Introduction: A Global Ethics for a Globalized World

In the last century, the growing pace of technological breakthroughs and an increasingly stable and secure world order paved the way for large-scale investments and unprecedented human movements. In such a context, the cross-border initiatives started by individuals soared exponentially, following the traditional proclivity of businesses to invest in, or trade with, other nations. This phenomenon, known as “globalization,” is today embracing nearly every aspect of life in almost every country in the world, relying on the Internet and exploiting the possibility to quickly travel and communicate. Inevitably, globalization has introduced humanity to new ethical controversies and challenges, as different cultures, economies, and political systems interact and compete with one another on a global scale. To address these ethical issues, several new approaches to ethics have been proposed.

Those who believe in the application of “universal ethics” argue that certain ethical principles and values, such as respect for human rights and dignity, should be applied across the world regardless of cultural, political, or economic differences.Footnote 1 According to this school of thought, the existence of globalization and therefore the spreading awareness that all the sentient beings will now share the same space and time would reinforce the moral norms upholding individual responsibility and even drive new research on ethics.Footnote 2 A second approach is what has been defined as “virtue ethics”, which emphasizes the cultural traits of individuals to assess their inner moral consistency rather than relying on a general moral rule applicable to all human beings. Virtue ethics is loosely connected with wider cultural relativism, a school of thought that underlines the differences between peoples and cultures and mostly denies the existence of a rational objectivity that would work as the ultimate Grundnorm for morality.

Cultural relativism doesn’t always reject the notion of common ethics as such but confined the same to single interrelations and/or historical moments, thereby questioning its universal character.Footnote 3 There are many other possible approaches to solve the conundrum between ethics and politics, inspired by notorious political thinkers such as Hobbes (contractarianism)Footnote 4 or western philosopher like Kant and Aristotle.Footnote 5 Almost all of the competing schools of thought on modern ethics inevitably link the development (or simply definition) of a moral rule with political consequences that affect either the contemporary jus cogens or the jus gentium. This is an intended outcome, as the same existence of a “πολιτεία” – namely, the world – presupposes both internal regulations inspired by some kind of international principles consistent with that domestic order. Therefore, the same theory around the concept of “global ethics” (that often paves the way for an argument in favour of global governance) is grounded upon a theoretical premise with huge political consequences.

The supporters of global ethics don’t deem it necessarily universal in the sense that it is always applicable beyond of time and space, even if this is the case for most of the contemporary studies on the subject (e.g. human rights theories). Nonetheless, all of the scholars who advocate for the existence of such ethics – or for its conceptual development – agree that the guiding principles of a global moral code should be considered universal, at least in the present (global) space and time. These markers rend global ethics an applied form of morality that transcends the realm of theoretical knowledge, focusing on, and translating into political action. In his famous book, Global Ethics and Global Common Goods, the philosopher Patrick Riordan discusses at length the concept of global ethics, closely associating the values upholding such an ethical posture (responsibility and knowledge, among others) with a set of intangible goods shared by all the sentient beings whose preservation inevitably binds all humanity together. The reflection of Riordan is original for it strives to connect the subjects of this applied form of ethics (individuals and institutions from the smallest to the largest scale) with the objects/goods over which this ethics finds application, such as health, peace, and environment.

Scholarly speculation about global ethics and the existence of intangible common goods shared by all humanity has gained traction in international politics. In fact, in 1945 the United Nations unarguably recognized the existence of such transnational goods (i.e. peace) and values (i.e. Justice) as a reason to foster international cooperation, as expressed in the funding Charter of this organization. Although the term “ethics” does not transpire in the Charter itself, the beliefs stated at the beginning of the same are unarguably ethical in principle (e.g. aim for freedom and rights equality) and still inspire this organization.Footnote 6 More recently, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) all explicitly recognized some global common goods in the respective areas of health, food security and international trade, using and interchanging different terms to call them. Furthermore, the UN itself just a few years ago recognized the importance of common goods in several resolutions and documents, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, where environment was featured on the top of the list.Footnote 7

Even though references to the concepts of global goods and ethics have recently proliferated, an institutional definition has been lacking.Footnote 8 A wide definition of a common good often employed by scholars is that of a resource (object) that is shared and accessible to all people (subjects), notwithstanding their location, ethnicity, or nationality, and that is considered essential for their well-being and survival. Some examples might be health, security, and access to outer space. Intuitively, the preservation of global environment is probably the chief public global good, both for its extrinsic nature as a precondition to enjoying the others (there cannot be health or security in a climate catastrophe) and for its intrinsic connection with human rights, such as the right to food and water.

Two Blocs, Two Different Sensitivities: A Comparative Perspective

The peculiar and sui generis institutional organization of the European Union makes it a good observatory to address the impact of environment on contemporary international relations. Like other institutions, the EU has adopted its own definition of public good as something that “give advantages to society from the provision of certain utilities and from satisfying particular wants and needs such as the eradication of disease or the elimination of pollution”.Footnote 9 The EU “broadly” classified the public goods into five types: environment, health, knowledge, peace and security, and governance. The first item on this list, the emphasis on the environment, is consistent with the Union’s history. When it was introduced in 1972, the environmental program of the then European Community was one of first real transnational challenges for this institution, which at the time had no power or competence over any of the other policy fields aforementioned. This competence over the environment was further expanded in title VII of the 1987 Single European Act, which stated unequivocally that “action by the Community relating to the environment shall be based on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should be rectified at source as a priority, and that the polluter should pay”.Footnote 10

From this principle would stem important effects, including ad hoc cooperations with third countries and other relevant organizations sharing the same “ethical” objectives. Hence, Article 130.5 of the Treaty states that “Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the member states shall cooperate with third countries and with the relevant international organizations. The arrangements for Community co-operation may be the subject of agreements between the Community and the third parties concerned”.Footnote 11 The Single European Act created in this way a strong link between environment and foreign policy, in a time when the latter was at an early stage of development. In the following years, there was a progressive enlargement of the powers of the Community on environmental issues, which led to the establishment of a dedicated Agency in 1993.Footnote 12 Meanwhile, the institution gradually empowered with a specific capacity on this matter was the EU Commission, whose competence will be reaffirmed in the Treaty of Lisbon with reference to the EU climate policy.Footnote 13 However, the references of TFUE to foreign policy and cooperation with third parties – now comprehended in the title XX of the Treaty – were bequeathed from the Single European Act and thus remained unchanged.Footnote 14

Mercosur became operational in those same years. Similar to the European Community but dissimilar to the newborn EU, the organization was exclusively founded on a strong intergovernmental exclusively foundation, and the only body not directly controlled by the member states was the Comisión de Comercio, whose duties were more technical than political and centred on advisory and regulatory functions.Footnote 15 Theoretically, the Comisiòn was the organism dealing with third parties in case of external negotiations but always within the limits of its mandate, which was providing assistance to the supreme Council of the member states (Consejo del Mercado Común). Mercosur was entitled to the same exclusive competence in the field of commerce and trade regulation as the European Community, for which it represented its member states wholly and exclusively.Footnote 16

In the years that followed, the two organizations pursued divergent strategies. As the European Community evolved into the European Union, the European environmental policy was gradually improved. In this regard, the 2008 adoption of the EU climate and energy package and the commitment to the 20-20-20 targets by the Council of the European Union are significant milestones. The process resulted in the establishment of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Climate.Footnote 17 This heightened sensitivity had ramifications for EU foreign policy. During the same period, the EU sought to enhance its international stance, establishing its first-ever diplomatic service (European External Action Service (EEAS)) in 2011. The establishment of this diplomatic corps, overseen by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, did not result in a centralized control of all elements of the EU’s external relations. Important parts of foreign policy, like as development and trade, were instead delegated to the Commission, rather than the external service, which has traditionally held them. The EEAS was charged with high-level political representation for the Union as well as a comprehensive coordination function, which included ensuring that the EU’s diplomatic ties with third countries, member states’ foreign policies, and the Commission’s trade and development discussions were all coordinated.Footnote 18

Despite the seemingly Baroque settlement for the EU foreign action, divided between the Commission, the High Representative, and the member states themselves, Brussels has been trying to exercise its competences in this field in the most consistent way possible, fostering a strong bilateral and multilateral dialogue with nation-states and non-governmental entities but even more so with other twin regional organizations, such as the African Union and the Arab League. These collaborations bolstered the perception (and sometimes self-perception) of the EU as a player actively working to improve global governance.Footnote 19 The EU foreign policy had no preclusion of interlocutors (thus contemplating the possibility of union-to-state agreements) but should have prioritized the dialogue with third parties for specific goals that are highly associable with global common goods, such as the preservation of peace, economic growth, human rights, and preservation of global natural resources.Footnote 20

Mercosur was one of the EU’s natural allies in this endeavour for global shared goods, particularly the environment. Already in 1995, on the eve of the Mercosur’s establishment, the European Community signed a Framework Cooperation Agreement with Mercosur on the margins of the European Council in Madrid. Within the scope of the political understanding described by this framework, the two blocs conducted three environmental forums, one in Luxembourg in 1996, one in the Netherlands in 1997, and one in Panama in 1998.Footnote 21 As a result, the EU applauded Mercosur’s decision to reach a “Framework Agreement on Environment” in 2001 (which became effective in 2004). The agreement, which recalled the Rio Declaration of 1992, aimed primarily to unify the internal legislation of the signatory countries, so avoiding the establishment of carbon emission incentives/disincentives that would impede the common market.Footnote 22 In relation to international relations and fora, the 2001 agreement stated that “The States Parties shall cooperate in the fulfilment of the international environmental agreements…such cooperation may include, as appropriate, the adoption of common policies for the protection of the environment, the conservation of natural resources, the promotion of sustainable development, the issuance of joint communications on topics of common interest and the exchange of information on national positions in international environmental forums”.Footnote 23 On paper, the Framework Agreement was indeed a remarkable step forward as it allowed the organization to issue directives on environmental policy and discuss this topic in international negotiations. Yet, in the following years, such policies and initiatives were often found inadequate.Footnote 24

The EU-CELAC Action Plan

The EU adopted environmental provisions in its foreign relations with South America in 2003, when it signed a “Political and Cooperation Agreement” with the Andean Community, and in 2012, when the Commission negotiated an Association Agreement with Central America.Footnote 25 The same attention to environment, and specifically to deforestation and biodiversity, was devoted when the bilateral strategic partnership with Brazil and Mexico was established.Footnote 26 Between 2013 and 2015, the EU increased the ambitiousness of its regional cooperation by adopting the EU-CELAC Action Plan. According to this plan, to whose conception the EEAS greatly contributed, the cooperation between Brussels and the Latin America Countries (LAC) should have spanned across different policy areas, such as migration, scientific cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges.Footnote 27 The point n. 2 of the agreement mentioned sustainable development, environment, climate change, biodiversity, and energy as significant areas of cooperation.Footnote 28 In this context, the flagship cooperation program “Euroclima” has been identified as the EU’s most significant investment in Latin America.Footnote 29

The desire of both parties to include the environment as one of the key issues of discussion, however, must face a difficult reality. Today’s South American environmental agenda strives to deepen the link between development and ecosystem preservation, and the initiative is driven by individual nation-state measures and their compliance with their individual international pledges, such as Mexico’s INDS in 2015Footnote 30 and Chile’s carbon price.Footnote 31 Mercosur and the entire Latin American region continue to struggle to balance their natural tendency to export vital raw materials with the emergence of stricter national and international environmental regulations. In fact, environmental protection has frequently led to conflict between Mercosur members and other international actors. For instance, disputes have arisen over the use and management of transboundary rivers, such as the Amazon River and the Paraná River, which flow across multiple national borders and are sources of pure water and hydroelectric power.Footnote 32 Despite the good intentions enshrined in the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (OTCA) of 1978, deforestation of the Amazon Forest and the conversion of natural habitats into agricultural lands and pastures are a further source of diplomatic disputes and international criticism.Footnote 33

These issues emerged in the case of the EU-CELAC plan. One of the expected outcomes of action plan was the signature of a deal to boost the commercial exchanges between the two regions, and Mercosur was recognized as the most likely partner in these negotiations. The goods that Latin America would export included agricultural commodities such as soybeans, corn, and wheat, which are in high demand in Europe. But even more, the import would encompass natural resources and raw materials that the EU common market is angry for, such as copper, timber, iron, and lithium, a key component for renewable batteries and other high-tech products. The imports from Europe would be rather focused on chemicals, luxury items, medicines, and machinery. At first, the parties considered such a deal to be mutually beneficial. However, as the content of the agreement was being discussed, it became increasingly controversial for the disastrous environmental consequences it may have caused in Latin America. The root cause of this controversy lied in a moral hazard concerning the kind of commodities that Mercosur should have exported, which was seemingly a contradiction, since both organizations somehow recognized the environment as a “global common good” to be enjoyed by their member states and the international community alike.

Still, it was undeniable that the trade of these same commodities over the last years has been causing significative disruptions of the regional natural resources in Latin America (which accounts for 3% of the world’s forests, 31% of the world’s freshwater, and approximately 70% of the world’s species), and their further exploitation was likely to worsen the trend.Footnote 34 Agriculture and herding and in particular the production of beef and wheat are among the major causes of deforestation in Latin America, as they are frequently linked to wildfires set by criminals or greedy entrepreneurs, sometimes with the tacit approval of institutions.Footnote 35 Even more disruptive for the forests are the activities associated with timbering. In 2018, Latin America accounted for more than 10% of the world production of timber, and, although the EU has already been working substantially on sustainable lodging and forest management, Greenpeace contends that from the two biggest timber-producing regions of Brazil (Pará and Mato Grosso), more than half of the wood may come from illegal logging. As far as the extraction of raw materials is concerned, this is one of the most polluting activities known in the world today, even considering the unavoidable processing needed to rinse the metals and closely entangled with the extraction itself.Footnote 36

The situation appears particularly concerning for the industry of lithium, a valuable resource that requires an enormous amount of water to be properly plucked out from the soil. The presence of lithium in several arid lands in South America has already doomed local communities and produced huge contamination of flora and fauna.Footnote 37 Therefore, the conundrum that both blocs should have resolved before deepening negotiations was the trade-off between a profitable exchange of tangible goods (raw materials and agricultural commodities) and a nonprofitable exchange of intangible goods (fresh air and water). The EU was expected to take the major responsibility for this gap, being the actor more committed to environmental protection both domestically and internationally. In contrast with Mercosur, the Union built its own foreign policy identity on an ethic ground, portraying itself as a defender of global common goods in general and environment in particular. As a result, only in the last two decades, the Union was engaged in a “climate diplomacy” that resulted in significant deals struck with China (Bilateral Climate Change Agreement), Japan (Environmental Partnership), Canada (CETA environmental provisions), and other ambitious commitments such as the COP26.Footnote 38 Such impressive record was expected to translate in similar provisions for Latin America.

The EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement

Shortly before the signature of the draft agreement between the EU and Mercosur, the auspices were not good. In August 2019, the heads of Ireland and France threatened to veto the agreement if Brazil did not fulfil its environmental commitments. The same year, in a letter to the then EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, Finland suggested to ban imports of Brazilian beef and exclude this commodity from the contents’ deal.Footnote 39 The opposition of several environmental organizations in Europe was joined – in this case – by European associations of farmers who were rather afraid of possible repercussions over the price of meat. However, in the end, the European Union and Mercosur signed a first version on the terms initially foreseen, after two decades of long negotiations. The deal created one of the world’s largest free trade areas, covering over 780 million people and almost a third of the global economy. Some key points of the agreement included (1) tariff reductions/eliminations on a wide range of goods, including agricultural products, automobiles, and textiles; (2) improved access to each other’s service markets; (3) increased protection of geographical indications, intellectual property rights, and sustainable development; and (4) abolition of technical barriers to trade – e.g. sanitary.

The agreement outlined obligations and commitments of both parties in the areas of environmental protection, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable use of natural resources. The agreement also established a Joint Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development to monitor and review the implementation of these environmental provisions. In principle, the Agreement contains an explicit reference to a range of sustainable development goals to be achieved by both the EU and Mercosur countries.Footnote 40 As in the free agreements with Mexico and Japan, there was compelling attention to respect the present international environmental agreements and promote corporate social responsibility. Furthermore, the parties committed to not lower their current health or labour standards in order to attract trade and investments. In case of a breach, a dispute settlement procedure may be invoked by either party.Footnote 41 The agreement addressed directly some illicit activities, such as illegal trade in wildlife, (7.2c), illegal logging (8.2c), abusive fisheries, and protection of the marine environment (9.2). Yet, as its opposers underlined, the Agreement lacked of the necessary measures to legally enforce such provisions, excluding those generically ensuring the fulfilment of obligations in international Treaties.Footnote 42

As of 2024, the EU-Mercosur agreement has not been ratified by the European Parliament, and after years even the support of the member states is wavering.Footnote 43 Notwithstanding, in October 2022, the High Representative Borrell reaffirmed the commitment of the EU institutions to harbour the agreement and push for a fast ratification, going as far as to define 2023 the “Year of Europe in Latin America, and of Latin America in Europe”.Footnote 44 This statement preceded the January diplomatic trip of the German Chancellor Scholz in different Latin American countries.Footnote 45 From a strategic viewpoint, the European stance is perfectly understandable. Many European companies are engaged in infrastructure projects in many countries across the region and notably Uruguay. Furthermore, the European investments are growing everywhere, particularly in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile –three countries forming the so-called lithium triangle. These countries are increasingly important for the EU industry in a time marked by the post-COVID disruption of the Asian supply chain. Without the South American supply, the EU member states, already weakened by the energy crisis started after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, could never afford the energy transition lingering at the peak of the European political agenda nor invest in high technology.

Besides, with the victory of President Lula da Silva in Brazil, the transatlantic political dialogue improved, despite some occasional frictions that cast a shadow over the reliability of the newly elected Brazilian government on environmental issues.Footnote 46 The future of the EU-Mercosur agreement lies in the ability of the EU Commission to persuade the French government to change opinion about the feasibility of this deal. However, the diplomatic weapons at EU’s disposal to achieve this goal are limited, and even additional protocols to the existing agreements could induce the perception that the Union is undertaking an “environmental aggressive” course of action.Footnote 47 Considering the past experience relating to agreements with Latin America (Central America or the Andean Community), which have still not been fully ratified on the European side, the biggest challenge will be to find a compromise without upending the main points of the provisional text. Mercosur, for its part, is far from dormant, and some of its members appear ready to raise the stakes by proposing to China the same agreement that is being discussed with the EU.Footnote 48

The EU-Mercosur agreement is still pending. Commission Von der Leyen tried to resurrect the agreement and overcome the opposition of some member states and the concern of numerous civil society organizations by proposing a “EU-Mercosur sustainability instrument” to increase the environmental accountability of Latin American nations. However, the provisional text of the Commission, which presumably leaked in March 2023, listed a number of initiatives that anti-Mercosur activists deemed insufficient. Several EU member states and civil society organizations shared the same scepticism regarding the new instrument proposed by the Commission. Austria was the first EU member state to publish a critical annex highlighting the shortcomings of the proposal, particularly in regard to food safety and agricultural imports, before the Council of the European Union for agriculture convened on March 20 to discuss the impact of the agreement.Footnote 49 Yet, the Austrian delegation was not alone in raising the stakes at the meeting, as the hardliners were joined by more than ten EU ministers.Footnote 50 On the other side, it appears that today even the Mercosur countries might be reluctant to reopen the nearly finalized agreement and could reject this additional burden.Footnote 51

Conclusions

Climate is a transnational issue and currently one of the most important topics in international relations in the global age. Given its nature, which is not limited to national boundaries, it seems appropriate to approach it from the empirical perspective of regional organizations, taking into account the attention that every international and supranational institution is devoting to the subject. In this regard, it is telling that contemporary interregional politics (particularly when it pertains to the EU external relations) focuses on environmental sustainability as inextricably linked to development and trade, thereby utilizing a holistic approach. Regionally, this entanglement is plainly evident in the EU-CELAC Action Plan, wherein commerce, international issues, and ethical concerns are inextricably interwoven. In a comparative analysis between Europe and Latin America, this chapter compared the most solid (as of today) and mutually recognizing organizations operating in the two regions, namely, the EU and Mercosur. The two actors translate their pro-environment policy in a different manner, with similar aspirations but also many differences in the practical implementation of the respective agendas, owing in part to the two organizations’ distinct nature and legal bases. The EU addressed the issue of decarbonization and climate change in different fora and introduced specific provisions related to climate in its recent negotiations with Canada, Japan, and other regional blocs. By contrast, Mercosur appears to be less inclined, at least for the time being, to present climate protection as a precondition to advancing trade agreements. When the first EU-Mercosur trade deal was proposed in the early 2000s, the reaction of the European civil society community was obstructive. The preoccupation about a potential environmental hazard caused by increased pollution as a consequence of the deal slowed the negotiations until 2019, when the first round of negotiations finally ended and a draft was made public. Yet as of 2023, the provisional text is still waiting for approval from the European Parliament and the EU member states, who are voicing concerns on behalf of European businesses, citizens, and NGOs.

The role that environmental issues play in the EU-Mercosur relationship can be described as contradictory. On the one hand, the EU is trying to reconcile commercial and political interests with its aim to act as a normative power in global governance. The challenge is not limited to the EU-Mercosur agreement but also encompasses other interregional strategic partnerships that for expediency could not find room in the present research.Footnote 52 From a different standpoint, Mercosur and all the regions of the so-called Global South could see Europe’s efforts to ensure a binding enforcement of the clauses related to the environment as a foray into their domestic affairs and a not-acceptable attempt to bring in cheap materials and impose tighter environmental standards. The EU’s apparent moral superiority, which appears to distrust Latin America (though with some justification), and the insistence on mandatory environmental provisions to be included in the Mercosur agreement suggested to some scholars that the EU may try to act as a “climate imperialist” power with its partners.Footnote 53

There are different possible solutions to this conundrum. One that has been proposed is to monetize the trade of intangible goods and connect their value to the actual trade of tangible goods. The consequence would be a new market under the control of a third regulatory party that would interfere with the prices of the traded goods by swapping them with the pollution that their production has caused. Unfortunately, the difficulty in operationalizing such a market stems from a lack of information about the actual supply chain of the goods in question, which is frequently hidden or difficult to obtain from the source. Another possibility is to invest in a bottom-up approach, improving the social responsibility of business actors by rewarding those who can demonstrate the smallest carbon footprint. Allegedly, the implementation of these measures could not only unlock the EU-Mercosur deal but also improve the international standing of the two organizations, making them compliant with the moral responsibilities that global governance entails. But the fundamental point that needs to be addressed in this instance is the responsibility of these actors to preserve the so-called global common goods and thus focus on the “objects” of immaterial trade from the ethical assumption that these organizations should exercise a greater leadership than their same membership may suggest.Footnote 54 However, this assumption can be effective only as long as it is shared across the actors of the international relations, who should ultimately accept the consequences stemming from this moral premise.