistically picked up on anti-immigrant rhetoric. Andrej Babiš, who served as deputy Prime Minister at the time and had come to power on an anti-corruption platform, started presenting himself as a ‘fighter against immigration’ (Wondreys, 2021, p. 733). Even some of the actors associated with more moderate political positions began talking about the need to defend Czech culture (Gigitashvili & Sidło, 2019, January 07, p. 3). This shift in political rhetoric was paralleled by changes in prevalent framings of immigration in mainstream media, with security frames becoming significantly more common than economic ones, particularly prominently so in tabloids (Kovář, 2020). Public opinion shifted accordingly, with almost two-thirds (65%) of respondents believing immigration to be a threat in 2015 compared with less than one-fifth (19%) in 2006 (Wondreys, 2021, p. 728).

In contrast to Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, where illiberal political actors immediately seized the opportunity to use the refugee crisis to polarize the electorate, developments in Serbia initially took a different course. During the early stages of the refugee crisis, Serbian authorities adopted an empathetic approach, with Prime Minister Vučić emulating the tone of Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel’s and emphasizing the need for solidarity and humanitarianism (Mitić, 2018). This approach was reflected in Serbian media coverage at the time. During the early stages of the crisis, humanitarian framings prevailed and Serbian media reports focused primarily on actions aimed at helping refugees, as opposed to media coverage in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Czech Republic where reporting focused on security measures designed to protect the country and/or Europe (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017, p. 10). This approach was largely motivated by Serbia’s position as an EU candidate country that saw Germany as a key ally (Mitić, 2018). Serbia’s geographic position played an important role as well, as the country was a central node on the so-called Balkan migration route—the major entry point into the EU for refugees at the time—and came under increased pressure after Hungary closed its borders to refugees in September 2015 (Šelo Šabić & Borić, 2016, p. 1). Yet, Serbia was not a destination country for refugees and, unlike the other three countries discussed here that are all EU members, it was never under pressure to accept a refugee quota. Instead, Serbian authorities approached the crisis as temporary, issuing temporary permits to refugees that allowed transit through the country (Župarić-Iljić & Valenta, 2019, p. 373). Arguably, this position made it easier, and indeed advantageous, for Serbian authorities to adopt a welcoming approach to refugees.

However, even in Serbia the situation shifted as the crisis intensified in the autumn and winter of 2015–2016, when key EU destination countries began introducing restrictions on refugee numbers. This had a knock-on effect on countries along the Balkan route, which started adopting increasingly stringent security measures. This gradual securitization of the refugee crisis culminated in February 2016, when Serbia put its security forces on high alert (Šelo Šabić & Borić, 2016, p. 9). Shortly after the agreement between the EU and Turkey, Serbia and other countries closed their borders to refugees, effectively closing the Balkan route. There is some evidence to suggest that these developments went hand in hand with more negative public attitudes to immigration (Župarić-Iljić & Valenta, 2019, pp. 379–380). Research also highlights the presence of negative coverage of immigration on social networking platforms at the time, potentially fuelling negative attitudes (Ilić, 2018). In the following years, a new anti-immigration group appeared on Facebook, attracting over three hundred thousand followers, while coverage of immigration in mainstream media also turned increasingly negative (Buha & Lainović, 2020). These recent changes resonate with our own data, collected in late 2019 and early 2020, which show that levels of anti-immigrant prejudice in Serbia were rather high, second only to the Czech Republic.

5.1.2 LGBTQ+ Rights and ‘Gender Ideology’

Shifting the focus from immigration to LGBTQ+ rights, slightly different patterns emerge. If Hungary took a leading role in promoting anti-immigration rhetoric, Poland led the way with regard to homophobic prejudice. The mainstreaming of homophobia in the country went hand in hand with the growing presence of far-right parties in the national parliament. Between 1997 and 2005, when Law and Justice first came to power, the salience of homosexuality in mainstream news increased considerably, with the number of articles containing the word ‘homosexual’ published in the leading daily newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza rising from well below 100 in 1995 to close to 350 in 2005 (O’Dwyer, 2018, p. 907). Another key actor in this process was the Polish Catholic Church, which eventually became directly involved in political campaigning against LGBTQ+ rights and the associated ascent of illiberal political elites to power. During the 2005 election campaign of the former Polish President Lech Kaczyński, the Church leadership sent letters to voters asking them to support candidates who ‘defend [the] laws of nature’ (Ayoub, 2014, p. 348). The Church was also involved in the politicization of homosexuality in the lead-up to Poland’s EU accession in 2004, when both far-right politicians and Church leaders warned that EU adherence to liberal values stood in stark contrast with Polish national values (O’Dwyer, 2018, pp. 904–905). This elite-led campaigning was paralleled by wider public mobilization, with several far-right civil society groups organizing anti-LGBTQ+ marches (Ayoub, 2014, p. 349). Ultra-conservative, catholic media, such as Radio Maryja, also contributed to the mainstreaming of homophobia (Ayoub, 2014, p. 349).

Homophobia also played an important role in the presidential and parliamentary election campaigns in 2015, when Law and Justice returned to power with an overwhelming majority. Once again, the Catholic Church prepared the grounds for public hostility against LGBTQ+ communities. The key villain this time was ‘gender ideology’, a catch-all label used by ultra-conservative and far-right actors to refer to efforts to advance women’s and LGBTQ+ rights. The campaign started gaining ground in 2012 and 2013, and initially coalesced around responses to recommendations on domestic violence and sex education issued by transnational bodies, including the Council of Europe and the World Health Organization (Graff & Korolczuk, 2022). Catholic leaders picked up on the ‘gender ideology’ label, with a prominent bishop, Tadeusz Pieronek, stating that this ideology was ‘worse than Communism and Nazism put together’ (Graff, 2014, p. 432). A pastoral letter read in Polish parishes in December 2013 stated that ‘gender ideology’ originated from Marxism and was being imposed by foreign bodies without knowledge or consent from parents, threatening family values and leading to depravity (Sroczynski, 2016, p. 89). These arguments were picked up by Law and Justice during presidential and parliamentary election campaigns in 2015. ‘Gender ideology’ was mentioned in the party programme for the first time in 2014 and presented as being incompatible with Polish national identity and a threat to traditional families (Gwiazda, 2021, p. 586).

The early stages of the Polish war on ‘gender ideology’ coalesced around issues of sex education and women’s rights. LGBTQ+ rights came more firmly to the fore in 2019, when several local municipalities in Poland declared themselves to be ‘LGBT-free zones’ (Korolczuk, 2020). In August 2019, the Archbishop of Krakow caused consternation with his remarks about the ‘rainbow plague’ that—in his view—was threatening Poland and compared it to the ‘red plague’ of communism (Chadwick, 2019, August 02). Opposition to LGBTQ+ rights was also central to Law and Justice campaigning in the run-up to elections in 2019 and 2020. In his leader statement during the 2019 parliamentary election campaign, Jarosław Kaczyński emphasized that members of his party ‘object to same-sex unions, their marriage, and their right to adopt children’ adding that ‘there are only two sexes: men and women’ (Gwiazda, 2023, p. 650). LGBTQ+ issues remained at the forefront of public debate during the 2020 presidential elections, narrowly won by the Law and Justice incumbent Andrzej Duda who used ‘LGBTQ ideology’ as a central tenet of his re-election campaign (Gorska & Tausch, 2022, p. 1049). Anti-LGBTQ+ campaigning successfully polarized the Polish electorate, contributing to an increase in anti-LGBTQ+ prejudice while also provoking some public resistance (Gorska & Tausch, 2022, p. 1054).

In Hungary, the early attacks on ‘gender ideology’ and the first moves towards dismantling gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights coincided with Orbán’s rise to power in 2010. As soon as the Fidesz government took office, it removed a recent amendment to the preschool curriculum that required teachers to avoid gender stereotyping, arguing that it was incompatible with Hungarian social norms (Takács et al., 2022, p. 42). This was followed by changes to the legal definition of marriage. The country’s controversial Fundamental Law, which replaced the constitution in 2012, defined marriage in explicitly heteronormative terms and foregrounded the traditional family as ‘the basis of the survival of the nation’ (Takács et al., 2022, p. 42). This laid the groundwork for extensive family policies designed to support the traditional family and contributed to spread the perception of LGBTQ+ rights as a threat to national survival. In 2018, the attack on ‘gender ideology’ extended to universities, with the Hungarian government revoking permission to teach gender studies programmes (Pető, 2018, September 18).

The dismantling of LGBTQ+ rights accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, the Hungarian parliament passed a law that prescribed ‘sex at birth’ as a category that cannot be changed, and later also banned adoption by single, gay and lesbian parents (Takács et al., 2022, p. 42). Anti-LGBTQ+ campaigning became particularly intense from October 2020, when Orbán attacked a recently published anthology of fairy tales that included adapted classic tales featuring LGBTQ+ characters (Gera, 2023, p. 109). In 2021, despite warnings from European human rights officials and some of the domestic opposition, the Hungarian parliament passed a law banning LGBTQ+ people from appearing in schools or in TV programmes, films, adverts, and other cultural products aimed at children (Guardian, 2021, June 15). The law framed the ban as a matter of child protection against paedophiles, closely resembling a similar piece of legislation passed in Russia in 2013 (Persson, 2015). According to some observers, developments in Russia also played an important role in fuelling homophobic prejudice in the country at the time (Guardian, 2021, June 15). In April 2022, the campaign culminated in a referendum on ‘LGBTQ issues’, which coincided with the general elections at which Fidesz secured a supermajority in the parliament for the fourth time running. Thanks to a campaign coordinated by several civil society organizations, over half of those voting—more than 1.7 million people—spoiled their ballots (Takács et al., 2022, p. 44). Nonetheless, most valid votes were in favour of the government’s position, which was enough for Fidesz to proclaim the referendum a success (Freedom House, 2023).

In the Czech Republic, attempts to politicize LGBTQ+ rights have a shorter history, and escalated only in 2018, during the parliamentary debate on same-sex marriage, when the then President Miloš Zeman started mimicking the anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric seen in Poland and Hungary, seeking to present LGBTQ+ rights as a threat to the traditional way of life (Guasti & Buštíková, 2020, p. 232). The politicization of LGBTQ+ rights continued in 2019, when the Archbishop of Prague, Cardinal Duka, started criticizing the use of rainbow flags by the Prague Magistrate and warned of the impending demographic catastrophe that would purportedly affect the Czech Republic if it continued to support LGBTQ+ rights. Much like the Cardinal of Cracow in Poland earlier that year, the archbishop spoke of the ‘rainbow plague’ and drew a contrast between ‘rainbow activities’, which supposedly lead into depopulation, and traditional families who ‘raise and care for their offspring’ and ‘without whom the future of the nation [would] not exist’ (Guasti & Buštíková, 2020, p. 226).

In contrast to Poland and Hungary, this campaign has so far only had limited impact on Czech public opinion, which remains overwhelmingly supportive of LGBTQ+ rights. The early debates on registered partnerships in the 1990s and early 2000s went hand in hand with a remarkable increase in public support, with the proportion of respondents in favour rising from 35% in 1998, before the proposal for a law on registered partnership was first debated in parliament, to 75% in 2008, two years after the law was adopted (Guasti & Buštíková, 2020, p. 235). A similarly positive impact of public debate can be seen in relation to public support for same-sex adoption, which rose from only 19% in 2005 to 51% in 2017 (Guasti & Buštíková, 2020, p. 235). This is consistent with our own data from 2019 and 2020, which shows the Czech Republic to be considerably more open to LGBTQ+ rights than the other three examined countries. Whether this is likely to endure is an open question. With the bill on same-sex marriage tabled again in 2022, along with a counter proposal to constitutionally define marriage as the union of a man and a woman (cf. Křičková, 2023, p. 7), the politicization of LGBTQ+ rights is on the rise, with uncertain consequences for public opinion.

Unlike in the Czech Republic, where elite support lags behind public opinion, elites in Serbia seem more supportive of LGBTQ+ rights than the general public. This misalignment between elite and public views can be traced back to the early 2000s. The first signs of positive shifts in elite acceptance of LGBTQ+ minorities started appearing after the fall of Milošević in 2000, when the country underwent several legislative and regulatory changes that increased the effectiveness of democratic institutions. However, Serbia’s first ever Pride Parade, organized in 2001, was met with fierce resistance from right-wing extremists and several of the participants were injured (Bilić, 2016). The political elite interpreted these reactions as a sign that Serbian society was not yet ready for embracing non-normative sexualities, as exemplified by the then Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić’s statement, claiming that ‘it was too early to stand this test of tolerance in a country that has been isolated for so long, and which has had a repressive patriarchal culture’ (Slootmaeckers & Bosia, 2023, p. 13).

Nonetheless, activists continued to put pressure on the government, linking LGBTQ+ rights to Serbia’s aspirations for EU integration, and pressing for anti-discrimination legislation (Slootmaeckers & Bosia, 2023, p. 13). These efforts came to fruition in 2009, when the Serbian parliament passed a new law that prohibited discrimination on several grounds, including sexual orientation (Stakić, 2011, p. 44). Empowered by this development, activist groups sought to organize a Pride Parade later the same year. However, owing to opposition from far-right groups, some political parties, and the Serbian Orthodox Church, the authorities cancelled the event on the grounds of security concerns (Stakić, 2011, p. 43). The move prompted public outcry, both domestically and internationally. The EU made clear that Serbia would not be able to progress on its path to EU integration unless it managed to enforce the new antidiscrimination legislation. As the analysis of public discourses at the time shows, right-wing groups succeeded in framing the parade as an ‘anti-Serbian’ event and as a threat to public safety. At the same time, discourses of ‘public security risk’ and ‘mayhem’ were also amplified by mainstream media, with little opposition from the elites (Johnson, 2012).

Criticism from international organizations, and especially pressure from the EU, prompted Serbian authorities to change their approach and allow the Pride Parade to occur a year later, albeit with heavy police presence and several clashes with far-right activists (Stakić, 2011, p. 44). This time, official support for the event was much more prominent, and discourses that presented the parade as a symbol of Serbia’s Europeanness overshadowed concerns over security risks (Johnson, 2012). In the following year, however, the situation shifted again, and the parade was banned. In 2013, the Constitutional Court declared the ban to be in violation of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of assembly. Thus, in 2014, the parade took place, however heavily presided by the police, and the then Prime Minister Vučić used it as a tool to promote himself internationally as a proponent of Europeanization (Slootmaeckers & Bosia, 2023, p. 14). In 2017, in a further move to instrumentalize LGBTQ+ rights to demonstrate Serbia‘s readiness to join the EU, Vučić appointed an openly lesbian Prime Minister, Ana Brnabić—a move that stirred homophobic prejudice across the political spectrum and sowed division among LGBTQ+ groups (Bilić, 2020). As our survey data suggest, these instrumental and, arguably, half-hearted gestures in favour of LGBTQ+ rights had little impact on public opinion, which remained overwhelmingly homophobic.

5.2 The Illiberal Public Sphere as an Amplifier of Illiberalism

The account provided in the previous section focused primarily on the role that political elites and, to some extent, religious figures played in the mainstreaming of illiberalism, but also offered some insights into the role of media. Examples included the impact of alternative, mostly Catholic, outlets in the early stages of mainstreaming of homophobia in Poland in the 1990s and early 2000s; the involvement of social media in the more recent mobilization of anti-immigration discourses in Serbia; and the potential of mainstream media—including public service broadcasters—to amplify anti-immigrant prejudice as tools in the hands of illiberal elites, as seen in Hungary. In this section, we develop a more systematic investigation of the role that media can play in either facilitating or resisting the rise of illiberalism. Specifically, we ask how the illiberal public sphere contributed to the amplification of prejudice promoted by the elites, and whether its role changed as the hold of illiberalism over the public sphere increased.

Existing literature offers limited insights into these issues. This is partially due to the fact that available research on the topic has largely focused on countries in Western Europe and Northern America where the illiberal public sphere is at the incipient stage. Growing hostility against immigration during the 2015 refugee crisis and recent backlashes against LGBTQ+ rights in Eastern Europe prompted an increase in scholarly research on the region. However, only a small minority of this work investigates the link between media and attitudes. Instead, this work mostly focuses on media coverage, usually in the form of single country studies (e.g. Krzyzanowski, 2018; Kovář, 2020) with occasional studies adopting a comparative approach (Radovanović Felberg & Šarić, 2017; Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). In relation to LGBTQ+ issues and the media, a similar trend is evident, with a growing range of studies investigating the role of media in spreading homophobia, especially in relation to Pride Parades. However, most studies examine media coverage (e.g. Johnson, 2012; Rédai, 2012; Stakić, 2011) or investigate the use and impact of the media among LGBTQ+ minorities (e.g. Szulc, 2018), rather than focusing on the link between media coverage and public opinion.

Another pitfall in existing research on the relationship between media and LGBTQ+ rights is the dominance of an optimistic narrative that associates greater visibility with greater acceptance. Existing research evidencing media’s ability to inform social norms on sexuality is primarily concerned with how media foster more positive attitudes, acting as an important instrument of visibility, and thereby enabling public acceptance of sexual minorities’ rights (e.g. Ayoub & Garretson, 2017; Chen & Pain, 2018). Yet, as Ayoub (2016, pp. 45–46) reminds us, greater visibility does not necessarily lead to greater public acceptance but can also amplify hostility and prejudice (e.g. Edenborg, 2020; Kerrigan, 2022). In contrast to studies of media coverage and public attitudes to LGBTQ+ rights, research on media coverage and immigration attitudes already acknowledges the ambiguous impact of visibility. For instance, a study focused on Belgium that combined content analysis of Belgian newspapers and television news with election polling data between 1991 and 2000 showed that the electoral growth of the right-wing party Vlaams Blok was paralleled by a growth in immigration coverage. These findings led the authors to conclude that media were one of the factors fostering growing popular support for right-wing politics (Walgrave & De Swert, 2004). More recent research paints an even more complex picture, revealing that mainstream media coverage of immigration in the United States, France, and Norway displays a more positive attitude towards immigration than public opinion on the topic, while public service media exposure is not consistently linked with more positive attitudes (Beyer & Matthes, 2015). These results arguably indicate a weaker link between mainstream coverage and public opinion formation, especially in countries where elite debates have become more polarized, while mainstream media maintain a more liberal approach.

We argue that conceptualizing the relationship between news coverage and public opinion on immigration and LGBTQ+ through the prism of the illiberal public sphere offers a promising avenue to understand the disparate patterns observed in different countries, including those where illiberalism is more advanced. We seek to demonstrate this by drawing on the analysis of the population survey and interviews we conducted in late 2019 and early 2020. In line with the discussion in the previous section which pointed to the key role that elites play in shaping public opinion over time, we now pay attention to the extent of elite-led politicization of immigration and/or LGBTQ+ rights in each of the examined countries at the time of data collection. To put it differently, we expect the link between public attitudes and news consumption to differ depending on the stage of the illiberal public sphere and the extent of elite politicization. Finally, we assume that different types of media will play different roles, depending on their position vis-à-vis the illiberal public sphere in its different stages of development.

Our analysis focuses on two media types that, as shown in preceding chapters, are particularly interesting in this context: public service media (PSM), including radio and television broadcasting, and digital media, comprising both online news outlets and social media. As explained in Chap. 2, the illiberal capture of key mainstream media channels—including PSM where these play a prominent role in the media system, and this is the case in our four countries—is a key factor in the transition of the illiberal public sphere from the incipient to the ascendant stage. It is feasible to expect that the capture of PSM, which typically happens when the illiberal public sphere reaches the ascendant stage, will turn them into mouthpieces of the governing elites that can help entrench polarization and spread hostility. Conversely, the role of digital media is likely to change in the opposite direction. In a context where the illiberal public sphere is at the incipient stage, digital media are more likely to support the proliferation of illiberal attitudes, while countries where the illiberal sphere is more advanced are more likely to see digital media act as channels of liberal resistance.

Table 5.1 summarizes the main traits of each of the countries across these dimensions. Of the four, at the time of data collection, the Czech Republic was the closest to the incipient stage of the illiberal public sphere, with its PSM maintaining independence. The country also has a long history of elite promotion of anti-immigrant views, and, since 2018, saw an uptick in LGBTQ+ politicization. Poland offers the example of an ascendant illiberal public sphere with captured PSM. This is combined with a long history of politicization surrounding LGBTQ+ rights, but a shorter history of politicization of immigration, which was declining at the time. In Hungary and Serbia, the illiberal public sphere is at a hegemonic stage, with captured PSM. However, while Hungary had a long history of elite politicization on both issues at the time, Serbian elites held a more ambiguous position. They avoided the politicization of immigration at the time, but showed some support for LGBTQ+ rights, with the country’s first openly gay Prime Minister participating in several recent Pride parades (Bilić, 2020). Government instrumentalization of PSM in relation to the two issues also differed. While Hungarian elites made extensive use of PSM channels to promote an anti-immigration and anti-LGBTQ+ agenda, Serbian PSM maintained a more moderate tone (Kondor et al., 2022, p. 4141; Mihelj et al., 2023).

Table 5.1 The illiberal public sphere and elite stances on immigration and LGBTQ+ rights
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5.2.1 Public Service Media

The results of regressions for PSM (Table 5.2) show diverse patterns across the four countries. In Hungary and Poland, where PSM have been captured and where the governing elites have been hostile to both immigration and LGBTQ+ rights (albeit less so to immigration recently in Poland), the consumption of PSM is linked with more negative attitudes to both same-sex relationships and immigration. In contrast, in the Czech Republic, where PSM remain independent, PSM consumption is linked with more positive attitudes to immigration, despite elite-promoted hostility on the issue, while no effect is evident with regard to attitudes to same-sex relationships, possibly because elite promotion of homophobia is rather recent. In Serbia, where PSM was never fully independent and where the illiberal public sphere is well entrenched, PSM consumption has no effect on either type of attitudes, despite elite attempts to instrumentalize more positive attitudes.

Table 5.2 Public service media consumption and attitudes to immigration and same-sex relationships
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These results suggest that the role of PSM is particularly influential in reinforcing illiberal attitudes in countries where the illiberal public sphere has reached at least the ascendant stage and colonized several key mainstream channels, including PSM, and where specific issues such as immigration and same-sex relationships have been politicized by the elites—as is the case in Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, PSM can continue to perpetuate illiberal attitudes even when elites stop their hostility campaign, as is the case recently with immigration in Poland. Conversely, in cases where the illiberal public sphere is closer to the incipient stage and where PSM still retain independence, they have the capacity to act as a bulwark against illiberal attitudes. In such a context, even when an issue is mobilized by illiberal political elites and majority opinion on the issue is rather illiberal, PSM can resist the further advance of illiberal attitudes. This is exemplified by attitudes to immigration in the Czech Republic.

Finally, there are circumstances under which PSM appear to make little if any difference. As the case of LGBTQ+ rights in the Czech Republic suggests, this may occur in contexts where public opinion on an issue is largely homogeneous (in this case, overwhelmingly positive) and where the issue has not been politicized (or at least not for long). In such a context, PMS have perhaps not been drawn into the spiral of polarization and are, thus, less likely to affect public opinion. The Serbian case, on the other hand, may be seen as an indicator of how the interaction between news and public attitudes changes when the illiberal public sphere has advanced to such a degree that illiberal attitudes are widely shared among the population and most media outlets (i.e. not only state-controlled public broadcasters, but also commercial channels and tabloids) are contributing to the spreading of hostility. In such a context, any temporary changes in elite opinion or shifts in state-controlled PSM coverage may well have little capacity to affect public attitudes. No longer fully controlled by the governing elites and rather reliant on illiberal impulses from below, the illiberal public sphere appears as a semi-autonomous force, capable—to an extent—of reproducing illiberal attitudes irrespective of government behaviour and of the stance adopted by PSM.

Our interviews with participants in the four countries likewise reflect the shifting role of PSM at different stages of development of the illiberal public sphere. When asked where they encountered news about sexual minorities, several Polish and Hungarian participants mentioned PSM and noted their negative bias. For instance, Polish participant Pol-13 (female, 38) explained that Polish PSM channels do cover same-sex relationships, ‘but they present them in a bad light, showing that same-sex couples are against ethics and religion’. Similar patterns appeared when talking to participants about immigration coverage, with several participants from across the political and ideological spectrum singling out PSM as key sources of negative coverage. One of our Hungarian participants with anti-immigrant views explained that she often heard on PSM TV channel M1 ‘about the problems they [immigrants] cause in terms of public safety’ (Hun-14, female, 56); while a pro-immigration participant became very agitated discussing Hungarian PSM coverage, arguing that it constantly promotes exaggerated stories about criminal acts committed by immigrants (Hun-12, female, 59).

In Poland, several participants also commented on the polarized coverage on mainstream channels, specifically on the stark contrast between reporting provided by PSM and commercial broadcast channels. Comparing the coverage on the commercial TV channel TVN with the coverage provided by PSM channel TVP, participant Pol-17 (female, 24) claimed: ‘of course TVN will be more in favour of these people [i.e. LGBTQ+ people], while TVP will be more against them’. For another Polish participant, who is opposed to same-sex marriage and adoption, this polarization was also a reason for avoiding TVN, because ‘they promote LGBT and other things that I don’t approve of’ (Pol-08, female, 36). Such experiences are consistent with the ascendant stage of the illiberal public sphere found in Poland and the almost symmetric polarization of the country’s media landscape discussed in Chap. 3. As one might expect, given the more advanced stage of the illiberal public sphere and the asymmetric polarization of the media system in Hungary, Hungarian participants typically associated negative coverage on the two issues not only with PSM channels, but also with commercial channels (especially Hír TV) and right-wing websites, such as Origo. Conversely, participants linked more positive or at least balanced coverage only with a small group of online outlets, principally Index and 444 news websites. The experience of one of our anti-government, pro-immigration participants from Hungary is characteristic in this respect. He explained:

Both Index and 444 reported on the riots in Greece and mentioned, for example, how they would like to create a refugee camp there. […] Meanwhile on Origo, […] they started counting again how many thousands, billions of migrants are coming to knock on Europe’s gates. (Hun-18, male, 32)

It is telling to compare these responses to those seen in the Czech Republic. Here, only one participant explicitly mentioned seeing coverage of same-sex relationships in mainstream news, and even in this case, she felt that this is not a particularly prominent issue: ‘I do not think this is a topic that is being spoken about now […] Maybe when it used to be discussed here from a legal point of view there were some articles […] There are always some activists who bring it to the table, but it is not a big issue’ (Cze-22, female, 32). The near absence of recollections of news coverage of same-sex relationships in the Czech Republic is consistent with more accepting public attitudes and a relatively short history of political polarization on the topic.

In Serbia, on the other hand, several participants mentioned media coverage of same-sex relationships and immigration, but—unlike Hungarian and Polish participants—did not single out PSM channels as particularly negative. Rather, negative coverage was associated primarily with tabloids, commercial broadcasters, and social media. For instance, participant Srb-09 (male, 48) mentioned coming across negative news on same-sex relationships in the tabloid Informer, where news items about LGBTQ+ people reportedly appeared together with sensationalist titles referring to rape and harassment, indicating that same-sex relationships were framed as a crime or as deviant. He explained: ‘Usually, a certain page—I’m not sure which one—is reserved for news, such as “Girls grabbed”, “Boys raped”, “People requesting abortion are worse than paedophiles”. It looks like that page is reserved for that—it’s full of such news’. Similarly, in relation to immigration news, Serbian participants mentioned a whole range of sources, including PSM but also commercial channels and tabloids, as well as the pro-Russian radio station and news website Sputnik. For example, an anti-immigration participant (Srb-13, female, 28) mentioned seeing negative news about immigrants, linked with ‘robberies, assaults on women, burglaries’ on the public service TV channel RTS but also on the pro-government commercial TV channel Pink. These answers are consistent with the more advanced stage of the illiberal public sphere in the country, where illiberal attitudes continue to be promoted across a range of outlets regardless of occasionally more moderate opinions among elites.

5.2.2 Digital Media

In contrast to the results of regressions for PSM news, the results of regressions for digital news (Table 5.3) are less clearly aligned with our expectations. The link between the advancement of the illiberal public sphere and the changing role of online news channels is clearest in Poland and Hungary where the illiberal public sphere has reached the ascendant and hegemonic stages, respectively. In both countries, more frequent use of digital channels for news is correlated with more positive attitudes to same-sex relationships and immigration, particularly in Hungary where strong positive correlations exist for all three measures of attitudes to same-sex relationships, namely acceptance of same-sex marriage, same-sex adoption, and gay and lesbian neighbours, as well as for perceptions of immigration. In Poland, positive correlations are also evident, but are weaker than in Hungary, as they appear only in relation to two out of three measures of attitudes towards same-sex relationships, and one measure of attitudes towards immigration. This difference between the two countries is consistent with the relative strength of the illiberal public sphere.

Table 5.3 Digital news consumption and attitudes to immigration and same-sex relationships
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The results for the Czech Republic and Serbia, however, do not conform to our expectations. Although the Czech Republic is closest to the incipient stage of the public sphere—where we would expect digital media to act as sources of illiberalism—regressions are pointing in the opposite direction. More frequent use of digital channels for news correlates with more liberal attitudes, especially in relation to immigration (both measures) but also, to some extent, in relation to same-sex relationships (one of three measures). By contrast, results for Serbia show no significant correlations for any of the measures even though the country’s illiberal public sphere has long been at the hegemonic stage. It is quite possible, however, that these counterintuitive results are due to the specific dimensions of illiberalism examined here, namely hostility to immigration and same-sex relationships. In Serbia, illiberal views on immigration and LGBTQ+ rights are widespread, and the illiberal public sphere is, as argued earlier, deeply entrenched, creating an environment in which even digital channels may have difficulty acting as promoters of more positive opinions. In contrast, in the Czech Republic, levels of anti-immigration sentiments are likewise very high, ever higher than in Serbia, yet the illiberal public sphere is still relatively close to its incipient stage, meaning that it may be easier for digital channels to serve as important sources for more neutral or positive depictions of immigration.

Qualitative material adds further nuance to this picture. One notable pattern we observed was that digital sources of information, especially social media, were frequently mentioned as sources of both liberal and illiberal views. Furthermore, several answers suggested that participants interpreted information found online in one of two ways: they either criticized it if they disagreed with it or took it for granted if it was aligned with their own opinions. For instance, one pro-immigration Serbian participant described coming across posts about migrants on Facebook and getting involved in the discussion to counter hostile opinions and being attacked in return:

I was reading ads for car sales, and I came across posts about migrants. Is there a place on Facebook where you can avoid running into opponents of immigration? I saw a post full of hatred, fuelled even more by the COVID pandemic. I could tell from the comments that if the conversation continues like this it won’t end well. So I try to soften the comments a bit by telling my opinion, and I’d better not, I’m becoming a target of the crowd. (Srb-18, male, 42)

In contrast, an anti-immigrant Serbian participant likewise described finding information about migrants on Facebook, but without being particularly concerned about its veracity:

Well, I was reading about how a migrant had stabbed a kid with a knife. First, he had asked some boy for directions and then, when the boy tried to tie his shoes, he attacked him with a knife. I didn’t really have the time to check whether it was true or not.

Interviewer: Where did you find that?

On Facebook.

Interviewer: Do you often find news on migrants on social networks?

Yes, I keep reading about how they did this and that… How they broke into someone’s home, and so on… and I don’t like that. Now they’re saying how they’re going to let them live in smaller towns and villages, but I think that won’t really solve anything, since they don’t want to live in smaller environments. (Srb-14, female, 42)

A similar trend is visible with regard to LGBTQ+ communities. For participants holding negative attitudes, negative representations confirmed their views. For instance, one of our Polish participants (Pol-29, female, 47) argued that gay and lesbian people are associated with paedophiles, mentioning social media as a source. In a similar manner, a Hungarian participant (Hun-14, female, 56) who watches the right-wing Hír TV channel and follows the website and newsletter of the transnational, far-right organization CitizenGo mentioned coming across news on US studies about children adopted by same-sex couples who suffered negative consequences as a result. In contrast, participants with more positive views were not persuaded by negative depictions and were also more inclined to mention positive coverage online or describe heated arguments over same-sex relationships on social media. For instance, a Serbian participant (Srb-19, female, 62) mentioned coming across uplifting coverage on social media: ‘I saw something on Twitter, about a girl whose father has finally accepted her for who she is, and when you see that immense joy, you realize how little we need to be happy’. On the other hand, Polish participant Pol-15 (male, 38, rural) mentioned discussions about same-sex relationships on their Facebook newsfeed, and noted that in these discussions, LGBTQ+ people were ‘strongly criticized’, but then also added that in the comments section, he came across ‘a lot of comments [that] say that gay people are good, and so on’.

Taken together, these qualitative examples suggest that even in cases where political elites successfully appropriate mainstream media as means of spreading illiberal attitudes, social media can retain the capacity to sustain a more diverse set of discourses. This does not mean that digital media do not act as channels of negative attitudes—they do—but rather that the actual impact of visibility is not uniform and is shaped by pre-existing convictions.

5.3 Conclusions

This chapter delved deeper into two dimensions of illiberalism prominent in the four examined countries, but also globally, to take a closer look at the way in which illiberalism becomes part of mainstream discussions and participates in the rise of illiberalism. Focusing on immigration at LGBTQ+ rights, the chapter first highlighted the diverse patterns of public attitudes on these two issues across the four countries, using this to illustrate the multifaceted and malleable nature of illiberalism, which can adopt different forms depending on socio-political contexts, as well as changes over time. We then traced the rise in polarization surrounding these two issues in the four countries, paying particular attention to the role of political elites and the media, while also noting cases of transnational learning and borrowing of anti-immigrant and homophobic rhetoric and significant cross-country differences. We showed how both anti-immigrant hostility and homophobia were successfully mobilized by illiberal actors to either aid their rise to power or consolidate their existing power positions and provide legitimacy for controversial legislative measures. We also pointed out that the mainstreaming of illiberalism did not follow the same pattern everywhere. Different political leaders drew selectively on the illiberal repertoire, with some focusing on immigration, while others focused on LGBTQ+ rights and some avoided politicizing either of the two issues in favour of other polarizing topics.

Finally, we looked at whether the role of the media in either fostering or resisting the advance of illiberalism changes depending on how advanced the illiberal public sphere is. Building on arguments outlined in Chap. 2, we paid particular attention to two news channels: PSM and digital media. The results for PSM largely conformed to our expectations. When the illiberal public sphere is at an incipient stage, independent PSM are still able to instil more liberal attitudes, as seen in the Czech Republic. As the illiberal public sphere gains in strength, PSM become co-opted by the governing elites and turn into important channels for promoting illiberal views, a situation found in Poland and especially Hungary. Finally, once the illiberal public sphere is fully entrenched and supported by widespread illiberal attitudes among the electorate, it has the capacity to operate as a powerful actor in its own right. At this stage, the illiberal public sphere is able to sustain itself to some extent independently of elite support and of PSM coverage, as evidenced by the case of Serbia.

The results for digital media were less clear-cut. The results for Hungary and Poland appeared to confirm that, at more advanced stages of the illiberal public sphere, digital media can act as important channels for liberal attitudes. However, the results for the Czech Republic and Serbia did not follow the same pattern. In the Czech Republic, where the illiberal public sphere is closest to the incipient stage, we expected online channels to foster illiberalism. However, digital news consumption appeared to be associated with more liberal attitudes, albeit less extensively than in Hungary and Poland. In Serbia, on the other hand, where we expected digital media to act as vehicles of liberalism, online news consumption made no difference to participants’ attitudes.

It is possible that these results are in part affected by the particular focus and type of measurements adopted in this chapter, namely the fact that we examined only two dimensions of illiberalism and that we used a rather crude measure of digital news consumption, which lumped together news websites and social media news. In the next chapter, we look at the relationship between digital news and illiberalism more comprehensively, investigating a wider range of dimensions of illiberalism and allowing for the possibility of differential impact of social networking as opposed to messaging apps.