Building Paper Industria

Abstract

This chapter delves into the evolution of the Dutch paper industry during the era of Dutch monarchic liberalism, spanning the years between 1815 and 1914. In the early nineteenth century, the industry faced a period of stagnation attributed to the widespread adoption of steam-powered mills for chemically produced paper throughout Europe and Northern America. While this marked a significant transformation for the Dutch paper industry, transitioning from small-scale, handmade, peasant-based paper manufacturing to the dominance of a large-scale, corporate sector, the establishment of Industria served to sustain Dutch paper production without allowing it to match the industrialization levels seen in neighboring countries.

According to Schrauwers (2010, p. 753) the term Industria describes the nineteenth century “majestic home of the Industrialist Great Club”, which is made up of aristocratic financiers turned Saint-Simonian-inspired industrialists under the leadership of their Merchant King.

In the course of centralization, a whole host of individual capitals disappear, absorbed by others, while yet others fuse together by merger or consolidation. The centralization of capital is therefore a violent form of competition.

Aglietta (2000, p. 219)

During the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Dutch paper industry suffered from industrial stagnation due to the introduction and rapid spread of steam-powered mills for chemically produced paper all over Europe and Northern America.¹ This powerful innovation was too capital-intensive during the early and mid-nineteenth century to be implemented efficiently in the Netherlands. Machines had to run continuously in order to be profitable. Yet, Dutch paper market outlets could not accommodate such a rising scale of production. Thus, Dutch paper producers had a strong interest in cooperating closely with the government to establish national subsidiaries for paper mills and the legalization of cartels, ultimately aiming to restructure and centralize the Dutch paper industry. These demands were met by state authorities with political agendas of enacting favorable policies or even nationalizing parts of the industry.² Hence, networks in terms of close ties between industry agents and state authorities as well as among the paper industrialists themselves were pivotal to successfully meet the challenges of the early and mid-nineteenth century.³

From 1840 onwards, close cooperation between the monarch and the industrialist class fraction ensured foreign capital investment interests in Dutch industries and, thus, growing industrialization. Networks, in the form of cartels, were just as pivotal to re-establishing international competitive advantages as were other forms of networks between, for example, the industrialists and the monarchy to secure national subsidiaries.⁴ The new monarchy was efficiently co-opted by and itself co-opting the changing patrician and merchant-capitalist class fractions. This interaction enabled the corporatization of the Dutch paper industry under the unique construction of networked capital at that time. As a result, the way was paved for the gentlemanly capitalists to build their very own Industria.

More generally, these industrial developments took place in a politico-economic environment, which is referred to as monarchic liberalism.⁵ In this capitalist phase, from 1815 until 1914, the Netherlands underwent a state-orchestrated liberalization under the rule of the monarchs. While the networks of merchant regent families of the so-called ‘Golden Age’ continued to profit under the reign of William I of the Netherlands, they were gradually replaced by the growing class fraction of gentlemanly capitalists during the liberal revolution of 1840 with the emergence of managerial science and technocracy, and the reign of William II of the Netherlands.⁶ These gentlemanly capitalists were a new tier: They emerged out of the patrician (regenten) families and the merchant-capitalist class fraction to form a “close-knit elite network […]—the Industrialist Great Club—[and] built its majestic home, Industria, on the former site of the world’s first stock exchange”.⁷ The gentlemanly capitalists managed to use the mid-nineteenth century conjuncture of the succession from William I to William II and the economic crisis to change the power dynamics among the dominant class fractions. They formed “interlocks that transformed nominally independent corporations into coordinated networks”—nothing less than the modern corporation.⁸

National industries were saved from subordination to monarchic power and merchant class interests by subjecting trade, the finance sector, and national industrial production to the newly dominant class fraction: The gentlemanly capitalists. Essentially still resting on a dense network of families (just like their patrician and merchant-capitalist predecessors), the gentlemanly capitalists steered the nationalist project and accumulated capital by nothing less than expropriating the position of William I, nicknamed the King-Merchant, with a focus on promoting industrial growth, ultimately exerting control over the entire Dutch state.⁹

Nineteenth-century Dutch liberalism designates a historically specific conjuncture of a hierarchical order of class fractions, which fostered corporate governmentality as the driving force behind the establishment of the modern Dutch nation-state, the restructuring of its national and colonial industries, and the renewal of its economy.¹⁰ Accordingly, Dutch monarchic liberalism was an “[…] apologia of individualistic capitalism [and] freedom in restraint”.¹¹ Therefore, the Dutch liberalists of the second half of the nineteenth century and their constitutional demands have to be viewed in direct relation to the co-optation of Dutch monarchy under William I and II.

3.1 The Rise of the Gentlemanly Capitalists

During William I’s main politico-economic focus, namely the pursuit of wealth creation through expanding colonial trade, the Northern Netherlands¹² was marked by industrial stagnation in the first half of the nineteenth century. William I directed significant efforts toward reorganizing the commerce sector, prioritizing the interests of the Northern merchant class, even though this fraction's influence was waning.¹³ Despite the decreasing importance of the Amsterdam stock market in the global trade landscape and the VOC's bankruptcy in 1799, resulting in a reduced Dutch colonial presence, William I remained enthusiastic about colonial trade. Instead, these events served as a catalyst, driving his interest even further. Subsequently, national industries were barely promoted and the general economic infrastructure of the country could not catch up with industrialization processes abroad.

In alignment with his concerns for commerce, William I followed strategies of “corporate governmentality”, namely the delegation of sovereignty to chartered corporations at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the Netherlands.¹⁴ Instead of simply extending absolutist state repression, William I sought to connect with various class fractions, ensuring a new order of the national economy, while at the same time shaping workers’ subjectivities under a newly transformed management science. Concerning national industries, William I installed the so-called Funds for Industry, which distributed subsidies to “[…] lend support to especially those sectors of the national industry that can not be provided with adequate protection without raising tariffs to such levels that these could have a disadvantageous influence on commerce”.¹⁵ Concerning the restructuring of colonial exploitation, he established new commercial companies that replaced the bankrupted VOC, such as the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM, The Netherlands Trading Society). By shareholding in these corporations, William I and the Northern merchant class earned up to 39 million florins per year.¹⁶ While the label for Dutch colonial exploitation changed from VOC to NHM, its forces and results were similar to those of the first phase of Dutch capitalism, generating “‘indigenous’ revolts against forced labor and starvation”.¹⁷ These were directed against institutions such as the ‘culture system’, which determined certain amounts of colonial production for export, while pocketing the total revenue for the NHM and, thus, William I and the Northern merchant class. The vast majority of this capitalist slavery money was reinvested into financial speculation rather than national industrial developments, in turn manifesting the general trend of national industrial stagnation that marked the first half of nineteenth-century Netherlands.

Starting with the reign of William II, but especially from the liberal revolution of 1840 onwards, government authorities implemented free-trade policies.¹⁸ At the same time, the gentlemanly capitalist class fraction began to successfully implement their particular interests as general interests at the level of the state. Their successes were due to newly developing forms of cooperation, such as the establishment of the Chamber of Commerce in 1843. “Founded by the municipality in Zaandam [it] brought together representatives from different trades and industries […] to pressure government authorities to take measures for improving the Zaanstreek’s infrastructure”.¹⁹ The government started investing public money into building a national infrastructure and revolutionizing capital markets, transport, and communication in order to lower “the costs that entrepreneurs had to make to compete on international markets”.²⁰

Many more examples show, how well the interests of the gentlemanly capitalist class fraction and the liberals in parliament aligned. In 1869, the government abolished the tax on newsprint to cause a boom in paper demand and thereby combat the paper industry’s slow growth and stagnating investments.²¹ This strategy yielded an immediate effect on investors’ interests in the Dutch paper industry. Additionally, the inaccessibility of high-quality Dutch lompen outside of the Netherlands due to a national decree on restricting the export thereof and the apparent lack of industrialization within the Dutch paper industry led foreign financiers to seek profitable chances for investment.²² Soon these developments stimulated four Belgian bankers and paper makers to found the Koninklijke Nederlandse Papierfabriek (KNP, The Royal Dutch Paper Factory).

Other state strategies also fostered investors’ interests in Dutch industries. The restructuring of the monetary system was a long-awaited project, driven by the interests of the financial class fraction to allow for an “[…] efficient mediation by brokers and cashiers, [so that] almost everyone with surplus money or a (temporary) shortage could participate on this market”.²³ Part of these financial reforms was a restructuring of the first national bank’s management, the Nederlandsche Bank (DNB, The Dutch Bank). Already founded in 1814, William I had forced the bank to support government expenditures for centuries, thereby greatly diminishing the financial class fraction’s trust in this organization.²⁴ Nevertheless, the bank’s reorganization, the restructuring of the monetary system more generally, and the continuing growth of secondary financial markets yielded a rise in national stock and foreign security investments and assured continuous investments into national industries by the gentlemanly capitalists as well as the financial class fraction.²⁵

The above delineations illustrate the ability of the gentlemanly capitalist class fraction to establish joint forces, first with the monarchs and later with the liberals in parliament, in order to restructure national industries through state policies and interventions. Consequently, state-industry relations during Dutch monarchic liberalism are not marked by laissez-faire strategies and little to no protection for national industries, but by networked capital among the dominant class fractions as shown in the case of the Dutch paper industry.

3.2 Producing Paper of Endless Length

The phase of monarchic liberalism is marked by two major changes within the paper industry: The shift from handmade paper to mechanically produced paper and the change from cloth to cellulose fibers. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the blueprint for a machine that mechanically produced paper was created. The inventor, Nicholas-Louis Robert, and “his master, Francois Didot, grew impatient with the irascibility and ill temper of the workers, and it was this constant wrangling and discord, […] that gave Robert the impetus to devise a papermaking machine”.²⁶ The Fourdrinier brothers, all engineers, perfected Robert’s machine soon after it was patented in 1798. The machine turned vegetable fibers, which were wetted beforehand, into a web of dry paper by passing them over a large number of rollers, removing the water through suction and drainage. The matted and intertwined fibers are called felt, which was further dried by being pressed by steam-heated cylinders. Essentially, the machine imitated the production process of handmade paper. Yet, using mechanization—and in contrast to artisan production—it became possible to produce paper of endless length, the only restriction being the width of the machine that would determine the width of the paper. Even “a child” was able to operate such a machine; there was no longer any need for experts (or, as Robert would have called them, irascible and ill-tempered workers), who would know the detailed and demanding production process of handmade paper.²⁷ Soon the blueprints for the machine were introduced in the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States of America, where they were perfected by engineers and put to use by solvent paper makers to make production more profitable.

International competitive pressures grew immensely for the Dutch paper industry due to the rise of mechanical paper production in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States of America, Russia, and Scandinavia from 1780 onwards.²⁸ The industry’s international competitors produced large quantities of paper at ever-lower prices, having coal-fueled steam machines fully implemented and wood fiber readily available. Due to the high costs of adapting papermaking machines and a mentality that favored handmade paper production processes as well as handmade paper products, the Netherlands with its small- and medium-sized paper millers stayed far behind its international competitors.²⁹

Also on the national level, the competitiveness of Zaansian paper production decreased immensely around that time. Smaller Veluwian paper mills had always outnumbered the larger Zaansian ones. This gap increased steadily over time, even though both regions show decreasing numbers of paper mills (see Fig. 3.1). While in the early nineteenth century Zaansian paper production output was double as high as the Veluwian one, the roles were reversed by 1854.³⁰ The reasons for the immense decline in the number of Zaansian as well as Veluwian paper mills during the nineteenth century are threefold. First, the combination of high protectionism abroad and low protectionism in the Netherlands had for too long favored the interests of the merchant-capitalist class fraction.³¹ In fact, during the end of the eighteenth century, protectionism was a general trend throughout Europe to safeguard national industries, virtually closing down main consumer markets for Dutch paper producers.³² In addition, with only a small success to convey their interests on a national level, Dutch paper producers continued to suffer from low import taxes for paper, which played into the hands of Dutch paper traders as well as foreign paper producers.³³ Second, the uniqueness of Dutch paper regarding its durability and whiteness became outdated as soon as chemical paper strengthening and brightening techniques were implemented in other paper-producing countries.³⁴ Third, the most pressing issue, which led to the decline of the Dutch paper industry, was the cost of implementing steam-run paper machines.³⁵

Fig. 3.1

(Source Own calculation based on De Vries [1957, p. 276] and De Wit [1990, p. 19])

Number of paper mills in the Netherlands during the nineteenth century

To revive the Zaansian paper production and its (inter-)national competitiveness, William I and one of the biggest Zaansian paper producers of that time, Van Gelder Schouten & C., joined forces to implement the first paper machine in the Netherlands.³⁶ In fact, van Gelder bought the paper mill Het Fortuin te Zaandijk in 1837 and the minister for industry advised to order a steam-run paper machine through the Rotterdamse Stoomboot Maatschappij (RSM, The Rotterdam Steamship Company), established and partially owned by William I.³⁷ Yet, a series of difficulties led to the economic failing of this networked effort, namely the belated delivery and malfunctioning of the machine as well as the costliness of personnel able to operate such machines.³⁸ When William I granted van Gelder the first license to install a steam-run paper machine, he did not tax van Gelder the effective amount of six percent on the import of the machine but demanded the machine to be fueled with peat instead of coal. Overtly, the reason for William I’s demand was complaints of neighboring white paper producers, who feared that coal fumes would decrease the whiteness of their paper; covertly, the independence of Belgium ripped William I’s kingdom of its coal resources, leaving only the much costlier and less economic exploitation of peat in Dutch territory.³⁹ Although the king showed a keen interest in Dutch industries utilizing domestically sourced peat rather than foreign coal, relying on peat as a fuel source ultimately led to a significant rise in the machine’s economic inefficiency, reaching a point that was financially unsustainable. Though this first adaption of a steam-run paper machine for Dutch production failed, other paper producers followed. Similarly, their attempts to transition from handmade to mechanically produced paper were also unsuccessful from an economic standpoint.⁴⁰

By 1870, the implementation of steam-run paper machines finally took a grip on the Dutch paper industry; yet only capital-strong companies were able to successfully switch from handmade to mechanical paper production.⁴¹ Machines needed to run at full capacity to be profitable and the production output continued to exceed national paper demand by far. Thus, the two big paper producers of that time, VGZ and KNP, once more turned to the government for support. This time with the intention to force a nationwide switch from handmade to mechanically produced paper, in order to decrease national competition. To do so, VGZ and KNP filed a complaint with the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1879, against the cartel structures of the smaller paper producers.⁴²

This cartel structure, called Marten Orges, was an association of the remaining 30 producers of handmade paper, mainly located throughout the Veluwe, to agree on selling and buying prices.⁴³ Right after its establishment in 1872, the handmade paper producers successfully put pressure on national and colonial governments regarding paper import prices.⁴⁴ In 1879, the national printing press renewed an agreement in direct cooperation with the association Marten Orges, which was based on an original advice of the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1848 for all governmental organizations to only make use of handmade paper to boost the industry.⁴⁵ This collided with the complaint filed by VGZ and KNP, which ultimately led the Minister for Home Affairs to denounce Marten Orges as a form of unauthorized collusion, demanding from all governmental organizations to only make use of mechanically produced paper from now on. Thus, KNP and VGZ succeeded in imposing the exclusive use of mechanically produced paper by the state, including the national printing press. In doing so, all other paper mill owners were forced to either borrow money to mechanize their production or shut down. By 1890, the association Marten Orges was suspended and all Dutch paper mills had either mechanized (except van Houtum, Tzn Renkum, and Schut) or shut down their production.⁴⁶

Shortly after the introduction of the papermaking machine across different countries as well as in the Netherlands, a search for less costly and more durable fibers began, as the mechanization allowed for the exploitation of new raw materials. From 1800 onwards, the Dutch government eagerly promoted the nationwide formation of different sectoral commissions, which were intended to spread relevant knowledge and information about production techniques and promote cooperation.⁴⁷ The search for more efficient raw materials was taken up by, among others, Beerta, a sub-division of the Genootschap ter bevordering der Nijverheid te Onderdendam (Society for the Advancement of Industry in Onderdendam), which was an association and cartel-like structure founded in 1837 by the here(n)boeren (gentlemanly farmers) as well as state officials, merchants and industrialists.⁴⁸ Gentlemanly farmers, in opposition to peasant farmers, were an elite of landowners, originating in the middle ages, who engaged in more commercialized agricultural ventures and held local political offices. The commission Beerta researched the processing possibilities of straw in order to make the Dollardpolder⁴⁹ straw production more profitable for farmers.⁵⁰ The technical feasibility and introduction of straw-board production quickly generated new capital investments.⁵¹ At the end of the nineteenth century, the share of straw (including esparto and old paper) in Dutch paper production increased, while the use of cloth as a raw material steadily decreased (see Fig. 3.2).

Fig. 3.2

(Source Own calculation based on De Wit [1990, pp. 50–54])

Estimated share of raw material in Dutch paper production, 1870–1895

Between 1870 and 1880 about 20 straw-based paper production sites opened throughout the region of Groningen.⁵² While some of these were speculative investment outlets for entrepreneurial industrialists, others were cooperatives of farmers, who were eager to countervail the growing hostility of market pressure and low-cost selling arrangements for their overproduction of straw.⁵³ Even though the first of these cooperatives was not successful in surviving the competitive market environment of this newly emerging industry, other cooperatives were soon able to keep up with the speculative branch due to different reasons. For one, state-initiated land reclamation for agricultural usage and the rising pressures among farmers to utilize artificial fertilizers pushed the continuing overproduction of straw.⁵⁴ Secondly, worldwide demand for straw-board kept growing, while the Dutch straw-board industry remained inimitable.⁵⁵ Lastly, the legal organization of these cooperatives secured the availability of raw materials, based on the company shares held by each farmer.⁵⁶ In turn, rising straw prices or shortages in raw materials had little to no impact on the cooperatives and their production output. Understandably, these cooperatives had very different market strategies and interests to those of the speculative companies, who aimed at lowering straw prices to reach higher profit margins. Thus, mutual cooperation between these two camps to strengthen the strawboard industry’s international competitive advantages during crisis-ridden years was unthinkable.⁵⁷ Even though a few cooperative attempts had been made during the Dutch strawboard industry’s 100-year history (1870–1970), these never achieved any viable success.

From 1880 onwards, wood fiber emerged as a feasible alternative to cloth and straw. Despite the obstacles Dutch paper makers encountered due to the scarcity of wood fiber domestically, it eventually emerged as the primary raw material for paper production in the Netherlands by 1895. This transformation was largely driven by financially robust paper companies like Van Gelder Zonen and KNP, who took the lead in exploring and adopting alternative raw materials to replace cloth and straw. In 1883, Van Gelder Zonen in Wormer successfully transitioned to using exclusively wood fiber, while KNP established their first paper mill based on cellulose in 1884.⁵⁸ The advancement of paper production through mechanization and the adoption of new raw materials were facilitated by networks that allowed the affluent gentlemanly capitalist class fraction to consolidate their financial resources and stay abreast of global advancements. Moreover, the collaborative efforts between them and the monarchs William I and II, as well as the post-1848 interconnected relationships with the liberal parliament, led to the (re)establishment of favorable competitive structures, at the detriment of smaller-scale, handmade paper producers in the Netherlands.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Dutch paper industry experienced a surge in profitability due to advancements in straw-board production and the adoption of wood fiber by companies like KNP and VGZ. Similar effects of industrialization were observed not only in the paper industry but across various sectors in the Netherlands and abroad. The emergence of large-scale corporations had a detrimental impact on small and medium-sized enterprises throughout different industries. This decline was particularly evident in handmade paper production, initially in the Zaanstreek region and later in the Veluwe region. Figure 3.3 illustrates the decrease in the number of paper mills in both regions by 1903, alongside the thriving strawboard production in Groningen and the sustained paper production in Maastricht. By 1869, the three paper mills in Maastricht alone produced six times more white paper than all 21 paper mills combined in the Apeldoorn region.⁵⁹ These regional competitive dynamics in nineteenth-century Dutch paper production were heavily influenced by a fundamental shift in energy sources and industrial structure, characterized by a significant decline in the number of industrial windmills in the Zaanstreek region.⁶⁰

Fig. 3.3

(Source Own illustration based on Everwijn [1912, pp. VI–VII])

Paper mills in the Netherlands in 1848 and in 1903

The gentlemanly capitalist class fraction responded to the economic downturn in the Zaanstreek, re-distributional policies, and low protectionism by reinforcing their national paper cartels to ensure ownership and increase profits.⁶¹ These cartel structures were a landmark of “[t]he specific structure of Dutch industry with its strong position of the family firms, the lack of raw materials and the absence of a heavy industry determin[ing] the way collusive practices appeared in order to limit risk and uncertainty for the entrepreneur”.⁶² Despite successfully exposing and condemning the cartel of handmade paper producers, KNP and VGZ themselves continued to rely on familial connections and networks to not only ensure the success and stability of their companies but also to pursue their goal of centralizing the entire Dutch paper industry.⁶³ Though the legal structure of these family firms gradually transitioned from rederijen to non-listed limited companies, ownership, and managerial structures in the Dutch paper industry and broader Dutch economy continued to be organized through significant degrees of nepotism.⁶⁴ This nepotism manifested in the dominance of entrepreneurial dynasties by the end of the nineteenth century.⁶⁵ A prime example, the Dutch paper industry “was dominated by Van Gelder and Zon [VGZ], a 100 percent family owned business which produced nearly half of the total Dutch output, and KNP in Maastricht, […] owned and managed by a group of Dutch and Belgian families”.⁶⁶

In 1904, the government collaborated with numerous smaller companies (around 39 paper mills) to establish the Koninklijke Vereniging van Nederlandse Papier en Kartonfabrieken (VNP—The Royal Association of Dutch Paper and Board Mills). This organization served as a lobby group, facilitating the exchange of information regarding raw material markets, tariffs, and production capacity in other regions.⁶⁷ The establishment of the VNP aligned with the prevailing trend of corporate governmentality and was integrated into an intricate network of interconnected corporations.⁶⁸ This network extended the influence of the monarchy into civil society, the financial services sector, trade, and national industrial production. VGZ and KNP did not have any interest in joining the association. Instead, they had their own agreements in place to reduce the costs of paper production. Surprisingly, even without the participation of these two major industry players, the VNP managed to successfully establish lower price arrangements for raw materials, including straw, by exploiting peasants. While the smaller companies collaborated to exert control over raw material prices, the two dominant industry players, VGZ and KNP, continued to pursue their monopolistic market strategies.⁶⁹ Both these intra-industry and state-industry networks furthered the wealth of the gentlemanly capitalist class fraction by ensuring the perpetuation of labor exploitation, both in colonial and local contexts.

3.3 Modern Labor Exploitation

Comparably late, namely from 1820 onwards, the modern proletariat emerged in the Netherlands, as a result of the gradual annexation and privatization of the common land.⁷⁰ The annexation of common land, carried out by provincial generals acting on behalf of the monarch, primarily targeted rural areas in the hinterland of the Northern Netherlands (excluding Holland), which was originally leased by peasants from local nobles and landowners.⁷¹ By stripping peasants of their rights to use the common land, the government was able to exert various forms of control.

Firstly, it facilitated the creation of a proletarian class, as peasants no longer owned the means of production and were compelled to sell their labor in exchange for wages.⁷² Secondly, it provided the government with a comprehensive understanding of the available landmarks for constructing infrastructure, which enabled the intensified exploitation of natural and labor resources. Thirdly, through land privatization, the government ensured the commodification and increased monetary value of the land, leading to the commercialization of agricultural production.⁷³ This process of dismantling and destroying the common land, driven by harsh capitalist practices, came at the cost of brutally suppressing the resistance of the keuters (common land peasants).⁷⁴

Between 1860 and 1890, the number of industrial employees in the Netherlands doubled, reaching a total of 600,000 workers.⁷⁵ This significant growth in industrialization led to the emergence of new forms of labor-capital relations. Starting from 1870, waves of unionization occurred, along with more radical forms of workers' organization as active responses to the dominant powers at play.⁷⁶State initiatives, nonetheless, continued to dismantle labor security and rationalize the wage system further in order to promote the investment interests of the gentlemanly capitalist class fraction. As a result, a marginalized and impoverished social class rose, the lumpen proletariat. With a growing fear of the dominant capitalist class fractions about the potential formation of uncontrollable workers’ uprisings, similar to those witnessed in other countries during this time, the labor union prohibition law was finally abolished in 1869.⁷⁷ As a result, collective working agreements gradually spread across various sectors. Nonetheless, information regarding nationwide working conditions, wage scales, and employment opportunities remained limited and inaccessible to the majority of the proletariat.⁷⁸

Workers faced daily exploitation under harsh labor conditions, enduring 12-hour workdays and experiencing sudden unemployment and unpaid wages during times of energy or raw material shortages. These challenging circumstances made it difficult for workers to organize themselves against the combined influence of the gentlemanly capitalist class fraction and state officials.⁷⁹ The state-led industrialization of agriculture and local industries further exacerbated the already precarious situation of peasants. A notable example of this was observed in the speculative practices of entrepreneurial factory owners and the pressure exerted by members of the VNP, which compelled peasants in the straw sector to sell their surplus straw at continuously declining prices.⁸⁰ In response, peasants formed cooperatives to increase the prices of their excess produce. However, mounting market pressures resulting from increased capital investments in the straw industry, driven by speculative companies, transformed these cooperatives into selling arrangements dominated by the highest-bidding middlemen (commissioners), ultimately leading to their bankruptcy.⁸¹

Another problem feeding into the resistance of workers in the Dutch paper industry and the Dutch economy more generally was that, from the formation of the Workers’ League of Holland in 1871 onwards, Dutch unionism resembled the institutionalized fight for the right to work, instead of structural resistance to labor exploitation in industrialized capitalism. Therefore, independent anti-war, anti-work, and anti-colonial associations started forming around young collectives mostly based on the Marxist and anarchist idea(l)s, such as the Mokers group in 1904.⁸² Herman J. Schuurman was an important figure in the rebellious youth wing of the Dutch libertarian movement, who edited, together with other comrades, de Moker magazine and organized nationwide meetings under the umbrella idea of abolishing work.

This social system, capitalism, is based on the act of work; it formed a class of people, that have to work—and a class of people, that don’t work. The workers are forced to work, because if not, they will have to starve. “Because,” the owner teach us, “he who doesn’t work, will not eat,” and they claim that their calculating and gathering of profits is also work.⁸³

Regrettably, the possible ties between anti-capitalist and anti-militarist workers’ groups and laborers in the Dutch paper industry, as well as in other domestic industries, remain largely unrecorded owing to the considerable suppression by the state. The state employed measures aimed at marginalizing such organizations until their eventual defeat. Throughout time, both monarchs (William I and II) and the subsequent liberal parliament consistently opposed assisting workers’ rights and their struggles. Workers’ organizations, often targeted by networks of the dominant class fractions, such as the chamber of commerce, found their reasonable demands regularly rejected.⁸⁴ The legalization of unions in 1869 followed a similar strategic approach, serving as a preventive measure to avoid the emergence of more substantial workers’ uprisings. Overall, the prevailing attitude was one of resistance toward supporting workers’ rights and accommodating their demands.

To sum up, during Dutch monarchic liberalism the interests of powerful class fractions aligned in a way, which changed the characteristics of the Dutch paper industry drastically, away from peasant-based, handmade, small-scale paper manufacturers to the dominance of a large-scale, corporate paper industry (see Table 3.1). Subsequently, the networks within and between the dominant class fractions only enabled the continuity of national industries, not their catching up with the industrialization levels of neighboring countries. Thus, building Industria remained without success in terms of boosting the Dutch paper industry’s international competitiveness.

Table 3.1 Comparing Dutch paper production regions, nineteenth century