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China’s Rise in a Semi-peripheral Orbit (After WTO Entry)

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Abstract

This chapter traces China's trajectory of Ricardian export-led growth following its WTO accession. It explores the challenges posed by anti-developmental WTO rules to China's structural transformation, leading to a dilemma of “growth without development.” This predicament is influenced by China's crony comprador capitalist development, which places the country at risk of falling into a “middle-income trap” and sets limits on China's ongoing “peaceful rise.” These limitations become more pronounced with the emergence of great-power rivalries inherent in this semi-peripheral development.

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Notes

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  2. 2.

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  6. 6.

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  7. 7.

    Chinese economist Xiang Songzuo revealed China’s actual growth rate at just about 1.67%. He said: “according to the other calculation, the growth rate was negative,” far below the official figure of 6.6% in 2018. “Outspoken China economist casts doubt on growth forecast—Professor says contradictions in government statistics do not add up.” Nikkei Asia, 05/03/2019. https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Outspoken-China-economist-casts-doubt-on-growth-forecast; Eric Zhu and Tom Orlik wrote: “A study by economists at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and University of Chicago suggested that between 2010 and 2016, China’s ‘true’ GDP growth was about 1.8 percentage points below what the official data suggested. If China is in fact already on a slower growth path, overtaking the U.S. becomes harder.” News features on Bloomberg—“When Will China Rule the World? Maybe Never—The Communist Party wants the world to see China’s continued rise as inevitable. In reality, it’s anything but.” Bloomberg, 05/07/2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-07-05/when-will-china-s-economy-beat-the-u-s-to-become-no-1-why-it-may-never-happen.

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    2011 was the first time China set forth the timetable for industrialization at 2020. “Li calls for deeper trade ties with Germany.” The Financial Times, 07/01/2011. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d0244274-1a71-11e0-b003-00144feab49a.html#axzz1AXAIplJr; The State Council stated in the Notice on “Made in China 2025,” that “by 2020, China will basically achieve industrialization … By 2035, our country’s manufacturing as a whole will reach the medium level of the world’s manufacturing powers, and whereby to fully realize industrialization.” The State Council website, 08/05/2015. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm); Oddly, then Minister Miao Wei of MIIT (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology) was quoted by Xinhua as saying that “By 2025, with comprehensive index approaching that of Germany and Japan when they realized industrialization, China will basically achieve industrialization of our own and whereby to enter the second echelon of global manufacturing business.” Xinhuanet, 19/05/2015. http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2015-05/19/c_1115333559.htm; Miao Wei seemed to hint at a new timetable of achieving full industrialization at some three decades later (by 2050), far longer than the preset target of 2035. China Daily, 09/03/2021. (underlined and italics by the author).

  11. 11.

    Lou Jiwei, former Minister of Finance, issued warning that there was 50% chance for China to fall into the middle-income trap “in the coming 5 to 10 years.” RFI, 01/05/2015. https://www.rfi.fr/cn/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20150501-%E8%B4%A2%E9%95%BF%E6%A5%BC%E7%BB%A7%E4%BC%9F%E2%80%9C%E4%B8%AD%E7%AD%89%E6%94%B6%E5%85%A5%E9%99%B7%E9%98%B1%E2%80%9D%E9%A3%8E%E9%99%A9%E8%AE%BA%E5%BC%95%E7%88%86%E6%94%BF%E7%BB%8F%E7%95%8C%E8%AE%A8%E8%AE%BA; Economist Xu Xiaonian argued that China had fallen into the middle-income trap. See Xu Xiaonian’s address delivered to the Shenzhen Institute of Innovation and Development dated 05/05/2017. https://xuxiaonian.blog.caixin.com/archives/162653; Both President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang expressed concern but optimism of transcending the “middle-income trap” by 2020, the symbol of which would be China’s per capita GDP surpassing US$12,000 (According to Li). China Economic Weekly, 25/07/2017. http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2017/07-25/8286488.shtml. China’s per capita GDP reached US$10,500 in 2020. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN.

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  33. 33.

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  34. 34.

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  35. 35.

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  36. 36.

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  37. 37.

    Paulson, H. M. (2015), p. 239.

  38. 38.

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  39. 39.

    Wade, R (2003): Intro, p, xlviii.

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    Ibid., p. l.

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  50. 50.

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    Jianyong Yue

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Yue, J. (2024). China’s Rise in a Semi-peripheral Orbit (After WTO Entry). In: Crony Comprador Capitalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53154-5_5

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