Abstract
I start this chapter with a presentation and critique of Brian Ellis’ new essentialism, which consists in a dualist metaphysics of laws based on both categorical properties and powers. Like Ellis, I defend a dualist metaphysics of nature. However, unlike him, I attempt to dispense with essences and natural kinds and advocate an enlarged view of categorical properties. These include not only spatial and structural properties but all observable properties. Besides, I submit that categorical properties are not quiddities and that their identity across possible worlds doesnot reduce to a mysterious primitiveness. I also develop an empirical argumentation in favour of the reality of irreducible causal powers which ground the necessity of laws and their associated counterfactual conditionals. Since the instantiation of powers is relative to some possible worlds, the necessity of laws of nature is contingent. Such conditioned de re necessity of laws is distinct from the de dicto necessity of analytic propositions.
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Notes
- 1.
Like Ellis, I will not pretend to be entirely faithful to Aristotle’s terminology, or to do justice to all the subtleties of his metaphysics (of which I am not an expert).
- 2.
Ellis defines an intrinsic property as follows: “G is an intrinsic property of an object x = déf x would manifest G in the absence of any accidental force that might affect the properties that would be manifested by G.” (Ellis 2001, p. 29) Intrinsic or monadic properties are the properties of the object when isolated. Of course, an intrinsic property could be accidental.
- 3.
We can compare this distinction between the “in” and “by” instantiations with that between the two types of predication distinguished by Aristotle: <Socrates is rational> and < Socrates is a human>. The property of being rational is instantiated in Socrates while the kind human is instantiated by Socrates and not in Socrates, according to Ellis.
- 4.
More accurately, members of a natural kind are members of the class associated with the natural kind chlorine, but Ellis often says that the entities which instantiate a natural kind are members of this kind.
- 5.
For Ellis, the properties which determine a subspecies (and are therefore essential to them) are not accidental but “incidental” properties (Ellis 2001, p. 78).
- 6.
Unlike Lewis, Ellis does not postulate the concrete existence of possible worlds.
- 7.
It is important to distinguish the fact of evolution from an explanation of this fact, such as a neo-Darwinian explanation.
- 8.
Even the DNAs of so-called “identical” twins are slightly different.
- 9.
In my opinion, such a position cannot be empirically justified, nor can it be proven. It is akin to an act of faith. The existence of entities that are not physical and not cognitively accessible by scientific methods cannot be excluded a priori.
- 10.
Ellis concords with Putnam in asserting that a chemical element of composition XYZ distinct of the chemical composition of our water but having all its surface properties (Putnam 1973), hypothetically present on a twin earth, simply is not water (Ellis 2002, p. 16). Ellis gives ontological primacy to scientific properties.
- 11.
Unlike Ellis, I deem specific values of generic properties ontologically more fundamental (see Sect. 5.7 below).
- 12.
Notice however that there is some mixing up between in and by instantiations in Mumford’s discussion.
- 13.
See Armstrong (1978, vol. II pp. 62–63, 1997, pp. 67–68).
- 14.
Here I part company with Locke according to whom we would have discovered the real essence of water, namely its chemical composition (unknown to Locke of course), while the ordinary properties that allow us to recognise the presence of water constitute its nominal essence.
- 15.
For an overview of the debates on the semantics of natural kind terms, see Bird and Tobin (2023).
- 16.
- 17.
I defined causality by means of causal generalisations or laws, namely those that contain a time derivative (see Chap. 1). My view on causality differs from that advocated by Ellis for whom “the mechanism of causality appears to be simply that of energy transfer.” (Ellis 2012, p. 12) Ellis’ conception of causality echoes the one advocated by Salmon (1984) and Dowe (2000).
- 18.
With variations, a metaphysics of powers has been adopted and developed by, among others, Sidney Shoemaker (1980), Nancy Cartwright (1989), Brian Ellis and Caroline Lierse (1994), Ellis (2001, 2002), John Bigelow et al. (1992), Stephen Mumford (1998, 2004), Mauro Dorato (2005), Alexander Bird (2007), Anjan Chakravartty (2007), Ghins (2007, 2014), Jonathan Jacobs (2010, 2017), Max Kistler (2006) and Barbara Vetter (2015).
- 19.
To recall what I said in Chap. 1, nomological formulas, such as PV=KT or F = ma, are distinct from the complete formulation of a scientific law. The latter refers (most often implicitly) to the ceteris paribus conditions and mentions the entities for which the laws hold true, such as gases or massive bodies. In disciplines that are not mathematized, statements that describe lawful relations between properties can also considered to be nomological formulas.
- 20.
- 21.
Strictly speaking, it is not correct to say that “powers manifest themselves”, as we often read in the literature. Only particulars manifest (or exercise) powers. When a manifestation occurs, it may result in the disappearance of a power (such as solubility, when a lump of sugar dissolves) or its permanence (like the capacity to roll, when a ball rolls).
- 22.
- 23.
Just as the proposition <water is H2O > is a law, <copper conducts electricity> can be considered a law if copper is identified by its superficial properties.
- 24.
Surely, dispositions are sensitive to context. As Barbara Vetter (2015) remarks, a diamond as well as a Chinese vase have the power to break. But a diamond is not generally considered to be fragile, while a Chinese vase usually is. In other words, there is a gradability of dispositions: it is harder to break diamond than a Chinese vase… But a diamond has the real power to break (and is thus fragile) in the context of being hit by a hammer. To provide a general characterisation of degrees of powers (or potentialities, as Vetter calls them) is a daunting task. Given the wide variety of contexts on which such degrees depend, I personally doubt that such aim can be attained.
- 25.
- 26.
The possibility of a universe that contains only one body does not prove that powers are relational – not intrinsic – properties. It is true that in such a universe, a solitary body would never manifest a supposed power to attract another. But intrinsic monadic powers exist independently of their manifestations, and thus irrespective of our having epistemic access to them or not. In our universe many powers are never manifested, due to contingent circumstances. This does not prevent powers from existing.
- 27.
Since powers are not properties of properties but properties of particulars, this makes it possible to counter some objections according to which defending the existence of powers leads to infinite regress (see for example Psillos 2006). The regress objection rests on the assumption that a power has itself a power. It goes like this. Let us assume that power F (fragility, for example) has the power G to manifest itself. This power G is distinct from F. G is directed towards a manifestation, namely the manifestation of F. Again, G has the power to manifest itself etc. and we are dragged into an endless regress. Powers are not endowed with powers; they are powers. Here again language misleads us when we say, for example, that fragility, when not manifested, has the power to manifest. What has the power to manifest, that is to say, to acquire certain properties, is the particular bearer (the vase) of the power, as I stressed. A manifestation is an instantiated process (the breaking of the vase) or a final state (the broken vase).
- 28.
True, the existence of powers – metaphysically – explain why there are regularities. But this does not provide a reason to believe in their existence. Such reasons will be discussed below.
- 29.
Here is the original text: « Bachelierus: Mihi a docto Doctore domandatur causam et rationem quare opium facit dormire. A quoi respondeo: quia est in eo Virtus dormitiva cujus est natura sensus assoupire. »
- 30.
I don’t follow philosophers who, like Stathis Psillos (2006), claim that a disposition can be reduced or defined by its categorical basis alone.
- 31.
The expression “primary quality” was introduced by Robert Boyle in 1666. Before him, Galileo and Descartes had already introduced the distinction between what they called “first qualities” and “second qualities”.
- 32.
A saggiatore was an “assayer” capable of verifying whether an object contained only gold, to the exclusion of any other metal. For this purpose, a high-precision balance was used. In Il Saggiatore, Galileo weighs arguments pro and contra Aristotelian cosmology in order to show that his arguments and observations carry more weight than those of the Aristotelians.
- 33.
Even today, a complete explanation of the processes of colour perception is not available.
- 34.
In our world, there is a necessary link between the properties of being spherical and of having the possibility of being observed spherical, but such necessity is grounded on laws. I will come back to this issue in due course.
- 35.
The converse is not true since observability is an epistemic notion. It may be that there are categorical properties that are not observable. But then we have no reason to believe in their existence.
- 36.
However, it is doubtful that elementary particles can be spatially divided. The proton, for example, is not spatially organised into three quarks.
- 37.
This is why they are called “hexoses” with chemical formula C6 H12 O6.
- 38.
The plane of polarisation is defined by the direction of propagation of the light wave and the direction of its electric field.
- 39.
- 40.
This discovery was made in 2015 by the researchers of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO). (Abbott, B. P. et al. 2016)
- 41.
This seems to be close to what Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus (1.1 “The world is the totality of facts, not of things” and 2 “(…) a fact is the existence of states of affairs”). (Wittgenstein 1971) Facts can be multiple states of affairs or single ones.
- 42.
Of course, besides dyadic relations with two argument places like aRb the ontology I propose also contains polyadic relations, with three, four etc. argument places.
- 43.
The objections based on the possibility of finks and antidotes have been examined earlier (Sect. 5.3). Normal circumstances exclude the presence of finks and antidotes.
- 44.
See Ghins (2007, pp. 143–144).
- 45.
Contrary to what Vetter (2015, p. 12) and others suggest.
- 46.
As Gilbert Ryle famously contended.
- 47.
As Stavros Ioannidis pointed to me, Humeans (such as Gilbert Ryle) could accept that sugar cubes do have the disposition to dissolve without having to postulate the existence of powers in a substantial sense. My argument however decisively relies on the truthmaker principle. There must be something real, namely powers, to ground the truth of some counterfactuals without having to resort to the heavy metaphysical supposition of concrete possible worlds, as Lewis does.
- 48.
Notice that I do not resort to elementary particle physics to vindicate the existence of irreducible powers. This naturalistic argument is defended by, among others, Harré and Madden (1975, pp. 154–155) and also Molnar (2003, pp. 135–137). For a critique of this argument, see Psillos (2006, pp. 172–174). As I have already said, I am not a supporter of naturalized philosophy, whatever form it may take. Science, including physics, is – and always will be – unable to support arguments for or against genuinely philosophical, and therefore normative, positions.
- 49.
For continuous transformations we also speak of Lagrangian symmetries. A Lagrangian function for a physical system is usually the sum of its kinetic energy and an interaction term (potential energy). The Euler-Lagrange equations are differential equations which are obtained from the Lagrangian and the Hamilton’s principle of extremization of the action. From these equations, we can derive by integration the laws of motion of masses in a gravitational field, for example. For a detailed and illuminating discussion of Noether’s theorems and the connection between Lagrangian symmetries and conservations laws see Brown (2022).
- 50.
This is why Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse (1994) have sustained that conservation laws flow from the kind-essence of the whole world. However, their proposal is not immune of the difficulties that beset the notion of essence and the problematic empirical meaning of the “kind-essence of the world”. Moreover, they argue within an explanationist framework, whereas I am an inductivist as I spelled out before. At any rate, their explanation of the origin of the necessity of conservation laws is not satisfactory, as Ioannidis et al. (2021) rightly claim.
- 51.
This expression is also used by Lange (2000) but with a different meaning.
- 52.
This is why I cannot follow Ioannidis et al. (2021) who contend that powers alone are unable to ground the necessity of conservation laws and symmetry principles and more generally to perform a governing role.
- 53.
In his general theory of relativity, Einstein showed that the motion of a body subject to gravitational forces alone could be considered inertial since, in this theory, inertia is incorporated into the structure of spacetime. But such inertial motion is not rectilinear in the Euclidean sense. However, the classical law of inertia remains true to a very good approximation in many contexts.
- 54.
I am grateful to Theodoros Arabatzis for having pointed out this to me (private communication).
- 55.
See Mumford’s response (2004, pp. 174–175). He does not address the epistemological predicament, however.
- 56.
Remember that a scientific law is a universal proposition belonging to a well confirmed scientific theory and which we have good reasons to believe true.
- 57.
Remember that the electron is first identified as the cause of optical phenomena in discharge tubes (see Chap. 3). Necessary laws link optical phenomena to intrinsic properties of electrons.
- 58.
Personal communication. I am grateful to Peter Verdée for helpful comments on this section.
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Ghins, M. (2024). A Dualist Metaphysics of Nature. In: Scientific Realism and Laws of Nature: A Metaphysics of Causal Powers. Synthese Library, vol 483. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54227-5_5
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