Industry Engagement

Abstract

The protagonists of the SKA recognised the need and benefits of industrial participation from an early stage, correctly reasoning that the instrument simply could not be funded nor built without the economies of scale afforded by industry. Prior to around 2009, industrial engagement took the form of lively, though largely uncoordinated, activities driven by member countries to stir industrial interest and encourage minor contributions to the national effort. After 2009, the (optimistic) promise of imminent larger contracts fuelled closer engagement, with larger multinational companies, who were interested in both the contracts to deliver the telescope, and in the spin-off technologies. Once the SKA Project Development Office became active, industry engagement grew more strategic and coordinated, underpinned by various industry consortia and international events promoting the global nature of the project. Much good work was done leading up to the dual-site decision in 2012 in preparation for capability scouting and supply chain development within a complex procurement environment. While this work laid a foundation for an informed, competitive, and motivated global industrial capability, ultimately the project elected to largely procure through contracts and work packages tuned to Member country investment.

10.1 Early Industry Interactions, 1990s to 2009

While early conversations concerning the proposed SKA were no doubt occurring between universities and institutes and their various industry contacts, the first concerted efforts to engage more formally with industry are reported in the project literature around the early 2000s. Forming a ‘third-leg’ of the project organisation (with the International SKA Steering Committee (ISSC) and International Science Advisory Committee (ISAC)), the International Engineering and Management Team (IEMT) chaired by Peter Hall, then based at CSIRO Division of Radiophysics in Sydney, established contacts with selected companies thought to be interested in engaging with the project. Working at the international level, the IEMT pro-actively approached firms such as International Business Machines, IBM (USA) and Connell Wagner (Australia) in relation to future technologies, mass scale manufacturing, and project management of mega-science infrastructure.

Around the same period, institutes such as Australia’s CSIRO and ASTRON in the Netherlands were able to allocate seed project funding to support their contribution to the international effort, and thus attract broader national industry interest. In the case of ASTRON, a Coopers & Lybrand report “Scouting the Technology and Economic effects [of the SKA]” commissioned in 1998 underpinned an effort to reach out to local industry, with the Dutch Low-Frequency Array, LOFAR, project linked conceptually to the future SKA. This report supported the so-called SKAI (SKA Interferometer, see Sect. 3.2.4) proposal at the €2.5 M level and ran from 1999–2003 under the auspices of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. Its aim was to facilitate knowledge exchange, cooperation and innovation within and between Small- to Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and ASTRON. Around 45 SMEs became actively engaged under the program’s auspices, many of which endured.

In 2002, ASTRON’s €1.5 M “Northstars” program was approved, running until 2005. Together with interested SMEs as partners, a key element was to design and build conceptually marketable flat (i.e. phased array) antennas for Ku-band satellite reception using technologies from the SKA R&D program. The increasing number of technology transfer relations necessitated an Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy from 2002 and an active patent and publication policy. This resulted in 14 granted patents around 2009.

A key step for ASTRON was the establishment of the Astrotech Holding Company (ATH) by Arnold van Ardenne, ASTRON’s R&D leader. Still running at the time of writing, it was primarily intended to promote industrial innovation through engagements with the Dutch SKA R&D effort. ATH and its networking activities enabled important connections to the commercial world. IBM (a research partner in LOFAR from 2003), Philips, Cisco, and Alcatel all actively participated in the Dutch SKA Forum in 2010.

By 2002, CSIRO was collaborating not only with ASTRON and the Centre for Extra Galactic Astronomy, but also with industry on micro-nano research devices for time-delay beamforming technology applicable to wideband arrays.

A significant milestone in Australia was achieved in 2002 with the formal signing of the Major National Research Facility (MNRF) agreement between the Australian Commonwealth Government, CSIRO, the University of Sydney, Swinburne University of Technology, and several other collaborators. This agreement unlocked a flow of about $A20M into SKA research for technology development, and characterisation of candidate sites, over the following 5 years. Around the same time, the CSIRO was offered a A$500 K SKA engineering consultancy contribution from Connell Wagner, one of Australia’s largest engineering and project management companies. This notable spontaneous and sizable contribution enabled further SKA and LOFAR siting studies and was made on the (correct) judgement that further paid work would likely follow (see hba.skao.int/SKANEWS-4).

Events accelerated in 2003, when the International Astronomical Union (IAU) meeting in Sydney proved to be an excellent forum for exposing the SKA project to a wide audience, including an Australian Industry Day attended by 140 delegates. The “SKA2003” roadshow followed in Geraldton, Western Australia where local industry displayed strong interest in future contracting opportunities. This no doubt prompted a first discussion on industrialisation at the co-located ISSC10 meeting.¹

The following year, Cape Town hosted the 11th gathering of the International SKA Steering Committee (ISSC11) which focussed on remote power solutions for the telescope and identifying a possible fact-finding mission. A locally organised technology workshop gave the SKA community, and local South African academics, engineers, and industry an excellent opportunity to understand the technical demands of the proposed SKA telescope. Meanwhile, in India, SKA2004 also offered opportunities for interaction between local industries and radio astronomers. In particular, a workshop, managed by National Centre for Radio Astrophysics (NCRA), Pune and Raman Research Institute (RRI), Bangalore, highlighted the opportunities for research and development in hardware and software technologies, with 20 participants from 10 organisations representing the local software industry and high-technology R & D.

The year 2004 also marked the start of the four-year ASTRON-led SKA Design project (SKADS) , a major step in European cohesion with combined funding from the European Commission (EC) and national funding agencies such as the Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC).² (See also Sect. 10.2.1) Besides the 2-Polarisation All-Digital (2-PAD) aperture array demonstrator, SKADS established the world-first Aperture Array station of 144 m² (at Westerbork, Netherlands) as well as the 90 m² station in Nancay, France.

SKADS continued to gather pace and international support during 2004, culminating with a European Industry Day held at Dwingeloo, Netherlands in December. This event marked a significant phase for industry engagement, building on a series of Dutch industry days held since 2002. Organised by the International SKA Project Office (ISPO) and ASTRON, it attracted about 40 delegates, including 10 representatives of large multinational companies.

The event presented the SKA project to major potential industry partners in order to stimulate early interest in the project by highlighting European SKA activity; looking for examples of best-practice in industry-science links; addressing matters surrounding intellectual property and other legal issues; and seeking input to the development of a strategy for SKA-industry liaison. Companies represented at the gathering included Alcatel, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Philips. After presentations by the SKA speakers, company representatives gave their views on the project, including perspectives on how it might interest industry sectors and thus offered much useful intelligence on successful industry engagement.

A few thorny topics were already exercising the minds of those present, including High Performance Computing (HPC) and associated power demands, Radio Frequency (RF) systems and networks, the potential for dual usage of the infrastructure, and the substantial challenges in meeting international legal requirements. Lawyer Stephen Kahn, contributed specific expertise for mega-projects depending on industry involvement in both pre-competitive and procurement phases (including handling the contractual ‘lock-out’ problem).³

The event coincided with the transition of the IEMT industry group into an ISPO Engineering Working Group sub-group, known as the Industry Liaison Task Force (ILTF) and chaired by Peter Hall, the International Project Engineer. This group was introduced at the 2005 ISSC13 meeting and was assigned the role of advising the project on industry matters. The ten member ILTF was charged with generating a white paper on industry policy by the end of 2005 and extending the commentary of SKA Memo 52 on industry interactions beyond pre-competitive alliances. An interesting aspect of the ILTF’s industry studies involved a visit in 2005 to IBM’s Zürich research laboratories, and to the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva where the infrastructure of the Large Hadron Collider underlined the concept of “mega-science”. It was clear to the ILTF that there was much to be gained by nurturing links with both IBM and CERN. (See also Sect. 10.4).

A report of industrial contacts and future plans tabled at the ISSC14 meeting held in Pune, India, featured IBM prominently as a “serious enquiry” with much discussion about possible forms of cooperation. A sample Term Sheet was reviewed at the meeting, sparking further questions concerning intellectual property (IP)—a topic that to remain somewhat problematic through the procurement development phases.⁴ The Term sheet re-appeared at ISSC15 without resolution.

Throughout 2006, the ISPO was active in extending SKA community insight into industry collaboration and engagement issues, as well as taking a main role in producing the ILTF’s white paper and drafting a collaborative R&D agreement with IBM. This template was considered an enabling step for demonstrator projects but also proved useful later in furthering understanding of critical issues such as IP procurement strategy and high-level Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). In addition to continuing to facilitate (pre-competitive) collaboration initiatives, the ISPO was clearly positioning itself to take the lead in preparing the SKA project for efficient, timely and economical delivery by industry—an essential exercise in terms of the original concept of an instrument mainly assembled from commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. This aspiration was however to remain unfulfilled, as the subsequent conceptual design work remained largely within institutional walls and there was limited appetite to benefit from industry expertise in mass produced product integration.

Nonetheless, industry engagement continued to ramp up with the sixth Australian industry SKA briefing held in Perth in December 2006, hosted by the Western Australia Government’s Department of Industry & Resources. Notable at this meeting was the growing competitive spirit driven by the single site concept design and repeated aspirational remarks around opportunities for Australasian industry. The commercial mood of Western Australia business (colloquially known as “WA Inc”) added to the sense of excitement an environment of booming state development. An example of this somewhat ‘gung-ho’ mindset was demonstrated by Tenix Pty Ltd., a partner in the Australian SKA Industry Cluster Mapping project. Tenix commissioned renowned Sydney Opera House architect Jan Utzon to prepare a schematic design for an SKA Visitor Centre in Western Australia. Tenix bequeathed this design to the Australian SKA project amid much fanfare in November 2006, only to fade from sight within months. Meanwhile, at ISSC16 (in Dresden) industrialisation continued to be discussed, concentrating on the cost benefits of mass production, aspects of procurement rules, as well as success from cooperation with IBM—a topic that was later developed further at the first SKA Science and Engineering Committee (SSEC) meeting by telecon in 2008.⁵

Meanwhile, in early 2007, CSIRO sponsored the Australian Symposium on Antennas in Sydney with the aim of bringing together engineers, scientists, and industry representatives to discuss current and future developments in antenna design. The following month CSIRO and ISPO hosted the 3-day Third International Focal Plane Array Workshop, indicating the steep rise in SKA technical interest at this time. The meeting attracted 96 participants, representing astronomers, engineers and industry representatives from Australia, Europe, Canada, USA, South Africa and New Zealand.

By mid-2007, New Zealand had commenced a series of SKA Industry events spurred on by similar events elsewhere, especially in Australia. In July, an Australasian team led by Sergei Gulyaev (Auckland University of Technology, NZ), Brett Biddington (Chair, Australian Telescope Steering Committee), Phil Crosby (CSIRO) and Carole Jackson (CSIRO ATNF), gave a series of presentations to audiences in Christchurch, Wellington, and Auckland. The interest level at these events was reflected by the engagement of the attendees and the support from several key New Zealand organisations, including Canterbury Development Corporation, Connect New Zealand, New Zealand Supercomputing Centre, New Zealand Telecom, and AUT Technology Park (see Fig. 10.1).

Fig. 10.1

Australasian industry team leaders. Left to right: Carole Jackson, Phil Crosby, Sergei Gulyaev, and Brett Biddington

The year 2007 also saw the formation of the first formally convened SKA industry group, sponsored through the national Australian Government’s AusIndustry program and initially labelled the Australian SKA Industry Cluster (ASKAIC). The ASKAIC was established as an industry-led project to drive a national initiative to understand relevant Australian capabilities, and to develop opportunities within the Australian SKA Pathfinder (ASKAP) and SKA projects. Foundation members included CSIRO, Cisco Systems, and Radio Frequency Systems, as well as defence ‘primes’ Boeing, BAE Systems, Raytheon, and Tenix, each seeing advantages in involvement with a mega-science project at the cutting edge of new sensing and computing technologies.

Marking a notable development, the value of a formally represented ‘cluster’ of potential industrial stakeholders was very apparent at the 2008 International SKA Forum held in Perth, WA. The event was attended by around 200 delegates, with strong representation from SPDO, government officials, scientists from around the world, and industry and local stakeholders. This was the first time such a large and diverse global group had met to be briefed on the SKA and participate in discussions on the commercial opportunities of the SKA project.

During this period, Member countries around the world continued to hold periodic gatherings of local SKA project stakeholders, usually supported through attendance of SKA project personnel, and welcoming local industry to contribute project experience and technical advice.

In September 2009, the SKA featured in a one-day UK Government conference held to bring large scientific projects together with representatives from industry. This was to alert potential industrial partners to the fact that major procurements would be forthcoming as the SKA approached SKA Phase 1 construction. Although premature in hindsight, the event offered an important forum for understanding the mega-science project landscape from the viewpoint of industry—an aspect new to many of the scientists and the SKA leadership.

During 2009, ASKAP, focused on industry engagement activities thanks to the ongoing support of the ASKAIC which offered practical help in planning for industry involvement through secretariat services from The Global Innovation Centre. At this point, Australia was leading the way with marketplace offerings through an Industry Opportunities Register (IOR) (Crosby, McGarvie & Mulcahy, 2008),⁶ updated regularly as the project developed. The Oportunities Register, coupled with an on-line SKA Capabilities Directory, resulted in 400 Australian businesses becoming registered, indicating strong local interest and capability. While this initiative was commendable, it exemplified a trend among local scientists and engineers in many SKA Member countries of prematurely over-exciting industry as to the size and schedule of commercial contracts to build the telescope—a situation that strained industry relations in subsequent years.

Across the Atlantic, a workshop on the Canadian SKA programme was held in October 2009 at the University of Calgary. It brought together research teams and representatives from the National Research Council, current and potential industry partners, as well as representatives of government agencies at federal and provincial levels. The focus for Canada was leading-edge technologies and manufacturability, next generation HPC, low noise amplifier (LNA) technologies; signal processing; and integrated receiver system production. Meanwhile in the southern hemisphere, a new (though short-lived) industry group, the New Zealand SKA Industry Consortium was formed, made up of the NZ ICT Group (the industry organisation representing New Zealand’s IT software, hardware, networks, services, education and training providers), and New Zealand’s Trade and Enterprise Department.

10.2 Industry Engagement from 2009 Onwards

In 2009, following almost a decade of steadily building relationships with industry through the ISPO phase and into the SPDO era, many Member countries commenced working more strategically with the SPDO to foster links with their industrial partners focusing on technology design and development. These relationships became important for the various R&D consortia that were then forming. This coincided with a greater interest and awareness of SKA from the national funding agencies noted in Chap. 8. Hence there emerged a shift in emphasis from the project primarily engaging with industry to help develop the technologies needed, to an engagement more driven by the desire to show national governments a return on their funding investment.

10.2.1 UK

The Government’s STFC took a guiding role in connecting to UK industry with practical advice from the UK university-based SKADS team. This group identified driving technologies that were ripe for commercial procurement such as: broad-band antenna arrays, RF amplifiers optimised for both low noise and RFI robustness, ultra-fast analogue to digital converters (ADC), ultra-fast digital signal processing, high data volume wide-area networks, ultra-precise time and frequency transfer via optical fibres. As a result, various local firms were contracted to provide advanced technologies. (See Box 10.1).

Box 10.1 UK firms that benefited from local contracts for early R&D work

• Cambridge Consultants (DSP look-ahead study)

• BAE Systems (phased array antenna element study)

• Roke Manor (phased array architecture study)

• EEP (supply of Electromagnetic-tight container to house high-speed digital hardware)

• MC2 (noise measurement)

• RFMOD/LOADPOINT (supply of innovative packaging for semiconductor devices)

• Selex Galileo (design validation and testing of high-speed ADC in technology)

• e2v technologies (high-speed low-power ADC in SiGe and other technologies)

• IBM (study of high-speed low-power integrated CMOS ADC, and supply of advanced DSP hardware).

By mid-2010, SKADS had identified active industrial partnerships with IBM, Intel, SELEX Galileo, BAE Systems, Microsoft, and Altera among others, as well as international connections in Australia, South Africa, Netherlands, and Canada, underlining the growth and importance of global industry linkages.⁷

Subsequent UK industry-specific meetings, mostly driven by the Government-supported Knowledge Transfer Network (KTN) included a briefing meeting held at the Science Museum in London (July 2008); STFC & Sensors & Instrumentation KTN (with UK Trade & Investment) “Research Infrastructures Meet the Buyer” event (Sept 2008); an e-KTN event focused series aimed principally at specific areas of phased array technology; Low noise, High-speed Analogue Electronics (Oct 2008); a Digital Signal Processing meeting (May 2009); System, computing and software workshop (March 2009); and an Antennas and Infrastructure for Phased Arrays meeting (Feb 2009). Under the stewardship of e-KTN’s Manager, Nigel Rix, a focused effort commenced on realising a UK industry cluster to bring together the disparate community of companies in the “SKA technologies” domain and provide a focus for their activity on SKA. Potential benefits anticipated included a knowledge base for members, promotion of the capabilities of the members, assistance with consortia bids for projects, and a general leveraging from the inspirational value of the SKA.⁸

An industry meeting in preparation for the pre-construction phase, held in Manchester in March 2012, heralded the end of e-KTN supported events due funding limitations.⁹

10.2.2 Australasia

In Australasia, the principal channel for industry engagement was through the re-badged Australian SKA Industry Consortium (ASKAIC), managed by John Humphries of the Global Innovation Centre (GIC), with membership by subscription. GIC maintained regular communications between its membership and the SKA project office, and the Australian and (less frequently) the NZ SKA offices. ASKAIC was effective in mobilising its members to participate successfully in a range of activities including consideration of SKA industry engagement issues and providing advice to government; participation in information exchange with CSIRO and others—including site visits, seminars/workshop, briefings—on technical and policy issues and best practice advice; and championing the SKA. ASKAIC also supported Australian industry capability mapping, and in the pre-site decision era, the Australia/NZ hosting bid. When control of ASKAIC passed from GIC to the Australian Government’s SKA office, the welcome decision to abandon subscriptions was made. The membership profile was broadened to include government agencies and research institutes (and any other interested party), thus losing focus in terms of strategic industry engagement with a consequent decline in industry attention and participation.

Practical industry involvement continued with maintenance of the Australian SKA Industry Capability Directory (linked to a capability matching exercise), commercial tenders for design and construction of the Murchison Radio-astronomy Observatory (MRO) Support Facility, sourcing and installation of the ASKAP optical fibre link between Geraldton and the MRO, geotechnical surveys of the MRO, design and installation of foundation pads for each antenna at the MRO, and installation of power and fibre trenches.

At this time, industries showed a keen appetite to establish strategic liaisons with the SKA. Examples included Cisco Systems (secondment of an engineer to the ASKAP team); Raytheon (provision of Systems Engineering training); IBM, Cray, Intel, Dell all offering IT/Computing design support, and other firms provided practical advice, loan of equipment etc. In addition, there were many meetings, interactions, and workshops with a wide range of companies to discuss best practice project management and systems engineering.

A significant procurement occurred during the period of ASKAP’s construction, with a contract awarded to the 54th Research Institute of China Electronic Technology Group Corporation (CETC54) for the design, build and commissioning of 36 ASKAP antennas. Responding to an open tender request, the Chinese government’s A$ten million offer beat all local offers to the extent that domestic industry could not compete. Patriot Antenna Systems (USA) were contracted to supply a single 12 metre antenna installed at Parkes Observatory for use as an Focal Plane Array (FPA) development testbed; and Puzzle Precision (Australia) were contracted to fabricate and test high-complexity back-end processing boards—a much lauded collaboration with a regional SME that lifted the company’s capability and reputation considerably.

10.2.3 South Africa

A different approach to industry engagement was taken in South Africa during these formative years of the project and into the SKA pathfinder phase. This was to ‘tap into’ specific capabilities that existed in local industry, or else develop it in-house. An impressive level of engagement with industry was highlighted by a list of over 50 firms supporting the South Africa SKA effort as outlined by (then) Chief Technologist, Justin Jonas at the Banff SKA Forum meeting in 2011.¹⁰ Ultimately, the design, manufacture, installation, commissioning, and testing of the KAT-7 antennas was subcontracted to BAE Land Systems Dynamics in South Africa. The feed (XDM) and Cryogenic engineering (XDM and KAT-7) were accomplished through a partnership with EMSS Antennas on a cost-plus basis, and this very successful and close partnership continued through to developing and delivering MeerKAT. The SKA had a big impact on EMSS’s capability and the growth of the (later) world-renowned FEKO © electro-magnetic simulator product.

Several other firms (Tellumat, ETSE, Foxcom, Miteq, Amplitech, SIA solutions, C$M, BEP, TFD, and Berkeley) were commercially engaged for sub-components and software modules, each a successful collaboration in which SKA South Africa played an active role.

10.2.4 Canada

The Canadian approach pre- and post-2009 was to engage and partner with relevant industries early in the process to establish long-term relationships that matched the development timeframe and performance requirements of the SKA. Even at this early point of conceptual design, Canada was actively investigating opportunities for next generation High Performance Computing (mainly with IBM), advanced memory and storage technologies, advanced high-volume data processing technologies, as well as low noise amplifier (LNA) technologies, and integrated receiver system production. Interestingly, NRAO even held concept level discussions with Lockheed Martin concerning the use of airships to deliver dishes to the remote site locations. In October 2009, Canada hosted the SKA focused industry connection/networking conference at University of Calgary, with IBM, government representatives, and other potential industry partners.

Foremost in the Canadian SKA Program ‘wish-list’ of SKA contributions was dish design prototyping using low-cost, high-performance composites. Work was conducted with Profile Composites, Inc. (Sidney, B.C.) and resulted in a new 10-metre composite dish incorporating significant advancements in design and production of the type of radio reflectors required for the SKA. Associated effort included exploratory discussions with BreconRidge of Ontario, regarding packaging of LNA technologies and receiver integration and production. Breconridge also delivered large-scale, high-density correlator hardware for the EVLA correlator and as a result were interested in working on the correlators for the SKA.

10.2.5 India

Over 2009–10, the National Centre for Radio Astrophysics (NCRA) initiated the formation of an Indian consortium of industry and research institutes aimed at addressing front line issues regarding software development for large astronomical facilities. This involved development of the architecture for a generic control and monitor system, optimisation tools for telescope scheduling, virtual observatory tools, and graphics processing unit (GPU) computing. To this end, a draft MoU was developed between the consortium partners (Tata Research Development and Design Centre, Persistent Systems Ltd., Centre for Development of Advanced Computing, NCRA and the Inter-University Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics, IUCAA).

10.2.6 The Netherlands

Building on the successful series of Industry Days (see Fig. 10.2) described in the preceding section, ASTRON established an informal industry group (SKA-NL) with over 30 first-tier companies, including IBM. SKA-NL partnered with a Dutch initiative promoted as the “Connecting Industry, Society and Science (CISS) workshop”¹¹ in Drenthe, during the SKA Forum in June 2010 (See also Sect. 10.10). Supported by several locally based companies—mostly those involved in the LOFAR and/or EMBRACE projects—the meeting offered a platform for the launch of the Dutch SKA Industry Position Paper (NXO, Siemens, IBM, 2010).¹² This document outlined the importance of the project for the Netherlands from an industry perspective and was written in collaboration with an industry group involving multinational companies.

Fig. 10.2

Arnold van Ardenne, one of the global leaders of the SKA design work, at the Dutch Industry Day 2004

10.2.7 Other Countries

Space precludes a detailed description of industry collaboration efforts by all interested nations. However, Italy should be acknowledged for their intense industrial engagement, and France albeit to a lesser extent. Sweden and Portugal were both industrially very active in the 2010–2020 period, while Germany started to strongly connect with their industry in later years. China showed strong interest in major infrastructure supply (dishes) from around mid-2000s lobbying hard for government factory contracts.

10.3 The Dream of COTS (and the Departure from it)

From the fairly intense era of early industry engagement described above, a consistent view emerged among the proponents of the international project that the instrument could only be realised with the direct involvement of industry. Whereas, with earlier large science projects, local (and in some cases international) firms had been contracted to the fulfil the conventional facilities construction and deliver parts of the physical infrastructure using bespoke component parts, it became obvious to most stakeholders that only industry could deliver the necessary production scale and economy for an affordable giant array.

Early concept designs for the SKA even considered the possibility of deploying thousands of cheap satellite TV dishes, of the type commonly seen in both metropolitan and rural communities around the world (personal communication, Peter Wilkinson to Crosby in 2010). While this approach would certainly have contained the ever-growing project cost projections, it was soon shown that the designs fell short in terms of technical and quality requirements. Nonetheless, aspirations of sourcing mass-produced “commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)” components from industry remained. As early as 2002, the SKA Newsletter #4, mentioned that a group of astronomers at Jodrell Bank Observatory (including Michael Kramer, Duncan Lorimer, Andrew Lyne, Peter Wilkinson, and Graham Woan) had submitted a concept paper of a ~ 5000 square metre (multi-dish) phased array intended to be a 1:200-scale SKA demonstrator system implying COTS components. In the same newsletter, the Thousand Element Array (THEA) 256 element demonstrator was reported as delivering its first data—again, having been built partly to evaluate mass produced technology for SKA.

Two other components which appeared promising as COTS candidates were the receivers, and high-performance computing systems (HPC). While the former was not strictly a COTS item, the prospect of an order to design and manufacture front-end receivers in their millions would certainly prove commercially attractive (and likely find applications beyond astronomy). The SKA Project Office either consulted, or independently approached, several major computing firms, to investigate whether their existing or planned products could find application with the SKA.

As the conceptual design slowly crystallised through the ISPO era, and proto-scientific goals shaped engineering designs and performance requirements, the instrument specifications became more refined and demanding, lessening ready application of (known) COTS products. For example, the desired frequency coverage began to lend itself to a mix of antenna designs and technologies, not just simple paraboloidal reflectors. Further, the computing requirements (in terms of channels) demanded a huge number of inputs and outputs—substantially beyond any commercially available machine. Power budgets, too, were beginning to be understood, placing further pressure on novel engineering design options.

By 2012, it had become clear that ambitions for a mostly COTS built instrument were unlikely to succeed, but there remained good scope for mass production of certain components (e.g. dipole antennas, receivers, etc.) and this aspiration should stay apparent in dealings with industry.

10.4 International SKA Project Office (ISPO) Strategic Initiatives 2004–2008

During the ISPO phase, the subject of industry engagement attracted international attention and began to be investigated largely by International Project Engineer, Peter Hall. He, together with an experienced consulting lawyer, Stephen Kahn, established and led the SKA Industry Liaison Task Force (ILTF) made up of ten representatives from the ISSC which had institutional members from eleven countries at the time, including the USA.

Under its Terms of Reference, the ILTF identified projects which had some similarity to the SKA (principally the Atacama Large Millimetre Array, ALMA, and LOFAR) and which were likely to yield lessons for the SKA in framing its industry engagement and governance, as well as the trade and legal issues associated with very large international collaborations. Even at this early stage, the need to begin looking at procurement issues early in the project was highlighted, yet as later history shows, the topic remained unresolved at the policy level a decade later—though in fairness, the decision to evolve to an Inter-Governmental Organisation (see Chapter 6) did necessitate a re-think of the procurement approach. Importantly, the ILTF addressed the need to identify effective mechanisms for managing both major industry involvement and mutual expectations over long periods of time, including issues around IP management. It is worth noting that IP management was first addressed in the early 2000s with Richard Schilizzi setting up a fledgling IP register.

An interesting exercise of the ILTF was to set out the reasons why companies might wish to be associated with the SKA, an important piece of work for framing future approaches and events to industry around the globe. The main drivers were identified as ranging from short-term financial gain via prototyping contracts in the development phase, through to more indirect motivations such as the wish to develop staff skills in ways not routinely available. This important sentiment remained in the SKA Organisation vernacular, appearing succinctly in subsequent iterations of the SKA Industry Engagement Strategy as¹³:

• The opportunity to grow and hone the creative energies of the best professionals in an imaginative project whose aim is no less than to chart the history of the Universe.

• The ability to develop and perfect leading-edge techniques and products in a very demanding application and to interact with highly technologically sophisticated users.

• The ability to generate and share information with other R&D partners—both institutional and industrial—in a benign and commercially non-threatening environment.

• The visibility flowing from association with an innovative, high profile, international mega-science project; and

• The potential for early involvement contracts with tangible payback in a funded, cutting-edge project spanning a wide range of infrastructure, engineering, and computing disciplines.

The ILTF introduced preliminary considerations about procurement strategy for the SKA, bringing to the fore the major issues (later to be addressed by PrepSKA WP5) concerning public procurement rules, fair competition, juste-retour, tender and pricing negotiations, and legal aspects of the defined contracting authority.

The first serious considerations regarding the management of industry interaction were undertaken by the ISPO to address specific collaboration issues then seen as facing the SKA. This included aspects of ownership and transfer of IP, in the context of an international (public) project, what potential legal protections might be afforded, and the implications of an ‘open skies’ telescope access environment (which would naturally limit any ability to guarantee a specific return on a national industrial investment). There was also the question of how external parties (e.g. industry) could become involved with the regional prototypes (known as SKA precursors and pathfinders) without prejudice, particularly when participation might involve contributions of technical know-how that could conceivably end up as part of a future tender specification. Outcomes from ILTF advice included the need for agreements with external collaborators to define tightly the areas of collaboration, set out clearly the background IP of the parties involved, and explicitly note the expected operational lifetime for the agreement. Agreements should also cover the issues of foreground IP, joint IP and licensing.¹⁴

10.5 SPDO Approach and Priorities

In late 2008, following the transition of the ISPO to its new home in the University of Manchester (UK) a new team was recruited under Project Director Richard Schilizzi, and established as the SKA Program Development Office (SPDO) (with the SPDO acronym quickly becoming referred to as “speedo”).

In April 2009, the role of Industry Participation Manager was taken up by Phil Crosby, who was seconded to SPDO for 2 years while researching his PhD on mega-science projects. Crosby’s background in high-technology industry participation brought advantages in support of the PrepSKA WP5 effort (see below and Sect. 4.4), and the development and implementation of an industry engagement strategy for the SKA project.

PrepSKA WP5 was formally titled “Procurement and Industrial Involvement” and when kicked off in April 2008 in Perth, Australia, consisted of an ‘oversight’ group of ten representatives from across the SKA project, led by Corrado Perna, from the Italian National Institute for Astrophysics (INAF), Italy. WP5 contained seven specific tasks, or outcomes, to be met within the stated period of 36 months. These involved; general procurement guidelines, an inventory of relevant member country industries; a cost-benefit analysis of procurement models; and work leading to a draft procurement model. Crosby and Schilizzi broadened and clarified the outcomes assigned to SPDO into four pragmatic objectives relating to industry and global procurement.

The SPDO’s core effort during the PrepSKA phase was roughly grouped according to telescope design outputs. (See Chaps. 4 and 5.) The specific WP5 tasks and outcomes were encompassed in four objectives depicted in Table 10.1 below.

Table 10.1 The four objectives relating to industry and global procurement undertaken by the SPDO

The SPDO focused initially on Objectives 1 and 2, the first requiring substantial research and analyses in both public and private sector policies, as well as best-practice models for industry engagement. The latter involved development of a collaborative working arrangement with PrepSKA WP5 leader, Corrado Perna (INAF) together with a Rome-based consultant (Riccardo Colangelo), bringing expertise in European procurement models. Perna coordinated the collaborative processes while the SPDO’s Crosby provided specialist experience in global industry participation. Whilst WP5 commenced with a promising suite of documents and initial meetings, (e.g. WP5 Draft Roadmap, work plans and action lists), there was little sustained interest from the WP5 oversight committee. After early concerns by the SPDO about missed milestones, the planned bi-monthly meetings were replaced by periodic progress discussions at INAF in Rome, with the actual document production more effectively executed in Crosby and Perna’s respective offices and polished via email exchange.

10.6 Broad Industry Engagement Policies and Principles

A vital task within the SPDO to develop an effective industry engagement was to map out the project-industry ecosystem, especially (though not exclusively) among the Member countries. As a first step in understanding the industrial landscape across the SKA project, it was necessary to identify and connect the people nominated from the various SKA Consortia, so they could act as an informal group able to offer local and global advice from their region/country. These Industry Liaison Officers (ILOs) advised on industry engagement matters, government industry policies, national and institutional procurement rules, and international IP management.

The initial nominees became the ‘point of contact’ for interaction with industry-knowledgeable people from each of the countries involved in the SKA. This meant including business groups, legal and economic advisors, and other relevant associated sources, as well as acting as the local information channel for SPDO discussions. Commencing in September 2009, an SKA Industry Newsletter was produced by the SPDO which contained contributions from the ILOs in actual and potential Member countries, with the first regular updates from the UK, Australia, South Africa and the U.S. (See Table 10.2). Ultimately, Portugal, Spain, New Zealand, and South Korea added ILOs from their respective nations.

Table 10.2 The initial group of member country Industry Liaison officers

Early exchanges across this group revealed that, while central co-ordination of industry engagement was appreciated, not all SKA partners were entirely comfortable with a free exchange of information which sometimes involved contractual matters or commercial relationships. While the key Member countries (including the potential site and headquarters host countries) soon found their comfort level in terms of describing industrial arrangements, others declined to openly contribute, perhaps not wanting to jeopardise relationships built over time, or through concerns over breaches of IP or confidentiality. This reluctance lessened over time, but still resulted in a reduced visibility of the industrial relationships landscape of the SKA project.

Nonetheless, as the SPDO became more aware of Member country national industry development policies, favoured suppliers, and procurement sensitivities, this information was used to inform a draft industry participation plan being developed by the SPDO and reviewed by the ILOs. By mid-2010, the first edition of the SKA Industry Engagement Strategy (IES) was released¹⁵, including a description of the project and goals in terms familiar to industry. This included the expectations of industry and principles of engagement, global capability assessment, communication of industry opportunities, and procurement principles and risks. This document continued to be updated and re-released periodically to maintain alignment with project policies and the maturing landscape and served the project into the 2020s.

Along with contributions from the Member countries, the SPDO felt it was important to consult first-hand with other mega-science projects, especially in terms of national engagement, procurement, and industrial participation. Members of the SPDO team had already visited several large infrastructure science/engineering projects to discuss success drivers for mega-science projects, including ALMA, ASKAP, the Australia Telescope Compact Array (ATCA) , Iridium, LIDAR (Antarctica), and the OPAL nuclear reactor in Australia. During 2009, Crosby conducted further investigations at the HIPER high-power laser project, the International Linear Collider, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) fusion project, the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, and the LOFAR and MEERKAT telescopes. Interestingly, apart from chance interactions at academic gatherings, there seemed to be few attempts by Member countries themselves to consult local contemporary large-scale projects. Although disappointed in this, reports from SPDO visits were made available to the Member organisations.

10.7 Evolution of Project and National Industry Priorities and Initiatives, and Growth of Enabling Organisations

A crucial adjunct to the fieldwork described above, was a series of interviews in 2009 with national government representatives in the SKA Member countries of Australia, China, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, and the UK. The focus of these meetings was to gain an understanding of policy support and initiatives for new technology development, and how research and development linked between industry, institutes and Universities, and the national science organisations (e.g. STFC, CSIRO, INAF etc.).

An important outcome of this process was the emergence of new or existing industry consortia, in some cases formed specially to address the potential opportunities for industry likely to be generated by the SKA. Mostly these cluster organisations took the form of a loose collection of ‘interested’ companies, but in some instances, they were much more mature and outward looking, e.g. ASKAIC in Australia, and the UK’s KTN. Interestingly, a U.S. industry group emerged in this period under the stewardship of Bill Boas (System Fabric Works). Consisting originally of STADCO, and Cray Computer, it later grew to include in-principle membership from several US high-tech firms but was not sustained following loss of continuing funding for SKA participation in 2011.

The mixture of profiles for such industry groups added to the complexity of the landscape as the SKA became better known, and in some instances became problematic when industry expectations were raised and then failed to be matched by the emerging project budget and schedule. Over time, interest and investment by commercial firms waxed and waned as their appetite adjusted to the inevitable delays towards major procurements, and as consortia activity grew or declined in the Member countries (see Table 10.3).

Table 10.3 SKA Project—Industry participation arrangements in 2012

In the SPDO era, the general (though ultimately incorrect) understanding was that most of the procurement would be ‘open market’ and that the most of the (then) estimated €1.5 billion budget would be allocated through project contracts. This message was carried through to national industry meetings and project roadshows, inevitably causing dismay when the realities of project schedule, cost, number of interested parties, and funding agency procurement policies emerged. Examples include the telescope control software eagerly pursued by India, and high expectations of orders by regional firms in Western Australia for thousands of mass-produced dipole antennas.

In some sense, this initial expectation that there would be a large, centralised budget and an open international procurement matched the belief that the siting of the project should be determined by scientific grounds alone. And just as there was with the siting decision, there was a price to be paid for greater involvement and interest of the national funding agencies: the realisation that industrial contributions and returns on investment were an important element of the case that needed to be made at the national level for funding the SKA. Funding agencies increasingly made it clear that they were reluctant to commit large sums of money to SKA without at least a strong expectation that a good fraction of what they contributed would be spent in their own region, and the procurement policy and industrial engagement started to reflect that thinking.

10.8 Reaching out to Industry

By the end of 2009, the SPDO had a well-established view of the high-level industrial landscape for the SKA project, and effective communication pathways ready to integrate national policies. Personnel in SPDO were in place to address industry enquiries and maintain consistent messaging to stakeholders on the topic. Most importantly, regular contact and consultation was established through scheduled telecons etc.; a move well supported by Member representatives.

With the SPDO located in Manchester, there was a tendency for UK based companies (and in some cases European firms) to want to visit the project office in person and meet with the project specialists. Occasionally this extended to invitations, especially from British organisations, to inspect industry facilities, or speak at technology meetings. Examples of this include a visit by Crosby and Kobus Cloete (SPDO Project Manager) to the BAE Systems radar testing facility on the Isle of Wight to discuss strategic involvement through testing facilities, SPDO support for a major KTN networking event in London, and Crosby speaking about applications of SKA engineering at the Astronomy Technology Centre, Edinburgh.

While in many cases these interactions were welcomed and useful, it did create the perception that UK companies might have an unfair advantage. Although in time this view was dispelled, the perception was partly reinforced when SPDO staff readily attended UK (and European) industry meetings (e.g. the UK Trade Investment KTN gatherings) and gave talks at European radio astronomy and big science events. While this was primarily a result of simple proximity with no intent to favour European markets, Schilizzi did acknowledge the risk early and instructed the project office to maintain a Register of Industry Contacts throughout the SPDO era. The register recorded all such interactions, and the purpose of the meeting or event, so that if a future tender bidder believed that pre-contractual contact with the SPDO was influential in the contract award, the nature and scope of the visit could be made clear.¹⁶

Occasionally a special meeting, or series of meetings, was convened to address a particular challenge of the SKA project, an example being the Power Investigation Task Force (PITF) meetings. The agenda for the PITF kick-off meeting in Manchester in October 2009¹⁷ shows broad participation from the project, academia, and industry, with representation from the candidate site countries. Parsons-Brinkerhoff were engaged (by SPDO) to furnish detailed reports (Parsons-Brinkerhoff, 2009)¹⁸ concerning supply/generation technologies, renewable power systems, and trends in a world with carbon trading.

Consultants were also used to advantage where expert opinions and specific data was required, for example during the site evaluation process where advice was sought from Parsons-Brinckerhoff, UK (basic Infrastructure components, power studies), Analysys Mason, UK (long term RFI environment), Kroll Security Group, USA (security), Pinsent Masons, UK (legal services), and KPMG, UK (customs and excise regulations).

The PrepSKA WP 2 meetings on SKA Design¹⁹ offered both good timing and a platform for SPDO to speak on effective industry engagement approaches, and the challenges associated with ‘lock-out’ and care with pre-contractual collaborations with commercial partners. The WP 2 meetings morphed into annual Engineering meetings with increasing industry attention (see Fig. 10.3). Ostensibly, these meetings were not open to general industry, however certain commercial representatives did attend either through personal invitation or simply showing up. Eventually, due to sustained interest from industry, sessions were added to the agenda to permit some participation.

Fig. 10.3

The SPDO team at the WP 2 industry event in the Manchester Museum, March 2010

Industry engagement reappeared on the SSEC meeting agenda in October 2010, with Schilizzi presenting a report on PrepSKA WP5, and the SKA IES. In particular, the SSEC were keen to learn of progress against objectives, particularly the “Towards A Procurement Model for the SKA” document, and a summary of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) meeting in Rome earlier that year (see below).

This constant tension between a desire to encourage industry involvement while trying to avoid the associated perceptions of favouritism required careful handling at best, and damage control in a few instances when the project technology specialists accidentally included specific supplier specifications in their presentations. Conversely, when the SPDO indicated reluctance to engage with international industry citing the pre-contractual difficulties, it received criticism especially from the telescope host countries for failing to take advantage of best-practice commercial experience. Schilizzi’s response to stakeholders was that the SPDO did not have any funds for industrial contracts for SKA, and until there were additional funds in the pre-construction phase, they would do better to approach the institutes designing and building SKA precursors and pathfinders.

Eventually the SPDO developed a workable solution to this issue through creation of a document called a (non-binding) Statement of Mutual Interest (SoMI). Based on an earlier template from the ILTF, and approved by a succession of legal advisers, the purpose of the SoMI was to:

• Establish a working framework so that certain organisations that had shown a willingness to become strategically engaged with the SKA project could interface in a more structured way with the SPDO on a ‘mutual interest’ basis.

• Set out the intentions, understandings, and topics that both parties had a shared interest in, and the subject areas that were to be discussed.

• Describe the distinct capabilities and needs of the parties, in order to allow some interchange of ideas and advice around technical innovation and direction, and project management expertise. (Any exchange of confidential information was covered by a separate non-disclosure agreement.)

• Provide limited access for the commercial party to have closer contact with SKA stakeholders, and opportunities for strategic engagement e.g. access to technical specialists.

• Permit access to commercial equipment and testing environments

Importantly, the SoMI was non-binding, contained no legal obligation for either party or any of the participants, and there was to be no exchange of money. Intentionally, only a small number of SoMI’s were signed, these were with IBM, Cisco, Selex, Nokia-Siemens, and BAE Systems, as representatives of their various business/technology sectors (see Fig. 10.4). The use of the SoMI instrument proved successful, with much useful advice provided to the SKA project including legal, contractual, technical, access to test facilities, and strategic direction.

Fig. 10.4

Signing of SoMI with BAE Systems at Jodrell Bank (l-r) Richard Schilizzi, SPDO; Les Gregory, BAE; Steve Watts, University of Manchester

By way of example, one of the first positive outcomes from the SoMI arrangement was with BAE Systems. The SPDO team attended a one-day High Technology Project Management and ‘lessons learned’ workshop arranged with BAE project specialist, Ian Williams, covering key techniques of mega-project management.

An important workshop addressing the non-science benefits of the SKA was held in Rome in 2010 under the auspices of COST. This major event in Rome involved industry aspects of engagement with the project and supported an economics business case approach to governments.²⁰ In attendance were noted experts from industry, science and technology institutes, business schools, SKA Member country project representatives, and ministry officials. In all, over 16 nations were represented, working together and in break-out themes. The meeting distilled the major benefits that could be expected from the SKA and other large scale infrastructure research projects, in four key areas: information and communication technology (ICT), renewable energy, global science-industry-government linkages and human capital development.²¹ The COST workshop was politically important since it offered evidence that funding agencies and governments took the SKA seriously.²²

By the time of the SKA preconstruction phase that began in early 2012, the former SPDO had transformed into the new SKA Organisation (SKAO, see Chap. 5). Given the likelihood of significant money being spent relatively soon, a more formal and somewhat more arm’s length position regarding industry engagement was adopted, and in early 2012 the SKA Project Office conducted an Industry Expression of Interest (EoI) exercise related to the work anticipated to be contracted to industry and managed as described in the 2010 SKA Project Execution Plan (see Chap. 4). During this phase, the SKA Organisation intended to enter into agreements with a small number of consortia that would be responsible for executing large portions of the work, especially at the element level of the SKA. Consortia (industry/institute collaborations) were invited to bid against work packages described in a detailed Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) /Statement of Work.

The aims of the EoI process were to establish a snapshot of the coverage of the interest to participate/execute the work as defined for the SKA preconstruction Stage 1 WBS and facilitate consortia formation by the gathering and utilisation of the information provided as part of the EoI process.

Following the release of the documents the SKA Project Office clarified that SKA consortia, organisations and industry were all welcome to participate. This latter group initially responded with key questions regarding how they might get paid for their effort, whether industry could lead a work package consortium, and how would IP be controlled. The results of this EoI were made public in a report dated June 2012 titled “Results of the preconstruction phase stage 1 expression of interest (EoI)”.²³

10.9 The Development of Procurement Policies and Models (PrepSKA WP5 Effort)

Central to the early work for PrepSKA WP5 was the collaboration between Crosby (SPDO) and Corrado Perna (INAF) on the development of a procurement policy and associated papers and guidelines designed to encompass the future specific needs of the SKA project. It also provided a workable framework for global procurement encompassing both central SKA Project Office purchases, and in-kind supply from Member and non-Member countries. A key input for this work was research and examples of actual procurement models from other international mega-science projects.

In accordance with the agreed schedule of deliverables for the PrepSKA project (later slightly modified), it was envisaged that the WP5 effort be staged, with the first reports covering procurement risks and options that could be socialised across the SKA governance committees, as well as a more practical review by those leading the closely associated PrepSKA WP 2 design collaboration. Table 10.4 summarises the PrepSKA WP5 deliverables.

Table 10.4 PrepSKA WP5 deliverables as originally conceived and approved, and the modified final outcomes^a

Concentrated PrepSKA WP5 work continued through 2009, resulting in the first deliverable, a guideline for WP 2 procurement released in September 2009.²⁴ Attention then turned to deliverable 5.2 which ambitiously addressed not only the design of an industry capability database²⁵ suitable for centralising and storing data from commercial suppliers across the SKA Member countries, but also a model (and ultimately a practical tool) for effectively gathering this data. The thinking behind this expansion of scope was simply that without some formal consistent methodology for gathering global industrial capability field data (and other national intelligence), the proposed database would be ineffective.

The INAF team developed a prototype database, which was then refined through practical testing using data gathered through SPDO’s register of industry contacts. Over several iterations, the database did become workable however by 2011 it had become clear that other commercially available systems were easily adaptable to SKA’s needs, relieving INAF from having to manage bespoke software with its inherent need for technical support.

10.9.1 SKA Global Capability Assessment Tool

Meanwhile the SPDO proceeded with the crafting of an SKA Global Capability Assessment tool. The model was developed as an initial strategic review process to assess the maturity and industrial capability of each SKA country/region to achieve and sustain contractual supply expectations (especially concerning on-time and on-quality deliveries) and expose any significant trade barriers.²⁶. The model did not replace any particular supplier assessment conducted as part of a specific procurement process during the preparatory or execution stage of the SKA project. In particular, the tool was designed to enable:

• identification of any gap(s) between the actual assessment and the expected capability, of SKA Organisation and country/region or key suppliers,

• facilitation of planning to cover the gaps identified during assessment,

• self-assessment by country/region or key suppliers,

• assistance with pre-selection of country/region or key suppliers for the development/construction of the SKA,

• companies to assess/select sub-tier suppliers for the development/construction of the SKA,

• Government agencies to assist in focusing support schemes on industry capability growth.

The output could also inform any decision to: (i) implement strategic foreign exchange contracts (‘hedging’) ahead of forecast procurements at the broad global scale, and (ii) adopt a decentralised procurement model.

Overall, the model’s purpose was to obtain a global view of strengths and weaknesses regarding regional, national, and business processes in relation to practical capability to deliver goods and services to the SKA project. The information derived was intended to provide useful input to procurement planning and help to strategically direct the Request for Quotation / Request for Tender processes and major contract award phases of the project. The tool, tested in both Australia and South Africa, essentially tackled the question—who can reliably and competitively do what? Unfortunately, following transition to the SKA Organisation at the end of 2011, the Global Capability Assessment tool fell by the wayside. In retrospect, the benefits of the model were never properly realised, and more recent observations of the pre-contractual phase indicate that it would have been a useful tool.

Through 2010 and into 2011, the PrepSKA WP5 team of Crosby (SPDO), Perna (INAF), and Riccardo Colengo (procurement consultant) continued research into analogous and best-practice procurement models for mega-science projects,²⁷ initially focusing on deliverable 5.3 relating to procurement model analyses, based on experience at national and international institutes (e.g. CERN, NASA, ITER).

The report, delivered in January 2010, built on deliverable 5.1 and addressed contracting models, procurement specifications, terms and conditions, quality assurance and risk, and covered approaches to ensure fairness and competitiveness. Importantly, specific experience was included from (then) recent and current international projects that informed and aided development of practical procurement policy and processes for the SKA. (Crosby, & Perna, 2010).²⁸

December 2010 saw the draft release of the PrepSKA WP5 Deliverable 5.4: a Procurement Options and Risk report (Crosby & Perna, 2010).²⁹ This document presented a summary of the SKA procurement environment and application of the procurement models examined and discussed in the previous report. The project required a good understanding of the procurement rules and legislation applying in the major trading regions of the participating countries, and a summary of such intelligence was included together with realistic options for operating the procurement office, and the associated risks. The paper also offered commentary on approaches to Member contract ‘balancing’—a prescient statement given the eventual direction of SKA procurement towards Fair Work Return.

The penultimate output from the PrepSKA WP5 Working Group was intended to be Deliverable 5.5: a report containing an inventory of national policies and SWOT analysis of refined procurement options for the SKA.³⁰ However, it was decided to combine reports 5.3, 5.4 and (a new) 5.5 into a single document that would eventually mature into a fully developed report integrating the research, findings, and recommendations as a White Paper.³¹ Meanwhile the required deliverable defined as “5.5” (in essence, explaining how to define a procurement policy and set up procurement processes to build the SKA) was drafted for discussion during a procurement workshop in late October 2011 in the UK (concurrent with the annual PrepSKA WP 2 meeting).

Feedback from the SKA community contributed significantly to teasing out the most useful areas of advice, and indeed, socialising of draft project policy documents realised many benefits. One example of this was an open meeting of the PrepSKA WP5 group prior to the main programme of the International SKA Forum 2011 (see next section) to review progress with procurement policy. The need for a broad industry capability ‘scouting’ activity was aired and with positive support, planned to commence later that year.

The final practical deliverable from PrepSKA WP5 (5.7) was a formal document encompassing a compressed version of all the WP5 effort, research, and advice in the form of a White Paper³² for tabling at the International SKA Forum 2012, and later distributed project -wide. Titled “Toward a procurement model for the SKA”, the document’s purpose was to enable effective design of the procurement system (policies, strategic sourcing, models, processes, supply chain considerations, and functional structures). Aimed at a general audience, the White Paper included a thorough discussion about work breakdown structures and supply chain design and management, up to acquisition management. It also included an analysis of options for policies and models for procurement made at a level compatible with the (then) current level of definition of the project. Global, local, and agreed-on procurement models were introduced and discussed and fitted in the framework of the SKA project constraints and the international procurement environment.

The White Paper contents were divided into two parts: Part A covering procurement strategies and the procurement framework, and part B covering options for procurement models for the SKA. The final version of the White Paper was submitted for an independent risk analysis, performed by an external consultant who evaluated the impact and weight of the applicability of the proposed procurement options in the framework of the SKA constraints. This was found to be a very worthwhile task and added polish to the final version.

10.10 Strategic Industry Engagement

An annual focal point, especially for external project stakeholders, was the annual International SKA Forums. These were first held in the potential site host nations (Australia and South Africa), later migrating to other Member countries and becoming larger events with more prominent industry attendance.

In June 2010, ASTRON, and its parent organisation, the Dutch Research Council (NWO) hosted ISKAF 2010. As with previous fora, many different meetings and activities were organised in and around the event. The climax of the week was the SKA Forum session itself, attended by scientists, engineers, industrialists, funding agencies and government, including many presentations from the broader SKA community. A trade exhibition was held with around 30 companies and organisations represented. Maria van der Hoeven, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs boosted local and international industry interest with the announcement of a new €2.1 M financial investment in ASTRON’s SKA technology program. This was specifically for the Aperture Array Verification Program (AAVP) led by ASTRON, setting a pattern of national government announcements riding on the SKA’s industrial opportunities.

ISKAF 2010 included the Connecting Industry, Science and Society (CISS) workshop, organised by local group Sensor Universe. The event focused on exploring cooperation between science and industry to foster industry-scientist interaction from an early stage, with an outcome being the Dutch Industry position paper on SKA, jointly produced by NXP, Siemens and IBM. The document described the importance of SKA to the Netherlands from an industry perspective, making a clear statement to the Netherlands Government and outlining the value of the SKA project to Dutch industry.

The following year, progress with development of SKA procurement guides and industry engagement models again featured at the SSEC meetings, with a study of options for IP management tabled.³³ The International SKA Forum 2011 was held in Banff, Canada, and hosted by the National Research Council (NRC). This annual event once again brought together representatives from science, national agencies, industry, and other stakeholders to review and discuss progress following the release of the pre-construction phase Project Execution Plan (PEP).³⁴

Reflecting a fresh emphasis on industrial participation, the organisers of the various regional and national industry clusters each gave an overview of their profile, structure, and anticipated benefits. Speakers from Australia, South Africa, Italy, UK, The Netherlands, and Canada each described how their clusters were growing in maturity and cohesiveness as they gained involvement in the SKA project. Delegates at the mid-week Forum Day in Banff were treated to stimulating keynote presentations from R&D executives from IBM and Boeing, each expressing the opportunities and challenges associated with large, complex, high-technology projects of the scale of the SKA. The upbeat mood for the commercial and scientific opportunities associated with the SKA was palpable, with industry expectations possibly peaking at this event.

The Industry and Engineering session at the Banff meeting was organised by the SPDO and was the largest to date at any International SKA Forum. Over 50 companies joined a similar number of science and institutional delegates to conduct a ‘deep dive’ into the industrialisation aspects of the SKA project. After several scene-setting talks by SPDO staff and from Cisco, participants were offered a choice of seven break-out sessions, each focusing on a particular technical domain and led by senior personnel from industry (see Fig. 10.5). The expert groups each reported back to the Forum with comments on future directions for their technologies and offering feedback concerning the value industry could bring in terms of R&D, strategic participation, supply, programmatics and experience (see Fig. 10.6).

Fig. 10.5

Wayne Goss (IBM, left) as Master of Ceremonies for the Industry and Engineering meeting at SKA2011 in Banff, Canada

Fig. 10.6

PrepSKA WP5 group at SKA2011, Banff, Canada. Left to right: Corrado Perna (INAF), David Luchetti (Australian Government), Peter Dewdney (SPDO), Riccardo Colengo (INAF Consultant), Simon Haynes (STFC), Simon Berry (STFC), Rob Millenaar (SPDO), Maaike Damen (NWO), obscured, Miriam Roelofs (NWO), Patricia Vogel (NWO), Phil Crosby (SPDO)

As with other SKA-related events, the International SKA Forum 2011 afforded an opportunity for several industry-related announcements. Cisco became the fourth international company to sign the Statement of Mutual Interest (SoMI) arrangement with the SPDO, thus opening the way for specific interactions concerning advanced digital signal transport technologies. Also John Humphreys from GIC, the secretariat of the ASKAIC, proposed a global ‘cluster of clusters’ industry network to support the SKA project³⁵ but this did not materialise.

The SPDO remained very active in this period in terms of industry events and building the project profile with presentations at many SKA meetings, including industry gatherings for the KTN in London, and at the Solar Flair event in Durham, UK, where the Boeing subsidiary, Spectrolab Inc., featured—heralding a fast-growing interest in the power supply aspects of the SKA. This meeting gave excellent exposure to a wide range of solar power experts and companies and led to important renewable energy contacts later in Germany. Meanwhile the Power Investigation Task Force (PITF) met in Oxford, where a speaker from Prudent Energy presented Vanadium Redox Battery technology as a practical option for a solar array energy storage system, together with some sobering data on the realities of the required scale of a renewable power infrastructure for the SKA.

Throughout the period 2010–2012, the SPDO continued to meet and talk to industry players regarding the project requirements, including a visit to the Selex Galileo Edinburgh facility to inspect radio frequency design and fabrication capability, meetings with IBM UK to discuss project management applications in their suite of software, and discussions with Circadian Power (UK) to get industrial perspectives on concentrated solar power technologies. Similarly, the challenges in relation to high-performance computing were addressed by Data Direct Networks (DDN) who outlined their Storage Fusion Architecture for balanced, high-performance storage systems. UK member support for the project was boosted by university visits and meetings between Manchester and Cambridge personnel and many high-technology companies.

PrepSKA WP 2 events were also highly valued and well attended by the key engineering staff in the various participating countries, their consortia groups, and attendant industry representatives. As the PrepSKA work gained pace and Conceptual Design Reviews and other technical evaluations were undertaken, the need for effective communications with industry about future procurement became ever more paramount, as evidenced by the inclusion of the WP5 team at WP2 meetings, and serious interest shown by representatives from the SoMI) partners (Fig. 10.7). These events allowed companies to understand the status of the project and the anticipated work programmes, as well as giving opportunities to meet the domain experts from the SPDO and network with other companies interested in the project.³⁶

Fig. 10.7

SPDO personnel and SoMI partners at the PrepSKA WP 2 meeting, Manchester, Oct 2011 (l to r): Phil Crosby (SPDO), Peter Matthewson (BAE Systems), Richard Schilizzi (SPDO), Tony Kinghorn (Selex-Galileo), Gerlinde Bedoe (NSN), Ian Kennedy (CISCO), (inset) Jan Blommaart (IBM)

While the Member countries each managed their domestic relationships with industry with varying effort and success, there remained a small number of multinational companies that invested substantial resources both in-country, and transnationally, in keeping close to the SKA project and its key protagonists. Examples of these included Boeing (initially, although later largely withdrew), Cisco, and IBM which proactively remained engaged with the SKA. (See Box 10.2).³⁷

Box 10.2 The IBM story

American computing giant IBM was particularly supportive of the SKA from the project’s early conception days based in The Netherlands. Leading IBM’s involvement was Bruce Elmegreen from IBM’s Watson’s Research Laboratories in New York, a noted astrophysicist and development engineer. Elemgreen (along with US colleagues Henry Brandt, Tom Liebsch, and Jan Blommaart in Holland) maintained close and regular contact with the SKA project through the SPDO years and beyond, providing valuable industry advice on large-scale computing as well as keynote talks at the annual International SKA Forums,^{38 39} and at the important COST meeting in Rome.

IBM contributed valuable strategic input concerning the trajectory of computing technology, including cost per computation, the outlook for Moore’s Law, storage and memory, and technology roadmaps in relation to processing hardware, processing speed, and power consumption. Unlike CISCO which also contributed crucial design intelligence but looked for more immediate design ‘down-selects’, the IBM team worked on a 10+ year timescale, fully expecting delays and a later partitioning of the project into SKA Phase 1 (with its cost cap) and SKA Phase 2. Moreover, involvement with the Dutch LOFAR instrument (which employed an IBM Blue Gene machine) helped IBM define the need for future exascale streaming analysis (a.k.a. computing-on-the-fly) that would ultimately underpin the SKA as an ICT machine.

Nonetheless, IBM were very careful to adopt a firm position of working with the SKA project but remaining at arm’s length in terms of detailed design input or proximity to the SKA Leadership. As Elmegreen noted in a 2020 interview, “If we gave you so much technology input to your design, we would not be allowed to bid … because we would have an unfair advantage. Following procurement, another company could complain”. Elmegreen added, “Maybe that hurt us, but we had no choice. [However] we always felt that we were listened to, we always felt welcome”. There’s little doubt that this finely tuned engagement worked well at the time, and will pay off in the longer term, with IBM continuing to brief the SKA team with new developments in the realm of exascale high-performance computing.

A point of tension observed by both multi-national and Member country industrial stakeholders (including IBM) was the ‘make or buy’ choice that would inevitably arise in the procurement era. While industry acknowledged the inspirational nature of the engineering challenge as outlined in the SKA IES,⁴⁰ many would-be suppliers were quick to point out the cost advantages of (COTS) technology, as against the largely academia-based push for bespoke solutions. IBM’s Bruce Elmegreen characterised the SKA project as an almost perfect customer for something big and great, with excellent potential for discovery, and clear opportunities in adjacent markets, thereby making it an excellent candidate for collaboration with IBM’s product development team. It is interesting to note that IBM even postulated the commissioning of an intercontinental cable for SKA data traffic, with revenue potential through leasing to other mega-scale data customers—just one idea among many imagined by industry excited by the inspirational nature of the SKA.

10.11 Ongoing Industry Engagement 2012

Following the establishment of the SKA Organisation (SKAO) at the end of 2011, the new SKA Project Office replacing the SPDO continued to interact with industry. Staff established contact with industry representatives to explore capability and technology pathways more broadly related to space science, with examples including Ciena Inc. (US), Orbit Communications (Israel), Vega Space (Telespazio VEGA, UK), as well as exploring new cryo-cooling technologies with engineers from Honeywell (US). Meanwhile, Crosby (by this time returned to Australia) facilitated meetings between top-level SKAO management and large-scale industrial project management (infrastructure) experts from Fluor Ltd., and Worley Parsons, in order to lift understanding around mega-scale infrastructure project management.

The SKAO Project Office continued to build its ‘knowledge-bank’ of mega-project management through high-level interactions with experienced multi-national firms and agencies. In March 2012, the International Centre for Complex Project Management (ICCPM) held its first Complex Project Management Roundtable in Australia. Crosby (SPDO) and Simon Berry (STFC) joined around 40 other mega-project experts from across the spectrum of government and the private sector, including aerospace firms such as BAE Systems and Thales. David Pitchford, Executive Director of the UK’s Major Projects Authority, gave the keynote address and specifically addressed SKA in his speech. The closing remarks were given by Kim Gilles, Vice President Boeing Australia, who recognised the value of lessons learned through projects analogous to the SKA.

Both SKA precursors (ASKAP and MeerKAT) continued to engage with industry to support site engineering work, and electronics fabrication. In South Africa, contracts were put in place for the radio frequency chain, dishes, and receiver support. Tenders were announced for antenna positioners, and partners evaluated for the digitiser, timing and frequency reference, and science processing. ACTOM (Pty) Ltd, the largest manufacturer and distributor of electromechanical equipment in Africa, won contracts for providing major power distribution components.

In Australia, workshops held in Perth on SKA Power and SKA Networking attracted over 20 firms to review the known SKA requirements and Project Execution Plan phase work. ICRAR ICT established a number of industry collaborations including agreements with Data Direct Networks and ThoughtWorks. Fremantle-based (WA) company, Poseidon Scientific Instruments was awarded a A$1.3 M contract to help deliver a key SKA precursor located at the Murchison Radioastronomy Observatory (MRO).

In Europe, the VIA-SKA project (Viability study of the Spanish industrial participation in the SKA), produced a first survey of the capacities of Spanish industry in 2012. More than 40 companies showed their specific interest in areas ranging from design and manufacturing of antennas and aperture arrays to data processing and signal transport and synchronisation.

Discussions in Portugal, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands on sustainable energy options for the SKA led to an initiative to organise a two-day seminar in June 2012, with a focus on applications to the SKA.

In Canada, the University of Calgary hosted an industry workshop in April 2012, with the purpose of communicating the processes and timelines of the SKA pre-construction phase. The aim was to foster international linkages and the national collaborations between Canadian industry and government and university research and development laboratories for Canadian participation in the pre-construction phase of the SKA, as well as establish a Canadian SKA Industry Consortium similar to industry organisations established in other participating countries.

In March, UKTI KTN hosted a meeting for UK companies to learn about the overall structure of the SKA pre-construction phase. Nearly 60 organisations were represented—from major international companies to small- and medium-sized companies and specialist firms. An aspect that became clear at this gathering was the increasing credibility of the SKA project and its non-core benefits in terms of commercial participation, in some cases stimulating investment in technology design generally.

In September 2011, BAE Systems recognised Crosby and Georgina Harris (SPDO) for their collaborative efforts in early industry engagement with the SKA through the announcement of a BAE SYSTEMS Chairman’s Award (Figs. 10.8 and 10.9).

Fig. 10.8

2011 Award ceremony at BAE Systems, Portsmouth, UK where Phil Crosby and Georgina Harris shared the Chairman’s Award for work on the SKA with BAE Staff

Fig. 10.9

BAE Systems notice of the award presentation, which was for collaboration during the concept phase of the SKA mega-project

10.12 Effectiveness of Approaches to Industry

In the years prior to 2009, approaches to, and interactions with, industry from the major western SKA Members were essentially ad-hoc and opportunistic, relying mainly on past and ongoing relationships between members of the science and engineering teams and known, trusted suppliers. Many of these companies had worked successfully before with the scientific agencies and institutes, and in some cases collaborated in joint developments. By and large, such arrangements were appropriate and could often exploit contractual efficiencies through “preferred supplier” status, pre-approved schedules of components and/or labour, extensions of term contracts, or simply exploit goodwill. In South Africa and India especially, there was a preference for drawing on trusted (and in the case of EMSS Antennas in South Africa, co-located) suppliers, whereas in China the research teams looked mostly to government factories (e.g. CETC-54) for any large scale procurements.

From early 2010, thinking within SPDO on industrial participation had matured to the point that the first (virtual) gathering of ILOs, and the release of the first iteration of the SKA IES document⁴¹ took place. The IES was the first formal guide for both SKA Member countries, as well as actual and potential industrial collaborators. This document covered the goals of industry engagement, expectations of both the project and industry, principles of engagement, capability assessment, and risk management. It also offered a framework for global industrial engagement strategies and remained an important framing document throughout the SPDO era and beyond, being updated at least annually.

Under the stewardship of nominated (ILOs), national industry groups and consortia formed (and re-formed) as the tone, scope, and timescales of the project developed. While the larger firms tended to stay interested and closely monitored progress through attendance at meetings and workshops, smaller suppliers with fewer resources tended to come and go, with many moving to a ‘watching brief’ status once the realities of budget and schedule (i.e. slippage) became obvious. One important avenue of sustained connection to the SKA development program was participation in the technical design consortia, although only a few of these arrangements enjoyed remunerated contracts—most were either in-kind contributions or simply goodwill involvement gambling on being better positioned to win a profitable contract during the construction phase.

Notwithstanding such arrangements, there were certainly missed opportunities. Promising early relationships with firms such as Communications Engineering Australia (now CEA Technologies Pty Ltd)—experts in array design with a real interest in beamforming—went undeveloped after the key CSIRO contact left Australia. Similarly, potentially seminal relationships with both Raytheon and Boeing cooled when engagement beyond the SKA ILOs was not exploited or sustained. The eventual withdrawal of the National Science Foundation also impacted on US companies interest. On the other hand, for some early motivated technology companies, the timescales between conceptual design and profitable supply contracts were simply too long. Peter Elford from Cisco captured this sentiment in the open forum at the Banff International SKA Forum (2011) when he stated: “Right now, the SKA may seem like a project to the scientists and engineers, but to industry it’s just a conversation”. Possibly the one big lesson from this experience is not to over-sell the project opportunities to industry too early.

Another probable missed opportunity was the lack of use, post-2012, of the Capability Assessment Tool⁴² (about which more below) crafted by the SPDO in 2010 and field tested both in Australia and South Africa.⁴³ This device, in the hands of a trained assessor, offered a mature process to guide the consistent assessment of the SKA Consortia Member countries in terms of industry capability, as well as a common model to identify regions/countries/organisations that have (or could have) capability to achieve sustainable on-time  and on-quality delivery.

10.13 Industry Engagement: The Journey to SKA Procurement

There are many positives to the industry engagement effort through the ISPO and SPDO eras, with several contributing a lasting legacy to the SKA project going forward from 2012:

• The early work of developing productive relationships with known and trusted industry players set an excellent foundation that both inspired many collaborations with industry and gave confidence to governments to support the project at the national level in the Member countries.

• Many benefits flowed from personal and professional relationships as a result of plentiful opportunities to interact with industry. The encouragement given to industry to attend and speak at briefings, international project meetings, high-level fora, and Member-organised national gatherings, engendered a spirit of cooperation and sharing of ideas.

• The ambitious science goals of the SKA served as a catalyst for truly innovative thinking by industry. Presented with the challenge of a highly demanding application, industry responded with thought-provoking and creative concepts fostered by a sophisticated project team. Many of these solutions will no doubt emerge in adjacent products and technology.

Nonetheless, there are also many lessons to be gleaned from the experience, including:

• The dangers of misunderstanding the expectations of industry. While the larger ‘primes’ (e.g. BAE systems, Cisco, etc.) are well used to R & D phases lasting many years, encompassing both dead-ends and breakthroughs, the majority of industry partners envision a shorter timescale between initial interactions and commercial contracts. In retrospect, the initial projections for the early contractual and procurement phases were not only optimistic, but prone to continual slippage. This resulted in much disenchantment within early industry associations. At the time of transition from SPDO to SKAO, the project mantra was that procurement was only a year or two away, whereas history has shown it commenced in earnest a decade later.

• While the physical interactions between the project and industry were useful and positive, little of the advice and feedback from industry was heeded in terms of adopting an industrial project management environment that would have meshed better with industry and provided a ‘drumbeat’ for the project. Too often, offers of support from industry went unanswered, (e.g. project tools and training from Boeing, and battery storage solutions from Prudent Energy) and at times the project participants (both SPDO and the partner institutes) seemed reluctant to accept external input.

• In hindsight, the overall structure and process of shaping and executing the industry engagement function (largely under PrepSKA WP5) was inefficient and constrained by traditional and formal framework for scientific project funding.  Committee oversight, work allocation and milestone reporting could have benefitted by a lighter touch, and the process of international collaboration was often clumsy and probably resulted in too many meetings and documents produced without a clear audience or user - either in the project or in the funding agencies. Much of what constituted “output” from WP5 was never revisited post-2012 for reasons that are not entirely clear.

The initial idea of adopting and integrating mainly COTS components to fulfil the vision of a massive, yet affordable, instrument was a seductive one, but could never be properly reconciled with the scientists’ desire to push the capabilities as far as possible. It was never wholeheartedly embraced through the concept development era, evidenced through reluctance by many of the international design teams to willingly take up offers by industry to collaborate. This attitude can isolate institutional design teams from taking advantage of commercial product development leading to increased costs from inevitable re-design.

Notwithstanding the less successful outcomes from early industry engagement processes, the underlying experience, enduring relationships, and other benefits of stakeholder association with such an aspirational project will no doubt pay off in time. The original ‘open procurement’ stance did not prevail into the early construction phase; the project protagonists reasoning that the specialist nature of cutting-edge science infrastructure requires that contractual risk should be minimised through ‘directed’ procurement, ideally via alliance-style contracting. To this end, the (European Commission supported) GO-SKA policy guidance project (November 2011—January 2015) addressed procurement through to the construction phase and endorsed the approach of undertaking work through a mixture of direct procurement and in-kind contributions from the Members. Accordingly, this adopted procurement policy was reflected in the 2016 Prospectus (for the SKA Organisation) and the 2020 version for the SKA Observatory.

While the overall effort could no doubt have been more effective on a global scale, the complex task of matching of industry with the critical capabilities, technologies, and challenges of the SKA will likely be delivered through arrangements that will unfold during procurement, construction, and commissioning.