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The Role of EU Securities Regulation in Sustainable Corporate Governance

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Sustainable Finance in Europe

Part of the book series: EBI Studies in Banking and Capital Markets Law ((ESBCML))

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Abstract

The debate on sustainable finance seldom includes the perspective of shareholders. However, shareholders are important for the governance of publicly held corporations today because their holdings are concentrated in the hands of a few institutional investors. Institutional investors can therefore have an impact on the sustainability of the largest companies in the world. The question is whether institutional investors actually have such an impact. Recent changes in EU securities regulation can bring more clarity on this matter. For instance, the revised Shareholder Rights Directive requires companies, on a comply-or-explain basis, to disclose voting policies and behaviours concerning sustainability. More in general, EU law is increasing the supply of standard measures of sustainable investment, to be used in institutional investors’ communications with their beneficiaries. This chapter discusses how EU securities regulation can align the incentives of institutional investors to pursue sustainable corporate governance with the sustainability preferences of their beneficiaries.

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Notes

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    Rock, E.B. (2020). “For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate over Corporate Purpose”. European Corporate Governance Institute—Law Working Paper No. 515/2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3589951. Recent literature has identified ways in which shareholders could tie their hands. See e.g. Armour, J., Enriques, L., & Wetzer, T. (2023). “Green Pills: Making Corporate Climate Commitments Credible.” Arizona Law Review, 65(2), 285–336; Pacces, A.M. (2023). Controlling Shareholders and Sustainable Corporate Governance: The Role of Dual-Class Shares. European Corporate Governance Institute—Law Working Paper No. 700/2023, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4412205.

  35. 35.

    See the Greenhouse gas Protocol, https://ghgprotocol.org/guidance.

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    See, respectively, Hartzmark, S.M., & Sussman, A.B. (2019). “Do Investors Value Sustainability? A Natural Experiment Examining Ranking and Fund Flows”. Journal of Finance, 74(6), 2789–2837; and Ceccarelli et al., supra Footnote 38.

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    De La Cruz, A., Medina, A., & Tang, Y. (2019). Owners of the World’s Listed Companies. Paris: OECD Capital Market Series. Notable exceptions include controlling shareholders and state ownership, both of which are prominent worldwide. Particularly controlling shareholders are sufficiently powerful to foster prosocial goals if they so wish. See Pacces, supra Footnote 34.

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    Azar, J., Duro, M., Kadach, I., & Ormazabal, G. (2021), “The big three and corporate carbon emissions around the world.” Journal of Financial Economics, 142(2) (2021): 674–696, 686. See also Bolton, P. & Kacperczyk, M.T. (2023), “Global Pricing of Carbon-Transition Risk”, Forthcoming in Journal of Finance, Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550233.

  42. 42.

    De La Cruz et al., supra Footnote 40.

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    Gilson, R.J., & Gordon, J.N. (2013). “The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights”. Columbia Law Review, 113(4), 863–927.

  45. 45.

    The 20 largest institutional investors own 25% or more, on average, in Canada, the Netherlands, Poland, South Africa, Finland, Japan, Sweden, and Norway. See De La Cruz et al., supra Footnote 40.

  46. 46.

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    See Pacces, supra Footnote 36 (defining greenwashing as selective disclosure of positive sustainability information, without full disclosure of negative information).

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    Recent research suggests that we are very far away from reaching the tipping point. Berk, J., & van Binsbergen, J. H. (2021). “The impact of impact investing”. Law & Economics Center at George Mason University Scalia Law School Research Paper Series No. 22–008, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3909166.

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    Azar et al., supra Footnote 41.

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    Fisch et al., supra Footnote 67.

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    Pacces, supra Footnote 34.

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    See e.g. Oehmke, M. & Opp, M.M. (2023). “A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment”. Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 20–2, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3467644.

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    Rock, E.B. (2020). “For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate over Corporate Purpose”. European Corporate governance Institute—Law Working Paper No. 515/2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3589951.

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    Fisch, J.E., & Davidoff Solomon, S. (2020). “Should Corporations Have a Purpose?”. European Corporate Governance Institute—Law Working Paper No. 510/2020, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561164.

  79. 79.

    Griffith, S.J. (2020). “Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority”. Texas Law Review, 98(6), 983–1047 (wondering why private ordering has not yet offered this solution). In previous work (Pacces, supra Footnote 36), I have argued that greenwashing undermines credible signalling of sustainability engagement by institutional investors. Regulation could ameliorate this problem.

  80. 80.

    Fisch, J.E. (2020). “The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds”. European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)—Law Working Paper No. 490/2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3525355.

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    Hart & Zingales, supra Footnote 47, 212–14.

  82. 82.

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  83. 83.

    Armour et al., Principles, supra Footnote 49.

  84. 84.

    European Commission (2018). Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth. COM(2018) 97 final.

  85. 85.

    For an excellent overview, see Siri, M., & Zhu, S. (2019). “Will the EU Commission Successfully Integrate Sustainability Risks and Factors in the Investor Protection Regime? A Research Agenda”. Sustainability, 11(22), 6292.

  86. 86.

    Griffith, supra Footnote 79.

  87. 87.

    Iliev, P., & Lowry, M. (2015). “Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?”. Review of Financial Studies, 28(2), 446–485.

  88. 88.

    Birkmose, H. S. (2021). ARTICLE 3G: ENGAGEMENT POLICY. In Birkmose, H.S., & Sergakis, K. (eds.), The Shareholder Rights Directive II: A Commentary, Edward Elgar Publishing, 143–163.

  89. 89.

    Katelouzou, D., & Puchniak. (eds.). (2022). “Global Shareholder Stewardship: Complexities, Challenges, and Possibilities.” In Global Shareholder Stewardship, Cambridge University Press, 33–34.

  90. 90.

    Katelouzou, D., & Sergakis, K. (2021). “When Harmonization is not enough: Shareholder Stewardship in the European Union”. European Business Organization Law Review, 22(2), 203–240.

  91. 91.

    Pacces, A.M. (2018). “Shareholder Activism in the Capital Markets Union,” In E. Avgouleas, D. Busch, & G. Ferrarini (eds.), Capital Markets Union in Europe, Oxford University Press, 507–525.

  92. 92.

    Condon, supra Footnote 73.

  93. 93.

    Azar, J. (2020). “The common ownership trilemma”. University of Chicago Law Review, 87(2), 263–296.

  94. 94.

    On these problems and the economic rationale of mandatory disclosure, see Armour et al., Principles, supra Footnote 49.

  95. 95.

    The first technical standards on environmental sustainability are included in the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 of 4 June 2021. More Taxonomy delegated acts are forthcoming. See https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/sustainable-finance-package_en#taxonomy.

  96. 96.

    Art. 19(3) Taxonomy Regulation.

  97. 97.

    See Pacces, A.M. (2000). “Financial Intermediation in the Securities Markets: Law and Economics of Conduct of Business Regulation.” International Review of Law and Economics, 20(4), 479–510, recommending negative disclosure to flag the lack of suitability of financial investment.

  98. 98.

    Pacces, supra Footnote 36, 10.

  99. 99.

    Commission Delegated Regulation of 21 April 2021 Amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 as Regards the Integration of Sustainability Factors, Risks and Preferences into Certain Organisational Requirements and Operating Conditions for Investment Firms. See also the ESMA guidelines: https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/guidelines-certain-aspects-mifid-ii-suitability-requirements-1.

  100. 100.

    Enriques, L., & Gargantini, M. (2017). “The Expanding Boundaries of MiFID's Duty to Act in the Client’s Best Interest: The Italian Case.” Italian Law Journal, 3, 485–510.

  101. 101.

    Commission Delegated Directive of 21 April 2021 Amending Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 as Regards the Integration of Sustainability Factors into the Product Governance Obligations. See also the ESMA guidelines: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-03/ESMA35-43-3448_Final_report_on_MiFID_II_guidelines_on_product_governance.pdf.

  102. 102.

    I have elaborated on this argument in Pacces, supra Footnote 36.

  103. 103.

    Pursuing sustainability via institutional investors may, however, undermine competition making the overall impact on social welfare indeterminate. See Azar, supra Footnote 93.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Alessio M. Pacces

  2. European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Brussels, Belgium

    Alessio M. Pacces

  3. European Banking Institute (EBI), Frankfurt, Germany

    Alessio M. Pacces

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  1. Financial Law Centre (FLC), Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Danny Busch

  2. Department of Law, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy

    Guido Ferrarini

  3. Financial Law Centre (FLC), Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Seraina Grünewald

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Pacces, A.M. (2024). The Role of EU Securities Regulation in Sustainable Corporate Governance. In: Busch, D., Ferrarini, G., Grünewald, S. (eds) Sustainable Finance in Europe. EBI Studies in Banking and Capital Markets Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53696-0_5

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