Tipping Away from Coal?: Exploring Narratives and Tipping Dynamics in the Phaseout of Coal on Svalbard

Abstract

This chapter explores societal tipping points in energy transitions in the Arctic through the case of the phasing out of coal mining on Svalbard. The economy of the region, which has high geopolitical importance in the Arctic, was founded based on extractivism. More than a century ago, coal mining not only consolidated as Svalbard’s main industrial activity, but also crystalized in the region’s identity and in Norway’s strategy for sustaining its presence on the archipelago. International agreements and debates concerning green transitions, in combination with fluctuating coal prices and ageing infrastructure, have provoked the emergence of various narratives concerning the future of the archipelago. These narratives entail both low-carbon alternatives for the local economy, and alternative energy sources to power human life on Svalbard. This chapter examines these narratives, focusing on the interplay between demographic and socio-economic developments of the past 20 years. Several kinds of societal tipping points can be observed, from politico-economic to demographic and socio-cultural tipping points. The question remains, however, whether the Svalbard case also exemplifies tipping points in the biophysical dimensions of social-ecological systems. This will in large part depend on the ability to find viable energy alternatives that harmonize with regional geopolitical security.

1 Introduction

Studies of social-ecological tipping points have conventionally focused on the biophysical dimensions. As result, there is a maturity in how biophysical tipping points are discussed in the literature. They refer to thresholds at which the structure and function of a system radically changes to take on new characteristics that may be difficult or impossible to reverse (c.f Gunderson & Holling, 2002). By comparison, societal tipping points have been given a more passive or nebulous role in social-ecological systems thinking, and they are less well understood. Meanwhile, in the global efforts to meet the Paris Agreement targets by reducing reliance on coal and carbon intensive industries and energy generation, there is need to understand how societies in carbon and coal intensive regions (CCIRs) can transform and thereby enable energy systems to transform. The TIPPING+ research that forms the background for this edited volume has focused on societal tipping points, with particular attention to the narratives that accompany demographic, political, governance, and economic shifts (Lieu et al., 2020; Tàbara et al., 2018). A key motivation for the Tipping+ project has been to find positive tipping points that ensure just transitions and avoid the risk of populist and extremist political backlash.

Svalbard is an archipelago in the Artic whose local economy and identity have been intimately tied with coal mining for more than a century. Nonetheless, transitions away from coal are underway, and Longyearbyen, which is the largest township on Svalbard, is in the process of shutting down the only Norwegian coal power plant and the last remaining Norwegian-operated coal mine in Norway. ¹ Svalbard has a crucial geopolitical importance, given its privileged location in the North Atlantic Ocean and the wealth of natural resources in the area. In addition, Svalbard is a unique case that is exposed to the balance of cross-national concerns, given the possibility of new maritime passages opening up for Artic shipping, and growing international interests in the region, exemplified in Chinese and Indian presence on Arctic policy, research, and industrial arenas. The 1920 Svalbard Treaty ensures Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago, but all signatories to the Treaty have the right to engage in natural resource extraction and other economic activity.

The end of coal has been controversial in a local perspective where the majority of residents have historically been connected to the coal mines even if indirectly, as well as in national politics where climate commitments and energy security have been prominent concerns. The special geographical characteristics of Svalbard make it a unique case of challenging the supremacy of coal, and offers lessons for other regions seeking to induce positive tipping points that enable low-carbon transformations. Not being a lifecycle community, the decisions to phase out the coal economy could be made top-down from the Norwegian National Government without the same level of concern of rising anti-democratic political mobilization as is the risk in other CCIRs. In that way, demographic and economic shifts resulting from the cessation of coal can be observed in a setting where local cultural and community history has limited power to influence the national government decisions on the future of the region. The Svalbard case described in this chapter exemplifies a flip into a fundamentally different development trajectory, where the narratives of clean-energy transitions has had profound impact on the local culture and the characteristics of the local economy and society, and will continue to influence energy security in the future. Moreover, the case illustrates several kinds of societal tipping points, from politico-economic to demographic and socio-cultural tipping points. The question remains, however, whether the Svalbard case also exemplifies tipping points in the biophysical dimensions of social-ecological systems. This will in large part depend on the ability to find viable energy alternatives, and for the foreseeable future, diesel will replace coal for energy production (c.f. Longyearbyen Lokalstyre (LL) 2023, Markussen, 2023).

In keeping with the aims of TIPPING+ and this edited volume, this chapter considers the stakeholders, policies, ideologies, institutions, and technologies, as well as the timeline of events, and/or lines of argument adopted by actors supporting different narratives (Tàbara et al., 2018; Lieu et al., 2020). Through these themes, this chapter seeks to understand the processes that led to the decision to end coal mining and how these changes affect the local economy, society and demographic trends. We examine different overarching narratives on coal and alternatives to coal on Svalbard. ² The main research questions that guide our work are: (i) what precipitated the decision to end reliance on coal as a source of energy and economic activity on Svalbard? (ii) how has the decision to end reliance on coal affected the Svalbardian society? and (iii) do key events in the cessation of coal configure positive socio-ecological tipping points?

This chapter first presents the concept of tipping points in a human geography perspective, before describing the framework used for this study. We then outline our data collection methods before providing an overview of Svalbard, with emphasis on the politics and economics of coal in the archipelago and how this led to demographic and societal changes. A presentation and discussion of the competing narratives identified in the case follows. We conclude the chapter with some reflections on Svalbard’s coal mining trajectories and on the concept of tipping points more generally.

2 Tipping Points in Human Geography

The concept of tipping points has gained increasing attention over the past decade within the academic community as well as in the broader professional and political public (Milkoreit et al., 2018). The concept denotes a qualitative system change that has its roots in specialized chemical and mathematical nomenclature (Milkoreit et al., 2018), where it followed the nineteenth century bifurcation theories (Lenton, 2013). In human geography, the concept of tipping points belongs to at least three strands of literature.

The first strand of literature refers to demographic transitions in urban contexts, and other concerns climatic and environmental changes. On demography, the oldest paper dealing with the concept of tipping points concerns radical changes in the prevalence of different racial groups in urban neighborhoods (Wolf, 1963). Other major works in this vein include the work of Woods (1977) and Schwab and Marsh (1980). The second strand of literature can be exemplified by the work of Malcolm Gladwell (2000), who conceives of tipping points as the results of small interactions between knowledge brokers and individuals with large and diverse social networks; these interactions result in rapid and large change. The third strand of literature focuses on systems changes, mostly related to linked human and natural systems. Tipping points are defined as “the threshold at which a phenomenon, object, system, or process is displaced from a state of stable equilibrium into a new status that is dissimilar from the first, and which is difficult to reverse” (Castree et al., 2013). Synonymous terms such as threshold (Steele & Henderson, 1984; Gunderson & Holling, 2002) critical threshold (Dakos et al., 2015; Kopp et al., 2016), adaptation turning point (Werners et al., 2013) have similar uses in the literature on global change. A key similarity between all these terms is that they denote a major systems or regime shift or transformation from which it will be difficult or impossible to return.

The challenge in pin-pointing a tipping point has long been a topic of debate. Woods (1977) cautions that the tipping point in social-cultural contexts might be quite complicated to identify. First, precise, empirically detectable thresholds may be difficult to identify (c.f. Russill & Nyssa, 2009). Second, there are phenomena that may be considered as a consequence of the tipping point, and at the same time be considered as the tipping point itself. In other words, the tipping points are in some cases estimated and quantified (Card et al., 2008) and in other cases tipping points are used as a generic concept́ without specific indicators (Werners et al., 2013).

In this chapter, we rely on the TIPPING+ framework building on Tàbara et al. (2018), who introduce the concept of positive tipping points (PTPs) to examine the transformations required for achieving the 2–1.5 °C target. PTPs are understood as “as emergent properties of systems–including both human capacities and structural conditions — which would allow the fast deployment of evolutionary-like transformative solutions to successfully tackle the present socio-climate quandary” (ibid, p. 120). The TIPPING+ framework integrates these insights with Lieu et al. (2020), who examines the narratives that perpetuate, provide alternatives to, and transform the coal-intensive economy. This chapter contributes to the social science understanding of tipping points by examining narratives presented by interviewees, the media, reports, and scientific publication. These narratives are examined in the context of changes in population, migration, gender, age, and employment, as well as in coal mining and other economic activities.

3 Theoretical Framework

In combining the frameworks of Tàbara et al. (2018) and Lieu et al. (2020) the TIPPING+ consortium also sought to identify narrative tipping points in descriptions or plans for demographic, political, economic, or societal shifts in CCIRs. Through this shared framework, the aim was to synthesize findings of the role of narrative dynamics on positive tipping points across numerous cases. Tàbara et al. (2018) describe positive tipping points in social-ecological systems as inherently difficult to anticipate but possible to navigate. They highlight that these transitions into new social-ecological system configurations are often described as negative, but that positive tipping points are both necessary and possible to plan for. Through designing a series of recurrent processes of creating visions for a post-coal world, working with capacities, and finding solutions and pathways, Tàbara et al. (2018) suggest tipping points to post-carbon societies can be sparked by re-imagining possible desirable futures and harnessing capacities.

The ways in which the post-carbon transformation is storied, then, is critical for transformations toward sustainability (Tàbara et al., 2018; Lieu et al., 2020). Indeed, careful attention to the role of narratives in inducing societal shifts have been highlighted in recent years (Barad, 2014; Paschen & Ison, 2014; Olson, 2015; Veland et al., 2018). Stories about sustainability transitions are entangled in both deliberate and reflexive ways with material transformations, placing great possibility but also responsibility for change in how persons and our communities think about, write about, and in other ways express desirable change (see O'Brien, 2016, 2020). The ways in which the world is storied are multiple and place-based, and the effort to characterize these stories into narratives as we do in this chapter is necessarily an abstraction. Our aim in indicating narratives is to provide some analytic insight for other locations seeking to transition away from coal and carbon-intensive societies.

The TIPPING+ project has combined the theoretical framings of Tàbara et al. (2018) and Lieu et al. (2020). In this way, the transition from mainstream to transformed narratives conceptualized by Lieu et al. (2020), is induced through the processes of harnessing capacities and creating vision for the future as conceptualized in Tàbara et al. (2018). The discursive tipping point is an inflection point at which the mainstream narrative is shifted into a new mainstream narrative in the second cycle (Fig. 2). Following Tàbara et al. (2018), workshops and interviews have been performed in various case studies to either explore or induce shifts into a new way of narrating energy and economic conditions. It is important to note that in this framework, focus is on how the narratives evolve over time, while material changes in the social-ecological system have been given secondary importance. The aim of this approach has been to provide much needed insight on the societal dimensions of tipping points, and to seek mechanisms that might precipitate concomitant material transformations in economy, technology, and institutions. While some case studies in TIPPING+ have already materially transitioned into post-coal regions (tearing down coal infrastructures, constructing energy alternatives), most have not. Indeed, the global shift into the post-coal societies has not yet precipitated but remains at most in a narrative transition is yet to materialize to enable rapidly staying within 1.5 degrees climate change. It is the intention that the collection of this book chapters will contribute to insights on how narrative positive tipping points can be induced (Tàbara et al., 2018). From there, the hypothesis is that these narrative tipping points will contribute to creating the cognitive conditions to induce material changes in energy generation without negative disruptions to former coal and carbon intensive regions.

In order to use the combined Tàbara et al. (2018) and Lieu et al. (2020) frameworks for the Svalbard case study, some adjustments were needed (Fig. 1). Lieu et al. (2020) distinguish between mainstream and on-stream coal narratives, and off-stream and transformation-stream narratives in the overarching debate on coal and low-carbon transitions. The coal-intensive mainstream narrative on Svalbard has already been replaced by the transformation-stream narrative. As such, we have adapted the language of this case study to consider the coal narrative, an economic transition narrative, an energy transition narrative and a transformed integrated economy-energy-environment narrative. The statistical demographical data presented below is used to illustrate the transitions, or tipping points between the coal and transformation narratives.

Fig. 1

The frameworks by Tàbara et al. (2018) and Lieu et al. (2020) adapted to the Svalbard case study in which the mainstream narrative is no longer coal based. Hence, we have chosen to present the coal narrative, two transition narratives, and a transformative narrative in this chapter. The cyclical processes of harnessing capacities, finding solutions and pathways, and creating a new vision mark the positive tipping point from one narrative to the next

4 Methods and Data

Our research strategy began by taking stock of our earlier research experiences concerning Svalbard and energy questions in the Arctic. For quantitative data, a database containing statistics on demographic and economic variables was created. Sources include Statistics Norway, the Norwegian Environment Agency, the Brønnøysund Register Center, and the Norwegian Ministry of Education. Data on population, employment, gender, business sectors, business revenue, and emissions were explored for possible tipping points from 2009 to the present. A key challenge for Svalbard is that statistical data is limited and patchy, such that the analysis lacks detail on, for instance, employment structure. Despite this limitation, possible tipping points have been identified.

For qualitative data, we consulted secondary sources, ranging from peer-reviewed literature, governmental strategies, reports and legal documents, and conventional media articles. We collected relevant news articles from national and regional sources, for the period between 2000 and 2021. These sources were used as basis for a preliminary document with information on: (i) the timeline of events and decisions, (ii) the main lines of argument in the coal discourse, (iii) the contrast between local and national political perspectives on the issue, and (iv) what energy alternatives appeared to be under discussion. Out of the pool of existing media articles, seventy-nine were actively employed in the writing of that preliminary analysis.

This preliminary analysis was also the baseline for forming our fieldwork strategy and interview guides. We conducted a nine-day fieldwork trip to Longyearbyen in October 2021, where 11 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants from business, government, volunteer organizations, and residents in Longyearbyen. Our fieldwork also allowed for rich observations, and informal interactions with residents, including a “welcome meeting” organized by the LL to newcomers on Svalbard, and participation in one internal meeting of the LL with representative politicians from different political parties. The fieldwork also involved a visit to Mine 3 (a decommissioned mine that became a touristic attraction), and a cruise trip to the Russian township of Pyramiden (a former coal community on Svalbard, now soviet-era tourist attraction).

The timing of the fieldwork coincided with fresh political developments in Longyearbyen concerning the interests of our research (that is, decisions concerning coal mining, demographic changes that resulted from earlier policies for economic diversification), which made the themes of interest subject to controversy and often led to a certain discomfort on the side of the informants. The first informant declined to give consent for the interview to be recorded. As a result, our data collection strategy was then adapted so that we relied little on having it recorded, with the intent to increase trust and minimize possible reasons for informants to hold back on details of their experiences. As a result, we proceeded to write detailed notes from each interview immediately after each interaction. Interviews occurred either in English or in Norwegian, depending on the language preferences of the informant.

We sought and received ethics approval from Norwegian Centre for Research Data.

5 The Growth and Decline of Coal on Svalbard

In this section, we present the main events in Svalbard’s trajectory (see Table 1), with a focus on the politics and economics of coal, and the correspondent societal and demographic changes associated with these events.

Table 1 Timeline of key events, correlated with coal production and price (coal production from SNSK, 2023)

The Norwegian Arctic is an example of how multifaceted and complex a region’s dependence on carbon can be. Svalbard is part of an Arctic energy region that is characterized by severe weather, seasonal darkness, and ice/permafrost. This places limitations on the available alternative energy sources. The Arctic energy region as a whole is heavily reliant on carbon based fuels (diesel, coal, wood, etc.) for heating, cooking, and local electricity generation. For Svalbard in particular, coal mining has historically allowed for energy security in Svalbard, as well as an economic basis to support Norwegian presence in an area where geopolitical concerns abound. At the same time, coal represents 35 percent of global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel energy generation (International Energy Agency, IEA 2023), and 20 percent of EU emissions. The EU seeks pathways to decarbonization, and for Norway ending coal mining on Svalbard symbolizes an important contribution. The LL (2023) energy report stated the realistic potential to become carbon neutral by 2030, while a coalition of Norwegian state and private companies are collaborating to find the right secure energy mix to reach net zero (Skift, 2023).

The climatic and geological setting of Svalbard places some limitations energy alternatives. The archipelago of islands lies at 78 degrees North in the northern Atlantic Ocean (Fig. 2). In this region midnight sun persists between April 20th until August 23rd, while the sun is below the horizon between October 26th and February 16th. Hence, the possibility for solar power is limited to the summer months. The geology of Svalbard is mainly sedimentary, made up of layers of sediments laid down from the Cretaceous to Palaeogene in tropical ecosystems. These ecosystems today manifest as a high grade form of black coal (bituminous coal), and a rich fossil record that bear witness to this archipelago once having a much warmer climate. Today, temperatures are increasing rapidly, and the archipelago is an example of how arctic amplification – the process by which the Arctic heats up twice as fast as other regions (c.f. Previdi et al., 2021) – affect ecosystems and infrastructures. The warming climate has resulted in novel risk, such as from avalanches near Longyearbyen (Jaskólski et al., 2018), while accentuating the risks to the Svalbard Seed Vault (Asdal & Guarino, 2018) and providing challenges to windmill developments (c.f. Panfilov, 2018).

Fig. 2

Map of the Svalbard archipelago with townships including Longyearbyen (Source: Norwegian Polar Institute,2016)

Svalbard is governed by Norway under the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. The treaty was negotiated in connection to the Versailles negotiations and allows for all signatories to exploit its natural resources. Recent discussions on the topic highlight that the treaty was designed for a completely different socio-political and economic reality than the one Svalbard experiences today; hence, while Norwegian sovereignty is undisputed, the interpretation of the treaty’s various articles is at times contested (High North News, 2020). The archipelago is governed by the Svalbard Sysselmester, who is appointed by the Norwegian State Government. The relevant institutions and administrative levels are the Longyearbyen Lokalstyre (LL) which is responsible for the local government, Sysselmesteren who administers the archipelago, the national government to which the Sysselmester is answerable, as well as to the Troms judiciary branch, located on northern mainland Norway.

Lying in the High North (78°N), the Longyearbyen township is not a ‘lifecycle community’, meaning that it does not have infrastructure for inhabitants to be born or die there. That is, pregnant women, elderly people and/or severely ill patients are directed to mainland Norway for medical assistance. Nevertheless, the archipelago has attracted a certain demographic of adventurous inhabitants. The population has remained stable at just over 2000 inhabitants over the past decade (SSB, 2023), despite the decline of coal mining. Nevertheless, as this chapter shows, changes in cultural and demographic aspects have been dramatic in recent years, and already present a tipping point in the Svalbard society.

5.1 Politics and Economics of Coal

Coal mining has for the past century been a crucial instrument for maintaining Norwegian presence on Svalbard. The early investments in coal were made by foreign governments subsidizing private actors. Over the years the subsidies were replaced by full nationalization by both Norway (ACC, SNSK, Svea) and Russia (Pyramiden, Barentsburg) (Table 1). The nationalized mining operations guaranteed the development of infrastructure and services on the archipelago. The process of nationalization was completed in 1976, when the Norwegian government nationalised the coal mining company Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani (SNSK). ³ This happened during the cold war and energy crisis, as the operations of SNSK was increasingly uneconomical, while the geopolitical interests of maintaining the company active were ever more crucial. Coal mining operations on Svalbard until the early 2000s were not very profitable, when production value increased markedly (Fig. 3). SNSK has often been referred to as a cornerstone company—or even the lifeblood—of Longyearbyen society, both before and after nationalisation (Figenschou, 2014; Samuelsen, 2015; Ertsaas, 2020). For example, until the 1980s, the company issued a kind of local currency known as ‘Spitsberg money’, a practice that was not uncommon in company towns across the world.

Fig. 3

Coal produced on Svalbard in millions of NOK in 2023 values (source: SSB, data after 2019 from SNSK, 2023)

Other natural resources have also been exploited on Svalbard. In addition to the historic practices of hunting and whaling, there have been drillings in search for oil and gas at different times; mining for metals has also been attempted, though short lived. The scope of resources identified, combined with the harsh arctic environments and long distances have not sustained the continuation of these activities at commercial scales. In essence, economic activity was deemed necessary to maintain presence and stability in the region, but the lack of commercial appeal has meant the need for state support. As a result, life in Svalbard has existed in a symbiosis of political goals and economic activity, of which coal has been at the center.

Starting in the 1990s, the Norwegian state has sought to transition from coal dependency to alternative energy and economic industries that are intended to be more economically and environmentally sustainable than coal (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 1999; Bjørnsen & Johansen, 2014; Palm, 2016; Olsen, 2017). Before then, the Norwegian government had been resistant to allow tourism on Svalbard. This changed with the promise to foster job creation and a diversified economic base as the government began to increase the budget allocation for research and higher education. In 1993, the University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS) was established. About a decade later, local democracy was implemented through the establishment of the LL in 2002. By 1999, coal mining was no longer perceived, by the government, as critical for maintaining a Norwegian society on the archipelago (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 1999), even though two mines opened after this realization (Svea in 1999 and Lunckefjell in 2014).

After the early 2000s, coal prices increased and coal revenue on Svalbard increased to a peak in 2007 (Fig. 4). While prices have fluctuated over the past 20 years, and revenue peaked, mining turnover has decreased stepwise to near zero (Fig. 5). All the while, debates surrounding coal phase-out and green transitioning have persisted. For example, the Committee on Foreign Affairs called for an assessment on the possibility of a renewable energy system in Longyearbyen both in 2001 and 2009 (Utenrikskomiteen, 2001, 2009). In a white paper from 2009, the government communicated an interest in facilitating more research, education, and tourism due to the vulnerability of the coal industry to price fluctuations (Justis- og politidepartementet, 2009). The politicians’ comments on the white paper were perceived as a signal for a phase-out of the Svea mine (Amundsen, 2009). Coal prices were plummeting after a record year in 2008, and SNSK was struggling to adapt and restructure (Aarskog, 2009). In 2012 and 2013 the company ran a large deficit and had production problems, resulting in the need to downsize and dismiss 70 employees (Amundsen, 2012, 2013). During and following this period, several articles and op-eds in Svalbardposten (local newspaper), as well as posts on the Facebook group ‘Ros & info Longyearbyen’, discussed the future of Svalbard and alternative energy sources.

Fig. 4

Produced coal price per tonn 1990–2020 (Source: SSB)

Fig. 5

Turnover from coal mining (NOK) on Svalbard 2008–2021 (source: SSB)

The years 2014 and 2015 were marked by large restructurings and economic problems in SNSK (Olsen, 2017). Between 2011 and 2015, the coal prices plummeted again (Fig. 6) and SNSK had to resort to temporary downtime, financed by government support (Holdal, 2015; Palm, 2015). Consequently, the local community engaged in public debates concerning the sustainability of keeping the mining activity alive through subsidies. In the white paper on Svalbard in 2016, the government stated that coal mining was of reduced importance, both due to a great share of the workers commuting from the mainland (thereby not residing on Svalbard), and due to economic problems (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2016). However, it did state that continued activity could be possible if coal prices were to indicate profitability in the future. The importance of tourism was highlighted, and the government wished to facilitate a transition through increased employment in this sector, as well as in research and education.

Fig. 6

Percentage women and men employed in mining on Svalbard 2008–2019 (Source: SSB)

The government recommended and allocated funding for the phase-out and clean-up of coal mining in the Svea and Lunckefjell mines in the national budget proposal for 2018 (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2017). This recommendation was partly based on a non-public report by Deloitte that concluded that continued operation would not be commercially justifiable (Nygaard, 2017). Before the recommendation was made, coal prices had risen and the local debate regarding the coal industry revived. The LL was already skeptical to parliamentary investments to re-open the mines after the downtime, in case they would not be profitable. The LL believed that the economy could benefit from reducing the dependency on SNSK, although it recognized mine no 7 as vital for local energy production and for the community.

In 2020, the LL decided to start an energy-shift project that could result in the closure of the coal power station. The end of Longyearbyen’s coal power plant was confirmed in January 2021 (though planned for 2023) and prompted SNSK and the government to also decide on phasing out mine 7. This decision has been celebrated by environmentalist groups, but has been very controversial locally, not the least because no clear alternative energy source had been defined as a substitute at the time. Furthermore, the coal power station had been outfitted with filters to prevent black carbon emissions that might otherwise cause snow and permafrost to thaw and contribute to unstable structures and hillsides. While the filters caused some increase in CO2-emissions because more energy became needed to generate sufficient heat, the emissions from coal mining on Svalbard has been in steady decline over the past 15 years, with a sharp decrease in 2015–2016 as mining operations were near halted (SSB, 2023). Approaching 2020, these emissions became nearly zero (from peaks of around 25k tons CO2-equivalents in 2007 and 2015, SSB, 2023). Meanwhile, energy generation continues to produce CO2 emissions. As a temporary solution, diesel generators will supply the energy needed to power Longyearbyen. Over time, pilot projects based on renewables will be tested with the ambition to determine the best energy matrix for sustaining Longyearbyen.

Without the demand from the local power plant, the volume exported (c. 75 percent of total production to Germany for metallurgy) was insufficient justification to keeping mine 7 operational. SNSK has been exploring other activities that support their own transitions. With the imminent end of coal, SNSK has been investing increasingly on arctic logistics, real estate development in Longyearbyen, ⁴ as well as pilot projects for energy alternatives on Svalbard, that can be transferred to other Arctic off-grid locations. In the words of one interviewee: “Vi produserer ikke kull. Vi produserer tilstedeværelse og stabilitet på Svalbard for Norge” (we do not produce coal, we produce presence and stability on Svalbard for Norway). In this spirit, SNSK is finding their way towards achieving their core mission outside of coal mining.

Plans for shutting down the mine have been disturbed by Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine in February 2022. First, Europe (and to some extent Norway) is facing a severe energy crisis, which has led the continent to look at Norway’s abundant energy generation as a lifeline. Furthermore, fuel prices are also high and volatile as result of the war, which affects the cost and energy security of running power facilities based on diesel. Not insignificantly, coal prices are also at a historic high, representing increased revenues for SNSK. The energy supply security presented by a local coal source is also accentuated by this geopolitical context. In the context of the invasion of Ukraine, and in absence of clear and reliable alternatives for energy, coal mining will continue for 2 years longer than initially planned. Over the period between which the coal mine closes and renewable energy alternatives can be planned, diesel will be used for electricity generation (NTB 2022). Diesel is expected to reduce the emissions by around 50 percent (Longyearbyen Lokalstyre 2023).

The diversification of the economic base on Svalbard away from coal has some defining characteristics with implications for society, culture and demography. Not only have the Norwegian developmental strategies taken a step away from the coal mining economy, but they have also gone in the direction of the services economy. This has implications for what types of knowledge and competences are needed in the local population, in order for the local economy to thrive. This also brings along changes in demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, ethnicity etc.

5.2 Demographic and Societal Characteristics and Changes

Svalbard’s population has near doubled since the mid 1990s, from around 1250 to 2500 residents, while employment in mining has been in a decline. Following the fluctuations in coal prices and government subsidies, employment in coal mining began to decrease by 1989. By the time the decision was made to cease coal mining, a sharp decrease saw 200 of 300 coal mining jobs terminated (Fig. 6). At the same time, employment in private business, especially within the tourism industry, started to increase, with a sharp change over the first two decades of the 2000s. Between 2015 and 2021 alone, mining revenue saw a decrease from 600 to 100 million NOK, while transport, research, and teaching each increased significantly (Fig. 7). The Svalbard economy was severely impacted by the COVID pandemic, when tourism revenue was near absent, and the numbers for 2021 need to be seen in light of a recovering hospitality economy.

Fig. 7

Change in turnover in millions of NOK across businesses on Svalbard (source: SSB)

With this change in employment, the demographic make-up of Longyearbyen also changed. An influx of seasonal and short-term workers employed in hospitality and teaching reduced the residence time in Longyearbyen to months or years, while the long-term residents became fewer. Several have documented how these demographic shifts have influenced social cohesion and trust. For instance, people started to lock the doors in homes (Eriksen, 2020) and cars (Mogård & Bergersen, 2017), marking a shift away from the close-knit relationships of the coal mining economy.

Our research suggests a stronger sense of political involvement in recent years. The Green Party established a local organization just prior to the 2015 elections to support cessation of coal. The cessation of coal appears to be connected with this mobilization. Residence on Svalbard is allowed only to persons who can support themselves financially. With the lower economic turnover during the pandemic there have been cases where persons have been forced to leave Svalbard and Norway due to lack of financial support. This need prompted discussions on the continued role of Svalbard as a non-lifecycle community, and the concomitant demands for sustaining rights of residency. The political ideologies are emerging both from Longyearbyen itself and the long-term residents there who have shaped their political views locally over many years, as well as from other parts of Norway and the world. The rapid loss of coal miners and their community values and political orientations has been matched by a rapid increase in new and short-term residents from all parts of the world.

In consequence of the changed demography of Svalbard, the Norwegian government in 2022 changed the voting laws (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2022a, 2022b). There is a local election for the Lokalstyre, for which until 2022 all residents on Svalbard had voting rights. Citing changed demographics, the Norwegian Government from 2022 grants voting rights only to persons who have lived at least 3 years in a municipality on mainland Norway (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2022a, 2022b). In practice this prevented around 700 residents from influencing governance of Svalbard in 2022. In 2019 1827 persons were eligible to vote, and by 2023 this number is around 1120 (SSB, 2023). Following this decision, the recently established Green Party ceased operations.

Today, the region is dominated by tourism, research and education activities, together with a variety of supporting businesses involved in construction and transportation. Longyearbyen is a hub for cruises and expeditions to natural areas across the islands and coast, and Ny-Ålesund is a research hub (but also a tourist destination) where 18 institutions from 11 countries work primarily on environmental and earth sciences.

6 Narrative Evolution of Svalbard’s Energy and Economy

In this section we examine the developments coal mining on Svalbard described above through the lens of the two key TIPPING+ frameworks (Fig. 1). Where coal had the function of being an energy source, an economic activity, as well as a community cornerstone, the transition away from coal needs to take into account the needs for transformation in all these three strands. Looking more closely at these narratives, the coal economic narrative, the community narrative, and energy narrative on Svalbard are differentiating. We can see that the energy transition relies on at first, wood pellets and diesel imported from lower latitudes, before the energy system can transform into viable and important renewable alternatives. The cultural and economic transition emerges together through the ‘three new legs’ of the Svalbard economy, where residents no longer are coal miners, but work in tourism, research, and education. As an alternative and less important narrative, we also give attention to an economic transformation narrative that does not rely on mass tourism. A seventh transformation narrative not represented on this figure is an implicit militarization of the archipelago. The publication of the new Svalbardmelding (Norwegian Government White Paper for Svalbard politics) has been pushed forward to 2024 in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and there is a sense of anticipation for what this white paper will entail for Longyearbyen.

In the following, we look more closely at each narrative transition. For each narrative, we also point to the material changes accompanying the narrative, and the degree to which it has been or is able to be materialized in the near future.

6.1 The Coal Energy, Cultural, and Economic Narrative

Mining has been a cornerstone of the Svalbard community for a century. In the narrative that enables and perpetuates coal, the coal mines and power plant plays the role as a securer of Norwegian presence on Svalbard, with the coal economic activity providing some return on the investment necessary to secure this presence (Fig. 8, 0). Coal has historically not generated large revenues on Svalbard (Fig. 3), until in the early 2000s when prices for black coal soared and production along with it (Fig. 5). It is worth noting that the intention to transition the economy toward tourism, education, and research came in the 1990s after 70 years of stably low coal productivity. Hence the production of coal has not been motivated by economic gains over the course of the Norwegian mining operations.

Fig. 8

Different narratives relevant to coal on mining on Svalbard, based on a Tipping+ synthesis framework

The late 1990s marked a tipping point in Norway’s Svalbard policies that set in motion the transition toward the 2017 decision to cease coal mining. As such, the coal narrative has not been mainstream (see Lieu et al., 2020) on Svalbard since the early 2000s (Fig. 8, 0). Meanwhile, a coal-legitimating narrative does persist, which puts forward energy security, the lack of energy alternatives, as well as abating technologies such as filtering coal power production and capturing carbon for storage (CCS). Another facet of this legitimizing narrative concerns the fact that the coal mined in Mine 7 is of a specific quality for use in metallurgy (bituminous coal), and that this use has lower emissions than coal energy production (Garte, 2021). Since this coal is not burnt it does not enter the accounting systems for greenhouse gas emissions; moreover, this narrative holds, metallurgical quality coal is used for manufacturing steel, given current scale and technological development, which in turn is necessary for the infrastructure needed for the green shift (Garte, 2021).

The coal narrative has once been espoused by the Norwegian national government, Longyearbyen local authorities and large parts of the Svalbardian society, in particular mine workers and their families, who up until the late 1990s corresponded to substantial shares of the local population. In the years leading up to Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, this narrative weakened substantially (Fig. 8, 0), but the geopolitical destabilization and concomitant concern for energy security is tied to the decision to delay closure of the last mine until 2025 and perhaps beyond.

6.2 Transition Narratives

Transition narratives stake out pathways to a low carbon society and economy. These narratives catalyze the replacement of coal by other means of generating energy, community, and economy (the offstream narrative in Lieu et al., 2020), but without themselves constituting the transformation into low-carbon societies and economies. In part, this catalysis is driven by the targets set out in the Paris agreement, but the process is driven also by the low economic profitability of black coal in Svalbard as in other regions. For coal more generally, the economic motivation for phase-out is illustrated by the observation by Lægreid et al. (2023) that peak coal production tends to precede by some period of time the decision to phase out coal. For Svalbard the decision to phase out coal came after 70 years of stable and low coal production (Fig. 3), precipitated by the confluence of the Norwegian State’s need to replace the ageing coal energy plant and the growing concern for greenhouse gas emissions. Today, the decision to phase out coal is broadly supported, as exemplified in the director of SNSK, Jan Morten Ertsaas stating, “There is no economic value in coal mining on Svalbard. Our salary and freight costs are too high. In addition, the market is too uncertain. A majority of the world believes coal should be phased out, and that is our opinion also” (Andreassen, 2022). The Norwegian state redirects subsidies according to transition narratives, to help catalyze ‘three new legs’ for the Svalbard settlement to stand on, and new low carbon energy to power Longyearbyen; but these narratives have not yet materialized into self-sustaining alternatives to the coal society and economy.

The most established transition narrative focuses on establishing education, research and tourism as new economic and cultural cornerstones (Fig. 8, 3). This narrative has been under development since the 1990s and has gained momentum with the decline of coal in recent decades. Critics point, however, that it is far from given that tourism is a sustainable alternative. Tourists reach Svalbard by plane or cruise ships, and a popular tourist attraction involves energy-inefficient diesel-powered snowmobiles. Tourism also puts other types of pressures on the vulnerable ecosystems in the High Arctic, and a sustainable tourism enterprise depends on collectively balancing economic and environmental governance concerns (Hovelsrud et al., 2021). A fringe narrative focuses on fisheries and processing of fish as an additional possible source of jobs and economic activity (Fig. 8, 6). Fishing in the region is highly regulated, and marine ecosystems are undergoing changes associated with climate change that are driving boreal species such as cod northward. This shift may make the fisheries more profitable than they are today, but remoteness and technology render Longyearbyen a less appropriate landing (Misund et al., 2016).

When it comes to energy production, there is in 2023 no wide agreement concerning which specific alternative energy sources will be phased in. A Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet (2022a) white paper on renewable energy writes, “for a small society like Longyearbyen it is important to find a good shared energy solution that does not carry excessive energy cost for residents and businesses. The energy solution needs to be in line with Norway’s climate goals, at the same time as it secures a safe provision of energy and heat for the residents of Longyearbyen. Failures in the energy provision on Svalbard can have serious consequences. Concern for provision security must therefore weigh heavily in the choice of new energy provision.” The white paper considers a bouquet of energy efficiency measures, including solar, wind, green ammonia, and energy saving measures together with other technologies as the most viable and immediate alternatives (Longyearbyen Lokalstyre 2023). Citing the need for energy security, this report suggests diesel, pellets, or gas as viable transition solutions while more permanent renewable energy bases are developed and institutionalized (Fig. 8, 4–5). In the long-term, a range of renewable-based alternatives are being piloted by SNSK, and represent not only new energy sources for Svalbard, but also new business avenues for the company (Fig. 8). Nonetheless, the weather and environmental conditions on Svalbard as a high Arctic region are severely limiting of alternative energy sources. The Norwegian State and Longyearbyen local government have indicated diesel energy generation as the preferred alternative while viable alternatives are developed (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2022a, Markussen, 2023).

Transition narratives also have ideological underpinnings, and some stakeholders point to the way in which events unfolded as evidence for this. The timid end of Svea and Luckefjell mines in 2017 had a more substantial impact on the economy and demography of Svalbard, while the announced end of Mine 7 is perceived to be unpractical and of little actual impact, if not arbitrary. Because the end of Mine 7 is more of a side effect of the LL decision to shut down the power plant than it is a move from SNSK or the Norwegian government, some see it as a symbolic gesture and a missed opportunity for decisive political action that promote low-carbon transitions. In sum, the transition away from coal on Svalbard has since the 1990s been motivated more by coal prices and demand than it has by emissions reductions. The plans to prolong coal mining for two more years now that prices are high and the geopolitical context strained, give further support to this observation.

6.3 Transformation Narratives

The transformation narratives for Svalbard are emerging but are not yet well defined or of high importance in defining the Svalbard society. The transition narratives described above (Fig. 8, 3–4) mobilize diesel, gas, pellets, an energy cable from the mainland, CCS, biochar, and other alternatives for energy generation (Urke, 2021), and rely on high emissions and ecosystem impact activities through tourism, research, and education. The need for this transition at the present time is driven in part by the low profitability of coal and the old age of the coal energy plant, in part by the symbolism of coal mining as a major emitter or CO₂. To build a new coal power plant would not be in keeping with the commitment to the Paris Agreement, such that alternatives are needed even as renewable energy is not yet available. Hence, the transition narratives are not to be equated with the transformative narratives that will emerge or are emerging to render Longyearbyen a low carbon economy.

The cultural and economic narratives have to a large extent been transformed through the cessation of coal, given the dramatic change in demographics and the investments in tourism, research, and education that precipitated those shifts. The cultural and economic transformation narrative (Fig. 8, 3) has become well established and is likely to continue. Meanwhile, the contents of these narratives will need to change in order to avoid the considerable impacts of tourism, research, and education in this remote region on climate and ecosystems. In part this transformation relies on new technologies being available that will reduce or eliminate emissions from air travel and cruise ships, in part on novel tourism packages that avoid impacts on fragile arctic ecosystems (Hovelsrud et al., 2021). As such, this narrative is not well defined, although its ‘themes’ on tourism, education, and research is likely to remain.

The energy narrative (Fig. 8, 5) is under rapid development. The 2022 Energy Plan commissioned by the Longyearbyen Local Government lists wind, solar, and geothermal energy as potential alternatives, but this planning is at an early stage and considerable investment in impact assessments and development planning is needed for this narrative to become defined, shared, and mainstream. The principal concern in defining this narrative is energy security, ensuring a safe and stable energy source (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2022a).

A final potential transformation narrative concerns other economic and societal alternatives than those in the transition narratives. In particular, the potential for fishing (Fig. 8, 6) has been raised in the discussions over alternative economic activity. The strongest limiting factor here is the ease with which fishing vessels can process catch on board and transport directly to ports in Norway. Other alternatives that have been mentioned concern being a port for transportation along Arctic shipping routes, but the bathymetrical conditions in Longyearbyen, as well as its location vis a vis other North Atlantic ports, make this a less desirable location. Moreover, there may be other narratives under formation that are imagining a different economic, energy, and societal Longyearbyen and Svalbard that can resolve issues concerning emissions, ecosystem impacts, and cultural cohesion and trust.

7 Concluding Discussion

Longyearbyen is a valuable place to investigate how ceasing coal mining impacts politics, culture, and economy. The top-down manner in which the Svalbard society is governed allows for sweeping policy changes without the same concern for political backlash as is the case in many of the other CCIRs investigated in the Tipping+ project (see other chapters in this volume). Hence, the key turning points in the transition to a post-coal economy and society on Svalbard have been driven by processes external to local values, needs, and priorities. Four key events have contributed to the cessation of coal on Svalbard, although none of these can be said to have tipped the social-ecological system into a low carbon region. First, in 1999, the government stated the ambition to facilitate a more diversified economy on Svalbard, indicating an intention that coal mining should no longer be essential to ensuring Norwegian presence in the region (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 1999). In 2017, at a time of low coal prices, the government recommended the Svea mine and Lunckefjell mine to be phased out. In 2020, Norconsult presented a report on the coal power plant that noted concern for the ageing facility and the urgent need for replacement. Finally, in 2021, the LL decided to stop using coal for power generation in 2023 (now delayed to 2025). A new turning point may be anticipated from the new Svalbardmelding (Government White Paper) to be published in 2024, which will stake out the new trajectory for the Longyearbyen settlement in the new geopolitical setting following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The transformative shift in demographics seems to have been an unanticipated consequence of these policy changes, which were cited as cause for restrictions in voting rights in 2022 (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2022b).

The ways in which the post-carbon transformation is storied is critical for transformations toward sustainability (Tàbara et al., 2018; Lieu et al., 2020). This chapter and the book to which it belongs contribute insights on how narrative positive tipping points can be induced (Tàbara et al., 2018). At the outset of the chapter, we asked what precipitated the decision to end reliance on coal as a source of energy and economic activity on Svalbard, and how has the decision to end reliance on coal affected the Svalbardian society. For Svalbard, narrative tipping points induced by the national government have created the cognitive conditions to spark material changes toward low carbon energy generation, but they have also induced challenging disruptions to Svalbard culture and energy security.

We have shown that the post-coal narrative on Svalbard has followed national economic trends, such as low turnover and high cost of upgrading and repairing the coal mine and power plant. The redirection of state subsidies to support the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from energy generation has played a central role in the National Norwegian political narrative. Meanwhile, there is an absence of initiatives to calculate and compare the emissions from coal mining and energy production with those of tourism, teaching, and research. This suggests that the decision to cease coal mining is not based on greenhouse gas accounting. Rather, it is based on a wish to move government subsidies from repair and upgrading of coal mines and coal power, to subsidizing net zero energy alternatives. Until such accounting is done, however, the combined carbon emissions of the human-natural system of Svalbard may or may not be virtually unchanged in the transition from the coal economy to the tourism-research-teaching-based economy. A credible post-carbon narrative for Svalbard requires this greenhouse gas accounting.

While the physical system has yet to transform to a low carbon trajectory, transition-related events have led to demographic and societal transformations on Svalbard. The coal worker population has been exchanged for a population working in the hospitality-related industry. New and shorter-term residents have replaced the longer-term former residents. The demographic transformation is recent, and its consequences for local democratic processes seemed unexpected given the sudden change in voting laws that rescinded the voting rights of persons who have not lived on mainland Norway for a minimum of 3 years. The demographic shift also altered the social fabric with impacts on the Longyearbyen culture, shown for instance in that people have started to lock their doors. In sum, the low carbon narrative has been fronted widely but the material transformation that has happened is so far limited to demographic patterns and economic activity. The Svalbard case suggests the need to consider narratives in the context of trends in the combined societal and earth system components of energy transitions and transformations toward sustainability.

Based on the lessons learned from the Svalbard case, we propose that a key enabler of positive tipping points in CCIRs are government actors who have previously incentivized coal mining as a community-building tool, and are looking to subsidize low carbon or zero emission alternatives. Potential barriers to the emergence of positive tipping points are the emissions levels, and other sustainability concerns, related to the economic alternatives, as well as the supply security of alternative energy sources. A more concerning insight from this case study and others in the TIPPING+ is that what triggers transformation in black (or hard) coal regions may not transfer directly to brown coal regions, where the economic profitability is very high.