Social Accountability in Lebanon: Collaboration Rather Than Confrontation in Times of Crisis

Abstract

This chapter brings a case study of social accountability (SA) initiative in Lebanon, focusing on the relationship between community-based committees and municipalities. It explores different meanings of SA, which in this context focuses more on the possibility of people to question the municipality’s actions, and latter’s openness to this kind of questioning. SA therefore takes a more reactive form, and is more accepted in the case of failure to respond to people’s priorities, while steering away from financial accountability. Local actors emphasise direct communication as a primary tool for SA. Collaboration is more valued than confrontation as it seen as more likely to yield positive results and change. During the multifaceted crisis in Lebanon, citizens’ expectations of municipalities and their respective roles are shifting towards responding to basic needs. This is coinciding with municipalities’ diminished resources to fulfil their duties. Municipalities therefore look to local citizen committees for support. This opens the door for collaborative planning, if certain boundaries are respected.

5.1 Introduction

This Lebanon case study is part of a larger research project on social accountability (SA) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), including Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia (see Chapter 1: Introduction in this volume). The three case studies revolve around the overall question of what SA looks like on the ground. In the case of Lebanon, the study presents key findings related to the concept of SA in the country. It links SA practices and activities to several key events in the MENA region and in Lebanon more specifically.

The case study examines local committees in two villages, Baaqline and Baysour, located in the Chouf district (qaḍāʾ) of the Mount Lebanon governorate (muḥāfaza). Both villages took part in one of the cohorts implemented by ‘Peacebuilding in Lebanon’, a project run by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) since 2007. The collaboration focused on creating mechanisms for social stability for each village. The two villages were selected because they were considered at high risk for tensions due to a population increase (Syrian refugees) and difficult living conditions. The project was implemented in tandem with the municipalities and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA).

I describe the link to SA through the relationship between the local committees¹ and their respective municipalities. I document the role and understanding of local committees acting as local mechanisms to hold the municipalities accountable through the former’s identification of priorities, decision-making and implementation of community-based activities. I also examine the different meanings local stakeholders ascribe to SA, document mobilisation methods used by local committees and municipalities, analyse the responses of the latter and shed light on the outcomes. The research revolves around the following main research question: What does accountability look like for the people on the ground?

The main question was divided into four subquestions:

• 1. Multiple meanings: what do locals understand by the word ‘accountability’? How do citizens engaged in SA mechanisms refer to it and ascribe meaning to it?

• 2. Mobilisation methods: how did local activists get the attention of fellow citizens (mobilising them) and of the officials in power responsible for providing certain types of information or services (i.e. how did they get them to listen)?

• 3. Responses from authorities: how did local activists maintain momentum in terms of mobilisation and how did they get power holders and officials to commit to providing the information and services? What motivated the official(s) to commit?

• 4. Outcomes: how did activists get power holders to deliver on their commitments? Did they succeed in exacting accountability at all, and if so, to what extent? And are there some signs of their commitments being institutionalised? What are the reasons for successes and/or failures?

5.2 Methodology

The case study was developed with data collected predominantly through qualitative methods. These included a review of relevant documents on SA, its background in Lebanon, the local context and community actors, contributing to a better design and tailoring of the methods and guiding questions. Five semi-structured interviews were conducted with two mayors (of Baaqline and Barbara; the latter is a small village in the Jbeil district in Mount Lebanon), two local committee representatives (Baaqline and Baysour) and one municipality spokesperson (Baysour). The interview with Barbara’s mayor was added to better understand findings on the shift in roles and people’s expectations from the municipalities during the public health (Covid-19) and economic crises.

An additional interview was conducted with the social policy and management consultant contracted by UNDP, who facilitated the formation and capacity-building processes of both local committees. The consultant worked with the committees for over a year. Support included coaching on participatory needs assessments, planning, capacity-building and implementation. I identified the case study and located both committees with the support of this consultant, who is a former colleague. I did not previously work or interact with the local committees and their respective municipalities in any way.

One focus group discussion (FGD) was conducted with seven members of Baaqline’s local committee, comprising four women and three men: the committee representative and six local activists or delegates of community-based organisations (CBOs). Participation was voluntary, and the invitation was shared in the committee’s WhatsApp group. I could not conduct a similar FGD with Baysour’s committee due to members’ lack of interest and availability.

Before conducting the interviews and FGD, I explained the background and objectives of the case study and collected interviewees’ informed consent to their participation and the recording of the interview. Recordings were transcribed and translated from Arabic into English with the help of a research assistant. Findings were analysed manually according to themes based on the research questions. Interviews lasted on average 40 minutes and were conducted online via Zoom or Microsoft Teams, due to the challenges of commuting amidst the fuel crisis in Lebanon, or in person at the municipality.

One additional workshop was organised online to validate the findings, including a presentation of preliminary findings answering the different research questions. The workshop was attended by 10 participants: the local committee representatives, one mayor who had taken part in the research, the UNDP project coordinator for Mount Lebanon, the vice president of a municipality in Mount Lebanon (Jeddayel), the former social policy and management consultant of the project, two local development consultants and one local researcher.

5.3 Accountability in Lebanon in Context

Lebanon was founded as a parliamentary democracy in which power is shared among religious communities according to the concept of confessionalism. Political parties were established reflecting citizens’ ideologies and religious beliefs. Politics in Lebanon is highly tied to sectarian elites, who use their positions of power to influence citizens and who have access to the state’s resources. The Lebanese system has long been described as ‘dysfunctional and problematic’ (Haase, 2018, 793) because of the highly clientelist power-sharing relationships between sectarian leaders and citizens. Hence, there is limited space for citizen participation in political life and decision-making. Also, Lebanon has been deeply affected by the influence and domination of foreign powers (Haase, 2018, 793).

Sectarianism is a complex phenomenon, and the sectarian system is deeply rooted in Lebanese politics. This system, first introduced in 1843 in Mount Lebanon, is considered one of the major contributors to the Lebanese civil war, which occurred from 1975 until 1990. Sectarianism was not applied to the rest of the Lebanese territories before the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 under the French Mandate and was not fully formed and developed until the country’s independence in 1943. The elites in power, representing Maronite and Sunni interests, joined in an unwritten agreement also known as the ‘National Pact of 1943’. This agreement distributed power positions on a sectarian basis: the presidency for the Maronites, the premiership for the Sunnis and the parliament speakership for the Shiites (Ofeish, 1999).

As a result of the Pact, sectarian conflicts increased. This, together with the constant influence of foreign powers in the country, triggered the start of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. Foreign interference was highlighted in the Taif Agreement of 1989, when different foreign powers negotiated in Saudi Arabia to find a formal way to end the war. The negotiations resulted in the Taif Agreement, which contained reforms to the sectarian system that did not materialise, however (Ofeish, 1999). The influence of sectarian elites grew even more after the civil war, which tremendously impacted Lebanese politics as people’s loyalties remained tied to their sectarian Za’īm (male leader) in exchange for services. Thus, there was less regard for national ties (Karam, 2017). Social accountability in Lebanon is affected by all these characteristics.

5.3.1 Legal Context

The Lebanese Constitution states in its preamble² that the people are the source of all power, given that the country is a parliamentary democracy. People have the ‘authority and right’ as citizens to hold public officials accountable. The Constitution also guarantees the practice of accountability through parliamentary elections, in which Lebanese people have the right to choose their representatives (“Lebanese Constitution” n.d.). Moreover, the Constitution acknowledges the importance of internal accountability practices through the principle of separation of powers.³ In its articles 8⁴ and 13,⁵ it highlights the importance of ‘liberty and freedom’, which are major pillars of SA practices (Moukheiber, 2021).

In 2017, the Lebanese Parliament ratified the Access to Information Law. It serves as a valuable legal instrument in the practice of accountability, as it enables citizens to evaluate and monitor the performance of public administrations (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] et al., 2018). The ratification of the law was considered a breakthrough, giving citizens, journalists, and researchers the right to access all public institutions’ files except for ‘personal data, state security documents and confidential diplomatic information’ (Chehayeb, 2020). In 2020, Parliament adopted Law no.175/2020, which provides legal grounds for fighting corruption in the public sector and requests the establishment of a national anti-corruption commission, 11 years after Lebanon acceded to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). The law lays the foundation for accountability practices, highlights the importance of investigations, identifies corruption cases in the public sector and monitors the enforcement of anti-corruption-related laws. It also defines corruption and sets penalties for corrupt practices, ‘including up to three years of imprisonment and a fine amounting to at least double the value of the bribe’ (Chehayeb, 2020).

5.3.2 Civil Society Organisations Pre-Arab Spring

Civil society organisations (CSOs) act as a ‘watchdog’ and have the power to hold public officials accountable through lobbying, spreading awareness or applying direct pressure (El Mufti, 2015). This section offers a brief description of some CSOs and initiatives that have been active in Lebanon since before the Arab Spring in 2011 on issues related to SA. Two organisations have been mainly concentrating on issues pertaining to the aftermath of the civil war (1975–1990). The Committee of the Families of Kidnapped and Disappeared in Lebanon was formed in 1982 to lobby for clarity on the fate of individuals who disappeared during the civil war. The committee’s main aim is to push politicians to officially take into account the issue of missing people (Civil Society Knowledge Centre, 2015). Support of Lebanese in Detention and Exile (SOLIDE) was established in 1990 to work on the issue of the disappearance of victims and arbitrary detention during the civil war.

Other organisations tackle political, legal and human rights issues. The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) was launched in response to Parliament’s decision to postpone the elections in 1996 (AbiYaghi, 2012). It has since been active in monitoring and evaluating all proceedings relevant to elections. At a broader level, the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA) was founded in 1999 in response to the increasing rate of corruption in the country. Its work focuses on encouraging and supporting civil society to hold officials accountable and ensure transparency in public institutions (Transparency-lebanon.org, accessed 10 February 2023). The Legal Agenda in turn was created in 2009 with the hope of bringing a ‘critical and multidisciplinary approach to law and justice in Arab countries’ (Legal Agenda n.d.). The organisation focuses on political, civil, social and economic rights.

5.3.3 The Arab Spring and its Spillover Effects in Lebanon

More than a decade ago, accountability seemed unattainable across Arab states. On 7 December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire in front of the local government building in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia (Gelvin, 2015). This incident led to the eruption of a series of civil protests propelled by wide discontent due to the unequal distribution of ‘civic, political and social rights of citizenship between different groups and societal classes’ (Vloeberghs & Bergh, 2021, 5) that set off what became known as the Arab Spring. A wave of revolutions rippled through the MENA region in 2011 and the following years, in Tunisia and other Arab countries such as Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria (Ma’oz, 2014). The Arab Spring is considered an important event in the history of the region, as it united citizens from different countries to demand justice, freedom and ‘accountable governance’ (Vloeberghs & Bergh, 2021, 5). However, its outcomes varied across countries. In Tunisia, the uprising resulted in the departure of President Ben Ali and political reforms. In Egypt, President Mubarak was overthrown while in Syria, a long-lasting civil war erupted, resulting in a severe refugee and humanitarian crisis that affected many countries (Elagati, 2011).

In 2011, Lebanon shortly became part of the Arab uprisings, as hundreds of Lebanese protested in Beirut calling for an end to the sectarian system. This march was planned on Facebook, with the organisers demanding a ‘secular, civil, democratic, socially just and equal state’ (“Lebanese protest”, 2011). However, the marches and mobilisation did not last long, as the movement did not manage to attract attention outside of the capital (Halabi, 2019) and scepticism among youth about the outcomes of the Arab Spring developed (Rosiny, 2018).

In 2015, civil movements grew stronger as a reaction to the garbage crisis. This crisis started when one of the biggest landfills in the country had to be closed as it had reached maximum capacity and the government failed to find a replacement. A large number of protestors took the streets, demanding an end to the crisis and using the slogan ‘You stink’ in reference to the country’s political leaders, who had left the country ‘paralysed’ for years (Yahya, 2015). These protests highlighted the importance of civil society movements, shedding light on the concept of accountability with the aim of generating long-lasting change. This paved the way to another mass uprising in the country in 2019.

On 6 May 2018, parliamentary elections took place after a nine-year hiatus, as Parliament had extended its own mandate on more than one occasion (LADE, 2018). A new electoral law enabled the Lebanese diaspora to vote from abroad for the first time in the country’s history. However, the election process lacked transparency. According to Transparency International, the Supervisory Commission for Elections operated with ‘such inefficiency and poor transparency’ that it created an ‘unfair advantage for candidates’ (Transparency International, 2018, 3).

On 17 October 2019, an evening protest in Beirut grew into a mass uprising. Activists and independent groups formed political parties and came together to mobilise protests. People took to the streets in reaction to the economic decay in the country, with several demands under the slogan ‘all of them means all of them’⁶ (Saab et al., 2021). Demands encompassed different aspects of Lebanese citizens’ lives and highlighted common hardships. The uprising targeted various issues in the Lebanese political administration and system: corruption, inefficiency, unemployment, sectarianism and clientelism (Saab et al., 2021).

This uprising broke through social and sectarian barriers. It was the first time in the history of Lebanon that citizens from all confessions, sectarian and political affiliations, generations, social and economic backgrounds and professions were united. Protestors succeeded in electing Melhem Khalaf to Parliament, and with him a new generation of young leaders and activists as a result of independents winning seats in student elections across different Lebanese universities. However, the scale of mobilisations has clearly decreased. Many observers link this decrease to the economic crisis, the Covid-19 outbreak and state oppression (Comaty et al., 2021).

5.3.4 The Current Multidimensional Crisis

Since 2020, Lebanon has experienced a multidimensional crisis, caused by political uncertainty and economic collapse and exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic and the fallout from the August 2020 Beirut Port explosion. Aggravated political and economic instability has affected the livelihoods, living conditions and safety of different populations in the country while increasing inequality (Abed et al., 2020). Thousands of people have been thrown into poverty as a result of these interrelated crises (Médecins sans Frontières, 2021). More than 55 per cent of the population is struggling to meet its basic needs and lives below the poverty line. The country is suffering from hyperinflation, with inflation averaging 84 per cent in 2020 (World Bank, 2021b). Salaries in Lebanese pounds have continuously lost value against the rapid cost increase of goods and services (United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 2021). Moreover, around 1.5 million Syrian refugees are currently hosted in Lebanon, equivalent to a quarter of its population. With the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world, social stability in many municipalities is fragile, as the large numbers of people increase pressure on already stretched services and infrastructure (International Labour Organization [ILO] n.d.). The World Bank categorised the current situation in Lebanon as among the top three ‘most severe crisis episodes globally’ since the nineteenth century (World Bank, 2021a).

The current situation has fuelled both inter- and intracommunity tensions, which already ran high. Access to jobs, services, resources and humanitarian and international aid has become more challenging (World Vision International, 2015). Relationships among communities are put to the test, with social, economic, geographical and confessional divides widening (El Mufti, 2015). Communal relations are deteriorating, driving tensions along with an increase in incidents and escalations triggered by the worsening economic situation, job losses, rising poverty and deterioration of services (UNDP et al., 2023).

The dysfunctional sectarian system in Lebanon has been the main contributor to the unprecedented economic crisis (Hubbard, 2020). The crisis built up for years due to the flawed political system, which hindered rational policy-making and enabled the growth of widespread of corruption and waste (Hubbard, 2020). Corruption has been a prominent issue in Lebanon for years. According to Transparency International (2022), Lebanon is ranked 150th out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index, with a score of 24/100 (a country’s score is the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0–100, where 0 means highly corrupt and 100 means very clean). Lebanese citizens have lost confidence in government officials, as the former act in pursuit of their personal interests, leaving the public interest on the side. Despite the severe impact of corruption on Lebanese society, the government has made little effort to fight it (Haase, 2018).

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Inter-Ministerial and Municipal Platform for Assessment, Coordination and Tracking (IMPACT)—an e-governance platform owned by the Central Inspection of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers—introduced new modules to fulfil crisis response needs. The government established the platform to facilitate people’s access to permits for moving around during national lockdowns. It was later used as the key and only reference for vaccination appointments and delivery. IMPACT is a one-of-a-kind public initiative that offers access to data collected by different public sector agencies (of ministries and municipalities). The overall aim is to enhance transparency and accountability of these institutions through the wider adoption of citizens’ right to access to information (https://impact.cib.gov.lb/home, accessed 5 February 2023). Nevertheless, ownership of data generated by IMPACT remains a source of dispute between the Central Inspection and the prime minister (IMPACT team, 2021).

5.3.5 Local Systems of Governance

Lebanon is divided into eight governorates, 26 districts and 1108 municipalities. Each governorate is headed by a muḥāfaz (governor) appointed by decree by the Council of Ministers (CAS, 2023). Municipalities aim to achieve local development within their area. They are subject to the Municipal Law promulgated by Decree-law no. 118/77 from 1977 and its amendments. They consist of a decision-making authority, embodied in the municipal council elected on the basis of general and direct vote, and an executive authority (Mourad & Al-Siddiq, 2018). The president (mayor) and vice president (deputy mayor) are elected by the municipal council. The municipal council has to have a clear agenda and is tasked with monitoring and planning different development projects in the area (Mourad & Al-Siddiq, 2018).

Article 47 of the Municipal Law states that ‘each work of public character or interest, within the municipal area, falls within the scope of the municipal council’s competence’ (Mourad & Al-Siddiq, 2018, 12). The municipal council has the authority to note its recommendations concerning subjects and projects related to public needs and public policies in its municipal area. It ‘is the competent authority in making decisions on subjects that do not fall within the scope of competence of any other authority, be it central or local’ (12). Therefore, municipal tasks consist mostly of providing basic infrastructure, such as paving roads, providing lighting and planning public parks. Since municipalities also issue work and building permits, collect fees and taxes and provide/oversee educational and health services, their role is important, as they directly influence the daily lives of their citizens. Hence, transparency and accountability are very important pillars of the municipal council’s practices, at least in theory (Gherbal Initiative⁷& UNDP Lebanon, 2020).

5.3.6 The Peacebuilding Project and Local Committees

Under the peacebuilding project mentioned earlier, UNDP partnered with the MoSA, aiming to reduce existing tensions between host and displaced communities. The project worked on reaching stability through providing a common space for the local community to express its concerns and participate in resolving conflicts (UNDP, 2018). The project (which is ongoing in other municipalities) aims at enhancing mutual understanding and social cohesion by addressing root causes of conflict. It also works on addressing the impact of the Syrian crisis on social stability in Lebanon. The project supports different groups—from local leaders to educators, youth, media professionals, journalists and civil society activists—in developing both medium- and long-term strategies for peacebuilding, crisis management and conflict prevention (UNDP n.d.).

The project included Baaqline and Baysour among its cohorts between 2017 and 2018. Both areas, unlike others that were part of the project, managed to form committees composed of 15 members each, all of whom were from the Druze sect, and brought together loyal supporters (of the municipality) and representatives from the political opposition (who run against each other during municipal elections or are part of opposing political parties and families). These committees cooperated on a strategic plan for the village. They are two rare cases where different sides came together to work to the benefit of the village in a structured manner. The committees included municipal council members, local activists and representatives of CBOs. They also had a higher representation of women and youth than other committees, which were dominated by men (social policy and management consultant, personal communication, 18 August 2021, online).

Baaqline is located in the Chouf district in the Mount Lebanon governorate and presents a rich and unique combination of cultural, historical and natural heritage. It is characterised by the presence of mostly Druze families and a minority of Christian families, with active yet relatively limited social relationships. It has around 17,000 inhabitants living in 2,870 homes (Ghosseini, 2017). Baaqline is an important Druze town, as it is the seat of the sect’s religious leaders. The Druze are a small religious sect (minority) characterised by ‘an eclectic system of doctrines and by a cohesion and loyalty among its members (at times politically significant) that have enabled them to maintain for centuries their close-knit identity and distinctive faith’ (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2022). An estimated 2,800 Syrian refugees reside in Baaqline (social policy and management consultant, personal communication, 18 August 2021, online).

Baysour is a village located in the district of Aley, also an administrative division of the Mount Lebanon governorate. It is more homogeneous in terms of religious groups, as it mainly consists of Druze communities. However, it is surrounded by villages with diverse religious and political backgrounds, with whom relations were tense in the past (“Baysour” n.d.). The total population in the area is estimated to be around 12,000 (Union of Municipalities of the Gharb Aala and Chahhar [Uomgac] n.d.). The village also hosts around 3,500 Syrian refugees since the beginning of the crisis.

5.4 Multiple Meanings

Having provided a background to the political system in Lebanon and the context of the case studies, I now turn to presenting my findings for each of the four sub-research questions. As for the first subquestion, I found that accountability and SA take on several meanings in the local context of Lebanon. In the absence of a clearly designated and synonymous word in Arabic, accountability lends itself to two translations and interpretations. The first is linked to muḥāsaba: the act of holding someone or an entity accountable for their actions (or inaction). This definition has a negative connotation and has closer ties to financial accountability. The second interpretation starts from musāʾala and is closer to ‘questioning’. In the following, the meanings associated with these two interpretations are presented from most to least frequent, as described by the stakeholders interviewed.

5.4.1 Accountability as Holding Authorities to Account

Different understandings and explanations among research participants revolved around the capacity of holding local authorities (municipalities) accountable by asking about their performance and plans. The most common interpretation of SA was constituents asking the municipality or the municipality being asked by constituents about actions or the lack thereof. This openness to being questioned is a major step that municipalities feel they are taking towards SA at the local level. This acceptance is not taken for granted. These actors perceived being open to people’s questioning as an effort to be acknowledged by the people they try to serve. This points to the importance of communication as a primary tool for SA in the perception of different stakeholders, as will be established below. As the mayor of Baaqline stated:

Any citizen has the right to question the municipality. To ask is a duty and to respond is a duty as well. This is accountability. The citizen has to ask and you, as a person holding a position of power, have to respond. (Baaqline mayor, personal communication, 13 August 2021, in person)

Municipalities agreed on the need to be questioned by different actors, but this remains conditional on when, why (which topics) and how (communication rather than confrontation) it is done. Municipalities and CSOs alike felt that they can, or should be, questioned if they fail to fulfil their duties.

The willingness and capacity to hold local authorities to account has evolved after the 2019 uprising. Interviews and the discussion during the validation workshop pointed to the growing sense of accountability, especially among the younger generation. According to a Baaqline local committee representative, young people are less affected by social pressures at the local level, unlike their parents, and have more courage to demand clarity and accountability (personal communication, 9 August 2021, online). There is growing ownership of and demands for holding public servants accountable and responsible for what they have accomplished in their areas, especially for those who have been in office for a long time. This was backed by the social policy and management consultant, who expressed that people feel that their voices can now be heard and that they can make a difference, unlike before (personal communication, 18 August 2021, online). This also contributed to a shift in the mayors’ mindset, whereby they began to fear being publicly shamed.

5.4.2 Accountability as Responding to Local Needs

For social activists, SA also meant holding a person in a position of power accountable for fulfilling the tasks dictated by their role. According to local committee members, the municipality should provide citizens with their basic rights, and they can hold it accountable in case it fails to do so. Members felt that the mayor is ‘someone in a position of power, this person has tasks; we shall hold him/her accountable if he/she did not accomplish the required tasks’ (Baaqline local committee FGD, 13 August 2021). They also stated that accountability is achieved when responsible people are questioned adequately and malpractices are not ignored. When people are held accountable, it forces them to do their jobs right. Therefore, SA is closely tied to the municipalities’ capacity to identify and respond to local needs. The more a municipality manages to deliver the services needed or expected by their constituents, the less it is subject to being held accountable. Thus, identifying supportand understanding local needs is an essential step in the local understanding of SA. Local committees the municipalities in this process by connecting them with people and active CBOs.

At the same time, stakeholders pointed to the increase in expectations during the multifaceted crisis in Lebanon, with people increasingly turning to municipalities with their requests and demands, given that these are the closest local authorities (Baaqline local committee representative, personal communication, 9 August 2021, online; Baysour municipality spokesperson, personal communication, 11 August 2021, online; social policy and management consultant, personal communication, 18 August 2021, online; Barbara mayor, personal communication, 9 September 2021, in person). In the midst of a national economic crisis and drained public funds, with the aggravation of the situation and especially shortages in essential imported products, municipalities are expected to play an active role in coordinating, facilitating access to or delivering basic needs such as water, electricity, fuel and healthcare required by Covid-19 (such as essential medication and access to hospitalisation). This represents a shift in municipalities’ earlier roles and tasks as described above, which were mainly related to administrative services and public infrastructure. This is why a municipality representative stated that people have the right to hold the municipality accountable, but that the latter should not be held responsible for the country’s current stagnation (Baysour municipality spokesperson, personal communication, 11 August 2021, online). Similarly, Barbara’s mayor shared that people in his village were aware of the current situation and challenges and were no longer holding the municipality accountable for council members’ election promises.

5.4.3 Accountability as Acting in the Case of Failure

Different stakeholders emphasised the predominant use of SA in cases of failure: situations in which municipalities failed to perform or deliver what citizens were entitled to, did not keep their promises or did not intervene where people felt it was needed. This is a more reactive stance towards SA, with a limited preventative approach or scope concerning what SA could be or contribute to. ‘At some point accountability includes receiving critiques. SA is present if the municipality is failing to respond to a crisis’ (Baysour municipality spokesperson, personal communication, 11 August 2021, online).

5.4.4 Accountability as a Legal Measure

The issue of who has the legal authority and jurisdiction to hold the municipality accountable was one of the key findings emerging from the conversations with mayors. Municipalities took different stands on who can hold them accountable legally. This also varied with governance levels. For example, some mayors concentrate all responsibilities in the hands of the district commissioner (qāʾim maqām), believing that they are the main reference for legal (financial) obligations. To quote one of the mayors interviewed:

If people elected me, they do not always have to hold me accountable and question where I am spending the money; there are experts for monetary issues who get to hold me accountable and not the people. If you put your money in the bank, you do not go and count it every day. (Baaqline mayor, personal communication, 13 August 2021, in person)

Different actors connected accountability to financial decisions or to how municipal or public funds are distributed. Accountability usually includes decisions, decrees or even informal policies enforced by the municipality with a financial implication. According to a committee representative: ‘With the current circumstances, there are no projects and thus there is no practice of accountability, because municipalities do not even have a budget’ (Baaqline local committee representative, personal communication, 9 August 2021, online). Local committee members also pointed to other facets of financial accountability concerning where the money was spent and what was achieved, as well as whether the funds were earmarked according to a specific priority (Baaqline local committee FGD, 13 August 2021).

5.4.5 Accountability as Access to Information

Access to information, which can be achieved by publishing budgets and official decisions, is another meaning associated with holding the municipality accountable. The level of information-sharing varies from one location to another. In Baaqline, local committee members felt that less than 10 per cent of the municipal information was being published, limited to yearly budgets. They were adamant about constituents’ rights to have access to this sort of information. On the other hand, municipalities like Barbara expressed that they are one of the few municipalities to publish their decisions, plans and budgets for the public on the municipality’s website. For them, this is an essential part of accountability (Barbara mayor, personal communication, 9 September 2021, in person). However, people’s awareness of their right to access and demand such information remained minimal.

5.4.6 Accountability as a Personal Contribution

Accountability in the perception of activists and municipalities also included the idea of holding oneself accountable. This is translated by questioning their contribution to the community. Taking ownership of one’s actions is a key manifestation and exercise of accountability. It starts with the person’s level of responsibility. As a local committee representative described it: ‘SA is linked to one’s contribution to one’s society. As a person who lives in a certain area, what is your contribution? How do you hold people in power accountable? How can you add value to your society?’ (Baaqline local committee FGD, 13 August 2021).

5.5 Mobilisation Methods and Means for Accountability

Moving on to the second subquestion, there are different methods, techniques and channels for accountability used vis-à-vis local authorities. These are presented according to the order in which they are used, as described by respondents.

5.5.1 Direct Communication

The first and most common channel for accountability is direct communication. Here, the extent to which the municipality, in particular the mayor him- or herself, is reachable through direct communication becomes important. An ‘open door’ policy was perceived to be the optimal solution for increasing residents’ possibilities to engage in conversations with the municipality, mostly to share requests, demands or complaints. This direct contact could also take the form of in-person visits or encounters with the mayor, at the municipality or elsewhere. The latter included social ceremonies like weddings and funerals, religious celebrations or festivals and social visits. Hence, the open door policy was translated as any chance to reach the mayor (or a member of the municipality) in person or over the phone to convey a message. Respondents saw an important link between SA and communication. The possibility of directly denouncing a possibly ‘wrong action or decision’ or sharing demands or grievances increased accountability in the perception of different parties. According to one of the mayors: ‘You have to listen to people. This is the key. You have to listen and respect everyone’ (Barbara mayor, personal communication, 9 September 2021, in person).

However, many citizens are (a) not aware of their rights to question the municipality and (b) lack access to the tools, fora and spaces to do so. This is why members of Baaqline’s local committee felt that it is important for citizens to know their rights. This was corroborated by the social policy and management consultant, who supported the call to empower citizens via access to the required tools to hold any type of institution accountable. Yet, there is also a question of access to the municipality and mayor. Opposing parties, residents and refugees (mostly Syrian in these cases) are likely to have less opportunities in this regard. According to the Baaqline mayor, the municipality’s door is open for communication, and they are always in contact with citizens. Nevertheless, during the fieldwork I did not observe any active initiatives from his side to inform people or connect with them.

To put the opportunities for SA through direct communication in perspective, it is useful to briefly consider the traditional political accountability mechanism, namely (local) elections. Voting for municipal and parliamentary elections still follows the parental place of birth of the person (in the case of male voters) or the place of birth or registration of the spouse (for married women voters).⁸ Residency in another village or city, regardless of the number of years, does not grant the right to vote for the municipal council in that location. Residents not holding a Lebanese passport or official identification document are not entitled to participate in municipal and parliamentary elections. This affects the extent to which the priorities of certain groups, such as Syrian refugees, are represented, communicated or acted upon. When you are not a voter, you have fewer chances to share your priorities or contribute to local accountability.

5.5.2 Support Rather Than Confrontation

Local committees adopted internal accountability in their attempts to support rather than confront the municipalities. There is a collaborative sense to this, in line with the preference for direct communication. ‘Internal’ accountability was described as more effective in some cases and involves communication and the process of questioning taking place behind closed doors, with the aim of finding solutions or improving the situation. Hence, the objective is improvement rather than blaming or shaming. Local committee members acknowledged that some municipal council members might lack experience in development work, and they saw it as the committee’s task to reach out to them and offer help. Working to support the municipalities enabled committees to push and influence them to achieve their own priorities or desired changes. Even those who came to the committees from a politically opposing position engaged in close communication with the municipalities. Being involved in the committee offered them a direct channel that provided a better understanding and access to knowledge on the inside. This also allowed for discussions on why certain things took place and why certain decisions were taken, which paved the way for more in-depth talks.

This emphasis on support is exhibited in this Baysour local committee representative’s opinion on the matter:

When you are holding a person accountable, you have two options. You approach this person either directly or indirectly. Directly through heading to the municipality. Indirectly through social media, although I am against it, especially during this time when anyone can create fake accounts and digital campaigns. (Baysour local committee representative, personal communication, 22 August 2021, online)

The municipalities have been welcoming and keeping close coordination with the local committees, as members of the latter have gained a better understanding of the situation in the villages and are better able to reach those who are most vulnerable. This points to the perceived and expected roles of the local committees, which are entrusted with assessing local needs, supporting the planning and execution of projects such as recycling, tourism and awareness of Covid-19, etc. These roles are less about oversight and accountability and more about support of and collaboration with the municipality. Municipal council members insisted that they themselves are the ‘decision-makers’ and that committees should (merely) take on a coordination role.

5.5.3 Denouncing on Social Media

Another, less frequent method of SA is the direct denouncing of the municipality on social media, mainly Facebook. The method is rarely if ever used by local committees and is employed more frequently by community members. Social media could be perceived as an indirect alternative to the direct approach. If the latter is not successful, and the municipality does not respond, social media becomes an option. The municipalities involved in this research have official pages where people can send messages and ask for clarification on issues of interest.⁹ They review these messages and try to find adequate solutions. After the 2019 uprising, public shaming and denouncing of political individuals or groups and public servants on social media became more common and somewhat acceptable (social policy and management consultant, personal communication, 18 August 2021, online).

In terms of mobilisation methods, given the challenges of getting around in Lebanon (due to roadblocks and fuel shortages), social media was considered the most common option for activists and municipalities alike to share their questions and priorities and announce their activities or decisions. Activists also considered social media, mainly Facebook, the main tool for mobilisation. WhatsApp groups are used to spread information, news and activities. However, they are less interactive and work mostly as dissemination channels.

5.5.4 Filing Complaints

The mayors mentioned filing official complaints or using the complaint box as possible SA means, but there is limited evidence of their use. Instead, those who can or want to access the municipality prefer to seek other, more direct and indirect approaches, as detailed above.

5.6 Responses from Authorities

This section answers the third subquestion on responses from the authorities, outlining responses that are again specific to the collaboration between the local committees and the two municipalities.

5.6.1 Using SA ‘Responsibly’

When looking at responses from municipalities, it should be kept in mind that people’s expectations from municipalities have changed, as explained above. From the municipalities’ point of view, SA is welcome as long as it is used ‘responsibly’. Municipalities call on those observing their performance to keep in mind the (limited) realm of their responsibilities, any gaps between available budgets and growing needs and the local context and current situation.

We are heading towards a very difficult situation. We are trying not to spend money to leave a certain budget for emergencies. …There are no resources available other than the people. What we are noticing is that people are engaging together and many of them are volunteering. (Barbara mayor, personal communication, 9 September 2021, in person)

‘Responsibly’ also refers to a preferred method of expression and collaboration. Some committee members in Baaqline and Baysour resigned at an earlier stage of the committees’ inception. Allegedly, this was due to repetitive clashes about approaches and points of view with municipal council members, who held traditional beliefs on social work and accountability (social policy and management consultant, personal communication, 18 August 2021, online) or on how people should express themselves (Baysour local committee representative, personal communication, 22 August 2021, online).

5.6.2 Free Qualified ‘Labour’ and Access to Funds

Especially in the current dramatic socio-economic situation, the municipalities see the role of local committees as supporting them with (mostly qualified) ‘free labour’, in a way as volunteers conducting needs assessments of the most vulnerable and organising awareness-raising campaigns. For example, their work as part of the Covid-19 response included identifying vulnerable families to support, distributing food items and raising awareness to prevent infection. They also supported the municipalities in other areas, for example with recycling and tourism projects. In both study areas, the municipalities benefit from a qualified and specialised group of people (i.e. the members of the local committees) to support them in social and humanitarian initiatives. As a municipal representative elaborated: ‘The municipality is a key actor and has many responsibilities, but it also needs support at some point, it needs volunteers during the crisis’ (Baysour municipality spokesperson, personal communication, 11 August 2021, online).

Such ‘participation’ also ensures that as recipients of funds, the municipalities fulfil donors’ and local non-public actors’ requirements and conditions of community engagement. This means that more funds are channelled to the municipality or the village through the committee. It remains to be seen to what extent this dynamic contributes to a depoliticisation or co-optation of the local committees, pulling them away from their SA roles. ‘We are not used to practicing accountability. Sometimes questioning the municipality creates further conflicts. Therefore, people prefer not to ask critical questions to avoid a misunderstanding’ (Baaqline local committee FGD, 13 August 2021). By ‘misunderstanding’, the interviewee probably meant tension with or retribution from the municipality, such as public shaming, pressuring the person’s family, halting communication, making it difficult to obtain future services, etc.

5.6.3 ‘Soft’ Power

Historically, but even more so in the current situation, a significant portion of residents does not pay taxes to the municipalities. This places them in a latent or ‘soft’ position of power, even if this is unclaimed or acted upon, with respect to people who wish to complain or hold them accountable. The case study was unable to find more data on this point, given how sensitive it is for the different parties involved. However, it would seem that the old adage of ‘no representation without taxation’—which is fundamental to the social contract as understood in the Global North—applies to this case and weakens the position of citizens vis-à-vis the municipalities.

5.6.4 Contextual Factors

As outlined above, the national context of widespread corruption determines the responses from authorities to a great extent, including at the local level. Lebanese officials have used certain laws to their advantage and failed to implement others, although the constitution and laws provide legal grounds for strong accountability practices. For example, Lebanese authorities have arguably ‘legalised corruption’, breaching laws for public appointments¹⁰ and motivating clientelism in public administrations. This strongly impacts accountability, as individuals are appointed on the basis of sectarian affiliations and ‘are expected to be loyal to political leaders, and are unlikely to inform/denounce wrongdoings’ (Martini, 2015, 4).

Similarly, even though the constitution guarantees freedom of expression and assembly, citizens and activists have faced and are still facing interrogation, detention and censorship at the hands of security forces for sharing different views and pinpointing corruption practices in government institutions (Touma & Zaghbour, 2020). The constitution solemnly declares the principle of equality of all citizens before the law. However, many forms of and mechanisms for immunity specifically favour civil servants and public officials (Moukheiber, 2021). In addition, several recent reports by LADE highlight the lack of transparency, law breaches and violations during recent municipal and parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Despite such documentation, the state continues to use corrupt practices and manipulate election dates and laws in its favour (LADE, 2018).

5.7 Outcomes

Finally, the fourth subquestion asked about outcomes. In light of the findings presented here, it is clear that in the case of Lebanon in general and of the two local committees of the case study in particular, the evidence of clear, concrete and solid results is modest. Nevertheless, the various interviews and discussions suggest that desired outcomes were achieved at three levels. First, the collaborations initiated under the UNDP project increased synergy and coordination between local committees and municipalities, leading to a better capitalisation and use of resources (human resources, access to people and funds). Second, the trust of municipalities in local committees increased both outreach and representation efforts. Third, the close coordination and engagement between the different parties (including the political constituency and opposition) boosted the local acceptance and legitimacy of municipalities and their efforts conducted at the local level. Indeed, this could be an additional factor pushing the municipalities to cooperate with the local committees and offer support.

5.8 Discussion and Conclusion

In the absence of institutionalised means and a lack of interest of the political ruling class to respond to local calls for accountability, the different endeavours and actions of CSOs working to advance SA remain unanswered. This is why CSOs currently focus on mobilising for parliamentary and syndicate elections.

Access to information remains one of the key challenges for SA at local and national levels. Lebanese authorities have failed to implement the Access to Information Law. Many municipalities and state institutions have poor website management and thus fail to a large extent to provide citizens with access to public data (Chehayeb, 2020). The low rates of compliance by and interest from public institutions in response to the Access to Information Law is well documented (Al Moghabat, 2018).

The multifaceted crisis has heightened pressures on local authorities to play a greater role in responding to citizens’ needs. This has increased people’s demands but has also given municipalities a greater leeway to passively escape accountability obligations. In an extremely resource-scarce environment, the dependency of individuals on bilateral connections with the municipality (in the shape of patron–client relations, co-optation, etc.) increases as they try to satisfy some of their urgent and primary needs.

SA initiatives in Lebanon have taken various forms at the local and national level and yielded different results. At the local level, as is the case with the local committees discussed here, a combination of close coordination, access and communication remains the most effective strategy. Being able to advise and take part in decision-making could be more pragmatic and impactful. Having a seat at the table counts more than protesting from the outside. On the other hand, the impact of formal organisations and CSOs has been weaker at the national level. Advocacy campaigns have mostly been met with negative (or no) responses by the government (Mardini, 2021).

After 17 October 2019, there has been a greater level of awareness of the importance of accountability and transparency, as well as heightened engagement and interest in issues of public interest, especially among youth. The latter’s approach has been dominated by direct opposition and confrontation. This pushes local authorities to take a defensive position, increase their inclusiveness or find a middle way, in which they use subtle strategies to co-opt or ‘divide and conquer’ critical groups of citizens, such as those represented in the local committees discussed here.

Suggestions for future research include the following, mainly shared and discussed during the validation workshop: it would be interesting to explore the extent to which accountability and advocacy have evolved or changed, especially after the 2019 uprising. In particular, if and when the next municipal elections take place (they were scheduled for May 2023 but at the time of writing, their current mandates had been extended by up to a year, see Wood, 2023), it would be useful to assess accountability practices around them, in addition to citizens’ and civil society’s roles in motivating, supporting and agreeing or disagreeing with the municipality. Will people engage with the new municipal council in the same way as they did with the previous one? In addition, the role of women in the public sphere in general and in the municipal realm in particular needs to be explored, including its challenges (opposition from some religious authorities and conservatives).

Notes

• 1. A local committee was created in each village with the support of a UNDP consultant. They initially included activists and representatives of grassroots organisations, major families and other civil society organisations. The committees’ composition differed according to the nature and dynamics of each village. Their initial role was to develop social stability plans and implement relevant initiatives. In both Baaqline and Baysour, the focus evolved to address larger community needs and priorities in collaboration with the municipalities.

• 2. Preamble D: ‘The people are the source of authority and sovereignty; they shall exercise these powers through the constitutional institutions’ (“Lebanese Constitution” n.d.).

• 3. Preamble E: ‘The political system is established on the principle of separation of powers, their balance and cooperation’ (“Lebanese Constitution” n.d.).

• 4. Article 8: ‘Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected by law. No one may be arrested, imprisoned, or kept in custody except according to the provisions of the law’ (“Lebanese Constitution” n.d.).

• 5. Article 13: ‘The freedom to express one’s opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association shall be guaranteed within the limits established by law’ (“Lebanese Constitution” n.d.).

• 6. Repeating the term ‘all of them’ served to emphasise and affirm that all politicians are corrupt, not one single party.

• 7. The Gherbal Initiative advocates for a better adoption by administrations of measures that guarantee access to information and transparency. The Initiative hopes to transform the current political rhetoric to a candid and patriotic dialogue that relies on facts and numbers. See https://elgherbal.org/.

• 8. From 2018, married women were allowed to run for municipal elections in their registered hometown (following their father’s registration) or in the town where their husband is registered.

• 9. See the Facebook page of Baaqline municipality: Facebook.com/Baaklinechouf. See also the Facebook page of Baysour municipality: Facebook.com/

• 10. Article 12 of the Lebanese Constitution states: ‘Every Lebanese shall have the right to hold public office, no preference shall be made except on the basis of merit and competence, according to the conditions established by law’ (“Lebanese Constitution” n.d.).