Introduction

Climate change has long received attention from the scientific community, civil society, the private sector, governments, and international institutions, in local, regional, national, and international forums for discussions and deliberations. However, as this is a highly complex and transversal problem, climate change and its social, economic, and environmental consequences have not been the object of public policies for effective detection, elaboration, implementation, and evaluation.

In this context, several initiatives on the topic of climate change and its consequences have been adopted across the globe. The efforts of international society, although converging in several aspects, have revealed resistance from public and private interests of multiple dimensions and even difficulties in technical-scientific frameworks.

Thus, some international actors have stood out, in a more forceful way, to better understand and face the phenomenon of climate change and its effects. In this sense, the European Union (EU) has had a prominent role in the political, economic, social, and legal scenarios.

In the area of European Community law, the legal frameworks have been greatly improved to have repercussions both within the EU’s internal scope and in its external relations, especially with the other states with which it maintains closer political-economic relations and with international society.

The EU institutions and the governments of EU Member States have a full understanding of the history of socioeconomically and environmentally unsustainable policies implemented, for centuries, in Europe itself and in all continents where the European states had a colonial intervention. However, currently, the EU has already incorporated, as an unavoidable and irrevocable commitment, the perspective of the need to change the civilizational paradigm to embrace social, economic, and environmental sustainability as a vector principle of its local, regional, national, intra-community, and international relations.

From the observation already pointed out (the need to improve the legal frameworks for confronting climate change and its consequences), this chapter is driven by the following core problem: in the context of climate change and the development of European environmental public policies, what innovations stem from the European Green Deal and the European Climate Law?

In this sense, the chapter is developed under the dogmatic decisional theoretical framework of the so-called European Green Deal (EGD). The EGD is the guiding policy of the current European Commission (presented by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on December 11, 2019) which is expressed in a set of initiatives, strategies, and legislative acts that, as a whole, aims to achieve a just and sustainable society and the inclusive transformation of European society and economy (Fetting, 2020).

Considering the core problem and the theoretical framework already presented, the hypothesis that is intended to be verified in this work is (i) the potential effectiveness and impact of the EGD and (ii) the consequent European Climate Law inside the EU and in its international relations on issues of climate change and its effects in the near future.

Specifically, the chapter aims to show how European Union regulation can affect relations with third countries, within the framework of association agreements with Latin America and especially with Mercosur.

It is noted that the Union’s relationship with third countries or organizations demands a specific analysis of the regulatory impact regarding an agenda based on sustainable development, where the issue of climate change reaches a high level of priority. An example is the Action Plan (2015) resulting from the II EU-CELAC Summit that took place in June 2015,Footnote 1 which dealt with climate change, thus affecting EU relations with Latin America.

As a general objective, the work seeks to discuss some of the premises of the EGD as a guiding EU policy in achieving socioeconomic and environmentally sustainable development, especially in the context of climate change impacts. As specific objectives, the article aims to (i) analyze European initiatives on climate change from the normative context with a focus on the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and (ii) analyze the regulatory scope and the enforcement of the European policy on climate change.

The methodologies used in the research were analytical-conceptual and dogmatic-propositional, since the study intends to analyze political and legal issues of the EGD and the consequent developments in the European Climate Law. In its primary and secondary sources, the research was based on legal scholars’ writings, laws, case-law adjudication, and administrative acts and reports provided by EU institutions.

The chapter– in addition to the introduction, final considerations, and bibliographical references – was organized into three topics. The first topic addressed the legal framework on climate issues adopted by the EU from Maastricht in 2018, 2021 and 2023 regulations. The second part of the chapter was dedicated to the European Green Deal and the question of climate neutrality. The third topic focused on the European Climate Law and the enforcement of the EU climate regulatory system as well as its impact on third countries, notably on the Association Agreement with Mercosur.

European Union Initiatives on Climate Change: From Maastricht to the Treaty of Lisbon and Beyond

In the history of the EU, public policies and regulations on climate change began mainly after the Treaty of Maastricht, in the 1990s. However, from the 1980s onward, the so-called European Communities already showed concern about problems arising from the greenhouse effect.

There was a coincidence between the international and the European agendas on the issues related to climate concerns. Since the first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in 1990, and the Rio/1992 Conference (also known as the United Nations Conference for Environment and Development or the Earth Summit), that climate regulation started to gain importance with the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC/1994). Since then, the EU begins to establish the first actions aimed, in principle, at energy efficiency and the reduction of greenhouse effects. One of the main examples was the creation of the SAVE programFootnote 2 in 1991, whose objective was to facilitate and promote the implementation of energy efficiency policies and programs.

Previously, the statement by the Council of Ministers for Energy and Environment, on October 29, 1990, emphasized that “The European Community and Member States assume that other leading countries undertake commitments along [similar] lines and, acknowledging the targets identified by a number of Member States… are willing to take actions aiming at achieving stabilization of the total CO2 emissions by 2000 at 1990 level in the Community as a whole.” It turns out that already at that time, the Community was already demonstrating the intention of adapting to the internationally assumed commitments, albeit in a general and ambiguous way, as pointed out by Grubb (1995, p. 43): “This falls into the pattern of ‘constructively ambiguous’ declarations that mark many stages of the development of climate policy, most notably the Convention itself.”

From Maastricht onward, the EU took a more proactive stance in achieving the objectives set out in the UNFCC, setting goals for Member States, and recognizing the importance of adopting specific regulations so that such goals could be achieved. However, it was only in 2000, after the Kyoto Protocol, that the EU launched the European Program on Climate Change (ECCP/2000), whose main objective was to examine a wide range of sectors and instruments with the potential to reduce GHG emissions and develop common and coordinated strategies to meet Kyoto targets. It was within the framework of the ECCP that the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) was introduced, with national limits for emissions from the energy and industry sectors in each Member State, as well as proposals and communications relating, for example, to energy efficiency and the use of biofuels.

However, the discussions for the implementation of the targets established in Kyoto, which was incorporated by the EU in 2004,Footnote 3 aimed at reductions for the period from 2008 to 2012. Even then a decisive consensus was not reached on the main matters that would be the object of a global regulation that could encompass measures linked to the following pillars: energy, transport, agriculture, waste, and the reduction of GHGs, among other sectors and policies.

The 20–20-20Footnote 4 package was adopted in 2007 based on three main policies: (i) reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% in comparison to 1990 levels, (ii) a 20% share of renewable energies in final energy consumption (as well as a 10% target for renewable fuels), and (iii) 20% of savings on the projected EU final energy consumption in 2020.

In 2009, due to the failure of the COP in Copenhagen – for not specifying feasible goals to be met, in addition to the difficulties arising from the revision, at the time, of the Kyoto Protocol (McGregor, 2011) – the EU launched the “Climate and Energy” Package, which was structured into four policy reviews: (i) the revision of the 2003/87/EC DirectiveFootnote 5 on the community system for trading greenhouse gas emission allowances (ETS), (ii) the revision of Directive 2001/77/EC and (iii) Directive 2003/30/ECFootnote 6 concerning the use of energy from renewable sources, and (iv) the revision of the norms concerning the geological storage of carbon dioxide with the consolidation of all the instruments in a single legal document (Directive 2009/31/EC).

All these actions referred, to a greater or lesser extent, to the need to meet the targets established in Kyoto and renewed in the Paris AgreementFootnote 7 (2015) and in subsequent Conferences of the Parties (COPs). The measures also aimed to boost a level of environmental protection in the bottom to up sense, that is, to verify what would be the possible obstacles to achieving a higher level of protection from a dynamic that could intertwine with the achievement of sustainable development as an objective and value for the EU.

Thus, the EU’s climate policy must be understood as a set of essential public policies to achieve not only the international commitments assumed but also to consolidate itself as a global player that leads the world’s initiatives on climate change. This is the main objective established by the EU in the Treaty of LisbonFootnote 8 and also in the Framework Action ProgramsFootnote 9 that establish the environmental priorities that must be the object of attention by EU agents and institutions.

Both in the institutional and normative aspects, the consideration of sustainable development must be understood as a premise whose content necessarily leads to a level of protection consistent with an “expansive” perspective that encompasses transversality as an element capable of introducing environmental sustainability in planning and implementation of public policies, even those of a common and regional nature such as those adopted by the EU. Measures aimed at mitigating, reducing, and safeguarding against the effects caused by climate emergenciesFootnote 10 are political policies established by the EU in the Parliament European Resolution of 28 November, 2019, on the climate and environment emergency. The number (6) of Decision 2022/591/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (adopted on April 6, 2022) on a General Union Environment Action Program to 2030 recognizes that environmental integration (as provided for in Article 11 of the TFEU) is a concrete norm that can be invoked to obtain the “highest level of protection” in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions, given its inclusion in all EU programs and actions, as well as in the actions taken by Member States to comply with European standards.

This high level of protection also extends to the Union’s foreign relations, especially when it comes to negotiating and signing association agreements. The spill over beyond the borders of the Union has a direct impact on the perspective of establishing a legal framework that must also be observed by the Latin American countries that are negotiating agreements with the Union, as is the case of Mercosur.

The Action Plan resulting from the Summit held in 2015 expressly established that the states that make up the CELAC must be linked to international efforts, within the framework of the Paris Agreement, to meet the goals established therein.

A noteworthy issue is that the subsequent action plans related to the 2016, 2017, and 2021 Summits made brief mentions on climate change issues when compared to the 2015 Plan, since the subject was treated in a collateral way and with vague content.

This dual perspective (vertical/horizontal) demands a continuous effort so that the EU can effectively comply with the vast (and often ambiguous and generic) regulatory framework on climate change. In this way both in the institutional and normative aspects, the “high level” of protection is linked not only to the provisions of a legal nature that are adopted both in the regional framework but also individually by each Member State. And it is precisely in this last point lies the difficulty in establishing a coherent and systemic normative framework that is easy to apply by all participants. The very (falsely) dichotomous relationship between economic growth and environmental protection generates uncertainties regarding the observance of goals considered ambitious adopted by the EU, especially regarding climate neutrality, as will be analyzed in the next topic.

An analysis of regulatory instruments cannot be disconnected from the arguments and discourse that European institutions have been continually emphasizing since the 1990s. An example were the targets adopted in 2007 (20–20-20 as described) which were not fully achieved, as regards GHG that only 21 Member States reached their national target in 2020.Footnote 11 In addition, despite the positive target for the use of renewable energy (estimated at 21.3%), the transport sector did not achieve the expected reduction, as “the 10% target for renewable energy in the transport sector was achieved in 2020, although only by a very small margin of 0.1 percentage point” (EEA 2021). Therefore, between the global leadership position that the EU intends to have as a spokesperson and lever of potentially higher regulatory measures and the reality that the organization itself faces, there is a long way to go.

Green Deal and Climate Change: Ambitious Goals for an Uncertain Scenario

The European Green Deal – known as the Green Deal – expresses the direct result of initiatives previously consolidated within the scope of the EU which, in its historicity, has been unfolding in a trajectory based on the socioeconomic and environmentally sustainable development and integration. The enforcement of the Green Deal can be seen as an objective (Article 3 of the EU Treaty) but also as a value of the EU when sustainable development is considered a human right (Article 2 of the EU Treaty).

The discussion about a “greener Europe,” therefore, is not recent and is increasingly consolidated not only in the planning, execution, and control of EU sectoral policies but also in the actions of community institutions and the Member States themselves. It is about establishing, in an increasingly deeper and continuous way, the pillars of socioeconomic and environmentally sustainable development based on concrete actions, delimited by normative frameworks capable of achieving this objective, as seen above.

In the Communication from the Commission entitled The European Green Deal,Footnote 12 there is a summary of all the aspects that were analyzed so that the Deal can really combine with the actions carried out and those in progress, seeking to create a unique space for decision-making always anchored in the premise of socioeconomic and environmental sustainability.

As the initial document that led to the creation of the Deal, the referred Communication presented important questions for the establishment of the main subjects of the Green Deal, with special mention to climate neutrality and, consequently, to climate change.

In this new political-legal context, the EU has developed several strategies and regulations that, although not directly related to greenhouse gas emission limits, influence issues related to climate change, such as energy policy and the use of renewable energies, within the framework of the 20–20-20 commitment.

Another important document adopted by the EU related to climate change is the Report called “2030 Framework for climate and energy policies”.Footnote 13 The Report gave rise to the communication entitled “A strategic framework on climate and energy for the period 2020-2030,” in which the Commission proposed a forward-looking strategy to be applied until 2050, in line with the “Roadmap” prepared to project until 2050, which seeks to reconcile socioeconomic growth with objectives related to coping with climate change and its consequences.

Likewise, in the Communication of 2014,Footnote 14 the Commission presents relevant data in which the progress made in this matter can be verified, highlighting the index achieved in the emission of greenhouse gases and the use of renewable energies.

Furthermore, as an integral part of the EU’s path toward climate neutrality, mention should be made of the Commission CommunicationFootnote 15 adopted in 2018 entitled “A Clean Planet for All – EU Long-term Strategy for a prosperous, modern, competitive and sustainable economy with a neutral impact on the climate.” The document points out several guidelines that must be adopted in the process of transition to a circular and sustainable economy and with the purpose of reaffirming the commitments assumed by EU in relation to the Kyoto goals and the Sustainable Development Goals (ODSs). This document shows the combination of efforts aimed at combining both the international agenda and the goals previously set by the EU, as mentioned above.

The transition to an economy guided by climate neutrality should encompass everything from the agricultural, extractive, industrial, and service sectors to the involvement and actions of civil society. The reconfiguration of socioeconomic activities will have as a parameter the performance of activities that can adapt to the new reality proposed by community institutions.

It is from the macro-conjunctural perspective that the European Green Deal was conceived and elaborated, that is, to encompass different themes focused on sustainability in its broad conception. These include aspects related to climate neutrality as a central point of the Deal. On December 11, 2019, the Commission presented “The European Green Deal” aimed at creating a roadmap to promote the transition to a circular economy based on climate neutrality, i.e., as follows:

The European Green Deal (in the following: EGD) has been developed before the economic corona pandemic to “put Europe on a pathway to a sustainable future, while leaving no one behind.” The objective of the EGD is to place Europe on the trajectory of a climate neutral, circular economic system. Aspects of a fair distribution of profits and burdens play a special role, which is also made clear by the reference to an “inclusive approach” of the EGD. The focus of the EGD is thus on measures that strengthen the importance of environmental and climate protection for the innovative and economic power of the EU and its Member States on the way to climate neutrality (Hainsch et al., 2020, p. 1).

Specifically, regarding climate issues, the Deal mentions both the measures that were adopted with the consequent results, as well as proposes a change in the regulatory framework related to the climate that [...] will adopt a new EU climate change adaptation strategy, more ambitious than the current one. This is an essential measure as, despite mitigation efforts, climate change will continue to create significant pressure in Europe. It is essential to redouble efforts in terms of coping capacity, resistance, prevention, and preparation in the face of climate change. Work to adapt to climate change must continue to influence public and private investment, including in nature-based solutions. It will be important to ensure that, across the EU, investors, insurers, businesses, cities, and citizens are able to access data and create tools to integrate climate change into their risk management practices (COMISSION, 2019, p. 10).

In this sense, the proposal to revise Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 – European Climate Law – in March 2020, emerged as an ambitious plan that seeks to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions in the integrated space by 2050. In addition, the proposed revision of the Regulation reinforced the parameters for achieving this goal, including, in several of its provisions, the participation of civil society, green governance, and the actions that must be taken by the Commission and other institutions so that neutrality can be achieved. This proposal was approved in the form of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 on June 30, 2021.Footnote 16

It was after the Green Deal, therefore, that the EU increased actions aimed at achieving climate neutrality on the same bases that had already been established in the European Climate Law, in addition to proposing a review of net-zeroing GHGs by 2050. Even though quite extensive, that regulatory framework was significantly changed, including the new goals to be discussed in the next topic of this work.

However, one cannot fail to mention the impact that the EGD generated on the European normative and institutional policies, since all actions are focused on fulfilling the objectives that were outlined in the EGD, in addition to the emergence, albeit indirectly, of new initiatives seeking to streamline the European action regarding climate change or as expressed by the European Parliament, climate emergencies.

It is expected that the multidimensional actions adopted by the EU at the local, national, regional, and international levels are in line with efforts to make climate neutrality not only a European objective but also a global one. Yet, according to the European Parliament, the EGD and its correlation with the climate issues must be “legally binding EU commitment to climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest will be a powerful tool to mobilize the necessary societal, political, economic and technological forces for the transition; strongly underlines that the transition is a shared effort of all Member States, and that every Member State must contribute to implementing climate neutrality in the EU by 2050 at the latest” (European Parliament 2021).Footnote 17

Despite the efforts made by the EU to achieve ambitious targets for the reduction of GHGs and the effective conversion of the energy matrix, the reduction of waste and the adoption of low-carbon measures have still not been possible to achieve relevant rates for combating climate emergencies. One of the reinforcements for achieving the climate neutrality goal that emerged from the EGD was precisely the revision of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, whose review of the climate goals will be analyzed in the next topic.

The Revision of the European Climate Law and the Enforcement of the Climate Change Policy

The EU’s actions on climate change built over time led to a more effective and rigid posture from the adoption of Regulation 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council on December 11, 2018. The Governance of the Union on Energy and Climate Action, also known as the European Climate Law, became a legal framework that aims precisely to meet the EU’s goals for 2030 (subsequently revised in 2021) and to apply the measures set out in the 2015 Paris Agreement.

This law was a direct result of several initiatives previously established by the EU, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 EU regulations and directives regarding climate change policies
Full size table

It should be noted that the previous acts provided for measures related to energy policy issues, as well as regulatory aspects regarding the exploration of hydrocarbons, natural gas, diesel, etc. into climate neutrality itself. The establishment of specific commitments for the reduction of GHG emissions was given by Decision n. 406/2009/EC which provides in its Article 1 the “minimum contribution of each Member State toward the fulfillment of the Community’s commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions over the period 2013 to 2020 in respect of greenhouse gas emissions covered by this Decision and the rules on how to make such contributions and the respective evaluation.” This act, in its Annex II, determined the emission limits of greenhouse gases with a fixed percentage for each Member State in relation to the respective emissions in the year 2005. Annual appropriations, in turn, were contemplated in Commission Decision 2013/162/EU, on March 26, 2013, which established progressive limits until 2020, as seen in Table 2.

Table 2 EU regulations and directives regarding energy and greenhouse gas emissions
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In the following years, revisions and expansions of such limits were carried out, to comply with the European Climate Strategy and the internationally assumed commitments, as described above. However, the 2018 Regulation established binding measures for Member States in terms of controlling the emission of greenhouse gases by establishing a governance mechanism and climate agreement based on five dimensions (Article 1.2): (a) Energy security, (b) Internal energy market, (c) Energy efficiency, (d) Decarbonization, and (e) Research, innovation, and competitiveness.

For each of these dimensions, specific obligations were created that refer, to a greater or lesser extent, to the quantification of the national contributions that must be achieved by the year 2050 for climate neutrality and by 2030 for renewable energy sourcesFootnote 18 and energy efficiency in the internal market.Footnote 19

In the revision of the European Climate Law in 2021 by the Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, the goal of climate neutrality was adopted. It should be achieved by 2050, seeking to zero the net balance of emissions. In addition, the previous target for the internal reduction of net GHG emissions forecast for 2030 increased from 30% to 55%, considering 1990 levels, in accordance with Article 4.1 of a neutral low-carbon system, which is perfectly consistent with the EGD.

It was specifically regarding decarbonization that there was a significant change since national contributions should follow the Regulation (EU) 2018/842. The objective was to achieve a 30% reduction in the respective greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, compared to 2005 levels, for the sectors of energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, and waste, based on a monitoring system that had previously been established by Regulation (EU) n. 525/2013, in addition to compliance with Regulation (EU) 2018/841, which created specific rules for activities related to land use and forests.

Specifically for sectors covered by Regulation (EU) 2018/842, the target was revised in April 2023 by Regulation (EU) 2023/857.Footnote 20 The main objective is to stipulate the progressive reduction of GHG emissions until they reach 40% in 2030, compared to 2005 levels, always aiming for a global average of 55% as set out in the 2021 Regulation.

Regulation (EU) 2023/857 establishes new national limits for each Member State, with a percentage fixed in its Annex I. It should be noted that this Regulation revised the national reduction targets that had been established in 2018, with more ambitious limits than those previously set for reducing GHG emissions. As an example, Portugal went from a percentage of −17% to −28.7%; Denmark went from −39% to −50%, as well as Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Luxembourg.

The annual appropriations must be provided by the European Commission through the adoption of an implementing act, in accordance with the linear trajectories established in Article 1.2 of Regulation (EU) 2023/857 according to a specific time frame. So, 2005 will be taken as the base year for all the effects but following the data from the national inventories from 2016 to 2018 to be applied for the calculations relating to 2021 to 2025 and, subsequently, for the calculations from 2026 to 2030. The most recent data from the national inventories will be used for the years 2021, 2022, and 2023. Therefore, the EU is concerned about establishing more effective parameters to limit what the allocations of each Member State will be, based on the information provided by the respective states according to Article 26 of the Regulation (EU) 2018/1999.

Article 26 of the 2018 Regulation was also amended by the 2023 Regulation. It establishes the obligation for Member States to submit, by January 15 of each year, the preliminary data of the GHG inventory and, by March 15 of each year, starting in 2023, the final data of the GHG inventory, following the provisions contained in the Annex V of the 2018 Regulation.

In short, there is a significant regulatory effort by the EU to achieve the goals that have been established and to obtain a commitment from Member States. However, some considerations should be made about the vast body of legislation that structures the European climate strategy:

  1. 1.

    Detailed regulation applied only to certain sectors: as mentioned in the preliminary provisions of the 2023 Regulation (point 11), “in certain sectors, greenhouse gas emissions have increased or remained stable.” In the same vein, the Communication from the Commission on September 17, 2020, when specifying that “achieving climate neutrality requires significantly intensifying EU action in all sectors” (European Commission, 2020), in addition to highlighting that “Achieving a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions will require measures in all sectors” (European Commission, 2020). The transition to a decarbonized economy will cause adjustments in all economic and productive sectors, in addition to demanding a significant financial contribution so that one can speak of a total conversion to climate neutrality. The most affected sectors according to the 2020 communication are energy, industry (notably the use of fossil fuels), transport, agriculture, and civil construction. The point-to-point regulation of each of them must always consider the targets already established by the 2021 and 2023 Regulations.

  2. 2.

    Difficulty in complying with the regulatory system: despite the recognition of the asymmetries in each sector and state and considering the singularities existing within the scope of the 27 Member States, the flexibility of adjustments still demands greater attention from the EU institutions to avoid noncompliance with the targets, as well as does not alter the initial climate “reduction” schedule. The 2018 Regulation already provides for flexibility instruments aimed precisely at enhancing and streamlining compliance with neutrality targets.

  3. 3.

    Impact of regulation on third countries: in this regard, the importance of EU measures on relations with third countries should be highlighted, notably within the scope of strategic association agreements, as is the case with Mercosur. In the Mercosur-EU Agreement, there is a chapter called “Trade and sustainable development” where the main measures to be observed by the Parties are established. The chapter has 18 articles, ranging from basic aspects such as the recognition of the main international instruments that should guide the entire decision-making process related to the Agreement to dispute settlement mechanisms that will be applied when it comes to sustainable development. In this perspective, Article 2 represents the core of the chapter by establishing rights and obligations that must be observed by the Parties regarding the level of protection and domestic regulation, embodying a normative provision of mandatory compliance. The use of terms of mandatory and non-optional observance results in hard law under this article, as those terms are used from a sense of command and not mere liberality. As an example, Article 2.2 establishes “The Party should not weaken the levels of protection afforded in domestic environmental or labor law with the intention of encouraging trade or investment.” There is no doubt that this is a clause whose content is not merely dissuasive but mandatory. It is not, therefore, an “umbrella” agreement clause since, upon entering into force, it assumes the observance of all the chapters contained in the Agreement, even if there is no express mention of possible punishments derived from its noncompliance. There are no empty words that can be awarded as an inherent part of an agreement of such magnitude (Mata Diz, 2021).

Regarding climate change, as well as the necessary neutrality to mitigate the negative effects it brings, Article 6 specifically mentions the recognition by the Parties of the importance of complying with the goals and devices set by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. Therefore, the Parties must adopt measures to promote the reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases and to mitigate the effects derived from climate change.

Besides that, according to Article 6(2)(a) TSD chapter, the Parties shall effectively implement the UNFCC and the Paris Agreement. Consistent with Article 2 PA, Parties shall promote the positive contribution of trade toward low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development and to increase the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change in a manner that does not threaten food production (Article 6 (2)(b) TSD chapter). Thus, a direct link to the agricultural sector is established (Heyl et al., 2021, p. 6).

This is a central aspect that must be considered when addressing the issue of climate neutrality and relations with third countries. If the EU intends to adopt global leadership on the issue of climate change, it must undoubtedly adopt a vanguard posture, effectively applying the goals set by it and managing to minimize the effects generated by GHG emissions in its own integrated space.

In addition, relations with other states within the framework of CELAC should also adhere to the regulatory impact adopted by the EU, whether in cooperation agreements under negotiation or even in association agreements already signed. The content of the action plans leaves no room for doubt that the theme is part of the bi-regional agenda. However, efforts to comply with international regulations have not yet been sufficient to achieve the goals established in the Paris Agreement. There is an urgent need for convergence in regulation so that consensus on such goals can be reached.

Conclusions

The quest for climate neutrality represents a permanent challenge that is difficult to solve, as it demands the adoption of suitable tools that can establish a global and general framework, as it is considered an emerging problem that affects the entire international society. In this context, states must make joint efforts to implement regulations that will minimize the effects caused by climate change, seeking to preserve existing resources for present and future generations.

The EU is a leader in proposing mechanisms that provide a fair, efficient transition that encompasses all productive sectors, especially those with the greatest impact on GHG emissions. The regulatory body of the Union has been developed over time, resulting in the adoption of normative acts that, to a greater or lesser extent, aim to implement sustainable systemic transversality in all policies, programs, and actions to meet regional goals and international commitments both by the EU itself and by the Member States.

The measures adopted by the EU range from the establishment of national limits for the reduction of GHG emissions, such as the most ambitious goal of zeroing the net balance of emissions by the year 2050, having also revised the goal adopted in Regulation 2018/1999 to reduce the general limit at the European level from 30% to 55% after the revision of the European Climate Law with the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2021/111. National limits were also revised by Regulation (EU) 2023/857 with higher percentages that can reach 50% for some of the Member States.

The impact of the measures adopted by the EU falls not only on the Member States but also on its relations with third countries based on the objectives and values of the EU, among which, sustainable development and, consequently, the norms related to climate change. In the specific case of the agreement with Mercosur, the specific chapter dealing with the issue of sustainability mentions the issue of climate change, committing both Parties to apply a high level of environmental protection that includes climate change.

Within the framework of CELAC, the Summits mention the issues of climate changes through the action plans. However, they do not reach a definitive consensus on what would be the necessary measures for the fulfillment of international and regional commitments. In addition, EU regulation with stricter parameters than those established by the CELAC countries demands an in-depth analysis within the framework of bi-regional relations, especially when it comes to negotiating and signing bi-regional agreements, as is the case with Mercosur.

Faced with a scenario of economic and political crisis, generated not only by the pandemic but also by the effects of the conflict involving Ukraine and Russia – the main supplier of gas to Europe – the decrease in the use of fossil fuels has destabilized the efforts made so far. The strategic association developed with third countries and economic blocs, including Mercosur, provides for sustainable development in the so-called extra-commercial agenda. Thus, the Parties will be required to observe stricter norms for the conversion and greening of economic sectors. This will therefore be a crucial point in the implementation of the agreements signed by the European Union and Mercosur, as it is recognized that policies aimed at climate neutrality will be even greater in the coming decades.