Keywords

Borders as a Paradox in European History

Historically, the concept of borders has evolved differently in Europe compared to many other parts of the world, as geographical spaces in Europe have been shaped by organized human settlements for as long as historical accounts stretch, whereas on most other continents the geographical expanse of the land was defined by the reach of the settlers and envisaged as the frontier between settlement and wilderness (Maier, 2002, 17). As no such uninhabited lands existed in Europe, borders were often conceived of dividing lines between geographical areas according to the control of the dominant order, whether empires, kingdoms, principalities, or tribes, thus separating peoples from each other and ordering them into different political units. Where natural borders existed, such as mountains, rivers, and seas, they had an important function to delineate one political unit from another, often separating inhabitants effectively and making crossings important points of contact. Such borders constituted important defensive lines as they were easier to hold in the event of an assault of a neighbouring country. On the whole, throughout history, borders on the European continent changed quite frequently through wars and conquests, at times befitting the people inhabiting the lands while at other times dividing ethnic and linguistic communities.

In early European history, most of the then-known lands were directly incorporated into the Roman Empire, or strongly influenced by its might. In the Romans’ conception, these borderlands became a demarcation line for the division between civilization and barbarism in Europe and around the Mediterranean and Black Seas, thus excluding Scandinavia and large parts of north-eastern Europe. The areas where the Roman Empire ended also constituted the limit of its jurisdiction. These border areas were referred to as limes and became formal demarcation lines between an advanced civilization and a political organization of space, and the lands that lay beyond (Maier, 2002, pp. 18–19). During the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, borders in Europe, as elsewhere, took on a different meaning in loosely held together empires, first in the appearance of the Holy Roman Empire, then its successor, the Habsburg Empire, later Austrian Empire, dominating varying parts of the continent. These empires consisted of territories, often inherited or acquired through marriage, ruled over by dynastic monarchies, and characterized by multiple cultures, languages, religions, and ethnicities (Hassner, 2002). The territories of the empires were accorded high degrees of autonomy and various centralization attempts were resisted and subsequently failed. The empires found their raison d’être vis-a-vis their component provinces and principalities in the defence against foreign enemies, first against the Central Asian invaders, the Mongols, then against the Ottomans, which justified the sovereignty of the empire and the loyalty of its subjects. The boundaries between these multi-cultural, decentralized empires and the outside were often imprecise, not least because of their varying geographical composition as well as the nature of the attachment of these territories, especially those far away, to the political centre which varied over time. This turned the borders of the empire, in the sense of a dividing line, into a relative concept as the economic, social, and cultural exchanges over the border zones were flowing relatively freely, constituting areas of interchange, often referred to as borderlands where the exact physical border line had little meaning (Parker, 2010).

The notion of a border as a demarcation line, delineating one geographical space from another, separating a geographical territory from another, is associated with the Westphalian Peace Accords of 1648, purportedly laying the ground for the nation-state. These treaties instituted the principles of the inviolability of borders and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states and, as a consequence, weakened the political power of the Catholic Church. From these principles followed the concept of a nation-state as a defined territory over which the ruling power had judicial, political, and military control. This conceptualization of political power and territory was strengthened during the nineteenth century in parallel to the emergence of the industrial era, ushering in technological advances in production, transport, and communication (Maier, 2002). To uphold the power of the elite in the shift towards modernity, the state needed to have control over the territory and the inhabitants, both to protect its wealth against enemies and the prerogative to tax its citizens. Borders became strict lines to separate those on the inside from phenomena on the outside that threatened the national order. The juxtaposition of nation and state created the notion of a fairly homogenous, well-defined area where the state could exercise power, including the legitimate monopoly of violence, and in exchange provide order, guarantee civil and other rights, and deliver social security for its citizens (see, Max Weber quoted in Maier, 2002, p. 20). Sovereignty became the privilege of the ruling elite who could count on the loyalty of the citizenry which formed communities around a sense of national belonging.

During the twentieth century, the nation-state fell somewhat in disrepute because of its association with nationalism which in certain European states led to the emergence of radical ideologies, such as Nazism and Fascism, followed by two disastrous wars which redrew national borders in much of continental Europe. At the same time, in many other European states, the nation-state became firmly anchored in modern democratic welfare states which as a form of political organization is predicated on a stable citizenship as voters, taxpayers, and beneficiaries of political rights and social services. The concept of nation-state came therefore to mean different things to different people. For some, nation-states’ territoriality, nationalism, and the quest for power were intrinsically linked to war and conquest (Krasner, 1999; Laitin, 2007), while for others, their ability to organize, the loyalty of their citizens and their ability to enshrine the principles and norms of democracy were prerequisites for welfare states and imagined communities (Anderson, 1991; Esping-Andersen, 1990). The Cold War effectively divided Europe into a western part, characterized by democracy and market economy, and an eastern part, dominated by Communist regimes and an inefficient command economy. As many scholars bear witness to, the dominance of Communist ideology in eastern Europe not only prescribed a particular form of organization of society and the economy but also froze ethnic, religious, and linguistic conflicts within the boundaries of the states (Liebich, 2002; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002).

In the era of globalization, gaining speed from the end of the Cold War onwards, the notion of borders as necessary dividing lines between a well-defined area, political rule, and citizenry began to be seen as outdated, even anachronistic: something of the past that had not been at the service of humanity (see, for instance, Maier, 2002). Many predicted the end of the nation-state with its hard border and protected (gated) communities (Guéhenno, 1995; Ohmae, 1995). It is therefore something of a paradox that globalization in the early 2020s became associated with rising socioeconomic inequalities in advanced industrial societies, the spread of organized crime, and unprecedented levels of immigration, fuelling populism, in places even nativism, and a yearning for protection from these ills. However, the era of globalization lasted undisputed for only about 25 years as the rise of emerging powers, some of them with revisionist ambitions, set off a geopolitical shift, a weakening of the rules-based international system, and great power rivalry between the US and China (Cooley & Nexon, 2020).

Since World War II, the efforts to integrate Europe have been tightly associated with the processes of political, social, and economic modernization, first in western and southern Europe and since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 also including countries in central and eastern Europe. Since its inception, the process of European integration has raised questions regarding the impact on the sovereignty of the member states and whether their statehood would be diminished through the pooling of competences and centralization of political power to the institutions of the European Union (EU) in Brussels. The control and management of the external border of the EU has been, and, still is, a sensitive issue in this regard. Nonetheless, the pressure, first on the European Community (EC) and later the EU, from the states on the outside has been constant as they have sought to end their exclusion from the ever-expanding political community by seeking association and membership. They fear that the exclusion from the European internal market and political alliance would have negative consequences for their socioeconomic wellbeing and safety. The process of an ever-closer union among European states has therefore engendered a twin-challenge of deepening and widening, thus shaping the nature of the internal and external borders of the EU (Amato & Batt, 1999). At the heart of this dilemma lies the question of how far the enlargement of the EU will go and where its outer boundaries will eventually be drawn. The answer to this question will have a significant impact on the states on the inside of those borders as well as for those on the outside.

European Integration and the Reshaping of Europe

At its inception in the early 1950s, it was far from certain that the efforts of the founding states to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and then the European Economic Community (EEC) would be of a lasting impact on the organization of Western Europe. However, as steps were taken in the mid-1950s to set up a common market in western Europe, trading nations on the outside, led by the United Kingdom (UK), feared the exclusion from their closest markets. Already in 1961, the British government handed in an application to join the EEC, immediately followed by Denmark, Ireland, and Norway. The accession of the UK, Denmark, and Ireland to the EEC took over ten years to complete and two failed attempts, primarily due to resistance from the French President Charles de Gaulle, who feared that the inclusion of the British would water down the aims of political integration (Michalski, 2014; Michalski & Wallace, 1992). Part of his suspicion was triggered by the UK’s initiative in 1960 to set up the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), regrouping most of the Nordic countries, Austria, and Portugal. Although the UK, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EC in 1973, EFTA continued to serve its member states well, not least by providing incentives for setting up bilateral free trade agreements between the EC and the remaining members of EFTA (Archer, 1979). In the early 1970s, most of western Europe was united through close economic and trading links which brought stability to the countries in western and northern Europe, including Finland and Sweden, as well as for Austria, which for reasons of military non-alignment were not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1962 and 1963, respectively, Greece and Turkey signed far-reaching association agreements with the EEC which envisaged an eventual membership application in the 1980s upon the completion of a customs union (Michalski, 2014). Their association with the EEC enlarged the common market to south-eastern Europe but without including the Balkan Peninsula with Yugoslavia still under the Communist regime of General Josip Tito.

Changing domestic political circumstances played a prominent role in the decisions of Greece, Portugal, and Spain to seek membership in the EC, eventually acceding in 1981 and 1986. Anchoring these states’ transitions from military dictatorships to democracies and opening up their economies, especially significant for Spain, to trade on the European internal market were seen as prerequisites by the political elites. For the EC, enlargement to include countries in south-western and south-eastern Europe implied that its borders moved closer to Africa and the Middle East. It also meant that the affinities to Latin America were considerably strengthened. At this time, the migratory pressures on these borders were still quite modest, not least because of the geopolitical context which remained frozen.

The division of Europe during the Cold War acted as a natural border for the European states in the sense that joining the EC was excluded for Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the Communist regime in Yugoslavia. Yet, the mounting security threats from the Soviet Union in northern Europe also inhibited Finland and Sweden from seeking membership of the EC. Military neutrality also prevented Austria, Switzerland, and Malta from pursuing closer ties to the EC. However, the geopolitical situation in Europe was changing quickly. Towards the end of the 1980s, the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe were crumbling, and soon newly elected democratic governments came to power. The end of the Cold War with the reunification of Germany in 1990 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 lifted the Iron Curtain that had divided Europe since the end of World War II. It heralded a geopolitical shift that had fundamental implications for Europe and the EU for years to come.

With the threat of the Soviet Union dissipating, the neutral and non-aligned EFTA members—Austria, Finland, and Sweden—which had been in the process of negotiating an extensive association agreement with the EC since 1989, took the opportunity and applied for membership in 1989 and 1991, finally joining in 1995 (Michalski & Wallace, 1992; Preston, 1997). The so-called EFTA enlargement was, however, only the prelude to the big eastern enlargement that saw the inclusion of ten central and eastern European countries, Malta and Cyprus in 2004 and 2007. The eastern enlargement was in a preparatory stage for over 15 years, starting with the invitation in the early 1990s of the then European Commissioner, Frans Andriessen, to the former Communist states to conclude an associate membership with the EC, which they promptly refused out of fear of finding themselves in a perpetual waiting room for membership. By the mid-1990s, however, the forerunners had signed association agreements, the so-called Europe Agreements, with the EU, seen as precursors to full membership.

The accession of the central and eastern European countries was a significant step in the process of European integration, not only from an economic and social viewpoint but perhaps even more so from a political perspective (Zielonka, 2006). Three considerations stand out: firstly, the enlargement of the EU to include twelve new countries (on top of the three which joined in 1995) meant that the EU had become near synonymous with Europe. Geopolitically, this means that the EU had become an international player, which led to expectations both at home and abroad about its ability to conduct foreign and security policy to enhance Europe’s security, and promote liberal norms and rule of law in the neighbourhood and further afield (Browning & Joenniemi, 2004).

Secondly, the EU’s border would now stretch into eastern European heartlands as it now counted among its members former Soviet states and previous Comecon members and satellite states of the Soviet Union. The instability in the East after the demise of the Soviet Union meant that the EU had to think about the nature of the new border so that it did not become a new dividing line between peoples who had strong economic, cultural, and linguistic affinities, but at the same time would not undermine the economic, social, and political transitions of the countries that had just become members, nor the deepening of the EU as a political and economic community (Lavenex, 1998; Liikanen et al., 2016).

Thirdly, as a consequence of the completion of the single market, the internal border of the EU was lifted through the Schengen Convention of 1985. This augmented the challenges on the borders of the enlarged EU, and as a result, the succession of treaty reforms in the 1990s opened a new chapter of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which included the issue of borders and the management of asylum and refugees. Although JHA was strictly intergovernmental at first due to the sensitivity of the issue area, by the revisions of the Amsterdam Treaty 1997, it had evolved into a European policy competence in its own right (Monar, 2001).

The enlarged EU, along with new competences in foreign and security policy, migration, asylum policy, and border management gained through treaty reforms in the 1990s and 2000s, had a great impact on the regions bordering the EU. For this reason, the EU took the initiative of setting up the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with the aim of drawing countries bordering the EU in the east and south closer to it (Schumacher et al., 2017). In regard to the states of the former Yugoslavia, apart from Slovenia and Croatia which joined the EU in 2004 and 2013 respectively, the enlargement process is long and uncertain. As a part of the ENP, the EU set up a special strategy for the western Balkans in the form of Stabilization and Association agreements concluded from 1999 onwards and updated several times since then. From the perspective of the internal and external borders of the EU, the management of its relationship with neighbouring states is of utmost importance. The EU’s aim was to cushion the effects of a hard external border to the states in the neighbourhood, but also to strengthen the borders against unwanted pressures and activities. Nonetheless, because of reasons lying both within as well as beyond these countries’ borders, the EU is now facing a dilemma of having to fortify the external border in order to keep the internal borders open, something which cannot be taken for granted judging from the experiences of the migration crisis in 2015–16 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–21.

This exposé of the changing borders of the EU would not be complete without discussing the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, which took effect on 31 January 2020 (Diamond et al., 2018). The decision of the UK to leave the EU was seen at the time as a major setback for European integration, with some predicting that other member states would soon follow in Frexit, Swexit, or Grexit. To be sure, the withdrawal of the UK had significant implications for the EU in economic, social, and political terms and also from the perspective of European foreign and security policy as the weight of the EU in international politics was believed to shrink, not least because of the considerable military capabilities of the UK. However, the impact of Brexit was felt the most by Britain itself which lost the free access to the EU’s internal market and its place around the table in the EU internal policy-making. The miscalculation of the conservative governments under Theresa May and Boris Johnson for seamless access to the market without abiding to the EU regulatory regimes or the rules of the EU’s customs union led to acrimonious negotiations with the EU which resulted in a fairly modest free trade agreement. A main reason for leaving the EU was the urge to regain control over national borders and purportedly stem the flow of immigrants to the UK. Ironically, in the years following Brexit, immigration into the UK has increased as a result of an increase in labour migration from outside the EU and a growing number of illegal entries of migrants and asylum seekers. Despite its geographical, economic, and cultural closeness to the EU and its member states, the UK has a less advanced form of association with the EU than countries such as Canada, Japan, or South Korea, and certainly much less close than the countries in the European Economic Area, Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland. The EU was adamant to protect the integrity of the internal market, EU law, and political unity proved in concrete terms where the dividing lines between membership and non-membership lie and where the limits of association to the EU without becoming a member are.

Perspectives on the Evolving Borders of the EU in an Unsettled Neighbourhood

As discussed at length above, the admission of countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the south-eastern Mediterranean raised the question of the EU’s future borders in a broader sense, not as barriers between peoples but rather as areas for contact—for economic, social, and cultural exchange (Amato & Batt, 1999). Over the subsequent 15 years, the Union succeeded in integrating these new member states. New external borders then emerged—vis-à-vis Russia in the northeast, the Black Sea in Eastern Europe, and the countries in the Balkans (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). The EU has been clear, despite the new types of deeper cooperation it has established with its neighbours to the south and east, it is keen to distinguish membership from other (partial) forms of integration, as embodied in association agreements and various free trade arrangements. The external border of the Union remains a dividing line between a zone of material prosperity, democracy, the rule of law, and political rights and freedoms, on the one side, and an area of instability and a lack of socioeconomic development, on the other.

The EU has learned from previous crises on the border, to be sure. Just as surely, moreover, the unthinkable fact that war is again raging on European soil helped generate consensus within the Union. Nevertheless, the EU confronts major challenges that will put its capacity for consensus to considerable tests, over the short and the long term. In this seventh edition of Palgrave’s Interdisciplinary European Studies, researchers in law, economics, and political science examine what it means for the EU’s internal and external borders that it finds itself in a global environment marked by conflicting norms, rising strategic tensions, and competition between systems and regulatory frameworks. How has the European security order been reshaped by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? What does the geopolitical shift mean for the EU as a global trading power? Can the Union continue to disseminate norms internationally and within its neighbourhood? Beyond the physical border, how does the EU international market regime distinguish between insiders and outsiders on the market? And finally, how has the Union’s border policy developed, what forms does it take, and how can it handle the tension between open borders internally and stricter surveillance of the external borders?

The evolution of the EU’s border regime is the theme of the chapter by Johanna Pettersson Fürst who considers the dilemma of the hardening of the EU’s external borders and the challenge to the freedom of circulation. She begins with considering the impact of growing tensions over border policy on the measures taken to control movement across EU borders. The main issue she addresses is how policies in this area challenge and contribute to European integration. Pettersson Fürst understands borders as political institutions created and maintained through processes in which material conditions, political decisions, and patterns of behaviour interact. In order to understand the consequences of border policy for European integration, she employs a theoretical framework with two dimensions: First, does a given policy apply to internal or external borders? Second, does it tend to dismantle or strengthen the borders in question? Pettersson Fürst analyses developments in three different dimensions of EU border policy. The first has to do with ‘temporary internal border controls’, the use of which increased significantly in connection with the refugee crisis of 2015, as well as later during the COVID-19 pandemic. Here, she shows how internal border controls have challenged the very core of the Schengen Agreement, through the temporary halt to freedom of movement they have entailed. The second dimension concerns developments in the EU’s external border policies, the aim of which is to control migration from outside the Union. External border controls have successively increased, both in terms of resources and mandates for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (also known as Frontex), and geographically, as border controls are moved beyond the EU’s external borders. The third dimension of border policy relates to EU investments in new technology for border control. To conclude, Pettersson Fürst discusses how these different trends can be understood from the standpoint of integration. The strengthening of both internal and external borders can be seen as defensive integration. As Pettersson Fürst sees it, there are risks associated with the tightening of borders as a simple solution to complex problems. She concludes with a call for a clear defence of free movement of people and fundamental rights.

The impact on the EU’s role in the world economy and the return of a hard border policy is the theme of the chapter by Fredrik Sjöholm. In the chapter, he considers the return of borders in Europe and the world from the standpoint of trade. Trade within the EU, as well as between it and the rest of the world, is facing higher barriers. This trend can in part be explained, Sjöholm shows, by the distributive effects of globalization. More specifically, groups that have not benefitted from globalization—whose jobs were moved out of the country, for example—have voted for more protectionist and inward-looking policies. Noting the influence on the EU of developments in China and the US, Sjöholm further elaborates the view of globalization in those two countries. The rise of China, with its state-controlled economy, has helped to change views on economic policy in other countries as well—towards a more positive view of direct involvement by the state. The US, with its protectionist policies and big investments in industry, has also influenced the EU in various ways.

The result, according to Sjöholm, has been a general concern within the Union that the EU’s companies are lagging behind competitors in other countries. A stronger focus on industrial policy is evident, both in the EU and in individual member states. A long series of planned measures, if introduced, will work as a regime change in European policy on the respective roles of the state and the market. This also involves a changed view of globalization, with openness to trade and foreign direct investment taking a backseat to a more inward-looking approach. Sjöholm argues that this emerging strategy—with its more active industrial policy, in which governments select companies and industries for special support and protect them against competition—is negative for growth and prosperity. Instead, Sjöholm contends, the EU should maintain open borders. This applies to both internal and external borders. In other words, the Union must ensure a well-functioning internal market, and it should work for an open and rules-based global trade regime.

In the fourth chapter, Marja-Liisa Öberg examines the outer limits of the internal market and their importance for EU foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Union’s neighbours. The internal market, as Öberg sees it, is the core of European integration. It has also gained greater external importance for the Union. Through various types of international agreements, third countries are given the opportunity to participate in the internal market, in exchange for adopting the Union’s regulatory framework in the areas concerned. The goals range from the establishment of initial partnerships with third countries to the full-scale integration of non-member states into the internal market. Öberg begins with a discussion of the importance of the internal market for relations within the Union. She then considers its impact on the EU’s dealings with its immediate neighbours. Her treatment embraces both states that seek closer relations with the Union in hopes of eventually joining it and states that desire a close relationship with the EU but do not wish to become members, such as Switzerland and the UK.

Öberg believes the application of the internal market’s regulatory framework, and the strong economic and political ties to the Union thereby forged, have become the key to a long-term commitment to the European project both within and outside the Union. Trade within the region is mainly conducted in accordance with EU regulations—a fact which confirms, in the view of the author, its status as the region’s normative superpower. Russia’s war in Ukraine has further underlined the importance of cooperation between the EU and its neighbours within the framework of the internal market. Besides being an important marketplace and a primary pillar of the Union’s integration, the expanded internal market has gained greater symbolic importance as representing a choice between paths—between Europe’s sphere of influence and Russia’s.

Citing the importance of the internal market within the Union, as well as for EU policy towards neighbouring states, Öberg argues that the extended bounds of the internal market constitute a highly significant part of the EU’s external policy, serving to consolidate its leading role in the region. The expansion of the internal market offers third countries an excellent opportunity to identify themselves as members of the wider European community, thereby cementing their long-term commitment to the project of European integration. Öberg contends that, while the formal, physical, and administrative borders of the Union persist, the borders of the internal market continue to fade, thereby broadening and deepening the project of European integration and promoting common security and prosperity. In conclusion, Öberg argues that the Union should continue to deploy the attraction of the internal market in its dealings with its neighbours. Flexible integration should serve as the benchmark here, without by virtue of that eliminating the formal boundary between member states and third countries which EU membership entails.

The chapter by Ann-Kristin Jonasson reassesses the attempts by the EU to disseminate norms in the southern Mediterranean neighbourhood in regard to its foundational values and norms and in regard to climate change mitigation. She begins by discussing how the EU, on the basis of its founding treaties, has undertaken to spread its fundamental values—democracy, human rights, and the norms based on these—in the international arena. At the same time, the Union has been subject to stinging criticism for not being the normative or ‘good’ actor it likes to portray itself as. Like all other international actors, critics claim, the EU pursues its own short-term interests above all—sometimes at the expense of its cherished values. Such a gap between word and deed is cause for concern, according to scholars in the field. It runs the risk of eroding the Union’s legitimacy, thereby reducing its global influence. Indeed, Jonasson argues, the Union may be undermining the norms and values themselves, by failing to act in line with them or to defend them when they are challenged. In this time of conflict, when the democratic order is under threat worldwide, the Union must work to protect—both within its borders and beyond them—norms and values linked to democracy and human rights, even if the short-term effect of so doing conflicts with its own short-term interests.

In order to ascertain how the EU can best work to disseminate such norms, Jonasson reviews what commentators in this area regard as necessary if value-based norms are to be spread. She also considers the EU’s own experiences in this context. In particular, she examines and compares its efforts to promote democracy and to promote climate goals in its southern neighbourhood. Success in promoting democracy has been notably absent, whereas work on the climate seems to have fared better. This, Jonasson argues, is because efforts on behalf of the climate, unlike those aiming to promote democracy, are based on what researchers highlight as crucial for the successful dissemination of value-based norms: i.e., they reflect a genuine desire on the part of both parties to embrace the norms in question and to promote their spread. The work of introducing such norms is thus locally owned, and their dissemination is based on reciprocity and dialogue between the EU and its partner countries. Jonasson stresses in conclusion that, instead of pursuing its own short-term interests, the Union should contribute to the development of democratic goals in its partner countries and encourage local ownership of their realization. By taking part in a true dialogue, the EU can work to spread the value-based norms which form the foundation for its existence.

The ability of the EU to spread its model of social market economy beyond its borders is the theme of the chapter by Pär Hallström. In the chapter, the author takes a broad approach to understanding the EU’s role in the world. His point of departure is that the model of society on which the nations of Europe and the EU are based—with democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and a liberal economy that allows state intervention to achieve social goals—is not just being called into question by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; other developments too pose a challenge to the Union, among them Europe’s diminishing role in the world economy, especially in relation to authoritarian China, and its declining share of the world’s population, not least in relation to the countries of Africa.

Against this background, Hallström analyses the ability of the EU and its member states to meet these challenges by influencing the larger world, directly and indirectly, to adopt European values. He does this by compiling and systematically examining the factors he considers crucial in that process, with particular stress on their legal aspects. He begins with a look at different geopolitical theories and at the distinction between political, economic, and soft power. On this basis, he examines how a European-inspired social and legal system has been adopted globally, but often in such a way as to take on a local colour when it encounters a traditional culture. On the other hand, the EU’s more technical and economic norms have undoubtedly inspired corresponding rules in other countries and its organization has served as a model for other regional associations. Internally, the EU took over decision-making power in the field of foreign trade from its member states, thus acquiring an important instrument with which to exercise economic/political power for its purposes. Externally, the EU proffered the support for the WTO on the basis of its inclination towards international free trade, a stance which has increasingly been challenged by China’s aspiration to become the Middle Kingdom once again. Hallström concludes that the EU, despite the major challenges it faces, has an opportunity to influence the rest of the world in favour of the ideals that form its foundation. It possesses, namely, the economic and soft power needed, and it can use the law as a means to achieve this.

In the following chapter, Torbjörn Becker and Anders Åslund evaluate the EU’s dilemma of being dependent on Russian energy imports at the start of the war in Ukraine. The authors first analyse how the mutual dependence of the EU and Russia has developed. Their focus is on Russia’s energy exports to the Union. The question Becker and Åslund pose in their chapter is whether this dependence will lead to division or to greater cohesion within the EU, now that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has forced the Union to reconsider its dependence on Russian energy. Over the short term, sanctions and the war have put a halt to a large proportion of Russian gas exports to the EU, and energy prices have skyrocketed as a consequence. Becker and Åslund show how the interdependence between the EU and Russia looks with respect to different types of energy, and they discuss in the light of this the sanctions and counter-sanctions implemented and planned by both sides as a result of the Russian war in Ukraine. The short-term effects of these sanctions, Becker and Åslund contend, will be palpable both in Europe and in Russia; but Russia will lose more in the end, both with regard to its relationship with the EU and in terms of its own economic development. Energy exports are a fundamental driving force for the Russian economy, and the country will not be able to wean itself from dependence on the export of fossil energy without major political and institutional changes. Without new leadership in Russia that prioritizes law and order within the country over the exercise of power outside it, the economic prospects for the country are dim at best. For the EU, the big challenge will be to manage the internal cracks that come to light when the relationship with Russia is reconsidered.

The EU has a historic opportunity now, in the judgement of Becker and Åslund, to speed up its green transition, while at the same time improving its security by making itself independent of Russian energy. This may require some transfers within the Union, in order to counteract divisions that may arise when countries with varying economic conditions and differing levels of dependence on Russian energy have to compromise on how the transition is to be achieved. Becker and Åslund conclude that if the EU and its member states are able to reach a consensus in such negotiations, the effect will be to strengthen both the EU’s energy security and its external borders.

In the eighth chapter, Maria Bergström analyses the Union’s law and policy against money laundering and the financing of terrorism in a digitalizing and fragmented world. Money laundering is an ever-changing threat that must be constantly combatted, for it continually facilitates new forms of criminal activity: drug trafficking in the 1980s; organized crime in the 1990s; terrorism after 11 September 2001; and tax fraud in the 2010s. Taking her point of departure in the development of the EU’s regulatory framework, Bergström describes the various threats, interests, and actors involved. The main question she poses is what the legal challenges are, whether they are addressed by existing instruments and current legislative proposals, and whether there is room for further reforms.

Bergström identifies a set of challenges for the emerging regulatory framework: First, the increase in public–private cooperation, in which private actors are involved in designing the regulatory framework and are assigned ‘police’ tasks. Second, the exchange of information and the special problems posed by digitization. Third, the interface between administrative law and criminal law, as well as different types of sanctions. Fourth, the long-standing ‘securitization’ of money laundering and terrorism financing, which among other things has called forth an increased competence for the EU’s institutions. With the increased fragmentation and digitization of central aspects of our modern world, recently updated regulatory frameworks face swiftly mounting challenges. The hope, according to Bergström, is that the diversity of tools that will be at the disposal of the Commission and of a proposed central Union agency will enable the EU to keep pace with the complex and rapidly shifting international environment in this area, with its fluctuating risks, without resulting in restrictions on fundamental rights. Bergström also looks at the latest legislative package, which is being discussed in the European Parliament and the Council. She considers it of special importance that developments be monitored in this area, so that society’s efforts to respond to constantly changing threats do not result in restrictions on the fundamental rights of individuals.

The European security architecture is the theme of the chapter by Kjell Engelbrekt. In the chapter, the author raises the overarching question of whether Russia’s war in Ukraine signals the definitive collapse of the European security order, or whether there are prospects for the latter’s renewal in a more robust guise within the near future. Engelbrekt reviews the origins and nature of the European security order, whereupon he delineates its current exposure to an exceptional challenge. Said challenge consists in the fact that one of the guarantor powers for stability and security—not just regionally but globally as well—Russia, has attacked a neighbouring country with full force, thereby casting aside the most fundamental norms and principles of the United Nations Charter. It bears stressing in this connection that the members of a regional security order are so intertwined that both the actions of individual governments and significant events within each country potentially impinge on the security of the others. It is thus clear, according to Engelbrekt, that the Kremlin’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine directly threatens the whole of Europe, as well as making individual countries along Russia’s border vulnerable and thus damaging them economically and socially.

Further, Engelbrekt discusses how Europe—via the EU, NATO, and other organizations—has sought to ensure that Moscow would fail in its ambition to reshape the European security order to its own advantage. The measures taken include sanctions; increasingly generous humanitarian, financial, and military support for Ukraine from Europe; and extensive diplomatic efforts to meet the challenge at a global level—in the UN, the G7, the G20, and other forums. One factor that Engelbrekt judges will be important for the rest of this decade will be how Germany uses the additional one hundred billion euros it has allocated to the Bundeswehr, its armed forces. This involves a potential defence capability of a level that can also prove significant outside of Europe and its immediate surroundings, at least if the forces in question are allowed to work together with those of other EU and NATO countries.

Engelbrekt argues in conclusion that the EU and its member states need to reassess the area of security policy. They must do what they can to preserve their political unity and to reduce their dependence on Russian energy, fertilizers, and other income-generating exports—all the while building up their capacity to defend themselves against the threat from the east by various societal and military means. Engelbrekt avers that most European states have already renewed or expanded their commitment to increase defence spending, as the US has long called on NATO members to do. In addition, there are several signs the Union is about to shift the focus of its security policy away from an emphasis on economic investments in its neighbours to the south and east, and towards a more traditional geopolitical approach where the stress lies on military power, energy security, access to strategic raw materials, and investments in technological competence within areas important for the defence industry.

In the tenth chapter of the book, Anders Åslund and Torbjörn Becker ask if the EU has the ability to conceive a kind of European Marshall Plan for Ukraine on its road towards EU membership. They begin with outlining a plan for the reconstruction of Ukraine, with the aim of one day making the country a full member of the EU. Åslund and Becker remind us that the war in Ukraine will eventually end, at which point the EU must be ready to help the country build anew for a better future in the Union. Already in 2023, the costs for Ukraine’s reconstruction were enormous, and they are increasing with each day the war continues.

Ukraine will therefore need far-reaching support, which should be managed within the framework of an EU agency devoted to the purpose. The task of such a body would be to coordinate donors and maintain a close dialogue with the government of Ukraine on goals and processes. Åslund and Becker also point out other vital principles for such a reconstruction: the aid must arrive quickly, but be subject to conditions ensuring it is used in the best manner for all of the country’s citizens; the assistance should take the form of a grant and not a loan; and the focus of the rebuilding effort should be on creating a sustainable economy with a clear green transition in terms of energy and infrastructure. Ukraine’s entry into the Union, moreover, must be a crucial factor in prioritizing institutional reforms that strengthen the reconstruction of all parts of Ukrainian society. Important points on the EU agenda ought to include securing the short-term financing of Ukraine’s national budget while the war is ongoing; working for a start to negotiations on Ukrainian membership in the first half of 2023; and ensuring there is a clear plan for how the outside world is to organize and finance Ukraine’s long-term reconstruction. A successful Ukraine within the EU, Åslund and Becker point out, will enhance the security and prosperity not just of Ukraine itself, but of the entire Union as well.

In the last chapter, Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Per Ekman, Anna Michalski, and Lars Oxelheim set the paradox of the internal and external borders of the EU in perspective from the vantage point of past, present, and future developments. To begin with, the authors take stock of the challenges which are besetting the EU’s internal and external borders from the perspective of contemporary events and evaluate them against previous economic, social, and political developments in the Union. They consider what can be learned from past experiences concerning internal borders which in the last decades have been lifted only to be reinstated again, as well as external borders which are unrelentingly hardening in order to keep unwanted pressure in terms of irregular immigration at bay while trying to prevent hard security threats, terrorism, and organized crime to enter. The chapter concludes by drawing some lessons from the geopolitical shift and the war in Ukraine regarding the EU’s border policy, the European security architecture, the internal market, and a future enlargement towards eastern and south-eastern European countries.