Keywords

The treaties of the European Union (EU) commit the Union to promote the norms and values upon which it is founded in relations with countries outside of its borders. At the same time, the EU has often been criticised for not being the self-professed global ‘force for good’ that it sets out to be, not least regarding democracy and human rights. Instead, the EU is denounced for promoting its own short-term interests, sometimes in ways that contradict its stated values, much in line with most other global actors, in the current state of geopolitical conflict.

Such a gap between discourse and practice is fraught with problems. Some scholars argue that too great a discrepancy between what is said and what is done risks eroding the EU's legitimacy and policy efficiency (Chaban & Elgström, 2021; Lucarelli, 2018), which in turn may lead to a decrease in global influence for the EU. Other scholars downplay these risks, arguing that other international actors are not deceived by the EU’s normative discourse, expecting little else than interest-based behaviour from the EU (Chaban & Elgström, 2021; Jurgelaitytė, 2023). Both sides point out that there is a discrepancy between the EU's statements and its actions. Still, the EU upholds its treaty-based values in its foreign policy, even if the normative discourse was downplayed in the EU’s new security strategy, the 2016 Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016; Barbé & Morillas, 2019).

This chapter argues that a failure of the EU to stand up for its value-based norms globally risks challenging not only its legitimacy but ultimately also its survival. By failing to stand up for its norms and values when they are challenged, the EU risks undermining the very same values and norms that it claims to promote globally, especially regarding democracy and human rights. In this era of geopolitical conflict, in which the democratic order is facing a frontal assault by authoritarian regimes, it is crucial that the EU stands by the rules-based world order, especially in terms of democracy and human rights. When the world order is at stake, the EU needs to stand up for its values, also to protect its long-term interests, even if doing so may counteract interests short-term. The question is how this best can be done.

Here, we look at how the EU works in practice to promote treaty-based values and with what effect against the backdrop of the theoretical discourse on the EU as a normative power. The analysis centres on the EU's promotion of democracy, contrasted with the promotion of climate action with a focus on the EU’s southern neighbourhood, a region in which the EU has been active albeit with seemingly different levels of success. This chapter discusses possible reasons for these outcomes and suggests possible ways for the EU to promote values and norms globally, focusing on democracy.

EU Norm Promotion in Treaties and Policies

‘Norm’ is an ambiguous concept. Theoretically, norms are often closely associated with formal or informal rule-based behaviour. In some contexts, norms are linked to legal standards (see, for instance, Marja-Liisa Öberg in this volume). It is important to distinguish between adopted and implemented norms or laws, since experience—not least from the EU’s own enlargement—shows that the adoption is not always followed by implementation (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). In other contexts, norms are linked to more fundamental principles of thought (see, for instance, Pär Hallström’s chapter in this volume).

This chapter focuses on what the EU refers to as the foundational values of the Union. At times, policy documents refer to ‘principles’ rather than values, although the Treaty on European Union (TEU, 2012), replaces ‘principles’ with ‘values’ at certain places. Sometimes, the EU uses the term ‘norms’ instead, particularly in relation to international agreements on democracy and human rights.

Even if different terms are used, the literature in the field has, as will be seen, consistently referred to the EU’s efforts to promote its values globally as norm promotion, arguing that the EU could be seen as a normative power. This conflation of ‘norms’ with ‘values’ and ‘principles’ may complicate the analysis. In this chapter, in line with the literature, values and (value-based) norms refer to what EU policy documents define as values and principles.

What are these values, then? Article 2 of the TEU states that ‘the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ (TEU, 2012). Article 3(5) states that the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests in its relations with the wider world, and contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth and the protection of human rights.

These values inform the EU's external action. Article 21(1) of the TEU states that the Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles that have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world, such as democracy, the rule of law and the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Article 21(2) declares that the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations in order to, among other things, safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law and to foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries.

The TEU thus establishes a catalogue of values that underpins the Union internally, which are also to be promoted externally. The EU’s neighbourhood is particularly targeted in this respect. Article 8 of the TEU states that a special relationship shall be developed with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.

The EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) following the eastern enlargement in 2004, which established new external borders for the Union (European Commission, 2004). As we shall see, the ENP is based on the mutual commitment to common values, in particular the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights (including minority rights), the promotion of good neighbourly relations and the principles of market economy and sustainable development (European Commission, 2004, p. 3). However, the 2015 ENP Review recognised significant shortcomings in the partner countries’ implementation of the values underpinning the ENP and declared that more effective ways to promote reforms were needed (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015, pp. 1–5). Overall, the Review placed less emphasis on common values than before, although it reiterated the EU’s commitment to promoting good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the neighbourhood, as well as cooperation on climate change.

The 2016 Global Strategy declared that the EU’s interests and values go hand in hand and that the Union has an interest in promoting its values abroad. Peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global order are the vital interests underpinning the EU's external action (EEAS, 2016, p. 13). It is further stated that the EU will be guided by clear principles, which stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world emphasising that ‘principled pragmatism’ will guide the EU’s external action in the years ahead (EEAS, 2016, pp. 8, 16).

The EU as a Normative Power?

The EU as a normative power has long been debated in the literature. The debate began in the 1970s with a discussion on what kind of actor the EU should be in the global arena and whether it ought to be seen as a civilian power, with civilian forms of influence (Duchêne, 1972), or if it should be regarded as (the embryo of) a military power, defending its interests strategically (Galtung, 1974). In 2002, Ian Manners (2002) coined the concept Normative Power Europe (NPE). With this concept, Manners argued that the EU is qualitatively different from other actors in the global arena by virtue of its normative, value-based foundations, and could be described as a normative power. However, Manners was strongly opposed by scholars, such as Adrian Hyde-Price, Richard Youngs and Helene Sjursen, who argued that the EU, like other actors, promotes its interests internationally, even if it does so using a normative discourse (Hyde-Price, 2006; Sjursen, 2006; Youngs, 2004).

In this debate, many scholars have shown that the EU has been poor at living up to its normative ideals in its external action (Youngs, 2004; Sjursen, 2006; Jonasson, 2013), a shortcoming which at times has also been recognised by the EU itself (Füle, 2011). As already mentioned, major problems have been identified with this gap between discourse and practice, although not everyone agrees that it is a problem (Chaban & Elgström, 2021; Lucarelli, 2018). The gap between discourse and action is deeply problematic, as it jeopardises both the legitimacy of the EU and the values themselves.

But what, then, should the EU do to promote its values and the norms based on these? The literature discusses different ways for actors to promote value-based norms internationally. Manners argues that the EU diffuses its norms by putting itself forward as an example, by being founded on treaty-based norms, and by its external action which is informed by and conditional on these norms (Manners, 2002, pp. 241–242). More specifically, Manners lists six ways in which the EU acts as a norm-diffuser. These range from contagion, i.e. unintentional diffusion e.g. by the setting of a virtuous example; informational diffusion resulting from strategic and declaratory communications and procedural diffusion involving the institutionalisation of relationships with third parties, to trade-related norm transference (e.g. in the form of export standards and conditionality), overt diffusion as a result of the EU’s physical presence, and, finally, providing a cultural filter, impacting political learning in third states, leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms (Manners, 2002, pp. 244–245). In this way, norms are diffused by the fact that the EU is founded on the norms in question, which predisposes the EU to act in accordance with them (Manners, 2002, p. 252). Thus, according to Manners, the EU is a normative power with the ability to define what is considered ‘normal’ in international relations (Manners, 2002, p. 253).

The debate that followed Manners’s highly influential article has centred on the extent to which the EU in fact is a normative power, and whether it actually does promote its value-based norms globally. Many scholars have convincingly pointed out that this is often not the case and that there is indeed a significant gap between the EU's discourse and practice in this regard making the EU’s position as a normative power highly questionable (Youngs, 2004; Sjursen, 2006; Jonasson, 2013).

Value-based Norm Diffusion

The literature on value-based norm diffusion has often applied a social constructivist perspective to the EU's norm promotion. This perspective emphasises two basic mechanisms of norm diffusion: a positive, socialisation-based mechanism (e.g. persuasion, diplomacy and moral support) and a negative, incentive-based mechanism (e.g. positive or negative conditionality) (Jonasson, 2013, p. 11). These mechanisms are in turn based on the two basic logics identified by James March and Johan Olsen (March & Olsen, 2004). According to the rational choice-based logic of consequentiality, an actor's behaviour is driven by rational calculation, motivated by interest-based incentives and personal gain. According to the institutionalist logic of appropriateness, actors act in accordance with a role, an identity, or a membership of a political community. They act in ways they consider appropriate in the current situation based on the ethics, practices and expectations of the institution, making their behaviour in line with expectations and therefore legitimate. According to this literature, a value-based norm is considered as diffused when the logic of appropriateness replaces the logic of consequentiality as the basis for behaviour, and when actions are carried out in accordance with the norms of the group because ‘this is what we do’, rather than on the basis of rational calculation, because ‘this is in accordance with my own (material) interest’ (Jonasson, 2013, p. 12).

This norm diffusion process consists of different steps, which in turn are based on the two basic logics. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) argue that strategic, instrumental adaptation takes place when actors adapt their behaviour to international norms without necessarily accepting the validity of the norms, in line with the logic of consequentiality. Socialisation, on the other hand, occurs through moral discourse, emphasising communication, argumentation and persuasion, leading to the acceptance of norms in line with the logic of appropriateness. According to this argument, norm diffusion comes about as the first process evolves into the second, resulting in institutionalisation and internalisation, allowing norms to be fully accepted by the actors (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, pp. 12–17). Genuine and authentic acceptance of the norm is seen as crucial for a norm to be considered as diffused. To achieve such acceptance, positive, socialisation-based methods are usually preferred to negative, incentive-based methods in this norm diffusion discourse. Positive methods facilitate genuine, as opposed to temporary, acceptance and only positive methods ensure authentic embracement of the norm (Jonasson, 2013; Risse & Sikkink, 1999). Adoption of the norm along the logic of appropriateness is thus favoured over adoption along the logic of consequentiality, even if the latter is considered as (potentially) leading to the former (Jonasson, 2013, p. 14). Importantly, it is pointed out in the literature that norm adoption along the logic of consequentiality risks creating only token change, not resulting in genuine norm acceptance.

It can be noted that most of the six processes that Manners outlined for EU norm diffusion are based on socialisation, even though there are elements of rational calculation, not least regarding conditionality linked to trade. It can also be noted that the norm diffusion literature has long indicated that socialisation-based norm diffusion is usually more successful. However, one crucial exception to this conclusion is often brought forth, namely the success of the EU's enlargement process, especially the eastern enlargement of 2004. EU enlargement is based on a logic of consequentiality, where negotiating countries become members only if they fulfil a (very large) number of conditions. As a consequence of this unprecedented success, the norm diffusion debate, not least in relation to the EU’s promotion of democracy and human rights, came to emphasise the importance of external incentives in bringing about normative change in candidate states, in line with the logic of consequentiality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005).

It is however important to note that Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier recognise that the incentive-based approach is premised on a more fundamental orientation towards the norms in question (Jonasson, 2013, p. 15). They argue that the conditional external incentives, based on the logic of consequentiality, were crucial in bringing about rule adoption in candidate states, and that conditionality is thus the EU’s most successful enlargement tool (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, pp. 210–211). Nonetheless, they acknowledge that the whole process of Europeanisation was embedded in a larger process of socialisation and social learning as the eastern enlargement was based on the candidate states’ fundamental identification with the EU and the high legitimacy of the European integration project (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 220; Jonasson, 2013, p. 16). They also note that norms adopted as a result of socialisation are far less contested locally and that actual implementation of and compliance with these norms therefore is far more likely. On the other hand, norms adopted as a result of external incentives, along a logic of consequentiality, are likely to generate more domestic resistance and risk facing lack of implementation (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, pp. 219–220; Jonasson, 2013, p. 16).

Other scholars also suggest that there are crucial differences in how policymakers respond to external demands depending on their initial stance. According to this argument, policymakers cannot be enticed to change their minds if the external requirements are completely contrary to their initial stance and norm diffusion will fail when policy stances are too foreign to domestic policymakers. However, they can be enticed (even if it is difficult) or persuaded (more easily) if the external requirements are not completely contrary to their initial stance (Kelley, 2004, p. 432; Jonasson, 2013, p. 15; Dandashley & Noutcheva, 2022).

According to this argument, a certain orientation towards the norms in question is thus necessary for their acceptance. On this basis, the necessity to study the recipients of norms is increasingly recognised in the literature through the so-called ‘local turn’ emphasising the agency of norm-takers (Grimm, 2019; Checkel, 1998; Jonasson, 2013; Dandashley & Noutcheva, 2022). In line with this local turn, for the norm to take root, it requires not only a local orientation but also local ownership, both in terms of goal setting and implementation of the norm in question, as well as a genuine dialogue between the norm-maker and the norm-taker (Jonasson, 2013, pp. 23–37). However, prior research recognises that it is difficult to realise local orientation, ownership and dialogue (Checkel, 1998; Jonasson, 2013; Dandashley & Noutcheva, 2022). A case in point is the EU’s external norm promotion which is criticised for failing to ensure local ownership when introducing norms, based on a locally rooted—at least nominal—orientation towards the norms, and to establish a genuine dialogue on norms. Instead, the EU is often accused of wanting to do things its own way, based on its own material self-interests. The EU is also at times accused of acting in ways that counteract its own norms in ways regarded as counterproductive (Jonasson, 2013, p 189; Dandashly & Noutcheva, 2019). A prerequisite for successful norm promotion is therefore that the norm-maker actually wants to promote the norm in question, something that is not always as self-evident as it may seem.

Based on the premise that norms are diffused either through strategic adaptation that (potentially) leads to normative change along the logic of consequentiality, or socialisation into the norm along the logic of appropriateness, the question arises whether different logics apply to specific norms? It may be argued that the conditions for norm diffusion vary depending on the nature of the norm, although the basic logic remains the same. While norms related to the social contract of a community, for instance, democracy, require a socialisation-based embracement of the norms, interest-related norms, for instance, related to trade, are more easily diffused following the logic of consequentiality. However, when interest-related norms challenge the social contract, problems will arise, and the outcome depends on the handling of these problems. Ultimately, what matters most is the extent to which both norm-makers and norm-takers are genuinely oriented towards the norm, providing a foundation for local ownership and mutual dialogue.

Following this argument, the conditions for norm diffusion can differ between norms related to democracy, on the one hand, and norms related to climate goals, on the other. Norm diffusion related to democracy, which directly affects the social contract, requires a process of socialisation on the part of the norm-taker, based on a local orientation towards the norm and local ownership of the democratisation process. It also requires a genuine dialogue with the norm-maker—and a true willingness by the norm-maker to promote democracy. Norms related to climate goals may be easier to diffuse through material incentives, at least initially. Fairly soon, however, the interventions affecting the social contract are likely to be so extensive that a deeper socialisation-based embracement of the norms is required for norm diffusion. In both cases, successful norm diffusion requires the norm-maker to want to diffuse the norm, and that the norm-taker is willing to embrace it.

The EU as a Norm Promoter

How, then, does the EU work to promote value-based norms, and how well does it succeed in doing so? In the following, we turn the focus to the promotion of norms linked to democracy and climate goals, in relation to the EU's southern neighbourhood. The EU has promoted these norms with seemingly different rates of success. It is argued that these two fields of norm promotion differ in fundamental respects. It may be questioned whether the EU in fact wants to promote norms related to democracy in the southern neighbourhood and whether the partners really want to take them on, whereas regarding climate mitigation goals these prerequisites seem met to a greater extent.

The EU as a Promoter of Democracy?

Promoting democracy, especially in the neighbourhood, became important for the EU after the end of the Cold War, even if the EU has worked at a general level to promote democracy beyond its borders since the 1970s. Since the early 1990s, the EU has thus developed more specific policies to promote democracy in third countries in the framework of its development policy. However, through the adoption of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, democracy promotion became an explicit objective of the EU's foreign policy. Today, the EU institutions are surpassed only by the US when it comes to the funding spent on the promotion of democratic values and institutions, as well as human rights and the rule of law globally (Khakee, 2022).

The EU has developed different policy instruments to promote democracy. These include:

  • Conditionality clauses related to human rights, democracy and sustainable development in agreements with third states

  • The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)/The Global Europe Human Rights and Democracy programme

  • The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and

  • The Enlargement policy

The conditionality clauses define human rights and democracy as essential elements in the EU’s political agreements with third states. Such clauses are also included in trade agreements, regardless of whether these agreements are linked to political agreements or not. Violations of these essential elements are grounds for various sanctions, including the suspension of the agreement. Since 1995, negotiations on agreements with states outside Europe have always included one or more such clauses, even if they have not always become part of the final agreement. Moreover, for more than a decade all trade agreements have included a clause on the three pillars of sustainable development—economic, environmental and social sustainability, which also includes social justice and human rights. Democracy is not directly included here, but there is mentioning of good governance.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was launched in 2006 mainly to support non-governmental organisations working for democracy and human rights in third countries, enabling the EU to fund the organisations directly without having to go through the formal channels of the host state. In 2021, EIDHR was succeeded by the Global Europe Human Rights and Democracy programme, incorporated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)—‘Global Europe’ (European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), 2021).

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed after the eastern enlargement in 2004, as the EU sought to establish good relations with its new neighbours, both to the east and, later, to the south. Since 2005, the ENP has offered the EU’s neighbours a privileged relationship, based on mutual commitment to common values such as democracy and human rights, the rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development. It is emphasised that the level of ambition of the relationship depends on the extent to which these values are effectively shared. It is further established that neighbouring countries that are part of international organisations for cooperation such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, or that have signed the Barcelona Declaration, are also committed to democracy and human rights (European Commission, 2004, pp. 3, 12–13).

Since the 1960s, the EU (and its predecessors) has undertaken different enlargements. Since 1993, the Copenhagen criteria were adopted stating that in order to be eligible for EU membership the candidate country must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, in addition to a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces of the EU. Moreover, the country is required to align with the EU's acquis, which also includes requirements related to democracy and human rights (EUR-Lex, 2023).

The policies to promote democracy are based on partly different logics. While the conditionality clauses are based on negative conditionality, as sanctions can be imposed if democracy and human rights are violated, the neighbourhood and enlargement policies are based primarily on positive conditionality, based on incentives, as benefits are rewarded if the partner state meets the objectives. In its democracy promotion, the EU thus attaches great importance to conditionality (positive and negative) and largely works in close cooperation with the partner states. However, a different logic underlies the EIDHR/the Global Europe Human Rights and Democracy programme, targeting support directly at non-governmental organisations.

In addition to these four policy areas, democracy promotion is also included in a range of other EU instruments, both short-term (such as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace) and long-term (such as development cooperation). Since 2013, the EU also collaborates with EU Member States to support democracy promotion, particularly in the neighbourhood, through the European Endowment for Democracy. Another instrument is the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime from December 2020, designed to support human rights by imposing sanctions on targeted individuals, entities and bodies, both governmental and non-governmental, in the form of travel bans, freezing of funds and prohibitions on making funds available to those listed (Official Journal, 2020).

Along the argument pursued here, material incentives and an incentive-based logic of consequentiality thus play an important role in the EU’s democracy promotion. However, democracy promotion is sometimes—in the ENP and, especially, in the enlargement policy—embedded in an approach based on more comprehensive socialisation, presupposing at least a nominal orientation towards the project of democratisation. The question is how well these different approaches work.

In practice, the EU’s promotion of democracy is not considered particularly successful beyond Europe's borders due to the problems associated with its implementation (Jonasson, 2013; Dandashly & Noutcheva, 2019). The literature points out that conditionality clauses are often manipulated politically, both in the negotiation phase and in the implementation phase. The EU is accused of requiring varying levels of compliance by different partners. Deterioration in democracy and human rights does not always lead to significant action, even in the case of authoritarian states. Even if the conditionality clauses lead to discussions between the partners about democracy and human rights, the effects of these discussions are often largely absent, as exemplified by one expert in the southern neighbourhood: ‘I think maybe the Europeans would like to promote their own values, because they think ultimately that is the only thing that will change these crazy terrorists. But at the receiving end here, this is all for toasting … at dinner parties’ (Jonasson, 2013, p. 62).

The EIDHR/the Global Europe Human Rights and Democracy programme support non-governmental organisations that promote democracy and human rights. While it is stressed by the EU that this support can also be given to organisations critical of the sitting regimes, this is difficult to implement in practice as the control over organisations is often very strict in authoritarian states. Regime-critical organisations are often banned from operating in the country and are not allowed to receive foreign funds. If they do so, they risk being deemed as subversive and punished, directly or indirectly. Therefore, organisations supported by the EU are in fact often close to the regime and therefore unlikely to work against it by promoting true democratisation.

Regarding the ENP, the EU’s 2015 ENP Review shows significant shortcomings in its democracy promotion (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015). On the one hand, the incentive-based conditionality approach is considered to have been successful in supporting reforms to strengthen the norms when there has been political will to do so locally. On the other hand, the Review points out that such political will does not always exist. It is questionable whether an authoritarian state has an interest in democratisation. The EU therefore stresses the need to work in more effective ways to promote reforms, upholding and promoting universal values (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015, pp. 1–5). Interestingly, it can be noted that the emphasis on common values has been replaced by a reference to universal values in the review of the ENP. It is emphasised that the EU will pursue its interests and that these include the promotion of universal values, such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and economic openness. It is declared that stabilisation is the EU’s main political priority in the new Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015, p. 2).

The enlargement policy, based on both conditionality and cooperation, is the EU’s most successful approach to democracy promotion. Here, the incentive-based logic of consequentiality is embedded in a larger socialisation-based logic of appropriateness, where Europeanisation includes a general orientation towards democracy, local ownership based on this orientation, and a dialogue with the EU, supposedly resulting in ‘true’ democratisation. It can be argued that the democratic decline that we see in some EU Member States today, for example, Hungary and Poland, shows that material incentives do not necessarily secure a genuine local orientation towards democratic values and a willingness of the state to attain them. As Daniel Silander (2022) points out, the anchoring of democracy in the political culture is lacking in several European countries. Democratic success can only be ensured to the extent that democracy is culturally rooted. If this is not the case, backsliding is likely.

Despite the emphasis on democracy in the ENP, and in the 2021 New Agenda for the Mediterranean (Council of the European Union, 2020), the states in the EU's southern neighbourhood show a glaring lack of genuine orientation towards democracy and local ownership of a democratic process. Research shows that while the sitting governments in the southern neighbourhood often express willingness to adopt democratic principles, this means little in practice (Dandashly & Noutcheva, 2019; Jonasson, 2013). Authoritarian regimes are rarely interested in true democratisation, contrary to their assertions. Furthermore, even if the EU sets out to ensure local ownership of the democratic process, the work envisaged is often based on conditions set out by the EU, often lacking a local contextualisation, which makes it difficult to talk about local ownership. Also, the principles of conditional support counteracts the ideal of mutual dialogue and the input from both parties on equal terms.

While EU democracy promotion in the southern neighbourhood presents major shortcomings in terms of orientation, local ownership and dialogue, the EU repeatedly demonstrates that it prioritises stability and security over democracy in the region. In 2022, the European Democracy Support Annual Review stated that ‘(i)n a year dominated by the rhetoric of defending democracy, EU democracy support policies were adjusted in important ways to align with the new geopolitical context. However, the union also seemed to treat commitments in this area as second-order priorities compared to security’ (Youngs & Ventura et al. 2022, cp. also Jonasson, 2013; Dandashly & Noutcheva, 2019). The southern neighbourhood is marked by a substantial degree of instability and insecurity, and the EU has witnessed the consequences of this in the form of large migration flows. While the EU’s discourse emphasises that democracy leads to stability and security, experience shows that whereas this often is true in the long term, things often get worse in the short and medium term before they get better again (Alizada, et al. 2022). This is clearly seen in the wake of the political uprisings dubiously dubbed the Arab Spring. At such critical junctures, the EU has often extended de facto support to authoritarian regimes in the southern neighbourhood, for them to maintain stability and security, rather than prioritised democratisation. The migration deals with authoritarian regimes in Turkey, Libya and, more recently, Tunisia, which offer support to socioeconomic development, without any mention of democracy, are examples of this practice (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood & Enlargement Negotiations, 2023).

The success of EU democracy promotion in the southern neighbourhood has thus been faltering. In line with the argument here, this is because the essential prerequisites for a successful norm promotion are missing. There is neither a genuine orientation towards, local ownership of, nor a mutual dialogue on, democratisation. This—together with the fact that it is questionable whether the EU wants to promote democracy in the region—makes the prospects for successful democracy promotion in the southern neighbourhood look bleak.

The EU as a Promoter of Climate Action?

The EU has long been considered a pioneer in adopting climate policies internally and in promoting such policies externally (Delreux & Ohler, 2019). At the international level, the EU partakes in the climate negotiations hosted by the United Nations (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC), both as an entity in itself and through its Member States, negotiating under a common umbrella according to a common negotiating position. The EU’s efforts in the international climate change negotiations led to a failure in Copenhagen in 2009. However, the EU learnt from its mistakes, and the 2015 Paris Agreement was a major success for the EU for reasons we will return to (Delreux & Ohler, 2019; Oberthür & Groen, 2017).

The United States (US) long led the fight against climate change through its strong climate ambitions under the democratic presidents, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. Under the rule of republican administrations, however, it withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 and the Paris Agreement in 2017. Under Joe Biden, the US re-entered the Paris Agreement in 2021. By the time of the 2015 Paris meeting, China had also stepped forward as an important climate actor, along with other emerging powers with large emissions. With its new strategy, the EU however managed to manoeuvre skilfully in Paris. While the goal is the same for everyone involved in the fight against climate change, the approaches and priorities differ (Oberthür & Groen, 2017). By virtue of its ambition to lead by example and basing negotiations on ambitious and legally binding agreements, the EU is often seen both as a leader and a mediator (a leadiator) in this endeavour (Delreux & Ohler, 2019).

The literature shows how the EU has established the world’s most comprehensive climate policy framework, based on an economic incentive scheme with emission allowances in the framework of the Emission Trading System, and binding commitments for Member States to reduce emissions. These measures have also been successful internationally, in some cases reaching far beyond the EU’s borders (Ferenczy, 2019). However, the literature points out that this is not enough to achieve the EU's own long-term goals. To do so, more fundamental shifts in a range of EU policy areas—from energy production and consumption, to transport, agriculture and industry—are required (Delreux & Ohler, 2019).

While an incentive-based logic of consequentiality, in the form of emission allowances, thus has reaped some success both within the EU and beyond, the literature suggests that the EU is most successful in the global arena if and when it succeeds in persuading/convincing its international partners through diplomatic negotiations (Delreux & Ohler, 2019; Ferenczy, 2019; Oberthür & Groen, 2017). A socialisation-based approach thus seems more likely to succeed. The low point in Copenhagen in 2009, when the EU failed to achieve its objectives and no agreement was reached, is regarded as resulting from the EU having set too high targets, which were poorly anchored with other states, and paid too little attention to the interests of its partners. In particular, the partners’ insistence that their right to economic development had to have consequences for the climate, as the EU and the rest of the industrialised world already had largely used their rights in this regard, was taken too lightly by the EU (Delreux & Ohler, 2019; Oberthür & Groen, 2017). Thus, along with the argument pursued here, it was the lack of common orientation, local ownership and mutual dialogue in relation to the norms that led to the failure in Copenhagen.

This lesson was however not lost on the EU. In the run-up to the 2015 Paris meeting, the EU worked hard to ensure that the agreement was genuinely anchored, through active diplomacy and coalition- and bridge-building with partners, a strategy which paid off in the agreement reached (Oberthür & Groen, 2017). This agreement was certainly less ambitious from a climate point of view than the EU’s previous targets, but also more realistic (Delreux & Ohler, 2019). Most agree that the Paris Agreement was a great success for the EU—it is better to have a less ambitious agreement where the parties agree on their commitments than either no agreement at all or a divisive one, even if the agreement is not really considered sufficient to save the climate (Delreux & Ohler, 2019; Oberthür & Groen, 2017).

After Paris, the socialisation-based anchoring process has been further refined, with even more focus on common orientation towards the goals, genuine local ownership both in the setting of goals and of processes and true mutual dialogue. The literature points out that actors in the global arena need partners to support an ambitious, comprehensive agenda and that the EU’s active climate diplomacy provides such support (Oberthür & Groen, 2017).

Central to the Paris Agreement is the recognition that conditions matter and that the states with the most favourable conditions have the greatest responsibility. Part of this responsibility is the various forms of support that industrialised countries provide to developing countries. In the 2021 COP meeting in Glasgow, the EU pledged even more financial support for climate action in developing countries. The Paris Agreement also introduced common rules for how climate action should be carried out in its different phases. In Glasgow, this rulebook was completed, and it was decided that the ambition of climate action should be further increased (United Nations, 2023). In Sharm el-Sheikh in 2022, the EU contributed to securing the final agreement and putting in place new funding to help vulnerable communities face the loss and damage caused by climate change (European Commission, 2022).

Analysing the international climate action of the EU from the perspective put forth here reveals that this action is conducted mainly along a socialisation-based logic of appropriateness, based on the fundamental idea that we are all in this together, even if more short-term, interest-based material incentives also are present (cp. Jurgelaitytė, 2023). This socialisation-based approach is underscored by the fact that the Paris Agreement stipulates that the action to address climate change should take into account crucial societal aspects like human rights and gender equality, thus addressing the more fundamental social contract (United Nations, 2015). The developments from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond also show that climate action is only successful to the extent that it is based on a common orientation, local ownership and mutual dialogue. Unlike in democracy promotion, there is furthermore a genuine willingness on the part of all parties to work towards common goals to combat climate change, even if it comes at a cost. The EU has thus been more successful in promoting norms on climate change, both because it has worked actively on securing socialisation and because all parties are genuinely interested in the common goals.

The EU emphasises that climate action is also important in relation with the southern neighbourhood. The European External Action Service stresses that the EU supports its neighbours in reaching their nationally determined contributions to the Paris Agreement through the external dimension of the Green Deal and that the EU will increase its support for the climate transition (EEAS, 2021). The 2021 New Agenda for the Mediterranean underlines that action to address the global climate challenge is a fundamental pillar of the EU’s policy in the region (Council of the European Union, 2021). It is emphasised that the EU is convinced that it, by working together with the southern neighbourhood partners, will contribute to a just and inclusive green transition. In line with the external dimension of the Green Deal, the EU will also work to increase the climate ambitions of the partners. It is stressed that the southern neighbourhood plays an important role in attaining the objective of a climate-neutral world and supplying green energy to Europe.

Thus, at level of policy, the EU sets out to cooperate with its southern neighbourhood partners in climate action, based on common orientation, local ownership and dialogue. The question is how this works out in practice. In the run-up to the 2021 COP meeting in Glasgow, a review showed that there are major difficulties for the southern Mediterranean states to fulfil their commitments under the Paris Agreement, not least because of domestic political instability (The National, 2021). While important achievements have been made, particularly in Egypt and Morocco, limited progress was recorded in Israel and Lebanon. Countries, like Jordan and Tunisia, have developed ambitious visions, but with little concrete action to show for it. Achieving success on the ground obviously has its challenges. Most southern neighbours however showed a positive development in their environmental performance, including performance on climate change, ranking among the top half of countries worldwide in terms of positive climate change mitigation over the last ten years (Wolf et al., 2022).

Despite the challenges, and even though the EU’s climate cooperation with the southern neighbourhood is relatively new, the prospects for success seem relatively bright. Not least because it is in the interest of the authoritarian states themselves—to a greater extent than in other issues—to cooperate with the EU in climate action, to secure their own survival as they are located in a region that is among the most vulnerable to climate change globally (Bremberg, 2022). The EU's interest in achieving success is also obvious, not least because climate change in the southern Mediterranean is driving migration towards the EU, in a way that it regards as highly undesirable. Many different diplomatic and technical initiatives have been taken by the EU to support national measures to strengthen climate action in the southern Mediterranean. For example, at the 2022 COP in Sharm El-Sheikh, a partly EU-sponsored Mediterranean pavilion was set up for the first time, with the aim of bringing together different regional actors—from Europe and the Mediterranean—in the fight against regional climate change (Union for the Mediterranean, 2022). While it is still early to judge the success of these initiatives, and while political leaders in the southern neighbourhood have shown some reluctance in this respect, a common orientation to shared goals, local ownership and mutual dialogue appear to be emerging in regard to climate change cooperation—all important factors for success in the EU's climate action globally as well as in its cooperation with the partner countries in the southern neighbourhood.

Can the EU Promote Norms Beyond its Borders in a Conflictual World?

This chapter shows that the EU's efforts to promote norms seem to work better in some areas than in others. It is argued that this is because both the EU and its partners are not as interested in the diffusion of some value-based norms, as they are in the diffusion of others. While the EU and the Mediterranean partners seem to have a genuine common interest in addressing rampant climate change, not least for the sake of their own survival, a similar interest is not at hand in the furthering of democracy. Even if the EU argues that democracy leads to stability and security, which is desired in the long run, and the neighbouring states in the South sometimes talk about democracy, both parties seem to agree that democracy is not desirable in the southern neighbourhood at present. Instead, a process of democratisation seems likely to lead, at least in the short-term, to the kind of instability and insecurity that both parties want to avoid. The EU has no interest in the migration flows that such a situation would generate, and the authoritarian regimes are not interested in undermining themselves.

For value-based norms to be successfully diffused, there needs to be a genuine political will on all sides. Furthermore, the diffusion of a value-based norm requires that both the EU and the partner state are oriented towards the norm in question and that there is local ownership in the implementation and mutual dialogue between the EU and the partner state. If these prerequisites do not exist, the prospects for norm diffusion are poor. This chapter has shown that these prerequisites seem to be present in the EU's work on climate change mitigation to a much greater extent than in its promotion of democracy, especially in relation to the southern neighbourhood. The chances for success in the battle against climate change thus seem far greater than the chances for success in the promotion of democracy.

How, then, can the EU work to promote value-based norms globally, especially with regard to democracy? Along with the argument pursued here, it is particularly important to focus on two things. First, it is crucial that the EU does not claim to promote value-based norms if this is not genuinely meant. The EU's promotion of democracy is an important example of how such an approach is not likely to succeed. Furthermore, such an approach risks undermining faith in democracy itself. If the EU believes that democracy is the best political system at hand for safeguarding human rights and ensuring stability and security in the long term—as it indeed has good reasons to think—the EU needs to prioritise democratisation, not stability and security, even if it comes at a cost. The EU must stand up for democratic principles in practice, even in difficult circumstances. The EU’s discourse needs be followed in practice, and support to non-democratic partner states should be reconsidered.

Secondly, the EU needs to base its policies on the research that unequivocally shows that democracy has to be locally rooted in order for it to take hold and flourish. Democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, but help can be offered to promote a domestic dialogue about democracy and what democracy means in the local context. The EU can contribute to such a discussion by addressing what democracy could mean locally in its dialogue with both partner states and other local actors, and by showing what benefits the EU itself has reaped from democracy in practice. By encouraging such a locally rooted discussion, which includes all parts of society, societal pressure for democratisation may grow.

In order to promote value-based norms beyond its borders in this era of geopolitical conflict, the EU needs to promote a local orientation towards these norms, to ensure that the work on these norms is locally owned and that there is a genuine dialogue. In the work to promote democracy, the EU can learn from the work against climate change and genuinely contribute to a local, contextualised development of democratic objectives and of the local approaches to meet them, by using inclusive dialogues.

At a time when the global order is at stake, and democracy is being challenged worldwide, the EU needs to reconsider its discourse, and, above all, its actions. To promote a global order based on democracy and human rights, the EU needs to honour its stated aims, both in discourse and in practice. The EU cannot afford to undermine democratic norms by claiming to act in accordance with them, when in fact it does not. The EU needs to stand up for its values, even if this may counteract interests in the short term, as the erosion of these values risks undermining the EU's long-term interests. In the inevitable conflict between interests and values, the latter needs to be prioritised over short-term interests. The EU needs to genuinely stand by its own values in the norm promotion and work to ensure that the norm-takers also embrace them. This is vital if the EU does not want to risk undermining the value-based norms themselves as well as its legitimacy and thus its influence worldwide, all of which are crucial to its own survival.