Abstract
We consider prophet inequalities under downward-closed constraints. In this problem, a decision-maker makes immediate and irrevocable choices on arriving elements, subject to constraints. Traditionally, performance is compared to the expected offline optimum, called the Ratio of Expectations (\(\textsf {RoE} \)). However, \(\textsf {RoE} \) has limitations as it only guarantees the average performance compared to the optimum, and might perform poorly against the realized ex-post optimal value. We study an alternative performance measure, the Expected Ratio (\(\textsf {EoR} \)), namely the expectation of the ratio between algorithm’s and prophet’s value. \(\textsf {EoR} \) offers robust guarantees, e.g., a constant \(\textsf {EoR} \) implies achieving a constant fraction of the offline optimum with constant probability. For the special case of single-choice problems the \(\textsf {EoR} \) coincides with the well-studied notion of probability of selecting the maximum. However, the \(\textsf {EoR} \) naturally generalizes the probability of selecting the maximum for combinatorial constraints, which are the main focus of this paper. Specifically, we establish two reductions: for every constraint, \(\textsf {RoE} \) and the \(\textsf {EoR} \) are at most a constant factor apart. Additionally, we show that the \(\textsf {EoR} \) is a stronger benchmark than the \(\textsf {RoE} \) in that, for every instance (constraint and distribution), the \(\textsf {RoE} \) is at least a constant fraction of the \(\textsf {EoR} \), but not vice versa. Both these reductions imply a wealth of \(\textsf {EoR} \) results in multiple settings where \(\textsf {RoE} \) results are known.
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Notes
- 1.
We assume that there are no point masses for simplicity of presentation. All of our theorems can be adjusted to the case where there are point masses.
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Acknowledgements
Partially supported by the ERC Advanced Grant 788893 AMDROMA “Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Research in Online Markets” and MIUR PRIN project ALGADIMAR “Algorithms, Games, and Digital Markets”, FAIR (Future Artificial Intelligence Research) project, funded by the NextGenerationEU program within the PNRR-PE-AI scheme (M4C2, investment 1.3, line on Artificial Intelligence). The last author further acknowledges the support of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation with funds from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) - Projektnummer 277991500, the COST Action CA16228 “European Network for Game Theory” (GAMENET), and ANID, Chile, grant ACT210005. Most of this work was done while the author was at TU Munich and Universidad de Chile. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem. Tomer Ezra was also supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. DMS-1928930 and by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation under grant G-2021-16778, while the author was in residence at the Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (formerly MSRI) in Berkeley, California, during the Fall 2023 semester.
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Ezra, T., Leonardi, S., Reiffenhäuser, R., Russo, M., Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, A. (2024). Prophet Inequalities via the Expected Competitive Ratio. In: Garg, J., Klimm, M., Kong, Y. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14413. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_16
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