Spatial and Causal Thoughts from an Idealist Point of View

Abstract

In this chapter, I begin to consider the consequences of the Idealist Interpretation for Hume’s Science of Man. The first question pertains to the spatial and causal thoughts we can have. We have uncovered Idealist limitations on the spatiality of the objects we can think about (Chap. 5). So a worry now suggests itself. Might this limitation manifest itself with respect to the sorts of spatial beliefs we can have (given that both thoughts and objects involve perceptions)? In particular, can Hume the Idealist uphold the (eminently plausible) claim that we can believe (as we clearly do) that space is unified, both synchronically and diachronically? The second question pertains to the possibility of causal thought, both ours, and Hume’s, and to the possibility that causal thoughts must all be false within Hume’s Idealist system, thereby severely vitiating his science. These worries, I will argue, can be dispelled.