Keywords

As the overarching theme of this book suggests, questions and problems relating to the external and internal borders of the European Union (EU) are becoming more prominent, as instability worsens and geopolitical tensions rise around the world. Many studies of borders and border politics have pointed out that the management of borders has become a prominent political issue globally and that border-control practices have gotten more expansive (Dodds, 2021; Jones, 2016; Longo, 2018; Simmons, 2017; Yuval-Davis et al., 2019). Borders are increasingly the subject of political debate, and walls and barriers are being erected across the world (Simmons, 2019; Vallet, 2020). The trend towards politicised borders and stricter border controls is also clearly visible in Europe. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, moreover, the new geopolitical (dis)order came violently to a head, as did the challenges to territorial integrity. Even before then, however, several crises for the EU over the last decade have been understood as crises of the Union’s borders. Brexit, for example, redrew the borders of the EU. The ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 brought an increased focus on the EU’s external borders, and led to an internal border crisis as well. The latter was then renewed due to restrictions on mobility imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, which challenged the principle of free movement within the Schengen Area. The war in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, combined with climate change and growing geopolitical tensions, indicates that many future challenges will be connected with EU border policy. The question of how borders are to be guarded is closely linked to the persistent question of what the relationship should be between the Union and its member states. The imposition of internal border controls, for example, raises the question of whether freedom of movement is threatened. Indeed, might the renationalisation of border controls even lead to the disintegration of the Union?

The issue addressed in this chapter is how the EU and its members deal with the various challenges facing them in the area of border policy. By highlighting three different trends in EU border policy, I seek to illustrate the questions involved. In the first section, I present a theoretical framework for understanding the role of borders in European integration. The second section, looking inward, deals with the use of ‘temporary internal border controls’—i.e., the reintroduction of national border controls within the Schengen Area. The third section reviews the development of EU policy on the external borders, the aim of which is to control migration from the outside. In a striking shift in this area, border controls are being moved further and further away from the outer borders of the Union itself. Since the refugee crisis of 2015, moreover, there has been a dramatic expansion and reform of the EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency, commonly known as Frontex. In the fourth section, I take a closer look at the development and use of new technology, and the increasingly ‘borderless’ methods of border control. The chapter ends with a discussion of what these different trends say about the state of the Union’s internal and external borders. Are integration and internal freedom of movement under threat? Or are we sooner seeing a consolidation of the external borders of the EU?

Borders as Political Institutions

Before moving on to the discussion of border politics and policies within the EU, I should clarify certain concepts and underlying assumptions. From a political-science perspective, borders are best understood as political institutions, which are created and maintained through processes in which political decisions, material conditions, and patterns of behaviour interact to establish and maintain the function of borders. Territorial boundaries are central to the existence of the modern state, and it is from them that much of what we understand as a state has its beginnings: without a clearly defined territory within which the state’s political decisions can take effect, it is difficult to imagine the idea of the sovereign state. Once a state’s territorial boundaries are established, they fulfil several important functions of both a practical and symbolic nature. It is at the borders that what belongs and what does not belong can be defined; thus, the marking of borders—with the help of buildings, fences, flags, and signs—has often been critical in the creation of a national ‘we’. Borders thus perform functions of inclusion and exclusion. They are also important, however, as gates and bridges for regulating flows between different countries. The manner in which they are managed, therefore, has substantial consequences, not least on economic life and on people’s rights and freedoms.

In the EU, many of the questions concerning the relationship between member states and the Union come to a head over questions relating to the management of borders. Questions of efficiency versus democratic control, of integration through intergovernmentalism or neofunctionalism, and whether power ultimately rests with the member states or with the supranational institutions—all are directly linked to decisions regarding the Union’s internal borders and its shared external borders. The question I intend to address in this chapter is how the ongoing border politics of the EU can be understood based on the tension between European integration on the one hand and state sovereignty on the other.

A suitable framework for understanding the relationship in the EU between the politics of internal borders and that of external ones has been presented by Schimmelfennig (2021). This author starts from the concept of bordering, which is often used in studies of border politics to illustrate that borders are not something static; rather, they are constantly created and recreated through social and political processes. In this regard, bordering refers to the activities and political processes involved in the creation of borders. In order to describe the creation of borders within the EU, I start from the two dimensions that Schimmelfennig (2021) identifies: first, the internal and external borders; and second, the different directions that bordering takes—from de-bordering (i.e., the dismantling of borders) to re-bordering (their strengthening). Based on these dimensions, according to Schimmelfennig (2021, p. 316), we can identify four positions in which territorial integration within the EU might find itself: (1) diluted integration, where both internal and external borders are dismantled; (2) effective integration, where external borders are reinforced at the same time that internal ones are dismantled; (3) disintegration, where national borders are strengthened at the same time that external borders are dismantled; and (4) defensive integration, where both internal and external borders are strengthened at the same time.

The relationship between bordering processes at the external and the internal borders can thus be said to generate four possible directions in which European integration can move. The polar extremes of this model, in terms of the level of integration, are maximum effective integration, where the endpoint is exemplified by the creation of a federal European state, and maximum disintegration, where the endpoint is a return to the national territorial framework (as through a departure of more states from the EU, along the lines of Brexit). In the case of the middling outcomes of diluted or defensive integration, by contrast, the level of integration is neither as total as in the case of effective integration, nor as weak as in the case of disintegration. In the case of diluted integration, integration is weakened by the lack of any consolidation of the external borders; in the case of defensive integration, it is weakened by the restrictions on internal movement. In the following three sections, I employ this theoretical framework to analyse the developmental tendencies that have been most evident with regard to European borders in recent years. The tension between the national level and the European one emerges most clearly in the first section below, which deals with the use of internal border controls. The next two sections describe the border-making processes for reinforcing the common external borders. I return, finally, to the theoretical framework in the concluding section, wherein I discuss how these different processes can be understood in terms of European integration.

Internal Border Controls as a National Response to the Migration Crisis and the COVID-19 Pandemic

Article 17 of the original Schengen Agreement, concluded by the Benelux countries, Germany and France in 1985, later incorporated as acquis of the EC, and subsequently as title VI, of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, sets out the following long-term objective:

In terms of the free movement of persons, the parties shall seek to abolish controls at the common borders and to transfer these to their external borders. To this end, they shall initially, if necessary, seek the harmonization of laws and other regulations concerning the prohibitions and restrictions underlying the controls and take complementary measures to protect the security and prevent illegal immigration of nationals from countries which are not members of the European Communities. (European Commission, 2000)

Thus, ever since the start of the Schengen Agreement, there has been an important connection between on the one hand the abolition of border controls between the member states, and on the other the security of external borders and the prevention of ‘illegal immigration’. The basic principle is that the internal borders, which separate EU member states from each other, should be freed from border controls to the greatest extent possible. With the UK’s exit from the Union, the only EU member states that are not part of Schengen are Ireland (which has special agreements) and Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania (which will eventually join). Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland are in Schengen but not the EU. In this chapter, I focus mainly on the countries that are in both bodies. Freedom of movement for EU citizens is not just a cornerstone of European integration; it is also that EU policy which EU citizens themselves value most highly. According to the recent Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2022), as many as 84 per cent support freedom of movement within the Union. It bears adding, however, that the second and third most popular policies are a common defence and security policy (77%) and a common migration policy (70%). This suggests there is also strong support for increased cooperation on external border controls.

Moreover, freedom of movement within the Schengen Area requires each member state to help guard the Union’s external borders—on land, at sea, and in the air. The absence of internal border controls thus requires that each member state have confidence in the willingness and capacity of all the other members to do their part to control the shared external borders. The Schengen Area is not based on supranational institutions for border control; instead, the responsibility for external border control lies primarily with each individual member state. At the same time, the responsibility for external borders is distributed unevenly among the member states, due to their differing geographical (and economic) positions. The Dublin Regulation stipulates that the country at which an asylum-seeker first arrives is responsible for the asylum process. This, in combination with a lack of legal routes into the EU, means that the main task of external border control falls mainly on the countries that have external land and sea borders in the south and southeast of Europe. The maintenance of internal mobility thus requires that certain member states take greater responsibility than others for guarding the external borders.

The EU’s internal borders have been opened, then, even as its external borders are not guarded on a common basis. The latter, moreover, have changed constantly with the Union’s enlargement. The tension thereby generated has always been an element of the EU’s fundamental character. The territorial borders of the Union have never been consolidated, due to the repeated addition of new members (Bartolini, 2005)—or, as with Brexit, due to a member state’s departure. The absence of strongly consolidated common borders also contributes to making the Union the sui generis entity that it is. Strongly consolidated external borders, namely, are primarily associated with a sovereign nation-state or federation. It would probably take a lot for member states to consider giving up control over their territory in the way that a fully shared external border would necessitate. During the 1990s and 2000s, national territorial control and open internal borders co-existed in a fairly conflict-free way; the internal borders were opened up without the external borders’ being overly tested. This changed in the 2010s, however. First, the Arab Spring in 2011, and later the refugee crisis of 2015, put the system to the test and led to debates about Schengen’s being in crisis (Börzel & Risse, 2018; Casella Colombeau, 2020; Votoupalová, 2018). Due to the arrival of large numbers of refugees in Greece and Italy, many of whom moved on to other EU countries, several Schengen states decided to reintroduce internal border controls on a temporary basis.

The reintroduction of temporary internal border controls does not directly violate Schengen rules, as it is part of these rules. In the event of a serious threat to national order and security, member states have the right to carry out such internal border controls. This exception was already included in the original agreement on the Schengen acquis from 1985, and it is provided for today by a series of provisions in the Schengen Borders Code (see Regulation 2016/399, Articles 25–35). Before 2015, temporary internal border controls were a tool that was used very rarely, usually for a few days to a week or so, in order to increase security around international events such as summits or sporting events (Groenendijk, 2004; Pettersson Fürst, 2023a). During the refugee crisis, however, controls were introduced in order to manage migration for the first time. Several countries decided to do so, and the controls they introduced were both more extensive and longer-lasting than had previously been customary. This prompted declarations that the border controls meant ‘the death of Schengen’, and worries that they would bring the end of freedom of movement in Europe (Brekke & Staver, 2018). Since border controls between member states challenge freedom of movement—the very core of European integration—commentators have described them as a serious problem and a ‘crisis of Schengen’ (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Furthermore, six of the countries that introduced temporary internal border controls during the height of the refugee crisis in 2015—Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden—have continued their controls in some form ever since (European Commission, 2023a). Over the course of this time, the justifications proffered for the controls have changed somewhat—from the need ‘to stop the large influx of asylum-seekers’ to the need to prevent cross-border crime or to reduce the risk of terrorist acts (Pettersson Fürst, 2023a)—but the fact remains: these countries have continued their border controls far beyond the point where they can be considered temporary.

When the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in the spring of 2020, the question of internal borders came up again—with full force. As the virus spread, several countries chose to reintroduce internal border controls, often as one of several measures for reducing the spread of the virus. During the 2016–2020 period, it bears noting, internal border controls had been used very sparingly except for the continuations mentioned above. In the spring of 2020, however, that changed quickly. A total of 17 Schengen countries introduced internal border controls vis-à-vis their neighbours, as part of an effort to curb the spread of the new coronavirus (Pettersson Fürst, 2023a, 2023b). These border controls differed in several ways from previous ones. They were more far-reaching in scope, and they were used at the same time by a larger number of countries. Some border crossings were closed completely, and in many cases, travellers were stopped from crossing borders altogether. However, the closing of borders was by no means unique to the Schengen Area; rather, it was something that was done around the world in response to the pandemic, often in combination with restrictions on movement within countries. In view, however, of the central importance of freedom of movement for European integration, the border controls presented a clear challenge to solidarity within the Schengen Area, not least because they were aimed at EU citizens in general for the first time. Heinikoski (2020) has shown that, in the face of the health threat posed by the pandemic, different member states interpreted the Schengen regulations differently, and they cited different legal provisions in order to justify their controls. Moreover, the common guidelines that the European Commission set out for border controls were not implemented in a coordinated manner (Somer et al., 2020). Somer, Meissner, and Tekin (2020) refer to this absence of coordinated action as a ‘sovereignty reflex’: in the face of the perceived threat from the pandemic, most member states focused on controlling their own borders and protecting their own populations. On the one hand, this shows that the member states have retained the initiative, despite the far-reaching integration that has taken place within the EU. On the other hand, they behaved the same way despite the absence of coordination. However, the reflex to introduce border controls when faced with a threat also brings the question of European integration to a head, as it highlights the tension between cooperation and control in the EU. Furthermore, the introduction of controls during the pandemic had a major impact on EU citizens living in border regions, where daily trips across borders had been taken for granted. However, unlike the internal border controls introduced in response to the migration crisis (which several countries are still applying), those due to the pandemic have not lasted long: most were lifted in the autumn of 2020.

The rapid resort of so many countries to internal border controls in order to curb the spread of COVID-19 has also been described as breaking a taboo. According to Wolff et al. (2020), the refugee crisis and the continuation of internal border controls since 2015 have normalised the use of such controls as part of regular policy within the Schengen Area. Thus, the previously restrictive stance against limiting mobility across internal borders has become less of a taboo, making internal border controls more readily available as a political tool in crisis situations—as we saw during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic when a majority of Schengen states introduced temporary internal border controls. However, member states that had done so on previous occasions were no more likely to use this tool than those that had not (Pettersson Fürst, 2023b). Thus, while the threshold for imposing internal border controls may have been lowered due to their use during the refugee crisis, the situation in this regard applies generally across the EU: it is not just a matter where certain member states have acquired the habit. For example, four countries that had never previously introduced temporary internal border controls—Czechia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Switzerland—did so in 2020 in response to the pandemic.

The issue of open borders within Europe has often been described in terms of a trade-off between economic efficiency and security. According to this view, it is rational for member states to give up some autonomy and to agree to openness because it is economically efficient to do so. With such an explanatory model, it stands to reason as well that when a security problem arises—in this case a global pandemic—states reclaim control and prove to be willing to renounce the economic gains resulting from open borders in favour of increased security for their citizens. As Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2021) have shown, this is what happened initially—when member states not only introduced internal border controls but also, in some instances, prevented the export and transport of medical equipment to other EU countries. However, these authors contend, the European Commission immediately began working to shift the focus to external borders, for example by introducing a common entry ban for the entire EU from other countries, while at the same time working to harmonise measures against COVID-19 within the EU and to remove internal border controls as quickly as possible (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2021, p. 356). Interestingly, the authors also conclude that, although internal borders were hardened during the first year of the pandemic, a more long-term effect was to increase economic solidarity, as EU member states managed to agree on far-reaching economic measures to help each other deal with the economic consequences of the pandemic’s closed borders. This echoes the views of other commentators as well, who have argued that the refugee crisis eventuated in more integration in certain policy areas (Rhinard, 2019).

The use of internal border controls on a much larger scale than was originally intended has posed a fundamental challenge to the Schengen Agreement, and there is an ongoing debate among researchers as to whether this should be seen as a sign of renationalisation and of European disintegration (see, for example, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2021; Guild, 2021; Scipioni, 2017; Votoupalová, 2019). Many believe, however, that the introduction of internal border controls has not substantially reduced the willingness of member states to cooperate; on the contrary, it has in fact led to strengthened cooperation at the European level. The expansion of internal border controls has not been accompanied by criticism of European integration among the countries that have continued to apply the controls. Rather, these countries have made their view very clear that the challenges over border control can best be solved through European cooperation (Pettersson Fürst, 2023a). One consequence of the reintroduction of internal border controls, during both the refugee crisis and the pandemic, was a new focus on external border control. If the trend in the EU during the 1990s and 2000s was largely towards the removal of obstacles to mobility across both internal and external borders, it has to a great extent, since the 2010s, rather concerned the strengthening of European cooperation in the guarding of the external borders. The internal border controls introduced during the refugee crisis were largely justified by the member states as necessary due to shortcomings at the external borders. Accordingly, much of the EU’s efforts since then have been devoted to strengthening surveillance of the shared external borders. In the next section of this chapter, I discuss how European cooperation in the area of border controls has developed.

Frontex and the Expansion of the EU’s External Border Guard

The Schengen Agreement does not just require that the member states open their internal borders to each other; it also necessitates far-reaching trust between the member states that each will take responsibility for external border control. As part of this, cooperation on the external borders has been both broadened and deepened. A very important step was taken in this direction in 2004, with the creation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (commonly called Frontex, after the French ‘frontières extérieures’), which established the agency, Frontex was intended to act as ‘a specialised expert body tasked with improving the coordination of operational cooperation between Member States in the field of external border management’ (Council Regulation 2007/2004, recital 3).

Already at the time of its creation, Frontex had a rather broad mission. This included facilitating the application of common measures in the management of the external borders and ensuring the coordination of these measures by the member states. This in turn involved assisting member states with the operational aspects of managing internal borders—such as returning third-country nationals, conducting risk analyses, and monitoring relevant current research—as well as contributing to the joint use of material resources, providing technical and operational assistance to member states when requested, and providing joint training at the European level for national trainers of border-guard personnel. The aim was also to develop common practices in the management of external borders.

After the refugee crisis of 2015, work was intensified to strengthen cooperation in the area of border surveillance. A new regulation was adopted in 2016, giving the agency a new name—the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)—and a greatly expanded mandate (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016b/1624). The Agency’s new mission continues its previous one, with the difference that Frontex can now review the work of the member states to a much greater extent. It is also able to deploy its own operational personnel in emergency situations, and it has a clearer mission to fight crime and terrorism than before. In connection with this expanded mandate, moreover, its budgetary resources have been significantly strengthened. Two aspects of the new Frontex are (1) a stronger and more explicit focus on return as a central part of border-guarding, through the establishment of ‘integrated border management’ and (2) an explicit sharing of responsibility for this integrated management between the member states and the Agency (although the formal responsibility for border-guarding still rests with the member states): ‘European integrated border management should be implemented as a shared responsibility of the Agency and the national authorities responsible for border management’ (Regulation 2016b/1624, recital 6). Integrated border management has four parts: external border controls; measures in third countries; cooperation with third countries; and measures within the Schengen Area, including return policies. The aim is to integrate border management at the national and EU levels. The reform goes a long way towards bringing migration and border control to the EU level, through the expanded mandate given to Frontex.

Three years after the ‘new’ Agency was established, another major step was taken in the common management of the external borders, as Frontex underwent yet another institutional reform. The main mission of the Agency was largely the same in 2019 as had been set out in Regulation 2016/1624. The difference resided in the Agency’s operational capacity, which was greatly expanded with European Parliament and Council Regulation 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast Guard, a uniformed force was established: the ‘standing corps’. A corresponding new long-term budget commitment was made, adding to the already growing budget of the agency, which has increased continually since 2005 and even more rapidly since 2014: from only six million euros in 2005 and 114 million euros in 2015, to 333 million euros in 2019, reaching 845 million euros in 2023 (Frontex 2005; 2014; 2019; 2023b). Its budget and personnel are furthermore slated to continue growing, with the goal of reaching 10,000 people in the standing corps by 2027, of whom 3000 will be Frontex staff (Frontex, 2023a). At the time of writing (the spring of 2023), approximately 2000 people are employed by Frontex, of whom approximately half belong to the standing corps. In the Agency’s own words, this is a historical event:

For the first time in history, the European Union has its own uniformed service—the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps. Trained by the best and equipped with the latest that technology has to offer, Frontex border and coast guards are ready for challenges at the borders… . (Frontex, 2023a)

The standing corps share many tasks with the national border-control authorities. For example, they have the right to check ID documents, patrol border crossings, and permit or refuse entry to the EU. This new operational capacity must be understood as part of an even stronger focus on return policies. This is emphasised in the 2019 regulation, which states that increasing the resources and strengthening the mandate of the Agency is being done ‘with a view to ensuring effective external border control and significantly stepping up the effective return of irregular migrants’ (European Parliament and Council Regulation 2019/1896, recital 8; author’s emphasis).

From a political-science perspective, it is remarkable how little debate the establishment of the European standing corps has occasioned in public, political, or academic debate. If we take Sweden as an example, the Frontex standing corps was mentioned only once in the Swedish press during the first year after the adoption of the regulation that established the new force in 2019, when the Swedish police and coast guard participated in a Frontex operation in Greece. Nor did the creation of the corps result in any political debate to speak of in Sweden. (Of the 359 articles in the Swedish press in October–December 2019 that mentioned Frontex, not one was primarily about the expansion of the Agency.)Footnote 1 This is despite the fact that the practical and symbolic implications of this expansion for the relationship between national sovereignty and European supranationalism are far-reaching. Uniformed police and military are usually seen as an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign state. The establishment of such forces at the European level, therefore, raises many questions about how this has become possible, and what it will lead to in the long run. Do the standing corps set an example that may end up being extended to other types of uniformed missions on a European basis? In this case, the member states have prioritised streamlining control over the external borders over keeping said control as an exclusively national task. The member states, through the European Council, have thus agreed with the European Parliament that joint border surveillance is needed and that the question of the mandate is subordinate to getting the task done.

In addition, the reform of Frontex in 2016 and its subsequent expansion in 2019 must be understood in light of the internal border controls that several member states introduced during the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, and which they have continued since. One of the main arguments for the continuation of internal border controls proffered by the member states that use them has been that such controls are necessary as long as ‘deficiencies at the external borders’ remain (Pettersson Fürst, 2023a). The expansion of Frontex can thus be seen as a response to the demands of these member states, as well as a way of relieving the countries (such as Greece and Italy) that due to their geographical location have been tasked with the greatest responsibility for controlling the Union’s external borders.

Regulation 2019/1896 states that the goal of Frontex is to manage the external borders effectively. As mentioned, this involves a clear focus on preventing irregular migration and countering cross-border crime. The opening paragraph, however, adds that ‘[a]t the same time, it is necessary to act in full respect for fundamental rights and in a manner that safeguards the free movement of persons within the Union’ (Regulation 2019/1896, recital 1; author’s emphasis). Furthermore, the introduction states that:

The extended tasks and competence of the Agency should be balanced with strengthened fundamental rights safeguards and increased accountability and liability, in particular in terms of the exercise of executive powers by the statutory staff. (Regulation 2019/1896, recital 24)

The European Council and the European Parliament were thus aware when they adopted these regulations and increased the Agency’s operational capacity, that such an expansion was not without risks for fundamental rights. Any government agency, regardless of policy area, that expands quickly in such a short time runs a significant risk of developing organisational problems. When migration is concerned, moreover, the issue of legality and the protection of fundamental rights become even more important, since the actions of the agency have direct consequences for people’s lives.

The expansion of Frontex’s mandate has not been without problems. Since 2019, the Agency has been accused of engaging in the illegal ‘pushback’ of refugees in the Mediterranean, where Frontex personnel have forced refugees out of European territory, thereby hindering their right to seek asylum and to obtain an individual trial (Luyten, 2022). Frontex has also been extensively investigated by OLAF (the European Anti-Fraud Office) for irregularities in the management of its resources. Among other things, this resulted in the resignation of Fabrice Leggeri, executive director of the Agency, with immediate effect in April 2022. On 18 October 2022, moreover, the European Parliament voted against granting discharge for the 2020 Frontex budget, due to the scale of the irregularities committed (European Parliament, 2022). Much of the existing research on the EU’s structures and policies for guarding its external borders points to the problem of the intermingling of humanitarian and security-policy objectives in the Agency’s work in the Mediterranean—where, according to the UNHCR, between 1500 and 5000 people died each year between 2014 and 2021 (UNHCR, 2022).

Stumpf (2006) has coined the term ‘crimmigration’ to describe the intermingling that occurs when more and more immigration-related actions are treated as crimes. The problem with this conflation is that all migrants are viewed as potential criminals, while actions by humanitarian organisations are criminalised (Mainwaring & DeBono, 2021). In this way, migration has become increasingly securitised: that is, it is treated more and more as a security problem rather than a humanitarian one, and migrants are increasingly described as a threat to Europe’s internal security. This serves to legitimise a trend towards ever-stricter measures to prevent people from crossing the outer borders into Europe. This is not, however, a uniquely European development; on the contrary, the securitisation of migration and the continual hardening of border policies and barriers is a global trend (Pettersson, 2020). For example, border-related deliberations on the UN Security Council have not only increased dramatically but their focus has also shifted—from the establishment and legitimisation of borders to questions of border security, control, and management (Simmons, 2019). An estimated 80 border walls, moreover, have been built around the world—more than ever before in modern history (Vallet, 2020).

A further aspect of how the EU’s external border controls have developed in recent years is the increased importance placed on border policies of externalisation. Externalisation means that external border control is moved away from the location of the actual border, often through agreements with neighbouring countries. An example of externalisation can be seen in how the United States supports Mexico with equipment and training for border guards in exchange for increasing surveillance by Mexico of its southern border, the object being to prevent people from proceeding north through Mexico to the United States (Galemba et al., 2019; Walker, 2018). The same principle applies to the EU’s agreements with states that act as transit countries for migrants on their way to Europe, such as Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Turkey (Mainwaring & DeBono, 2021; Pacciardi & Berndtsson, 2022). The agreement of this kind that has occasioned the most comment is the one that the EU concluded with Turkey in 2016, which charged the latter country with stopping people (mainly from Syria) from entering Europe via Turkey. The point of externalisation from the EU’s perspective is that it shifts border control away from EU territory, thereby reducing the number of people crossing the EU’s external border. However, like any other type of border control, externalisation does not address the reasons why people try to cross the border—it just moves the problem out of the sight of Europe. As a means of preventing the entry of asylum-seekers, it has therefore been called an ‘extremely fragile’ strategy (Borevi, 2022). One problem raised by critics of externalisation is that it places responsibility for refugees with countries known for not respecting human rights. Another problem is that the demand for increased border controls in transit countries can create problems for mobility between the transit countries and their neighbours—including for residents of border regions who are not migrants, as they too are prevented from crossing the borders (Pastore & Roman, 2020). The EU’s externalisation of migration control has also been criticised for neo-colonialism, since the EU uses its power to put pressure on countries in Africa—such as by making aid conditional on stricter migration controls.

The Border-Control Industry and the Digitisation of EU Borders

So far in this chapter, I have shown how political decisions in the 2010s and early 2020s sought to tighten control over Europe’s borders. At the national level, this has occurred through the reintroduction by member states of temporary border controls vis-à-vis their European neighbours. At the European level, it has taken place through expanded cooperation in the surveillance of the EU’s external borders, with the expansion of Frontex’s mandate and resources. What these processes have in common is that they both result from and reinforce a trend whereby border policy and the management of borders have become increasingly linked to the issue of European security: there has been a securitisation of policy in connection with borders and migration (see, for example, Huysmans, 2000; Léonard & Kaunert, 2020; Moreno-Lax, 2018). This means that border guards are increasingly held out as the answer to very different types of problems, such as the reception of asylum-seekers and the fight against pandemics.

One development in border-security policy is the creation of various digital systems for coordinating and streamlining the surveillance of the Union’s borders. These are intended for use by both national and joint authorities. Since the Schengen Agreement began, several such systems for surveillance and border control have been developed, and they are in use or about to be put into use. These shared systems collect and manage large amounts of information on border crossings, and they allow member states to exchange such information with each other. These systems can all be said to have been developed to compensate in part for the risks that each member state takes with open internal borders. As mentioned above, free internal movement requires member states to have great confidence in each other’s contribution to external border control. The central systems for joint border surveillance and migration control are the Schengen Information System (SIS)—which has existed for a long time but has recently been expanded—and three newer systems: VIS, a system for exchanging Visa information; the Entry-Exit System; and Eurodac, a database for asylum applications.

The way in which such systems change border control in the EU is exemplified by the Entry-Exit System (EES). This is an automated digital system, not yet operational, that was planned to be put in use in May 2023 in order to replace existing procedures with stamps in passports. According to the European Commission, this new digital system will be more time-efficient; it will provide systematic information about border crossings; and, unlike current procedures, it will enable the systematic detection of travellers who have overstayed their permitted time within the Schengen Area (European Commission, n.d.). Historically, Frontex has primarily focused on ‘illegal immigration’: i.e., on people who cross the border irregularly, even though a large proportion of those staying irregularly in the EU do so after having entered regularly. It is very hard to know how many are ‘visa-overstayers’—i.e., who have remained in the Schengen Area after their permitted (visa-free or visa-regulated) time has expired (Hansen & Pettersson, 2021). However, one development in recent years—not least since Frontex was assigned the additional task of ‘significantly increasing returns’—has been that ‘illegal stays’ have also come into focus (a development enabled by the introduction of new systems such as the Entry-Exit System). Created to register all third-country nationals who cross an external EU border in a regular manner, this new digital technology affords new means of controlling movement in the EU after entry as well—which means that overstayers can increasingly be made subject to Frontex’s securitisation of migrants (see Hansen & Pettersson, 2021).

Other digital systems have been expanded or developed recently. An example of this is the Schengen Information System (SIS), which allows national authorities to share or to search for information regarding for example wanted or missing persons, and which provides recommendations for action when wanted persons are found. In 2018, a series of new rules were adopted for the SIS, which among other things reflect the new ambition to increase returns. The changes, which became operational in March 2023, include making return decisions part of the information available in the common information system (European Commission, 2023b). As mentioned above, the budget for Frontex has been dramatically increased in recent years. The Agency’s mission and resources have been expanded (it has its own ships now, for example), enabling it to assist member countries with equipment. Progressively greater financial resources are thus being put into border-control infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, this trend is by no means unique to the European context; similar patterns can be observed in many other countries, which also devote substantial resources to fortifying and guarding their borders. As new technology develops, novel and ever more advanced ways of controlling borders become available. Providing the EU (and other states) with equipment for border control is a large and growing industry. Drones, thermal-imaging cameras, and biometric technology (such as facial recognition) are just some of the equipment in which the EU is investing in order to strengthen its capacity to monitor borders (Dodds, 2021). The economy that has developed around border security has been called a ‘border-industrial complex’, where political demand and industrial development reinforce one another. Dodds cites the European expansion of border control as an example of this complex, where the border-control industry has blossomed as a result of increased governmental spending, and where both the expansion of Frontex and the development of several new digital systems for border control will require investments in (digital) infrastructure worth hundreds of millions of euros. The big winners from this, Dodds contends, are European data companies; while the EU and other states that expand their digital border-surveillance systems are locking themselves into intricate and costly digital infrastructures. This lock-in effect is worth noting for several reasons: (1) because of the risks with digital systems, which are often vulnerable for example to data breaches; (2) because there are risks with all surveillance that can encroach on the integrity of the population; and (3) because it is recognised within border research that stricter border controls do not act as the deterrent they are intended to be. In this regard, border controls are useful as a political tool—it is thought to show vigour and resolve to invest in ‘increasing security’—but they have no impact on the underlying causes of migration. Instead, the imposition of more difficult border barriers usually prompts people to resort to more dangerous routes. It also favours organised human smuggling, which is exactly what the EU says it wants to stop with the help of more advanced methods of border control.

Stricter Border Controls Are No Quick Fix for Complex Problems

In this chapter, I have discussed three parallel and interconnected trends in European border policy: the imposition of internal border controls by several member states; the expansion of external border controls; and the expansion of technical systems aimed at facilitating border control. The migration crisis of 2015–16 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 both led member states to impose internal border controls to a much greater extent than they had before. Due to this reaction, described by some as a ‘sovereignty reflex’ (Somer et al., 2020) and a ‘knee-jerk reaction’ (Wolff et al., 2020), it may be that the same measures will be taken in future crises as well. That is, member states may come to regard more and more political problems as border problems, and internal border controls as a useful tool for dealing with them. This is in line with the politicisation of borders in general. The use of internal border controls poses a major challenge to the Schengen Agreement, inasmuch as it suspends freedom of movement within the EU (albeit temporarily). Since several countries have continued to apply their controls after 2015—far beyond what Schengen regulations allow—the internal border controls also challenge the legitimacy of those regulations. The issue of EU borders is more than a matter of policy or management. Control over territorial borders is strongly linked to national sovereignty and to the idea of the sovereign state as a clearly bounded territorial unit. EU membership, therefore, has always made for a certain amount of tension in the relationship between national self-determination and supranational integration. The ability of member states to introduce internal border controls, then, illustrates the complex relationship between national sovereignty and integration in the EU.

As discussed in this chapter, it is clear that border politics has come to play a central role in the process of European integration. The reintroduction of internal border controls poses a major challenge to European integration, as it undermines internal freedom of movement. In crises where risks were connected with control over borders—as during the refugee crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic—it became clear that the member states often give priority to national territorial control. At the same time, these crises resulted in a wave of new political decisions regarding border controls, border-surveillance systems, and not least the expansion of Frontex. There are no indications that internal re-bordering has led to decreasing levels of cooperation; and even when member states have introduced internal border controls, they have often done so while stressing the importance of European cooperation. In terms of the theoretical framework presented at the beginning of this chapter, it can be said that we have partly seen a re-bordering of the internal borders—both in the use of internal border controls and in the development of more shared systems for monitoring third-country nationals who are present within the borders of the EU. We have also seen a re-bordering of the external borders, through the expansion of Frontex, the externalisation of border controls, and the development of digital border-control systems. A re-bordering of both the internal and the external borders, then, has taken place. The trends discussed in this text can therefore be said to place developments in EU border policy clearly in the defensive-integration corner.

In light of this, a first recommendation for action would be to clarify the rules in the Schengen Borders Code, so that they reflect the intentions of the member states regarding the possibility of introducing internal border controls. Such a process is already underway. In December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal for changes in the Schengen rules (European Commission, 2021). The adoption of these new rules, however, has been stalled since then, and as of September 2023, they are yet to be adopted. The Commission recommends in this proposal that internal border controls be understood as temporary and that other methods of control—e.g., more police controls in border areas—be used instead. The idea of replacing border controls with more scattered police controls has been criticised, among others by the Swedish government, on the grounds that it is incompatible with other legislation, and also on the grounds that actual border controls are more effective. The new bill also seeks to clarify and strengthen demands on the member states, by requiring those that introduce internal border controls to communicate this in greater detail to the EU and the other member states. The proposed changes include new criteria for when internal border controls are to apply, as well as requirements for risk analysis on the part of member states that introduce such controls. The aim, among other things, is to prevent citizens who live in border regions and who often cross borders from suffering unnecessarily. The question that remains is whether the proposed changes will be adopted and whether they will be sufficient to get the member states which have continued to use internal border controls since 2015 to stop extending them for new periods.

Regarding the second developmental trend, it is clear that the member states have agreed to devote greater resources and effort to the identification and prevention of irregular border crossings, and to finding and turning away more people who have entered EU territory without permission. As both researchers and human rights organisations have shown, the risk is great that such policies will contribute to the criminalisation of actions that were previously seen as humanitarian, such as safeguarding the right to seek asylum or helping refugees who have crossed borders irregularly. Another major risk intimately connected with the expansion of large digital surveillance and information-sharing systems is that the ever-stricter border policies—the overall purpose of which is purportedly to protect the member states’ own populations—will have negative effects on those very populations. Border controls, both internal and external, are not neutral: they often involve ethnic profiling, which also affects persons who are EU citizens but who do not belong to the majority ethnic population. Such controls are also often time-consuming, and thus disruptive of traffic in integrated EU regions. A second recommendation is therefore to closely monitor the infrastructure being built for surveilling the borders, so as to ensure that it does not restrict the personal integrity of EU citizens or their freedom of movement. As the external borders become harder, moreover, it is important to establish and maintain the functionality of safeguards for the right to asylum, especially in view of the advancing process of externalisation, which often stops people who are fleeing their homes long before they approach EU territory.

In practice, it is difficult to ‘succeed’ with harder borders. There is no obvious endpoint to the expansion of border-control infrastructure, and the more border control that is done, the more it comes to be seen as a solution to a range of problems of varied origins. Yet, since border controls do not address the core problems that cause migration—such as wars, inequality, and climate change—there is no upper limit to how many resources can be spent on border controls. A final recommendation is therefore to consider carefully what the opportunity costs of expanded border controls are, and what direction we think European integration should take. The risk is that harder borders will be seen as a one-size-fits-all solution to global problems that are much more complex. However, if defensive integration is the way forward, then the safeguarding of free internal movement becomes imperative, for much of the EU’s legitimacy with its citizens lies in the benefits attendant upon freedom of movement.