Managerial Culture and Labour Relations at Pinewood

Abstract

This chapter examines the role of management and labour during a pivotal period of the studios’ post-war development. Drawing on documentation by Frank L. Gilbert, an executive who worked for the Rank Organisation in 1944-47, the chapter considers how management strategies evolved and assesses their effectiveness. It also discusses the role of film industry trade unions, particularly the Association of Cine Technicians, in responding to economic constraints and pressures for cutbacks, while including several key, inter-related themes including the contribution of women to the studio workforce. It concludes that technicians who worked at Pinewood exercised degrees of creative agency in coming to terms with the constraints associated with budgetary control. The immediate post-war years were key in influencing Pinewood’s survival despite the fluctuations and uncertainties associated with different managerial regimes, and the impact of economic and material constraints.

Studio cultures are shaped by the skilled technicians who work in them, including those in administrative and managerial positions. While the physical spaces and equipment which constituted the core activity of studios such as Pinewood were of paramount importance, how these were used, as the following chapters demonstrate, depended very much on employees’ responses at all levels to challenges they faced. In 1944 Frank L. Gilbert, a new executive, was employed by the Rank Organisation. He worked there until 1947, and his recollections of these years provide a useful way into understanding how both a managerial culture and labour relations were developing in the immediate post-war period. Gilbert, a former civil servant, was given the title of Managing Director of Production Facilities (Films) Ltd (P.F.F.), a company which provided common services to the production units working under the Rank orbit at Pinewood. P.F.F. was responsible for forming a ‘bank’ of actors under a common form of contract, arranging story material for films, establishing a common style of publicity, a library of sound effects, and a centralised accountancy service.¹ The aim was to establish a degree of coordination so that the film units operating under the Independent Producers’ umbrella would not have to compete for stars, story material, and studio space. Although these services were designed to reduce costs, producers soon resented P.F.F., pejoratively referring to it as ‘Piffle’, or an overly bureaucratic structure that ‘ended up throttling producers and directors with red tape’.²

P.F.F. was short-lived, lasting until the end of 1949, but its formation relates to debates about how to develop British film production after the visits in 1945 to Hollywood by technicians and other specialists. The tendency to look to Hollywood, with its centralised, vertically integrated structures and studios as models of best practice, can be detected in these initiatives, even if it was recognised that in many respects the production cultures and histories of Britain and Hollywood were very different. This chapter discusses the development and ethos of both managerial and labour relations, arguing that their inter-dependence offers insights into Pinewood’s post-war history. While historians have analysed private sector management in industries such as cars, engineering, and shipbuilding, as well as nationalised industries such as coal mining and railway transport, as Booth and Melling comment: ‘There are important categories of workers and sectors of the economy that have not attracted the attentions of researchers on industrial relations and industrial cultures’.³ In this regard P.F.F. and other managerial-led ideas, and contemporary disputes and agreements with the trade unions ACT (Association of Cine Technicians), NATKE (National Association of Theatrical and Kine Employees), and the ETU (Electrical Trades Union), offer an interesting case study of the logistical, operational and political shifts taking place in the film industry which influenced future developments.

The roles of studio manager and head of department had developed as the number and size of studios increased in the 1930s. As Atkinson and Randle point out, managers worked with teams of core personnel including unit producers, directors, editors, scenario and script editors who were signed on longer-term contracts than the larger number of ‘below the line’ studio workers who were hired on a temporary basis.⁴ As the Rank Organisation evolved into a vertically integrated company, and Pinewood’s reputation as having ‘the best studio layout’ in the country was confirmed by ‘many leading personalities and technicians’ when responding to a questionnaire in 1945, the environment was considered appropriate for rationalising activities, systems, and structures.⁵ The appointment of Gilbert as Managing Director of P.F.F. reflects the turn towards professional managerialism, even if as his account attests, its authority was limited by Rank’s tendency to defer to the perceived creative expertise of the managing directors of the film companies which he had grouped together as the Independent Producers. With no prior experience of the film industry, Gilbert’s background was as a temporary civil servant at the Ministry of Food where he had met J. Arthur Rank’s brother. Gilbert’s position with Rank was obtained due to this contact and he was enticed into the role by a generous salary with an expense allowance which exceeded rates in other industries.⁶ This role gave him access to the Rank Organisation’s upper echelons as a member of ‘a very high-powered committee’ of top production personnel which was chaired by J. Arthur Rank at his offices in Park Lane, London. As well as Gilbert representing P.F.F. the committee’s membership included accountants Leslie Farrow and Barrington Gain; solicitor Woodham Smith; the managing directors of Independent Producers (George Archibald), Two Cities Films (Filippo del Guidice) and Gainsborough (Maurice Ostrer). Also serving as ‘secretary’ was John Davis, the legendary and much criticised businessman who by 1948 had been promoted to Managing Director of the Rank Organisation.

Gilbert explained that this top-level committee discussed ‘all matters concerning films about to go into production, films in production and films just completed’; contracts were scrutinised and ‘a general eye kept on budget and performance against budget’. While the minutes of the committee do not appear to have survived such details are indicative of the management culture Rank was trying to develop, even though Gilbert concluded that budgets were normally too high, and ‘supervision was virtually non-existent as the three main production companies had rather different policies and attitudes’.⁷ It seemed that the profits from distribution and exhibition allowed for ‘extravagance’ to be to some extent tolerated, since the benefits of vertical-integration were that profits could be spread across an operation’s total sectors.

The fact that the five units in the Independent Producers all had their headquarters at Denham Studios under the direction of production manager James B. Sloan, attests to the physical and cultural distance that appears to have existed between Rank’s desire for greater managerial authority and the limits of its exertion. Active productions however used offices at Pinewood for more immediate administrative tasks, located close to the particular stage where a film was being shot. Pinewood was essentially the central focus of the creative agency as well as being a hub of technical experimentation. Gilbert recalled that the producers were suspicious of P.F.F., seeing in it a danger of curbing their authority and questioning their expertise. Managerial decisions could indeed have important implications for how best to run the studios, and which producers to accommodate. Tensions between domestic-orientated films and those aimed at attracting international audiences pervaded this period; the complexities of film finance required constant monitoring. After Caesar and Cleopatra (1945) was criticised as an extravagant gamble, John Davis sought to rein in the producers, leading to the subsequent break-up of the Independent Producers, as well as the closure of P.F.F. Caesar and Cleopatra was, in fact, more successful in America and Canada than in Britain, grossing $2 million overseas. But Rank saw little of this because the film had undoubtedly been expensive at £1.3 million, and US distributor United Artists retained 45% of the American and Canadian earnings.⁸

Looking at the actual work of P.F.F. as recorded by Gilbert provides some detail on its operation for the few years of its existence. Its offices from 1945 were at Denham, as opposed to the location in Park Lane of Rank’s executive committee of which Gilbert was a member.⁹ It seemed that the most successful departments which ran smoothly were Publicity, and Finance which was controlled by Robert Robinson, a former executive at Gainsborough, and its purpose was to pay all bills, wages, and salaries. Even so, the fact that P.F.F. charged for its services was resented; there was no imperative for producers to use them despite its role as part of Rank’s attempts at corporate rationalisation. While in theory P.F.F.’s coordination of centralised workshops to make them available to all the filmmakers seemed a good idea, according to Sidney Gilliat, in practice this turned out to be more expensive than if the materials had been hired from outside.¹⁰ In the Stories Department, the insistence that interest in properties such as novels or plays had to be registered through P.F.F. caused friction between producers since they could not bid directly or be assured that any proposal would be accepted on merit.¹¹ The Independent Producers were by no means favoured in such arrangements since P.F.F. serviced all filmmakers operating under the Rank Organisation’s umbrella. For his part, Gilbert also began to be frustrated: ‘At no time was I ever consulted as to the function or performance of P.F.F. There was no financial control and no budget. So it was not long before everyone found they could go their own way without penalty’. In addition, Gilbert felt that Rank ‘never spelt out any authority, responsibility or sphere of action as far as I was concerned’.¹²

It would appear therefore that while the ideas behind P.F.F. generally made sense, and as a managerial strategy its formation was in step with current practices towards efficiency, in practice it was unable to curb rising costs and budgets, so much so that one of the obvious economies in December 1946 was to close it down. Its operations had been perceived as interfering, causing resentment amongst the producers and technicians who saw in it an attempt to question their expertise. Divisions between managers and film industry professionals were thus exposed by the P.F.F. experiment which either had to be granted more assertive executive power or fold. Some of its departments subsequently became their own trading departments, including the film library and special effects which remained important facilities at Pinewood. Directed by technician Henry Harris, the special effects department had been attached to P.F.F., but once it was wound up David Rawnsley, one of its key experts, was able to sell his ideas to individual producers and to the BBC. This was important in the subsequent evolution of the Independent Frame which developed productive synergies with technological innovations at the BBC.¹³ Publicity was charged out according to clients and the remaining spheres of activity—artistes and the Rank ‘Charm School’, legal matters, and finance—were henceforward handled by solicitor Edmund A. Davies as a streamlined form of P.F.F. At the end of the 1940s Pinewood’s General Manager was A. W. Robinson who handled all contracts for studio facilities. Production personnel and requirements were overseen by Production Controller Arthur Alcott who held meetings with heads of departments, the operations manager, production managers, art directors, chief and unit construction managers, and the personnel manager.¹⁴

Reflecting on the significance of P.F.F, Frank Gilbert’s testimony and the Independent Producers’ negative experience, it seems that there were tensions between imposing new managerial structures and the practicalities of ensuring that they had sufficient power and authority to be effective. The timing of these interventions in the final stages of the Second World War and immediate post-war years did not help, as studios were being de-requisitioned and units such as Two Cities Films and the Archers were keen to maintain and extend their reputations for quality filmmaking. As we have seen, the films made during this time at Pinewood were in many ways remarkable, carrying on a positive trajectory that J. Arthur Rank seemed reluctant to curb despite imposing new systems that were quickly perceived as overly bureaucratic. P.F.F. was perhaps an attempt to appear to be acting in the best interests of the Independent Producers while being unsure, in the final analysis, as to whether this was the best formulation of the centralising strategy it was supposed to represent. The more devolved managerial structure which emerged at the end of the 1940s was perhaps an unintended consequence of the P.F.F. experiment. The restructuring of production and conservative managerial control under Davis resulted in small, ‘but respectable’ profits in production and distribution in the years 1953–7.¹⁵ Rank continued to be personally interested, albeit from a non-expert, managerial capacity, in his company’s production ventures and there are many photographs of him visiting Pinewood. In Fig. 5.1 Rank is seen examining production stills with E. Woods, director of Rank Films in 1955.

Fig. 5.1

J. Arthur Rank and E. Woods director of Rank Films, 1955. Alamy stock images

While this period did not repeat the creative élan associated with the Independent Producers, some more formulaic films such as Doctor in the House (Ralph Thomas 1954) and its six sequels, were box-office successes. In the immediate post-war and subsequent years, other significant shifts for Pinewood involving management and labour were taking place.

Labour Relations

After the Second World War working conditions in the film industry and consultations between management and the trades unions appeared to have improved following the formalisation after 1945 of the closed shop with the major studios, and in 1947 the agreement of a five-day, 44-hour week, wage increases and other benefits as negotiated between the British Film Producers Association and the three unions.¹⁶ As Atkinson and Randle have observed, larger companies such as Rank were in a better position to offer workers employment contracts that could run-on, rather than the more insecure tenures which prevailed in more precarious working environments.¹⁷ At Pinewood there was a personnel manager who producers had to consult regarding any discussions with shop stewards or trade union officials. In addition, a Works Committee operated in close co-operation with personnel to settle any problems. Such committees and other joint consultative groups were considered important in managing change in the workplace, as noted in a contemporary study which dealt with the Glacier Metal Company which had factories in London and Scotland. The book was influential as an early text on management science and behaviour.¹⁸ Its focus on engineering was partly applicable to the film industry, and the analogy often made between factory management and the running of film studios provided a context for its relevance. The principles of joint consultation had become part of film studio management at around the same time as the trend for such procedures grew in other industrial contexts. While there is no direct evidence of the book’s influence in the film industry or at Pinewood, its publication coincided with similar developments in the studios.

Joint consultation provided a platform for union representatives to advocate better pay and working conditions. During the war their participation in issues investigated by the Board of Trade concerning requisitioning enhanced their consultative agency, even if at times there could be friction. The ACT’s expertise, for example, provided very useful sources of information on equipment and personnel needs of studios when post-war requirements were being investigated. Although the ACT had only existed since 1933, the union had become adept at circulating technical and other studio knowledge via its magazine The Cine Technician. The publication provided a debating ground for studio-related issues, as well as expressing and symbolising the expertise of technical workers. This arguably increased their bargaining power, especially since many management executives did not have technical backgrounds. It would seem from the ACT’s perspective, as recorded by George Elvin, the union’s General Secretary, that by 1947 ‘the film industry has followed the trend of the times: detailed consideration has been, and is being given to the employees’ human problems and privileges’, including questions such as sickness and grievances, holidays, hazardous work, location work and salaries.¹⁹ Even so, that is not to imply that there were no persistent issues or potential conflicts between management and workers at Pinewood; rather, structures had been developed which enabled them to be aired at an earlier stage than had been possible in the 1930s when the unionisation of studio workers was in the early stages of consolidation.²⁰

Co-operation between the unions and management was crucial throughout the immediate post-war years to meet the considerable economic challenges facing studios. Pinewood was only able, for example, to accommodate four production units working at full pressure in the autumn of 1947 because of an agreement with NATKE over night work. Construction manager Ted Hughes accordingly planned Pinewood’s day-to-day set arrangements and placed as many workers as possible on night work.²¹ It was recognised that the five-day, 44-hour week did not necessarily cut the amount of screentime shot per day since such figures depended on several factors and did not allow for the quality of the film in question. George Archibald however acknowledged that the five-day week had ‘come to stay’.²² But there were recurring problems which some studios experienced particularly acutely, as evidenced by an ACT report in March 1949 which noted a slump with idle stages, unemployment, and decreases in union membership.²³ The grades most affected were assistant directors, publicity personnel, assistant editors, and sound department crew. ACT members were more affected since workers belonging to NATKE and the ETU, with their membership spread across a greater number of trades, to some extent had skills that were more transferable.

As noted in previous chapters, the causes of the slump were the rising costs of films, especially overhead costs such as story and script charges, the cost of sets, labour rates, and studio rents. As we have seen, the reported rise in the cost of sets was to some extent offset at Pinewood by the ingenuity of art directors, and in any case the rise was related to the cost of materials which were more expensive in a context of post-war shortages. Studio overhead costs were generally large, and these costs weighed heavily on Rank in part due to the number of studios the Organisation controlled as well as Pinewood. An attempt was made during this time to reduce overhead expenditure by instituting some of the cost-cutting methods described in previous chapters.²⁴ While figures from the 1930s to the early 1950s in respect of production costs show increases for sets and materials, those for studio facilities decreased.²⁵ The studios most affected were Shepherd's Bush, National, and Islington, indicating that to some extent Pinewood was more able to weather the storms.²⁶ In July 1950 it was reported that Pinewood was working to capacity and was in a healthier state than it had been for the previous eighteen months.²⁷ Pinewood was the largest employer at the end of 1951, according to comparative figures for the three largest studios Pinewood, Shepperton and Associated British, Elstree (Table 5.1).²⁸

Table 5.1 Studio employment December 1951

Despite the crisis affecting studios and the slump identified in most trade publications, figures for first feature film production compiled at the end of the 1940s do not show a dramatic reduction. In 1946 British studios turned out 49 films, and this figure rose year on year to 66 by 1949. In 1950 the slump resulted in a small drop to 62, and again in 1951 to 53, but the following year there was an upturn to 63 films.²⁹ There was a drop in shorter feature productions, and it seems that most film companies were not making sufficient profits despite the fact that first feature production was not in decline.³⁰ Rank’s overall operation was losing money, resulting in cuts including senior production executives, imposed by John Davis, the business manager with a reputation for imposing economies where possible.³¹ By 1951 the situation had improved somewhat but ‘the company was still making a loss on production and distribution’.³² Production was concentrated at Pinewood, and the Gainsborough studios at Shepherd’s Bush and Islington, and the Two Cities studio at Denham were closed. Denham finally ceased to be a functioning film studio in 1952. With an eye on cutting budgets, Davis and Rank were keen to keep Pinewood going so it could supply the cinema circuits under their control with sufficient films to meet the requirements of the statuary quota of British films which had to be shown by exhibitors. This had risen in June 1948 to the highest it had ever been at 45% for first features and 25% for supporting features; the first feature quota was reduced to 40% in 1949–50, and then to 30% where it remained for 1951–2.³³ It was designed to support British production and, to some extent, Rank’s funding of independent filmmakers. This point was observed by United Artists’ representative in London: ‘The Board of Trade, in its action with the Quota, is using the Independents to sustain the Rank production enterprises’.³⁴ The quota legislation however created tensions with the exhibition part of the Organisation’s business which needed to be sustained by top quality, often expensive British films, rather than cheaper supporting features, as well as by US films. Rank’s resources were stretched to such an extent that exhibition was subsequently prioritised in the 1950s as a principal Rank revenue base in the UK and overseas.³⁵

The role of the trade unions, particularly the ACT, in charting developments during this period, was significant. The Labour Government of 1945–51 instituted a programme of post-war reconstruction, and the film production industry received indirect assistance in the form of the National Film Finance Corporation and the Eady Levy.³⁶ Although the trade unions were consulted in the evolution of these measures, the ACT’s calls for more extensive intervention towards nationalisation were rebuffed. In its evidence to the Portal Committee on Distribution and Exhibition the ACT recommended the foundation of a state film studio that would create more opportunities for independent producers.³⁷ This issue was intertwined with criticisms of the Rank Organisation as a monopolistic concern.³⁸ The unions’ interest in extending the state’s involvement in the film industry can be seen as representative of how unions more generally in the immediate post-war years were ‘ready to contemplate radical economic policies as well as distinctive approaches to bargaining within a framework where employers as well as workers were held to account for the exercise of their rights and responsibilities’.³⁹ For US distributors the news of increased state support for British films was alarming, as United Artists’ representative in the UK reported to the home office: ‘The nationalisation of the motion picture industry here is not along the next step but one that is now spoken of in terms of the foreseeable future’.⁴⁰ While ideas on a state film studio and nationalisation received no support from the Board of Trade, their articulation is another indication of the ACT’s evolution since the 1930s into a strong and politically committed union representing technical roles.

The achievement of the five-day, 44-hour week in 1947 was a considerable advance on the previous 47-hour week. It offset several recurring grievances at Pinewood. As detailed in Chapter 6, travelling to and from the studios could exacerbate the adverse impact of long working hours, especially in winter. The 1947 Agreement between the BFPA and unions stipulated that transport should be provided for workers if working hours fell outside normal public transport schedules, and on occasion individuals’ start and finish times could be adjusted so that travelling to and from work using public transport was easier. The Agreement ensured minimum salaries for many technical grades, although roles such as supervising Art Director were still subject to individually negotiated contracts. The hierarchy of grades noted that the highest salaries were still paid to producers, directors, and cinematographers. Company production managers, editors, art directors, scriptwriters, and sound recordists were the next rung down, although the figures quoted referred to approximate minimum salaries since as Elvin noted: ‘It is perfectly possible for a film worker to be given more’.⁴¹ The provision of one-hour meal breaks, and fifteen-minute morning and afternoon tea breaks was also written into the Agreement. Clauses in respect of overtime, night work and location shooting ensured employers provided travelling expenses, accommodation, subsistence, and that on longer shoots away from home for eight or more weeks workers could return home for at least one weekend. An important provision was for minimum crews in respect of both studio and location work: floor, production and casting, camera, sound recording, and sound maintenance. An Apprenticeship and Training Council was also established to train new entrants to the film industry, although many still learned on the job. Described in the studio magazine Pinewood Merry-Go-Round as a ‘landmark’ event, this Agreement was crucial, particularly its timing in August 1947 on the heels of the imposition in July of the Dalton Duty.⁴²

Effective collaboration between the film trades unions was also evident in October 1947 when it was announced that the ACT, ETU, and NATKE would operate as co-operative labour exchanges. This meant that they were in control of labour: studio technicians were given jobs through their union instead of having to report to a local Ministry of Labour office every time they commenced working on a new film.⁴³ As previously noted, the closed shop was key in ensuring the conditions of film industry employment as set out in the 1947 Agreement, including minimum crewing levels, were adhered to; this was especially important in periods of recession.⁴⁴ The ACT had evolved into a particularly effective craft union by the 1950s, as noted by Seglow: ‘It had become a force to be reckoned with in its relations with employers…Its power and influence were out of all proportion with its size’.⁴⁵ At larger studios such as Pinewood many employees could rely on full-time employment. Even in the 1960s Pinewood retained its own full-time construction staff that all production companies using its stages had to employ; this applied to some extent to camera crews. Even so more precarious, freelance contracts became more common as studios were rented by production companies for making only one film, for which they hired crew and cast on fixed-term contracts.⁴⁶

Women Workers in the Film Industry

Opportunities for women working in the film industry expanded in the 1940s, particularly following their ‘high profile’ contribution to the film economy during the Second World War.⁴⁷ While male dominance of roles such as directing, producing, cinematography, sound engineering, and musical composition, was not disrupted, inroads were made by women into areas including editing, screenwriting, documentary filmmaking, art direction, costume design, casting, and publicity. Art director Carmen Dillon worked mainly at Pinewood during her career, and she remembers the studios as her ‘spiritual home’, ‘rather comfortable’, and ‘better in some ways than Denham’.⁴⁸ In Fig. 5.2 we see Dillon as art director in 1948 with set designer Robert Furse working on Hamlet.

Fig. 5.2

Set Designer Robert Furse and Art Director Carmen Dillon on set of Hamlet, 1948. Alamy stock images

Dillon, a trained architect, had the unusual position of a woman occupying a senior position in the art department. Following the recognition of her early work designing much of The Mikado (1939), shot at Pinewood, and her distinguished work during wartime, Dillon’s ingenuity was highlighted by the trade press and in reviews in relation to productions at Pinewood such as The Woman in Question (1950). This film necessitated working with only one set but presented in slightly different ways, as were the costumes and appearance of the central character Astra played by Jean Kent. These changes were necessary to reflect impressions of Astra by five characters who recollected events leading up to her murder. Each of their viewpoints, presented in five consecutive segments, revealed a different opinion of Astra. As well as Kent’s acting and appearance, small set details were altered between segments.⁴⁹ In spite of Dillon’s recognition, change was slow in the industry, particularly concerning women occupying senior roles. Although there had been some important shifts, as Bell notes: ‘Wartime opportunities did not lead to lasting structural change’.⁵⁰ A gender pay gap prevailed, as in many other industries and professions, and skilled jobs most often held by men were better paid than ‘broadly equivalent jobs held by women, such as wardrobe mistress and production secretary’.⁵¹ These were key, but less recognised, roles within studios, personal accounts of which rarely feature in archives.⁵²

Local Conditions at Pinewood

In terms of political allegiance, Harper and Porter note that while most Pinewood employees lent towards conservatism, they did not necessarily support management.⁵³ Gordon McCallum, resident sound mixer at Pinewood from 1945 to 1985, was a shop steward for some years, a role he gave up when dubbing work he undertook in the post-war period demanded his full-time attention. He recalled that one personnel officer at Pinewood recognised that his job was to ‘find holes’ in the 1947 Agreement.⁵⁴ So while the Agreement achieved greater clarity regarding employment conditions, in practice its operation was not always smooth or without conflict. The regime of tighter budgets imposed by John Davis at the beginning of the 1950s influenced a production culture that tended towards hierarchical control, especially by departmental heads. This structure was similar to Hollywood’s, and it was designed to avoid the problems which had arisen with the P.F.F. experiment. As Drazin has observed: ‘Reminiscences of the Rank Organisation in the 1950s make it clear that it was a place where any originality or creativity could not possibly thrive’.⁵⁵ But Pinewood was well-equipped and, as we have seen, had developed an infrastructure geared towards technical innovation, even if this was not always exploited in terms of high-risk projects or the quality hallmark that typified films made in the mid-late 1940s by the Independent Producers.

The types of originality and creativity that marked productions at Pinewood in the 1950s were perhaps a little different from those in the preceding years; indeed, their values have been appreciated by revisionist histories of the 1950s.⁵⁶ The studios were carried by the box-office success of films such as Genevieve (Henry Cornelius 1953); the Doctor series of films produced by Betty Box; films starring popular comedian Norman Wisdom; and the first Carry On…films. Other titles such as The Browning Version (Anthony Asquith 1951), White Corridors (1951), The Importance of Being Earnest (Anthony Asquith 1952), and A Night to Remember (Roy Ward Baker 1958) were notable, critically applauded Pinewood productions. Even so, by the end of the 1950s the Rank Organisation was forced to curtail film production due to falling cinema admissions and the financial failure of a slate of productions aimed at international markets. But in terms of technical and material infrastructure, Pinewood remained as Britain’s premier studio, a status that was further enhanced in the 1960s, largely through the James Bond franchise with its innovative set designs by Ken Adam. When Cyril Howard, who first worked in Pinewood’s Secretarial Department in 1948 and subsequently became a studio manager, was interviewed for the Broadcasting, Entertainment, Communications Trade Union (BECTU)’s oral history project, he commented on the studios’ longevity, its survival in the face of triumph and adversity, and recalled that it was one of the best studios with generally good working relations with employees.⁵⁷ He also recalled that workers at Pinewood were generally less politically active than at Denham.⁵⁸ While there is no evidence to support the role this may have played in the decision to close Denham, it may well have been a consideration although as noted in this chapter and in chapter 6, workers at Pinewood were generally active union members.⁵⁹

The example of Pinewood highlights how a studio focus brings to the fore a different set of variables than are normally taken into consideration in relation to the history of the Rank Organisation. Although managerial roles were not necessarily held by filmmakers, technicians who worked at Pinewood exercised degrees of creative agency in coming to terms with the constraints associated with budgetary control. In a period that was difficult for the film industry, particularly in relation to increased competition from television in the 1950s, maintaining a large studio facility for filmmaking was a ‘bricks and mortar’ asset that in the 1960s became very profitable as it became a ‘four walls’ facility. Film and television production companies could rent a stage and associated space, hiring additional facilities and freelance labour. As we have seen, the latter became the dominant model for employment in the film industry after the late 1950s which involved ‘the associated unpredictability of rates, intervals of unemployment and the frequent obligation to assist, unpaid, in speculative and promotional work’.⁶⁰ From this perspective, Pinewood’s longevity was influenced by long-term trends in the labour market which were not necessarily beneficial for employees. As the Rank Organisation backed away from film production Pinewood took the opposite direction towards becoming the hub of international production it is today. As this chapter has shown, the immediate post-war years were key in influencing its survival despite the fluctuations and uncertainties associated with different managerial regimes, and the impact of economic and material constraints.